Show Summary Details

Page of

 PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, COMMUNICATION (oxfordre.com/communication). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).

Subscriber: null; date: 20 January 2019

Disruption Information Seeking and Processing Model Applied to Health and Risk Messaging

Summary and Keywords

The disruption information seeking and processing (DISP) model is a variation on the risk information seeking and processing (RISP) model. While both the DISP and the original RISP models seek to predict how individuals will search for and attend to information in response to a perceived hazard, DISP aims to broaden analysts’ view of the sorts of information individuals may seek in such situations. It does so by expanding the repertoire of social psychology theory on which the model is constructed to include ideas from the literatures on sensemaking and identity maintenance.

A major argument of DISP is that on many occasions the information that people seek in response to a risk will not be directly related to the risk itself. For example, if you hear a news bulletin on an outbreak of food poisoning associated with ground beef, the next thing you look for may not be information on the risks of E. Coli, but a recipe for chicken. While the observation that people seek non-risk-related information in response to risks is a broad one, the DISP concerns itself with one particularly important aspect of this idea.

Specifically, based on research in the sensemaking and identity maintenance traditions, the DISP model proposes that, for information seekers, the self and the various identities in which individuals are personally invested are often as much the objects in need of interpretation as the hazardous environment. The implication of this is that when faced with a risk, individuals are likely to pay attention not just to information on the risk itself (the sort of information prioritized by RISP), but on the identities impacted by the hazard—for example, how a person’s acceptance of or strategy for coping with the risk might affect her self-image as being a good parent, a conscientious employer, etc.

The DISP also proposes that some hazard situations are likely to be more disruptive to individuals’ sense of self than others—namely instances where the individual has a high vested interest in a particular identity that is challenged by the hazard combined with a low sense of self-efficacy with respect to remediating the hazard. A typical example would be a parent who prides herself on keeping her kids safe, who finds out about an environmental risk to children in her neighborhood, but who cannot afford to move.

According to the DISP model, in such a circumstance the individual would likely become more attuned to information about the countervailing positive aspects of the neighborhood, such as good schools or a low crime rate. These sorts of information, which do not pertain to the risk directly, but are nonetheless sought as a consequence of the risk, exemplify the manner in which DISP seeks to expand the focus of the original RISP model. In the parlance of DISP, the model adds a “self-relevant” information dimension to RISP’s original focus on “risk-relevant” information.

Finally, the DISP model proposes the notion of “norm trumping,” suggesting that individuals experiencing disruption in the face of a hazard—who run afoul of the set of social norms associated with an identity in which they are highly invested—are likely to pay particular attention to self-relevant information that emphasizes alternative sets of norms that help to preserve or reconstitute a desired sense of self.

This model has yet to be tested empirically.

Keywords: disruption, sensemaking, information seeking, information processing, norm trumping, identity maintenance, self efficacy, vested interest

Basis in RISP

Any account of the disruption information seeking and processing (DISP) model appropriately begins with the risk information seeking and processing (RISP) model on which DISP is closely based. Readers wishing for a full account of RISP should turn to the dedicated entry on the topic. However, a few words on RISP are warranted here insofar as they lay out the basis for DISP and what it seeks to accomplish in relation to the original RISP model.

The risk information seeking and processing (RISP) model, developed by Griffin, Neuwirth, Dunwoody, and Giese (Griffin, Dunwoody, & Neuwirth, 1999; Griffin, Neuwirth, Dunwoody, & Giese, 2004; Griffin, Neuwirth, Giese, & Dunwoody, 2002) uses a variety of concepts from social psychology to predict the conditions under which people will seek out information about hazards in their environment, as well as how they are likely to process risk information they find, whether they come across it as the result of intense personal investigation or simply encounter it in the course of their everyday routines.

As with other behavioral models used in risk communication, RISP is a useful tool in the planning and management of public health and safety campaigns. It allows risk communicators to better forecast which audiences might be responsive to messages aimed at changing risk behaviors, as well as the channels and sorts of messaging that are most likely to be effective in informing and persuading those audiences.

RISP is also intended as an audience-listening model, in that an express aim of the framework is to determine the public’s own self-perceived desire for information relating to a risk—a strategy that can be contrasted with models and campaign strategies that start with expert assertions about what the public should know about a risk, rather than what it wants to know.

It is in this last capacity—RISP’s role as an audience-listening model—that DISP seeks to augment the framework on which it is based.

The Self and the Environment: DISP’s Three Propositions

While RISP indeed seeks to predict the public’s desire for information in response to a risk—and in doing so takes an important step as a corrective to the tendency in risk communication to privilege expert authority over public autonomy—the model is still limited in its utility as an audience-listening framework in at least one important way. Namely, RISP’s view of the public’s desire for information in response to a hazard is largely confined to its desire for the sorts of information deemed relevant by experts.

A major claim of DISP is that on many occasions the information that people seek in response to a risk will not be directly related to the risk itself. For example, if you hear a news bulletin on an outbreak of food poisoning associated with ground beef, the next thing you look for may not be information on the risks of E. Coli, but a recipe for chicken. While the observation that people seek non-risk-related information in response to risks is a broad one, the DISP concerns itself with one particularly important scenario in which this seems likely to occur: “narrative disruption.”

In DISP, disruption and its importance to information seeking and processing are explained by way of three propositions:

Proposition 1: The self is as much an object in need of (re-)interpretation as is the risky environment.

Weick (1995), Dervin (1989), and a variety of other scholars in the sensemaking tradition of communication research highlight the interplay between the external environment and our individual sense of self. In other words, as individuals we’re not simply imbued with some pre-existing and static set of personal characteristics that together form the lens through which we evaluate the world around us. Rather, we are also constantly engaging in introspection, crafting our identities, and evaluating and re-evaluating our own sense of ourselves based on events in our environment.

Weick (1995), in describing this recursive interaction between individuals’ assessment of the environment and the self, says that the task of interpretation “flows just as often from the situation to a definition of self as it does the other way” (p. 20). Other social science traditions support—or are at least compatible with—this claim. Weick (1995), for example, notes that Festinger’s (1957) concept of cognitive dissonance and its various tributary constructs involve adjustments of self-concept in response to the environment. The self-environment relationship described by Weick (1995) is also compatible with defensive and impression-management motivations for information seeking and processing that appear in the heuristic–systematic model.

DISP proposes that risk events and environmental hazards can often be instigators in the process of self-(re)interpretation, testing our mettle and even, at times, challenging our ability to live up to social roles and obligations in which we’re highly invested. This process of self-interpretation and self-evaluation can involve information seeking and processing as we look to the environment for information that helps us to reflect on our lives and act in accordance with the identities we wish to project to others.

Proposition 2: Reinterpretation of the self occurs in response to the disruption of one’s culturally and socially constructed sense of identity, and risk information can disrupt one’s sense of identity.

A range of research traditions in the social sciences—particularly those concerned with cultural identity and sensemaking—“argue that we make sense of our lives and our world through socially constructed narratives that tie together the events of our past and set up our expectations for the future” (Braun & Niederdeppe, 2012, p. 145). The narratives on which individuals draw to make sense of their lives include broad societal-level normative assumptions as to what constitutes a typical “life course” within a given culture—for example, the manner in which people in a particular society are expected to progress from childhood to adolescence to a sequence of acceptable adult roles (Becker, 1997).

And, as Charlotte Linde (1993) notes, sensemaking narratives can also be more interpersonal in nature, having to do with stories about the lives we’ve lived—and hope to live—that we tell to family and close friends, and which they reflect back to us in conversation. For example, a student may invest a good deal of her sense of identity in a story about the hard work and sacrifices she has made to get into college. Such narratives are very much social in nature: Elements of the story may originate with or be reinforced by parents and friends, and the same will be true with the projection of the story forward—the bright future and successful career ahead. Even mundane interactions with significant others serve to co-create and strengthen sensemaking narratives (e.g., “I’m so proud of you for giving up your weekend to study for the exam,” or “You’ll be glad you took that class when you’re in college.”).

Whether the normative assumptions of particular narratives stem from broad cultural expectations, our unique ensemble of interpersonal relationships, or both, narrative scholars agree that they are essential elements of our sense of personal identity. We use stories to make sense of our lives, others use stories to convey their expectations of us, and the sense of self that results is full of normative expectations in which we become deeply invested.

Of course, these narratives can be taxed considerably by events in the world. The “college bound” narrative may be challenged, for example, when a student receives a poor grade on a test or gets a rejection letter from a first-choice school. Typically such instances may simply be received by an individual and the people in her life as obstacles to be overcome. Adversity is an element of any compelling story and may, in the long term, simply serve to strengthen one’s sense of identity and the normative assumptions invested in it.

But there are times when events in the world can throw up insurmountable obstacles. When this happens, the projected future set up by the narrative arc in which we are invested becomes—often quite suddenly—unavailable to us. This sort of narrative disruption can, in turn, severely disrupt a person’s sense of self. “Disruption,” in fact, is anthropologist Gay Becker’s (1997) term for what happens when events intervene this severely in an individual’s expected life course, causing her to run afoul of the normative expectations in which she is highly invested.

The events described by researchers that lead to disruption of this degree are typically highly traumatic ones, such as being diagnosed with a debilitating or terminal illness (Frank, 1995; Kleinman, 1988), discovering one is infertile (e.g., Becker, 2000), or being forcibly displaced from one’s homeland (e.g., Becker, 1997). It’s worth noting, however, that some scholars in this literature also describe less severe forms of disruption, which occur not in response to the major narratives that frame the core of our socially constructed identities, but with regard to our expectations of far less remarkable elements of our lives.

The construction of narratives is essentially the process of fitting facts together into stories/chains of causal events. If narrative construction is a central way in which we process information about our environment—or, as some scholars assert, our only method of doing so—then it stands to reason that tiny violations of our expectations about the world may require us to adjust the stories we’re using to make sense of things.

Upon discovering that a soda you drank in the evening was caffeinated when you thought otherwise, you may reappraise how long it’s going to take you to fall asleep. This changes the narrative arc of your evening, and in this sense we might think of such an example as an instance of narrative disruption. Of course, the sort of mental reappraisal of past and future events involved in a mundane example like this seems like it may be different than the sort of disruption described by scholars studying dramatic examples like terminal illness or forced migration.

Whether such a difference is in degree or in kind is an important empirical question. The DISP model focuses on the dramatic form of disruption without foreclosing the possibility that more mundane instances of disruption may also play important roles in information seeking and processing.

In keeping with this focus, the disruption information seeking and processing model takes its name from Becker’s (1997) term, though it should be noted that many other words and phrases for the same phenomenon exist within the literature on narrative and sensemaking (see “Historiography” below).

A major claim of DISP is that environmental hazards can cause severe narrative disruption. A typical example would be a parent who prides herself on keeping her kids safe—an aspect of identity she projects to friends and family—who finds out about an environmental risk to children in her neighborhood, but who cannot afford to move.

According to the DISP model, in such a circumstance the individual might well become more attuned to information about the countervailing positive aspects of her neighborhood, such as good schools or a low crime rate—information that helps to repair or reconstitute her sense of herself as a parent whose choices are good for her kids’ wellbeing. These sorts of information, which do not pertain to the risk directly, but are nonetheless sought as a consequence of the risk, exemplify the manner in which DISP seeks to expand the focus of the original RISP model from an exclusive focus on information narrowly related to the risk itself to a broader array of information relevant to maintaining the narratively constructed identities and social roles of affected individuals.

Proposition 3: Individuals respond to (at least) extreme cases of disruption through a process of norm trumping.

When severe disruption occurs, individuals can no longer pursue the trajectory of the narrative arc in which they and their social circle are highly invested. For instance, in Becker’s (2000) research on infertility patients, a typical example involves people who have pursued infertility treatments only to ultimately discover that they cannot conceive a child. This may be because their physiology is not amenable to treatment, because they cannot afford continued treatment, or because continued treatment is too psychologically daunting or damaging to their relationships.

In such cases, the affected individuals run afoul of a set of norms in which they themselves are highly invested. These norms have to do with both societal-level narratives—the cultural expectation that people will pursue a normative “life course,” wherein they will become parents at a certain age—as well as with the interpersonal narratives they have constructed among themselves with significant others, friends, and family.

Individuals who experience this foreclosure of the future toward which they’d been working—in this case a narrative in which they’d envisioned themselves as doting parents of biologically related children—are faced with the need to stitch together the facts of their lives and personal histories into new narratives that will take precedence over the old narrative, which no longer seems to lead to a possible future and can thus no longer be a story by which they order their existence.

Research by Becker and others suggests the new narratives these individuals construct will typically accomplish this by focusing on how the options still available to them embody norms that are also valued in their culture and social circle. These norms can be generatively played off of the ones the person has breached as a result of the disruption in her life. The couple that decides to stop infertility treatment, for instance, may construct a new narrative in which they decided that it was more important to have a loving family than a biologically related one. Or they might construct a new narrative in which they decided that, in the face of the tension brought about by treatment, it was more important to preserve a loving marriage than to continue trying to have a child. One of these narratives helps the couple to pursue adoption, the other to live child-free. Both provide a new structuring narrative for the affected people’s lives in which a new set of norms are prioritized over the ones to which the couple can no longer adhere.

DISP refers to this as norm trumping, the process by which people’s construction of new narratives allows them to heal the breach of one set of norms, prioritized by the old disrupted narrative, by overriding them with a different set of norms that also have cache within their culture and social circle. The word trumping, as opposed to trading or replacement, is important here, in that individuals who engage in this process are typically not denying the importance of the norms they have breached, which are still valued by their culture and their friends, and which may even be necessary to explain the motivation for their past behavior. Rather, the affected individuals are constructing narratives that allow them to assert how another set of norms is (or became) more important than those they’ve run afoul of.

In the context of risk information seeking and processing, DISP proposes that in the face of a disruptive hazard, as people become sensitized to information that helps them to reconstruct a new narrative structure to explain and justify their lived experience and set up their expectations for the future, much of the information these individuals seek and/or attend to will be information that facilitates the process of norm trumping.

For instance, in the example above of the parent who cannot afford to move her children away from an environmental risk, the information about positive aspects of her neighborhood to which she is now attuned—a low crime rate or a school’s high graduation rate—can be used to construct a new narrative that emphasizes an alternative set of widely accepted norms. The new narrative might preserve the identity the parent has projected for herself as someone who prioritizes the safety of her children by emphasizing the relative safety of the neighborhood by other metrics (e.g., low crime) or prioritize other positive aspects of her identity, such as her concern for her kids’ education.

Revisions to RISP

The three propositions described above suggest a number of revisions to the original RISP model. Importantly, the various concepts involved—narrative-based sensemaking, disruption, norm trumping—come from research traditions that are largely descriptive in nature. That is, they are based on research that typically aims to explain the world as it is rather than to predict future states of affairs.

This is in contrast to most of the concepts used in the original RISP model, and indeed the RISP model itself, which are based on predictive research that aims to use data about individuals to forecast their future behavior. To marry the newly introduced descriptive concepts with the rest of the predictive RISP model, DISP must recast those concepts in predictive terms.

The authors of the model have done this by operationalizing disruption as a combination of low self-efficacy (i.e., a lack of ability, as perceived by an individual, to change the situation at hand) and high vested interest (i.e., seeing oneself as having a significant stake in the outcome of that situation). Both self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977, 1982) and vested interest (Crano, 1983; Crano & Prislin, 1995; Lehman & Crano, 2002; Sivacek & Crano, 1982) are predictive constructs with rich theoretical contexts in the social psychology literature, and it is hoped that combining them in this way will yield many “ways in” to the problem of operationalizing and testing the notion of disruption for future research and researchers.

The process of norm trumping, meanwhile, is operationalized as an instance of what Afifi and Weiner (2004) dub “cognitive reappraisal”—the manner in which an individual’s need for information can change in response to her reassessment of the environment (or, presumably, the self).

Finally, where the original RISP model used the simple term information sufficiency to discuss whether and when individuals faced with a risk felt they had enough information to consider a problem, DISP divides information sufficiency into two different types. The first of these is risk-relevant information sufficiency, which refers to information narrowly about the nature of the risk itself. This is the sort of information with which the original RISP model exclusively concerned itself. The second type is self-relevant information sufficiency, which refers to information that individuals seek in response to a risk that may not concern the risk itself, but is nonetheless required to maintain or evolve one’s sense of self. Self-relevant information, in other words, is the informational dimension that DISP seeks to add to the original RISP model.

Usefulness and Limitations

DISP aims to give risk communicators a broader view of the sorts of information that may be valuable to target audiences in the hope that the ability to predict instances of disruption and to provide for a more expansive set of informational needs of people impacted by a hazard will lead to better community outcomes.

At the same time, as discussed further in the “Historiography” section, the DISP model has yet to be empirically tested and is thus open to debate and falsification on numerous fronts. While it is difficult to suggest alternative explanations for data that does not yet exist, it is worth outlining areas where the model is likely to prove limited and/or may need to evolve to serve the needs of risk communicators:

Parsing differences in narrative traditions. As discussed below, the construct of disruption is a synthetic one. It is derived not from a unified literature, but from similarities across numerous descriptive studies and traditions. It may ultimately be that some such accounts provide a more useful basis for a construct of disruption than others, and the operationalization of the construct may shift accordingly over time.

Different modes of sensemaking. Many of the descriptive accounts from which the notion of disruption is drawn fit broadly into what is sometimes called the narrative paradigm, a scholarly tradition often associated with Walter Fisher, which asserts that people are wired to process information in narrative form and that human communication is invariably bound up with narrative. This assertion has been critiqued as being too expansive. Even some narrative scholars have suggested that narrative should be viewed as only one among a broader range of strategies through which humans process information and make sense of the world. It stands to reason, then, that the utility of narrative disruption as an explanatory device will only be as extensive as the frequency with which people turn to narrative to make sense of the sorts of situations described in the DISP model.

Fit between descriptive and predictive constructs. Because much of the academic work that foregrounds the construct of disruption has been qualitative and descriptive in nature, there may be difficulties incurred when attempting to operationalize the construct in predictive and quantitative terms. The combination of low self-efficacy and high vested interest that the model’s authors have put forward may imperfectly capture the phenomenon articulated by descriptive scholars. It is also possible (if unlikely) that descriptive accounts of disruption could simultaneously prove entirely accurate and empirically rare. That is to say, even if disruption is properly operationalized, it may turn out to explain the behavior of only a relatively small portion of the population.

Goals of risk communicators. The original RISP model is sometimes critiqued for being overly complex, which may make it difficult for risk communicators to utilize insofar as that complexity has the potential to translate into the necessity of lengthier survey instruments and larger sample sizes. To the extent, then, that DISP adds to the complexity of the original RISP model, what it contributes to the model’s explanatory power on paper may be outweighed by the additional difficulties it creates in obtaining actionable data. This may be one reason the model has yet to be empirically tested, particularly insofar as risk communication researchers remain focused on validating the original RISP model.

Historiography

The DISP model is based closely on the risk information seeking and processing (RISP) model, which in turn is built predominantly out of concepts from the heuristic–systematic model (HSM) and the theory of planned behavior (TPB). As such, readers may wish to refer to the historiography of these other models, respectively.

With regard to concepts that the DISP model adds to RISP, these are largely taken from research on sensemaking and identity maintenance conducted in social psychology, sociology, and anthropology. This work, which spans disciplines, repeatedly introduces a concept that Gay Becker (1997) called disruption, to describe how events in the world can suddenly call into question the narrative frameworks with which individuals previously made sense of their lives. Becker and others also qualitatively describe the aftermath of disruption in terms that DISP distills into the notion of norm trading.

Notably, while the DISP model uses Becker’s (1997) term (disruption), there is no common word across the literature, but rather a broad collection of cognate concepts. Burke (1965) describes disruption as the recalcitrance of the material world. Weick (2001) deems it a “cosmology episode, an interlude in which the orderliness of the universe is called into question because both understanding and procedures for sensemaking collapse together” (p. 109; see also Weick, 1993). Bruner (2002) uses the word peripeteia, which he borrows from Aristotle (p. 4). Still more researchers provide qualitative descriptions of disruption without providing a specific term for it. Mattingly (1998) describes “ruptures from the normal course of events” in life (p. 107). Frank (1995) writes about “the ‘loss of destination and map’ that had previously guided the . . . person’s life” (p. 1). Kleinman (1988) talks about moments when we are “shocked out of our common-sensical perspective on the world” (p. 27). Dervin (1989) refers to instances in which “sense runs out” (p. 77). Weick (1995) flags the interplay between environment and personal identity when he discusses the “failure to confirm one’s self” through interaction with the environment.

One challenge in introducing disruption and associated concepts into the RISP framework is that the research traditions from which they come are largely descriptive in nature, while RISP and the models out of which it is constructed are built from predictive constructs. DISP is thus faced with the challenge of operationalizing a variety of descriptive concepts in predictive terms. Whether it succeeds in doing so is a matter for both theoretical debate and empirical testing. It presently operationalizes disruption as a combination of high vested interest (Crano, 1983; Crano & Prislin, 1995; Lehman & Crano, 2002; Sivacek & Crano, 1982) and low self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977, 1982), and it links the practice of norm-trumping to Afifi and Weiner’s (2004) notion of cognitive reappraisal.

One way in which these operationalizations are complicated is with respect to the manner in which the descriptive source literatures diverge in their accounts of disruption. In some instances, exemplified by the work of Kleinman (1988), Frank (1995), and Becker (1997, 2000), disruption is described as an experience related to a life-shattering event, such as displacement from one’s homeland or being diagnosed with a terminal illness. Other scholars, like Bruner (1990) and Weick (1995), meanwhile, describe narrative disruption as a relatively ordinary occurrence that takes place when even relatively small, routine expectations of the world are violated. When considering the state of disruption and resulting cognitive reappraisal experienced by individuals, it’s worth asking—and testing empirically—whether the psychological differences in how individuals cope with major versus minor events are a matter of degree or of kind. Understanding this would certainly have great bearing on the larger DISP model.

Again, the DISP model has not yet been subject to empirical testing, so there is much about the model dynamics and their operationalization that is open to debate and falsification. Also, given that the original RISP model has at times been criticized for being overly complicated, it is fair to critique the DISP model for adding to rather than alleviating that complexity. That said, one stated goal of the DISP model is to ultimately replace a number of the demographic factors, or individual characteristics, that the original RISP authors judge to be poorly situated theoretically with more conceptually rich accounts of individuals’ psychological states. Empirical testing and further conceptual development of the DISP model, then, may ultimately streamline aspects of the RISP framework by determining which of RISP’s many demographic variables might be considered duplicative of information captured by disruption-related constructs.

Primary Sources

As this model has yet to be tested empirically, there are currently no data sources directly related to the model. The model is originally described in a paper by Braun and Niederdeppe, “Disruption and Identity Maintenance in Risk Information Seeking and Processing,” published in the journal Communication Theory (volume 22, issue 2).

Further Reading

Becker, G. (1997). Disrupted lives: How people create meaning in a chaotic world. Berkeley: University of California Press.Find this resource:

    Becker, G. (2000). The elusive embryo. Berkeley: University of California Press.Find this resource:

      Braun, J. A., & Niederdeppe, J. (2012). Disruption and identity maintenance in risk information seeking and processing. Communication Theory, 22(2), 138–162.Find this resource:

        Bruner, J. S. (1990). Acts of meaning. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Find this resource:

          Dervin, B. (1989). Audience as listener and learner, teacher and confidante: The sense-making approach. In R. E. Rice & C. K. Atkin (Eds.), Public communication campaigns (2d ed., pp. 67–86). Newbury Park, CA: SAGE.Find this resource:

            Fisher, W. R. (1987). Human communication as narration: Toward a philosophy of reason, value, and action. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.Find this resource:

              Frank, A. W. (1995). The wounded storyteller: Body, illness, and ethics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Find this resource:

                Griffin, R. J., Dunwoody, S., & Neuwirth, K. (1999). Proposed model of the relationship of risk information seeking and processing to the development of preventive behaviors. Environmental Research, 80, S230–S245.Find this resource:

                  Griffin, R. J., Neuwirth, K., Dunwoody, S., & Giese, J. (2004). Information sufficiency and risk communication. Media Psychology, 6, 23–61.Find this resource:

                    Griffin, R. J., Neuwirth, K., Giese, J., & Dunwoody, S. (2002). Linking the heuristic-systematic model and depth of processing. Communication Research, 29(6), 705–732.Find this resource:

                      Kleinman, A. (1988). The illness narratives: Suffering, healing, and the human condition. New York: Basic Books.Find this resource:

                        Linde, C. (1993). Life stories: The creation of coherence. New York: Oxford University Press.Find this resource:

                          Mattingly, C. (1998). Healing dramas and clinical plots: The narrative structure of experience. New York: Cambridge University Press.Find this resource:

                            Weick, K. (1995). Sensemaking in organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.Find this resource:

                              References

                              Afifi, W. A., & Weiner, J. L. (2004). Toward a theory of motivated information management. Communication Theory, 14(2), 167–190.Find this resource:

                                Bandura, A. (1977). Social learning theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.Find this resource:

                                  Bandura, A. (1982). Self-efficacy mechanism in human agency. American Psychologist, 37(2), 122–147.Find this resource:

                                    Becker, G. (1997). Disrupted lives: How people create meaning in a chaotic world. Berkeley: University of California Press.Find this resource:

                                      Becker, G. (2000). The elusive embryo. Berkeley: University of California Press.Find this resource:

                                        Braun, J. A., & Niederdeppe, J. (2012). Disruption and identity maintenance in risk information seeking and processing. Communication Theory, 22(2), 138–162.Find this resource:

                                          Bruner, J. S. (1990). Acts of meaning. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Find this resource:

                                            Bruner, J. S. (2002). Narratives of human plight: A conversation with Jerome Bruner. In R. Charon & M. Montello (Eds.), Stories matter: The role of narrative in medical ethics (pp. 3–9). New York: Routledge.Find this resource:

                                              Burke, K. (1965). The poetry of action. In Permanence and change: An anatomy of purpose (2d rev. ed., pp. 247–272). New York: Bobbs-Merrill.Find this resource:

                                                Crano, W. D. (1983). Assumed consensus of attitudes: The effect of vested interest. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 9(4), 597–608.Find this resource:

                                                  Crano, W. D., & Prislin, R. (1995). Components of vested interest and attitude-behavior consistency. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 17(2), 1–21.Find this resource:

                                                    Dervin, B. (1989). Audience as listener and learner, teacher and confidante: The sense-making approach. In R. E. Rice & C. K. Atkin (Eds.), Public communication campaigns (2d ed., pp. 67–86). Newbury Park, CA: SAGE.Find this resource:

                                                      Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.Find this resource:

                                                        Frank, A. W. (1995). The wounded storyteller: Body, illness, and ethics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Find this resource:

                                                          Griffin, R. J., Dunwoody, S., & Neuwirth, K. (1999). Proposed model of the relationship of risk information seeking and processing to the development of preventive behaviors. Environmental Research, 80, S230–S245.Find this resource:

                                                            Griffin, R. J., Neuwirth, K., Dunwoody, S., & Giese, J. (2004). Information sufficiency and risk communication. Media Psychology, 6, 23–61.Find this resource:

                                                              Griffin, R. J., Neuwirth, K., Giese, J., & Dunwoody, S. (2002). Linking the heuristic-systematic model and depth of processing. Communication Research, 29(6), 705–732.Find this resource:

                                                                Kleinman, A. (1988). The illness narratives: Suffering, healing, and the human condition. New York: Basic Books.Find this resource:

                                                                  Lehman, B. J., & Crano, W. D. (2002). The pervasive effects of vested interest on attitude-criterion consistency in political judgment. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 38(2), 101–112.Find this resource:

                                                                    Linde, C. (1993). Life stories: The creation of coherence. New York: Oxford University Press.Find this resource:

                                                                      Mattingly, C. (1998). Healing dramas and clinical plots: The narrative structure of experience. New York: Cambridge University Press.Find this resource:

                                                                        Sivacek, J., & Crano, W. D. (1982). Vested interest as a moderator of attitude-behavior consistency. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 43(2), 210–221.Find this resource:

                                                                          Weick, K. (1993). The collapse of sensemaking in organizations: The Mann Gulch disaster. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38(4), 628–652.Find this resource:

                                                                            Weick, K. (1995). Sensemaking in organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.Find this resource:

                                                                              Weick, K. (2001). Making sense of the organization. Oxford: Blackwell.Find this resource: