Show Summary Details

Page of

PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, NATURAL HAZARD SCIENCE (oxfordre.com/naturalhazardscience). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).

date: 20 February 2019

Natural Hazards Governance in the Philippines

Summary and Keywords

Located in the Pacific Ring of Fire and the typhoon belt, the Philippines is one of the most hazard prone countries in the world. The country faces different types of natural hazards including geophysical disturbances such as earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, meteorological and hydrological events such as typhoons and floods, and slow-onset disasters such as droughts. Together with rapidly increasing population growth and urbanization, large-scale natural phenomena have resulted in unprecedented scales of devastation. In the early 21st century alone, the country experienced some of the most destructive and costliest disasters in its history including Typhoon Yolanda (2013), Typhoon Pablo (2012), and the Bohol Earthquake (2013).

Recurrent natural disasters have prompted the Philippine government to develop disaster risk reduction and management (DRRM) strategies to better prepare, respond, and recover, as well as to be more resilient in the face of natural disasters. Since the early 1940s, the governing structure has undergone several revisions through legal and institutional arrangements. Historical natural disasters and seismic risks have affected and continue to threaten the National Capital Region (NCR) and the surrounding administrative areas; these were key factors in advancing DRRM laws and regulations, as well as in restructuring its governing bodies. The current DRRM structure was instituted under Republic Act no. 10121 (RA10121) in 2010 and was implemented to shift from responsive to proactive governance by better engaging local governments (LGUs), communities, and the private sector to reduce long-term disaster risk. This Republic Act established a national disaster risk reduction and management council (NDRRMC) to develop strategies that manage and reduce risk.

Typhoon Yolanda in 2013 was the most significant test of this revised governance structure and related strategies. The typhoon revealed drawbacks of the current council-led governing structure to advancing resilience. Salient topics include how to respond better to disaster realities, how to efficiently coordinate among relevant agencies, and how to be more inclusive of relevant actors. Together with other issues, such as the way to co-exist with climate change efforts, a thorough examination of RA 10121 by the national government and advocates for DRRM is underway. Some of the most important discourse to date focuses on ways to institute a powerful governing body that enables more efficient DRRM with administrative and financial power. The hope is that by instituting a governing system that can thoroughly lead all phases of preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery, the country can withstand future—and likely more frequent—mega-disasters.

Keywords: disaster governance, mainstreaming disasters, disaster risk reduction and management, Philippines, Typhoon Yolanda, disaster management funds, disaster management in international development

International Trends on Disaster Risk Management and the Philippines

Mainstreaming disaster management in development has been a globally important policy debate since the 1990s. Rapid urbanization, intense weather events, and continuing geophysical disturbances, coupled with interconnected economic and social systems, have made mega-disaster impacts increasingly significant. In response, a concerted international effort to reduce disaster impacts and increase resilience has become a priority at local and national levels.

The United Nations designated the 1990s as the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) (United Nations, 1989). This was a first attempt to raise consciousness among development actors about how disasters affect development efforts and to emphasize the necessity of strategies to reduce damages and losses worldwide. Policy actions focused mainly on improving response to disasters and minimizing fatalities and socioeconomic loss. After a decade of operation, IDNDR was replaced by the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) in 2000. The existence of these disaster reduction initiatives has proved effective, as adequate emergency response over the years has led to a reduction in human losses (United Nations, 1999). In addition, the approach to disaster reduction gradually shifted from emergency response to mitigation. In 2005 the UN General Assembly endorsed the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) to mainstream disaster management in international development and boost mitigation efforts in development (Briceno, 2015; De La Poterie & Baudoin, 2015; Wahlstrom, 2015). The HFA approached disaster risk reduction across nations and communities systematically by sharing a goal of resilience with all developing actors (UNISDR, 2018). In this second decade of an internationally concerted effort, the world has benefited from an advanced early warning system and increasingly shared knowledge on disaster risk, which has in turn successfully contributed to reducing natural disaster impacts (United Nations, 2005).

However, challenges still exist, particularly in the form of multiple sequential mega-disasters. One response was the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. Adopted in 2015 at the third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, the Sendai Framework embraces all levels of actors including individuals, civil society, NGOs, businesses, and governments in order to continue and enhance resilient societies (United Nations, 2015). It underscores advancing risk reduction activities, extending the standard response and mitigation actions to include recovery and reconstruction for vulnerability and risk alleviation. Internationally, 2015 was unique for having several global agendas to cross; both the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) and Paris agreement adopted in the Climate Change Conference (COP21) highlighted a DRRM agenda as part of their strategy implementation (Forino, Meding, & Brewer, 2015; Kelman, 2015; UNISDR, 2015).

The Philippines is one of the most vulnerable countries in the world. Located in the Pacific Ring of Fire and the typhoon belt, the Philippines, after Vanuatu and Tonga, ranks the third highest on the World Risk Index (2016). The country faces different types of natural hazards including geophysical disturbances such as earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, meteorological and hydrological events such as typhoons and floods, and slow-onset disasters such as droughts. Together with rapidly increasing population growth and urbanization, large-scale natural phenomena have resulted in unprecedented devastation. In the early 21st century alone, the country experienced some of the most destructive and costliest disasters in its history, including Typhoon Yolanda (international name: Haiyan) (2013), Typhoon Pablo (international name: Bopha) (2012), and the Bohol Earthquake (2013), among others. As the nation has always faced devastations from calamities, managing disasters has been a top priority for the country’s well-being.

The country comprises more than 7,600 islands, which makes systematic DRRM activity a challenge. The Philippine Islands are categorized into three groups: Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. The nation’s capital, Metro Manila, is located in Luzon, the country’s largest and most populated island. Most of the national government offices are located in the 17 administrative regions, eight of which are in Luzon, three in Visayas, and six in Mindanao. National services are provided through these offices, including executing policies and programs on disaster preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery.

Natural Hazards Governance in the PhilippinesClick to view larger

Figure 1. Philippines, administrative regions, and natural disasters.

Source: Created by authors.

This article lays out the historical evolution of disaster risk reduction and management (DRRM) strategies in the Philippines in order to better prepare, respond, recover, and to be more resilient against natural disasters in the future. It also explains current dialogue and future prospects to establish more responsive governance systems to better handle ever-worsening disaster impacts, accelerated by climate change and urban development. Next, the historical perspective of disaster governance in the Philippines is discussed to illuminate the shift from reactive to proactive governance over time. Legislation and its managing bodies are reviewed by stages including: (1) Evolutionary period (1941 to 1977), (2) the period of Presidential Decree 1566 (1978 to 2009), and (3) the period of Republic Act 10121 (2010 to date). Funding structures related to disasters, regulations, and policies and programs for promoting safer development are also addressed. In the third section, ongoing discourse is presented on current governance on management of disasters in the Philippines. Descriptions focus on complexities that emerged after Typhoon Yolanda in 2013, immediately after an innovative legislation on disaster management had passed in 2010, which revised 30-year-old disaster management legislation. Discussion also focuses on reviewing new legislation, other policy focus elements such as climate change efforts, and the restructuring of the institutional setup for disaster management governance. The concluding section summarizes the transformation of the Philippines natural hazards governance, highlights current points of discussion, and provides a few points to achieve disaster risk reduction and management.

This article focuses primarily on government-led efforts at the national level. It is important to underscore how civil society organizations and private sectors also play an important role in often filling gaps between governmental actions and societal needs in the Philippines (see Bankoff & Hilhorst, 2009; Lorna, 2003; Luna, 2001). However, because national level efforts by the government are often visible, historically traceable, and transparent to immediate change, governmental efforts are the primary focus of this article. The authors are scholars and practitioners who have conducted fieldwork in the Philippines for several decades, some having devoted their entire career as practitioners—including in key governance roles—to disaster risk reduction and management.

Disaster Governance in the Philippines: A Historical Overview

Not only are the numbers of extreme disastrous events on the rise, but increased hazard exposure has also resulted in increased impacts. The country continues to experience population increases. Since around the year 2000, the national population has increased from 76.5 million to 101 million (as of 2015), an annual growth rate of 1.72% (Philippines Statistic Authority, 2016a). To accommodate such a rapid population increase, development occurred in high-risk areas including along faults, shorelines, and riverbeds. Metro Manila, administratively referred as the National Capital Region (NCR), has experienced a particularly rapid population increase and related urbanization, and as such, is at an increasing risk. The population of the NCR grew from 9.9 million in 2000 to 12.9 million in 2015, a 30% increase in just 15 years. Considering the region accounts for 12.8% of the national population, this exposure to disaster creates a particularly critical situation (Philippines Statistic Authority, 2016b).

Protecting people from natural disasters has increasingly become a national concern. The Medium-Term Philippines Development Plan (MTPDP)—often referred as the national development plan—is normally prepared under new presidencies. The MTPDP addressed managing natural disasters during the 1992–1998 Ramos administration, having included organizational response to disasters as a priority, and has continued to do so with subsequent administrations. The rationale was that natural disasters set back development efforts, and thereby handling such events would support the nation’s prosperity (see Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, 2001). In addition, the extent of the policy reach has evolved over time. For instance, the Arroyo Administration’s 2004–2010 MTPDP acknowledged possible threats of natural disasters and nothing more (see Britton, 2007; NEDA, 2004). It was not until the 2011–2016 plan prepared for the Aquino III administration that natural risk reduction and management was recognized as a national agenda and thus a shift in legislation to proactively manage disasters (see NEDA, 2011). Similarly, the climate change agenda has expanded over time. The 2004–2010 plan touched on climate change issues, but it was barely addressed and only within the context of a disastrous event. However, the 2011–2016 plan highlighted emerging concerns on climate change, and together with DRRM efforts underscored the need to develop guidelines to advance risk reduction while managing to fulfill a goal of sustainable development (JICA, 2017). In essence, climate change became viewed as an inevitable event that threatens people. In the MTPDP 2017–2022 from the Duterte Administration, disaster management efforts have further evolved, adopting the phrase “human-induced” disaster in addition to natural ones (see NEDA, 2017).

Natural disasters happening at the time of transformation are relevant to the restructuring and revising of natural hazards governance in the Philippines. The following sections identify three stages of Philippines governance post-1940s, all of which aim to establish a responsive system to disastrous events (hereinafter used interchangeably as “disaster governance” or “disaster management governance” as both terms are used in practice).

Evolutionary Period (1941–1977)

The current Philippines disaster management system originated during its commonwealth era, as early as before World War II, to prepare for war-related emergencies. Executive Order (EO) 335, the Civilian Emergency Administration and its Service to the People, came into effect in 1941 during the Manuel Quezon administration and aimed to “formulate and execute policies and plans for the protection and welfare of the civil population or the Philippines in extraordinary and emergency conditions” (President of the Philippines, 1941). The National Emergency Commission (NEC), chaired by the Secretary of National Defense, was the central body creating policies to address the Civil Emergency Administration’s (CEA’s) mandate. EO 335 also established emergency committees at provincial, municipal, and city levels headed by the governor, municipal mayor, and city mayor. EO 335 provided power to the CEA to supervise and control multileveled emergency agencies, and to function with other representatives of key emergency response groups (see Figure 2 for historical transformation of disaster governance between 1941 to 2010).

Natural Hazards Governance in the PhilippinesClick to view larger

Figure 2. Historical transformation of disaster governance in the Philippines.

Source: Created by authors.

In 1954, Republic Act (RA) 1190 (also called the Civil Defense Act) was endorsed during the Magsaysay administration. RA 1190 created the National Civil Defense Administration (NCDA) to continue carrying out EO 335’s mandate of “the protection and welfare of the civilian population in time of war directly involving the Philippines or other national emergency of equally grave character” (Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines, 1945). This act also established the National Civil Defense Council (NCDC) to consult and advise the administration on “civil defense, particularly with respect to the coordination of the functions and activities of the different organizations represented in the Council, with the civil defense program” (Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines, 1945). (See Figure 2 for historical transformation of disaster governance.) To carry out the mission of RA 1190, governance structure of NCDC and NCDA were replicated at provincial, municipal, and city levels. This setup and its replication in multiple layers of government continue to serve as the base structure for disaster governance to date.

It was not until the late 1960s—and after having confronted a sequence of disasters—that natural disaster operations, rather than civil defense issues, was acknowledged by national committees as important for minimizing damage and loss in society. In 1968, the 7.6 Mw Casiguran Earthquake shook Metro Manila, causing about 270 deaths and causing extensive structural damage, including the collapse of the Ruby Tower, a mid-rise building in the heart of Manila (PHIVOLCS, 2018). To address lessons learned from having confronted coordination problems under emergency situations, Administrative Order No. 151 (AO 151) was signed by then President Marcos. AO 151 emphasized seamless coordination among “different agencies during disasters caused by typhoons, floods, fires, earthquakes, seismic sea waves (tidal waves), volcanic eruptions, epidemics, major accidents and other similar calamities, in future disasters” (President of the Philippines, 1968). To ensure effective coordination across the national agencies and down to local agencies, a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) that explains organizational setup, duties, and responsibilities was described and replicated in committees and organizations at different levels of government (Shaw, 2015). In addition, Typhoon Sening (international name: Joan) of October 1970—one of the worst typhoons in the Philippines history—and the Great Philippine Floods of 1972, killing 775 people by excessive monsoon rains to form an inland sea connecting Lingayen Gulf and Manila Bay (Gordon, 1973).1 These caused extensive damage to Metro Manila and were key reasons for the Marcos administration’s development of the first disaster and calamity plan. The plan led to the creation of the National Disaster Control Center, which operates effective response to manmade and natural disasters (Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, 2001; Shaw, 2015).

Shortly after in 1972, President Marcos reorganized the 1954 NDCA into the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) through a Letter of Implementation No. 19, Series of 1972 (Mendoza, 2014). This was to increase national security by concentrating power in an office that could be “responsible for coordinating, on the national level, the activities and functions of various agencies and instrumentalities of the National Government and private institutions and civic organizations devoted to public welfare so that the facilities and resources of the entire nation may be utilized to the maximum extent for the protection and preservation of the civilian populace and property during time of war and other national emergencies of equally grave character. (President of the Philippines, 1972).

Four years later in 1976, the Moro Gulf earthquake and tsunami hit coastal communities in the Mindanao region. With its epicenter south of Mindanao, the Mw 7.9 earthquake not only shook the Mindanao and Visayas regions but also generated a locally destructive tsunami (Stewart & Cohn, 1979; USGS, 2018). The earthquake caused an estimated death toll of 5,280 and generated a tsunami that swept over villages in the Moro Gulf (Haas, 1978). Since the country had been under martial law since 1972, it was easy to enforce emergency response orders. The country heavily restricted the amount of foreign aid received, in order to maintain control over support to victims during the immediate emergency period. At an early stage of rebuilding, two efforts to reduce vulnerability—not to rebuild dwellings along 200 meters along the coast, and upgrade and enforce the existing building code PD 1096 (President of the Philippines, 1977)—were enforced quickly and in a top-down manner (Haas, 1978). Yet, government agencies were generally not successful at effectively gathering needed information and communities remained disorganized, both of which impeded response activities (Haas, 1978). Experiencing an unprecedented magnitude of devastation and a need for effective response led the country to consider preparing for disasters beforehand.

Period of Presidential Decree 1566 (1978–2009)

A sequence of disasters in the 1970s, including Typhoon Sening and the Moro Gulf earthquake and tsunami, raised national attention to the need for improved disaster management and resulted in a nationwide framework supporting community-level disaster response. In 1978, PD 1566 “Strengthening the Philippine Disaster Control, Capability and Establishing the National Program on Community Disaster Preparedness” was adopted to form a governmental structure that could better respond to different types of disasters at the national, regional, and local levels.2 It also mandated responsibilities for involved agencies to better prepare for and respond to disasters. One prominent outcome was the establishment of the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC), the Regional Disaster Coordinating Councils (RDCC), and the local Disaster Coordinating Councils (DCCs) for disaster-related policy decisions. Another salient feature of PD 1566 was a mandate for a planning disaster operation; the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) was responsible for creating the “National Disaster and Calamities Preparedness Plan” for approval by the president and then sharing it with the NDCC for implementation. The plan was first approved in 1984, which required all tasked agencies and organizations to develop action plans to support the national plan (JICA, 2005).

One important shift from previous disaster operations at this stage was an attempt to prepare disaster response at the community level, thereby developing several coordinating councils to duplicate efforts at different levels. It was also unique in that it underscored self-reliance at various levels of government. Planning for disaster response was also a new attempt. However, natural disasters were still considered events to control, and as such, post-disaster operations were not given equal importance. In this sense, community participation remained limited, and actions taken for disaster management continued to be narrow in focus. A centralized decision-making structure operated until the early 1990s. When the local government code (RA 7160) passed in 1991, local governments received more power to administer their affairs within their jurisdictions, which included responsibilities to counter disasters themselves (Congress of the Philippines, 1991). With more decentralized power to the local governments since the early 1990s, PD 1566 served as a basis for disaster management governance in the Philippines for more than three decades.

The Philippine archipelago continued to be affected by a series of major disasters from the 1980s to the 1990s. Two of the worst typhoons hit in 1984. Typhoon Maring (international name: June) and Typhoon Nitang (international name: Ike), were the worst recorded up to that point and alerted the nation to the need for better response (see Warren, 2013). A series of large-scale disasters in the early 1990s were the final wake-up call for the NCR. First was the 7.7 Mw Luzon earthquake in July 1990, which was responsible for 1,283 deaths, 321missing, and 2,786 injuries with an estimated direct loss of PhP 31.176 billion (USD 617 million) (Iuchi & Esnard, 2008, citing OCD).3 In June 1991, the eruption of Mount Pinatubo caused 850 deaths, 23 missing, and 184 injuries with an estimated economic loss of PhP 22.8502 billion (USD 452 million) (Iuchi & Esnard, 2008). Then in November of the same year, Typhoon Uring (international name: Thelma) brought intense rainfall causing a flash flood, which devastated areas along the major river in Ormoc, a city located in the west coast of Leyte Island. Almost 5,000 people perished and an additional 1,000 went missing, just from the Ormoc City alone (Nakamura, Takahiro, Shibayama, Miguel, & Takagi, 2015). In August 1999, several consecutive days of rain caused a landslide in Antipolo City, just outside the NCR, killing 58 and injuring 31, in addition to damaging 379 houses (Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, 2001). The 1990 Luzon earthquake particularly triggered the concern of Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), an agency responsible for metro-wide services through development planning, monitoring, and coordinating functions (see RA 7924, Congress of the Philippines, 1994). MMDA saw the need to determine the risks and vulnerability of Metro Manila in an event of a very strong earthquake, considering that the NCR contributes close to 40% of the Philippines’ GDP. Together with the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS), a seismological arm of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) (see EO 784, President of the Philippines, 1982), an initiative to promote science-based scenario and plan for contingencies in Metro Manila emerged around this time.4

Natural disasters continued to threaten the country, especially Luzon Island in the new millennium. Four consecutive tropical cyclones hit the island in a two-week span in November 2004. Typhoon Unding (international name: Muifa) first hit the southern part of Luzon in mid-November, followed by Tropical Storm Violeta (international name: Merbok) and tropical depression Winnie in the following week. Next, Typhoon Yoyong (international name: Nanmadol) brought heavy rainfall and strong winds, exacerbating conditions in already flooded regions. The torrential rain caused by the series of typhoons and tropical depressions triggered massive landslides, commonly known as the REINA landslides, and flooded the villages and communities of Quezon Province (Real, Infanta, and Nakar [REINA]) in Luzon, causing over 900 deaths, over 840 missing, and 750 injured. In total, over three million people were affected and 650,000 displaced as a result of the four mega-typhoons (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2004). In Leyte Island, a massive landslide in February 2006 demolished Guinsaugon Village, and only 20 out of 1,857 people survived (NOAH, 2018). The Guinsaugon landslide is one of the largest in Philippine history and was triggered by three factors: massive rainfall a week prior, a 4.3 Mw earthquake generated nearby the site, and deformation of the slope prior to the event (NOAH, 2018). The 2009 typhoon season also ravaged the NCR. Metro Manila and surrounding administrative areas were consecutively hit by powerful tropical cyclones beginning late September; first by Tropical Storm Ondoy (international name: Typhoon Ketsana), followed by Typhoon Pepeng (international name: Parma) and Typhoon Santi (international name: Mirinae) all happening just in a month. For Metro Manila, Tropical Storm Ondoy was one of the most destructive ones in its history, causing 241 deaths, 394 injured, and destroying more than 65,000 buildings (Sato & Nakasu, 2011). Although they caused fewer casualties, two subsequent typhoons intensified damage of greater NCR, which was already under a state of calamity declared by then President Arroyo.

Despite an accumulation of laws and regulations, continuous threats and an inability to respond to disasters effectively prompted disaster-coordinating councils and politicians to continue reviewing PD 1566 arrangements. Initiatives advancing disaster preparedness, especially with a project assessing Metro Manila’s earthquake hazards and risks, also contributed to shared concern by politicians, governments, and residents. Congress saw the need to change PD 1566 to better address the risks and vulnerabilities identified in that project. Although ultimately unsuccessful, a number of proposed measures were submitted to Congress aiming to address the root causes of vulnerabilities that led to ever-increasing damages and losses from natural disasters. Over time, proposals began to shift disaster management approaches from reactive to proactive, and turned to advancing social equity and furthering the participation of civil society organizations in disaster management activities in order to reduce vulnerability (Agsaoay-Sano, 2010; Heijmans & Victoria, 2001).

Period of RA 10121 (2010 to Date)

After nearly two decades of debate among disaster management advocates, President Arroyo signed RA 10121 “Philippine Disaster Risk reduction and Management Act of 2010” in May 2010 (Heijmans & Victoria, 2001). Destructive tropical cyclones in 2009 and identified earthquake vulnerabilities of Metro Manila with the science-based assessment project were some of the key reasons for having this act being pushed through. This act finally framed proactive disaster management governance, by “addressing root causes of vulnerabilities to disasters” on the ground, adopting a “disaster risk reduction and management (DRRM) approach,” and proposing to “develop, promote, and implement a comprehensive National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan (NDRRMP)” (President of the Philippines, 2010). The act also emphasizes “holistic, comprehensive, integrated and proactive approach” to reduce disaster risks (President of the Philippines, 2010, section 2). Several key features and initiatives took place once this act became effective. The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) replaced the NDCC but with similar functions, and it remained effectively the same as the NDCC. OCD, the operational arm of the NDCC, continued to be the leading NDRRMC organization. Furthermore, the new NDRRMC continued to be responsible for “policy-making, coordination, integration, supervision, monitoring and evaluation” in support of the DRRM (President of the Philippines, 2010, section 6). Second, the NDRRMC adopted the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Framework (NDRRMF) in 2011 to guide and provide a common understanding and benchmarks to national and local DRRM efforts. Resonating with the international mainstreaming movement on disaster management, this framework highlighted the importance of understanding the strong relationship between disasters and development and that reflecting DRRM philosophy in national and local plans is inevitable (NDRRMC, 2011). With this framework, disaster management legislation moved the approach from purely response to proactive disaster risk reduction. The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan (NDRRMP) was created, with the goal of “safer, adaptive, and disaster resilient Filipino communities towards sustainable development” in 2012 (Office of Civil Defense, The Philippines, 2011). The plan’s four pillars—disaster prevention and mitigation, disaster preparedness, disaster response, and disaster rehabilitation and recovery—are classified as thematic areas for attaining this goal, and each are staffed with key members (Domingo & Olaguera, 2017; Mendoza, 2014). In addition, while resembling the former NDCC structure, the number of participating agencies and organizations in the new council increased from 19 to 44 members; the participants broadened to include civil society organizations (CSOs) and the private sector with mandated responsibilities in this area of governance (Commission on Audit, 2014). However, the NDRRMC co-chairs, who also represent heads of the four DRRM pillars, continued to be from national departments (e.g., Department of Science and Technology [DOST] for disaster prevention and mitigation, Department of Interior and Local Government [DILG] for disaster preparedness, Department of Social Welfare and Development [DSWD] for disaster response, and National Economic Development Authority [NEDA] for disaster rehabilitation and recovery). Finally, the Build Back Better (BBB) concept was included in the act to promote DRRM approaches, a half-decade prior to the adoption of the Sendai Framework (For conceptual transformation of governance between PD 1566 and RA 10121, see Figure 3.)

Natural Hazards Governance in the PhilippinesClick to view larger

Figure 3. Conceptual framework transformation on governance from PD 1566 to RA 10121. Abbreviations for the left figure—PD (Presidential Decree); NDCC (National Disaster Coordinating Council); OCD (Office of Civil Defense); DND (Department of National Defense). Abbreviations for the right figure—RA (Republic Act); NDRRMC (National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council); CSO (Civil Society Organizations); DRRM (Disaster Risk Reduction and Management); NDRRMP (The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan); OCD (Office of Civil Defense); DOST (Department of Science and Technology); DILG (Department of Interior and Local Government); DSWD (Department of Social Welfare and Development); NEDA (National Economic Development Authority)

Source: Created by authors.

Managing Disasters in Action

While legal and institutional frameworks are important to promoting DRRM, inevitably funding, codes, and regulations are necessary for preventive activities to be effective. The Philippines have been successful on both fronts. In this section, transformation of the funding structure over years, and creation and emergence of codes and regulations to better mitigate disaster impacts are reviewed

Funding Related to Disaster Management

Funding was first made available for local governments. An official statement in respect to disaster-related funding first appeared in 1974, in PD 477, “To be Known as the Decree on Local Fiscal Administration,” mandating local governments to reserve 2% of their regular revenue for unexpected “natural calamities or financial dislocation” (President of the Philippines, 1974, section 27). The passage of PD 1566 in 1978 partly allowed the use of funds to prepare for disasters, including use by the Disaster Coordinating Councils, for “the establishment of physical facilities, the equipping and training of disaster action teams” (President of the Philippines, 1978, section 9). The percentage of funds allocated for calamities was increased to 5% when the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) was enacted. Although the percentage of regular revenue set aside for disasters increased, its use continued to be limited for “the area, or a portion thereof, of the local government unit or other areas declared by [either the local councils or] the President in a state of calamity” (Congress of the Philippines, 1991, section 324). The fund was named the Local Calamity Fund at this time. Although the percentage of allocated funds stayed the same, use of the Local Calamity Fund was specified “for relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and other works or services in connection with calamities” with RA 8185 (Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines, 1996), from its original statement of use upon “unforeseen expenditures arising from the occurrence of calamities.” The act also defined “calamities” as “a state of extreme distress or misfortune, produced by some adverse circumstance or event or any great misfortune or cause or loss or misery caused by natural forces” (Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines, 1996).

A national version of the calamity fund was not secured until 1999 and included in the National Government Appropriations law. The use of this National Calamity Fund was defined through issuance of Memorandum Order No. 02, s-1999 (NDCC, 1999), which allowed the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC)—the disaster coordinating council at that time—to set guidelines for use of national funds when disaster struck. The guidelines identify use of funds for: (1) calamity-related work and services, such as relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction; (2) pre-disaster activities such as training; and 3) capital expenditures, such as equipment needed for disaster-related operations. There are also priorities for use: first, emergency relief operations and rehabilitation of critical public infrastructure and lifelines; second, repair and reconstruction of other public infrastructure; and third, pre-disaster activities. Upon implementing the projects using the National Calamity Fund, local governments with larger revenues—classified as first, second, third, and fourth class governments—are required to prepare a matching fund of 30% to 50% of the implementing project cost.5 The fifth and sixth class local governments with less revenue are exempt from this pairing of funds, though there is a cap on the amount available.

In 2010, approval of RA10121 established a national disaster reduction and management framework, and the Local Calamity Fund was renamed the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund (LDRRMF). With this act, the amount of the expected regular revenue secured for calamity use increased from 5% to “not less than five percent” (President of the Philippines, 2010, section 21). Seventy percent of the LDRRMF could now be used for pre-disaster preparedness programs, post-disaster activities, and payment for the insurance calamity on premiums, among others. Unexpected amount for the current year is carried over to the next fiscal year. At the national level, the existing National Calamity Fund appropriated under the annual General Appropriation Act was renamed to the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund (NDRRM Fund). Its purpose was also broadened to include “disaster risk reduction or mitigation, prevention and preparedness activities” in addition to “relief, recovery, reconstruction and other work or services in connection with natural or human induced calamities” (President of the Philippines, 2010, section 22). Both the local and national funds have to secure 30% for the Quick Response Fund (QRF), otherwise called a stand-by fund, for emergency needs. In addition, OCD as a lead agency in implementing this new disaster reduction and management framework received PhP 1 billion (approximately USD 19.8 million) as a revolving fund.

Use of the NDRRM Fund requires multiple processes and decisions. Fund release requires presidential approval, but prior to this approval, NDRRMC develops recommendations to the president based on requests submitted by various groups. Requesters vary—these include national government agencies, local governments, government-owned and controlled cooperation, as well as non-governmental organizations (Villacin, 2017). Since 2009, appropriation and calamity fund usage has been generally on the rise, despite some fluctuations. For instance, there was a 275% increase, or PhP 5.5 billion (USD 10.8 million) spent between 2009 and 2013 (Commission on Audit, 2014) (see Table 1 for legal evolution on funds related to disaster).

Table 1. Legal Arrangements and Development on Funds Related to Disaster

Year

Legal Arrangements

Contents

1974

PD 477: Decree on Local Fiscal Administration

Mandating local governments to reserve 2% of their regular revenue for unexpected “natural calamities or financial dislocation.”

1978

PD 1566: Strengthening the Philippine Disaster Control, Capability and Establishing the National Program on Community Disaster Preparedness

Use of the calamity fund at the local government level for natural calamities or financial dislocation in order to prepare for disasters, including use by the Disaster Coordinating Councils, for “the establishment of physical facilities, the equipping and training of disaster action teams.”

1991

RA 7160: Local Government Code of 1991

General revenue set aside for calamity fund increased from 2% to 5% with the passage of RA 7160. The fund was named the Local Calamity Fund. Fund use continued to be “only in the area, or a portion thereof, of the local government unit or other areas declared by the President in a state of calamity.”

1996

RA 8185: amending Section 324(d) of Republic Act No. 7160 of 1996

Local Calamity Fund was refined to use for “relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and other works or services in connection with calamities.” Calamities also defined as “a state of extreme distress or misfortune, produced by some adverse circumstance or event or any great misfortune or cause or loss or misery caused by natural forces.”

1999

Memorandum Order No. 02, s-1999: re: Policies, Guidelines, and Procedures on Calamity Fund Management

NDCC establishes the National Calamity Fund and use guidelines. This fund is appropriated under the annual General Appropriation Act. It will be used for: (1) calamity related work and services, such as relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction; (2) pre-disaster activities, like training; and (3) capital expenditures, such as equipment needed for disaster related operations.

2010

RA10121: An act strengthening the Philippine disaster risk reduction and management system, providing for the national disaster reduction and management framework and institutionalizing the national disaster risk reduction and management plan, appropriating funds therefore and for other purposes.

Former names for the local and national calamity funds were replaced with the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund (LDRRM Fund), and the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund (NDRRM Fund). Use of both funds was broadened to pre-disaster preparedness and mitigation activities, in addition to emergency response and reconstruction. The amount secured from general revenue for local governments were increased to be no less than 5%.

As a lead agency for disaster risk reduction and management, the OCD was allocated with a revolving fund amounting to PhP 1 billion (USD 19.8 million).

Source: Compiled by Authors.

Regulations, Policies, and Programs for Promoting Safer Development

Aside from developing legislation on disaster management, the Philippines have proactively designed and adopted regulations, policies, and programs aiming for safer development. Some notable ones related to disasters, include, but are not limited to: national building code, geological assessment order, risk imagination, and land-use guidelines. A national building code was first endorsed in 1977 with PD 1096 after a devastating earthquake and tsunami hit communities in Moro Gulf in 1976. Adoption of this code considered the rapid urbanization and growth. The code continues to serve as a basis for building construction, providing minimum standards for “location, site, design quality of materials, construction, use, occupancy, and maintenance” against natural disasters and fire (President of the Philippines, 1977). The national building code has gone through several revisions; a major one in 2004 implemented rules and regulations in response to major disasters such as the Mount Pinatubo eruption and Typhoon Uring in the early 1990s and a series of typhoons in the early 2000s (JICA, 2017). Departments responsible for construction have used the National Structural Code of the Philippines, a similar code addressing safe structures, since 1972. Through the leadership of the Board of Civil Engineering of the Professional Regulation Commission, the code is revised regularly and its sixth edition was published in 2010 (JICA, 2017).

Besides building codes, geophysical land assessment informs development in vulnerable areas. One requirement is to conduct an Engineering Geological and Geohazard Assessment (EGGA) as a part of an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). This is to ensure the safety of subdivision development. This order was issued by the Department of Environmental and Natural Resources (DENR) in 2000 (DENR AO 2000-28) after the 1999 destructive landslide in Antipolo City, which literally obliterated a subdivision (Aurelio, 2004). Similarly, the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) promotes risk-considered development through a guideline that explains risk assessment approaches, integrating results into spatial development and to projects for implementation (See NEDA, UNDP, & ECHA, 2008).

Additionally, findings from a scientific disaster scenario study for Metro Manila were first shared with the public in the early 21st century and contributed to bringing the Philippines’ DRRM discussion to a higher level. The study assessed possible earthquakes that could affect Metro Manila and scientifically calculated damage and loss considering its urban development status (see JICA, 2005). Using this scenario, mitigation plans and projects were developed for implementation and were crucial for initiating discussions and coordinating possible solutions by governmental staff, politicians, and residents to initiate

The aforementioned policies, programs, and projects have contributed to the promotion and advancement of safer development in the Philippines since the early 1970s. Experience from disastrous events, as well as scientific innovations—sometimes a shared project for raising awareness—played a crucial role in this aspect.

National Evaluation of the Republic Act 10121

Soon after RA 10121 came in effect, one of the most catastrophic typhoons in Philippine history, Yolanda in 2013, caused widespread devastation and left thousands in Leyte devastated, requiring a national-level recovery effort. This event exposed a need to advance practical hands-on mitigation, preparation, and response efforts at the national, regional, and local levels. At the same time, responses to mega-disasters have underscored drawbacks of the council-led governing structure. The OCD, being the implementing agency of the NDRRMC, considered the lessons learned from the response and recovery from Typhoon Yolanda and other relevant issues brought about by the potential impacts of climate change. The result was the Pre-Disaster Risk Assessment (PDRA), an institutional mechanism to assess risks and impacts of tropical cyclones and other weather disturbances. The PDRA process is undertaken at the national and regional levels to identify areas and communities that would most likely be severely affected by hydro-meteorological events. The result of such assessment serves as the basis for focused warnings and preparations to effectively meet the needs of those who are along the potential path of destruction. Likewise, RA 10121 has been under review since 2015, as was originally required. National advocates for DRRM agree that the current natural hazards legislation is innovative and reflects key aspects considered important to mainstreaming DRRM in the international development arena (e.g., detailed in the Hyogo Framework for Action [2005–2015] and in the Sendai Framework [2015–2030]). Yet, organizational structure and capacities for local government leadership to handle DRRM for this unprecedented scale of disasters still present challenges. The hope is that by instituting a governing structure that can thoroughly lead all phases of preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery, the Philippines will be able to respond to and mitigate possible large-scale disasters in the future.

Typhoon Yolanda: A Challenge to RA 10121

Typhoon Yolanda (international name: Haiyan) was one of the worst typhoons in Philippine history. On November 8, 2013, the typhoon made one of the first of six landfalls in Guian, Eastern Samar. It then continued moving westward over central Philippines, with a maximum speed up to 280 km/h and with wind gusts of 315 km/h (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2017). Storm surges over 4 m, in addition to strong winds, devastated coastal communities and regions in its path (National Economic and Development Authority, 2013). Out of 730 tropical cyclones recorded in the country since 1970, Yolanda’s damage was the most extreme—the NDRRMC reported 6,300 dead, 1,063 missing, and 28,688 injured. Ninety-three percent of those who perished were from the Leyte region, with drowning as the main cause of death (NDRRMC, 2013). The typhoon damaged 1.2 million houses and affected more than 1.5 million families, 920,000 of which were displaced (National Economic and Development Authority, 2013; OPARR, 2014). The National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) calculated the direct economic loss to be about PhP 132.36 billion (USD 2.6 billion) (National Economic and Development Authority, 2013).

With the post-2010 NDRRMC structure, DSWD and NEDA were the two major national departments responsible for leading coordination for response and recovery. Due to the unprecedented scale of disaster, however, a united effort at the national level was considered more appropriate, rather than a response by agencies as organized in the NDRRMF. At the time, President Aquino III created the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (PARR) for rehabilitation and recovery in early December, within three weeks post-typhoon (Memorandum Order no. 62, s. 2013) (President of the Philippines, 2013). NEDA then prepared a rebuilding strategy, “Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda: Build Back Better (RAY),” to be approved by the president in following weeks. The document, along with funding needs, listed several key principles. These included: (1) efficient coordination among national departments and coordination to support flexible local recovery implementation; (2) inclusive and participatory reconstruction processes to address preexisting vulnerabilities; (3) partnership with the private sector for more inclusive and extensive recovery; and (4) the role and mandate of the Presidential Assistance on Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (PARR) to establish under the Office of the President (National Economic and Development Authority, 2013). PARR began operating in early January 2014, coordinating between national departments as well as with affected local governments to develop a comprehensive rehabilitation and recovery plan (CRRP) (International Research Institute of Disaster Science, 2016).

In facilitating national departments, agencies, and other relevant actors, PARR established five clusters to proceed with recovery. These included infrastructure, social services, resettlement, livelihood, and support clusters, each headed by DPWH, DSWD, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and NEDA & Department of Budget and Management (DBM) (Presidential Assistance for Rehabilitation and Recovery, 2014). Within nine months, PARR published “Yolanda Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan (CRRP),” an 8,000-page, eight-volume plan, incorporating plans prepared by 14 local governments affected by Yolanda. Of the entire PhP 167.86 billion (USD 3.32 billion) budget proposed for recovery, 21% was allocated for infrastructure to rehabilitate and improve infrastructure, 16% for social services to deliver basic services and healthy environment, 45% for resettlement “to relocate affected families living in hazard prone areas to safe areas,” and 18% for livelihood to “achieve inclusive, sustainable business and livelihoods” (OPARR, 2014). Besides the national effort, the private sector has played an important role in the recovery effort; more than 1,250 private organizations have pledged to contribute a total of PhP 26.3 billion (USD 520 million) for recovery by summer of 2014 (International Research Institute of Disaster Science, 2015).

Reconstruction leadership by PARR, however, was not in place for long after the CRRP was completed. In April 2015, about a year and a half after Yolanda, the President signed Memorandum order No 79, s. 2015. This provided “the institutional mechanism for the monitoring of rehabilitation and recovery programs, projects, and activities for Yolanda-affected areas” as “conditions [of affected areas] begin to normalize, the functions of PARR can now be subsumed under the regular functions of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) and other relevant agencies under Republic Act (RA) No. 10121, or the ‘Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council of 2010’” (President of the Philippines, 2015). With this memorandum, recovery-related responsibilities on programs, projects, and activities (PPAs) formerly under PARR transferred to the NDRRMC vice-chair, NEDA, to lead recovery. Five clusters and chairpersons remained the same as originally proposed by PARR. The E-management Platform: Accountability and Transparency Hub for Yolanda (eMPATHY) established by PARR was also transferred to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), who monitors NDRRMF in the NDRRMC, to centrally keep records on recovery budget expenditures. In addition, NEDA coordinated meetings with the five clusters to keep up with recovery effort. With NEDA’s presence, chair organizations for each cluster called for meetings and received information regarding ongoing efforts and progress in affected areas, through regional offices of the participating agencies.

Another turnaround was when the president signed “Creation of an Inter-Agency Task Force for the Unified Implementation and Monitor of Rehabilitation and Recovery Projects and Programs in the Yolanda-affected Areas (IATF)” in August 2017 (President of the Philippines, 2017). The Administrative Order (AO) underscored the need to establish an effective and efficient coordinating body to boost recovery efforts, which has been widely understood as lacking due to lack of coordination among government agencies. One highlight of this AO was the broadened members of the task force; the new members were appointed based on local needs, from agencies that represent recovery importance. These included agencies and departments of: agriculture, education, land registration, water, electricity, irrigation, and coconuts. Additionally, local representatives of national agencies gained more responsibility, which was particularly evident with the Office of the Presidential Assistant for the Visayas (OPAV) being appointed as co-chairpersons under the Cabinet Secretary. Additional important aspects in this AO are: first, the IATF was mandated to receive consultations from communities and non-government organizations upon developing programs and projects (section 3); second, state universities and colleges as well as local governments were tasked to help promote recovery programs and implementations (section 5); and third, the relevant agencies were authorized to charge their needed funds to promote programs and actions through the approval of DBM (section 8) (President of the Philippines, 2017).

Throughout the years since Yolanda, national governments have proactively led rebuilding efforts by continuously designating recovery roles to relevant organizations and platforms—from PARR to NEDA and then to IATF—reflecting the transforming nature of recovery needs with time. Regardless, recovery was not as easy as aid for several reasons. First, coordination was not as functional as desired. Initially, cluster meetings were held at least once or twice a month to update and share the situation of the affected areas, and then to decide on programs to continue. Eventually as programs and implementation for recovery begun to take shape, meetings became more infrequent as needs focused more on implementing and monitoring efforts. Coordination turned to be increasingly difficult once programs began—for instance, changing the proportion of responsibilities or amount of the allocated funding among agencies was almost impossible even if the affected areas’ needs changed. Second, affected local governments were required to develop and submit rehabilitation and reconstruction plans to PARR. Since 1991 with the local government code in effect, local governments are responsible for planning, funding, and implementing their development. This is also the case for recovery efforts. However, the capacity to plan and implement, especially under post-typhoon devastation, varied considerably between local governments. Unsurprisingly, recovery plans submitted by the local governments were often incomplete, or revealed a significant gap between the DRRM efforts and local planning efforts, as preparing such documents were new experiences for many (Santos, Toda, Orduna, Santos, & Ferrao, 2016). Third, the funding amount that local governments could spend for recovery varied. Although RA 10121 states local governments can secure a minimum of 5% from the general revenue for calamities (LDRRM fund), many local governments, especially the smaller ones, had not done so. Regardless of the typhoon devastation, local governments’ size of the general fund greatly affected the amount they were able to pool for DRRM funding, thus influencing the volume of recovery effort that could take place. Additionally, due to discrepancies between local needs and national projects, hard-hit local governments continued struggling to rebuild.

RA 10121 Sunset Review

Section 27 of RA 10121 requires a sunset review—a systematic evaluation by the Congressional Oversight Committee to understand overall accomplishments, impacts, and performance of the act—to be conducted within five years or upon a need to adjust the structure of the natural disaster governance (President of the Philippines, 2010). There are several key points discussed in the review, and it largely is a response to hard lessons learnt from Yolanda. First, typhoon Yolanda proved that the current governance structure to cope with disasters continued to be reactive (Blanco, 2015; Commission on Audit, 2014). One of the main factors behind this was the unprecedented size and impacts of the typhoon; greater than the NDRRMC or the governmental agencies ever imagined. Coordination and collaboration among national departments, agencies, and local governments to respond and recover from such a disaster were much more complicated than expected. Additionally, cross coordination among the four pillars of the DRRM approach—prevention and mitigation, preparedness, response, and rehabilitation and recovery—was not as useful after the unprecedented natural disaster (Blanco et al., 2009). Second, practicing the BBB concept in recovery was more challenging than anticipated. Soon after Yolanda, a national level agency to lead and oversee recovery, in addition to the NDRRMC’s operations under normalcy, was required for efficient coordination under strong leadership. Ideally, five clusters could lead coordinated recovery efforts, yet collaboration issues persisted as related agencies continued to have day-to-day duties which discouraged additional cooperation (Commission on Audit, 2014).

Besides learning from Yolanda, an important discussion stemming from the RA10121 revision is the role of NDRRMC. With the current mandate, the council has no power beyond coordinating agencies and organizations involved, making policies, and advising presidents and agencies on DRRM implementation. Additionally, NDRRMC as a council has no budget to use, and thereby relies on national departments to implement DRRM related actions and programs. This limited power over the budget sets back their effort to promote DRRM. For instance, DRRM funds used between 2014 and 2016 were significantly larger than previous years, as a large portion was allocated for Yolanda recovery (Senate Economic Planning Office, 2017). For 2017, the allocation decreased by half compared to the previous year, which explains the funds are mainly used for responding to disasters (Senate Economic Planning Office, 2017; Villacin, 2017). Another issue is that work to be held by members of the NDRRMC overlap with the “Four pillars of DRRM” approach, thus creating inefficiency (Blanco et al., 2009).

The complex procedure required for local governments to take DRRM actions is another point of discussion. For instance, a local government request has to be submitted to a regional/local DRRMC and to a regional OCD, next to regional OCD to national OCD, and then to NDRRMC for approval of the president. If this was a fund request, approval will then be forwarded to the DBM to process the fund release (Commission on Audit, 2014). This funding process requires local governments to submit project proposals and certifications to national governments, which require considerable effort especially under disaster devastation and urgency. A simplified governance structure is needed.

Aside from the coordinating issue, there has been minimal involvement of civil society organizations and private sectors in the actual DRRM initiatives, although this is underlined in RA 10121. These alternative actors saw themselves as excluded from plan development and decision making in the post-Yolanda rebuilding process (see SURGE, 2015). The collection of positioning papers from CSOs and NGOs, as in the SURGE document, suggest a need for local actors to be incorporated into the central structure for more power for DRRM decisions (2015).

Climate Change Efforts

Aside from the RA 10121 evaluation, ways to incorporate climate change efforts with DRRM efforts has been another important discussion point. Since 2009, the Philippines has begun to underscore the importance of protecting and advancing “the right of the people to a healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature” and vowed to “cooperate with the global community in the resolution of climate change issues, including disaster risk reduction” (RA 9729, section 2). A Climate Change Commission was established with a national government agency status, attached to the Office of the President, to create climate change policies through coordination, monitoring, and evaluation of relevant programs and action plans (Congress of the Philippines, 2009). The president serves as the chairperson and appoints three non-stationary commissioners every six years. While its efforts are tailored to slow-onset disasters such as risks from climate change (e.g., rising sea levels, as well as increasing severity of droughts, fires, floods, and storms), poverty and biodiversity goals are shared with the RA 10121 to empower vulnerable communities from natural threats. Later in 2012, RA 10184 established the People’s Survival Fund by amending Section 18 of the original Act (Congress of the Philippines, 2012). This fund was created to pool a certain amount of the budget, enabling local governments and local community organizations in vulnerable areas to carry out projects related to climate change adaptation.

It is still too early to assess the impact of RA 9729 and the People’s Survival Fund. With RA 9829, all local governments seeking financial assistance are required to prepare a Local Climate Change Action Plans (LCCAP) (Republic of the Philippines, 2018). This is an opportunity for local governments to review their vulnerabilities on climate risk, poverty, and biodiversity. However, such planning exercises are often too complicated for local governments, as special skill sets such as vulnerability assessments are required. As result, only a few local governments submit proposals. It is hoped that this will change. In reality, requiring such an exercise could become another layer of burden to local governments, and whether to merge or keep distinctive Climate Change and DRRM efforts continues to be a point of discussion.

Restructuring Institutional Setup for Better Disaster Governance

While various discussions occurred within the different spectrums, one main consensus point was the need to create a permanent agency to manage and reduce disasters. DRRM advocates believe that such an agency could carry responsibilities beyond simply policy development and advisory provisions pushing DRRM efforts. Discussions are currently pointing toward establishment of a department-level body, replacing the current coordinating council so that its existence is more sustainable, accountable, and credible. Coordination will be also streamlined so that decisions and actions will be more efficiently carried out. Two options are proposed: one is to scale up the current NDRRMC chair, OCD, to a department level separating it from the Department of National Defense (DND). This way the new department will maintain the DRRM’s four-pillar approach, which has been the foundation of the Philippines’ disaster governance since 2010 (e.g., Salceda, 2017). The second option is to create a new department-level agency—that may contain “resiliency” in its title—by restructuring the current governmental structure. The OCD would continue to be the lead in this new agency, and offices from other departments would be transferred into the new department (e.g., Ejercito, 2017). One of the questions raised for this second proposal is whether the scientific offices currently positioned under DOST would be better or worse off once it transformed into a disaster agency. On the one hand, it could be beneficial for the new agency to have in-house scientific offices; on the other, it could lose its scientific identity, which may be harmful to the country in the long term. The idea of having a “resiliency” agency originally emerged from President Duterte’s State of the Nation Address in 2017, with him calling to “craft a law establishing a new authority or department that is responsive to the prevailing 21st century conditions and empowered to best deliver [an] enhanced disaster resiliency and quick disaster response” (Philstar, 2017).

Toward More Effective Governance

A longitudinal review of disaster governance in the Philippines can explain the transformation from civil defense to civil participation, extreme events response (mainly addressing wars) to natural disaster response, top-down centralized approach to inclusive and varied approach, responsive approach to proactive approach, and disaster response coordination to disaster-risk reduction.

Because initiation of disaster management governance in the 1940s stemmed from a mission to protect people from war, the notion of disaster management throughout the 1950s was about protecting people from extreme manmade events rather than from natural disasters. It was therefore not until the late 1960s and early 1970s when national attention was directed toward responding to natural disaster by coordinating disaster operations. This was largely due to a sequence of natural disasters that devastated communities and revealed a lack of governmental capacity to respond adequately. Despite this change however, the words “Civil Defense” remained, as governance functions were still geared toward protecting the civilian population during war and other national emergencies during this time.

After a series of natural disasters in the 1970s, PD 1566 in 1978 developed a multi-governmental structure that aimed to manage natural disasters for the first time. The decree also mandated the national government to create a plan for communities and societies to prepare for natural disasters, as disaster management had become a central national concern. This institutional structure remained unchanged for the next three decades until a voice urging review of this system emerged. Advocates considered the system top-down, centralized, and narrowly defined within a scope of relief and response. With RA 10121 of 2010, the framework for disaster reduction and management saw a paradigm shift in its new structure from reactive to proactive, especially with its DRRM approach and funding system. This act was innovative in its inclusive governance, focusing more on the role of vulnerable populations, civil society organizations, and the private sector. RA 10121 has been evaluated as a legislation comprehensively written to cope with natural disasters from three decades of experience.

While there has been advancement in legislation, experiences from unprecedented typhoons and the subsequent reviews of legislation have raised several important aspects. First, the mega-typhoon exposed how well-intentioned legislation and governance structures actually perform after an actual disaster. The NDRRMC did not take a central role during the initial stage of recovery, and initiatives for direct recovery operation brought several coordinating complications to the forefront. The result was the creation of several short-lived national-level recovery groups, including the PARR. Besides national efforts, local governments—especially the smaller ones—struggled to create recovery plans, seek funding, and implement projects. Ideally, decentralizing powers to local governments should promote their independence and creativity; however, this is largely dependent on available resources. Collaboration with civil society organizations and private sector has also been a challenge. While new governance allowed non-governmental actors to participate in DRRM, it resulted in more work for the governmental staff. Typhoon Yolanda revealed various shortcomings of the current governance scheme as well as shortcomings of funding arrangements, both of which prevented an efficient rebuilding process.

Second, there are pros and cons to having a permanent department for DRRM. By making an agency permanent, personnel and funding resources will be more stable, and advancing DRRM efforts may be easier. Having and handling a collective power—whether aiming for resiliency or civil defense—is a question yet to be answered. There is a sensitive balance between advancing development first versus pushing disaster impact reduction efforts to the forefront. The idea of attaching scientific agencies to the new department-level agency could best exemplify this. Combining the two would benefit the agency by providing a direct flow of information. However, detaching them from the science and technology department may potentially jeopardize their mission. Similarly, having DRRM efforts upfront would hinder other basic developments—for example infrastructure, education, and economy—which is critical for a nation’s development. Additionally, having a super body streamlined toward effective DRRM may potentially exclude varied participatory and innovative opportunities. While the current council-led governing structure showed its vulnerability upon swift rebuilding, it undeniably allowed non-government actors to participate and created spaces for different ideas and actions.

Arguably, an important part of preparing for unexpected natural disasters is the development of a science-based disaster scenario and plan for contingencies. Developing a disaster scenario requires bringing together scientific information related to hazards of multiple types, which can produce a visual output, such as hazard and risk maps. This process not only benefits stakeholders to understand hazards of different types in region; the ability to imagine disaster impacts in detail helps prepare them for contingencies. Additionally, developing scientific disaster scenarios can attract DRRM advocates, civil society organizations, private sector, and communities to communicate and prepare on the same ground, as seen in the project developed to reduce the impact of a large earthquake in Metro Manila in early 2000. The scenario development exercise is powerful because it can be developed at different scales, whether at the metropolitan, regional, or local level. This allows stakeholders to prepare for new and large-scale disasters. However, such exercises have not been widely adopted in disaster governance efforts.

Mainstreaming disaster management has been trending worldwide. Yet there is no consensus on how and to what extent disaster impact reduction efforts should be prioritized over basic development efforts. As the world becomes more democratic, participatory, and inclusive, larger coordination efforts and openness to new ideas will be required. Scientific tools, particularly disaster scenario modeling, could support different actors to communicate inclusively to prepare for unexperienced disasters. Along with securing DRRM legislation for better governance, scientific tools for imagining disasters and communicating with stakeholders is a key component for disaster risk reduction and management.

Acknowledgments

The authors extend their appreciation to all those who shared their time and knowledge during our multiple fieldwork trips during 2014 and 2017. The authors are also extremely grateful to the friendship provided by national government officials and Yolanda-affected city officials who are the DRRM advocates of the Philippines. Finally, the authors appreciate Beth Tamayose’s assistance with the manuscript and the anonymous reviewers and the editors for their helpful suggestions. This article was greatly improved by their efforts. This work was partially supported by JSPS Grants-in Aid Grant Number 16H05752 and Tohoku University.

Further Reading

Agsaoay-Sano, E. (2010). Advocacy and support work for the disaster risk reduction and management (DRRM) law in the Philippines. In P. Cruz, E. M. Ferrer, & M. C. Pagaduan (Eds.), Building disaster resilient communities: Stories and lessons from the Philippines (pp. 129–143). Quezon City, The Philippines: UP.Find this resource:

Asian Disaster Preparedness Center. (2001). The Philippine disaster management story: Issues and challenges. Pathumthani, Thailand: ADPC.Find this resource:

Blanco, D. V. (2015). Disaster governance in the Philippines: Issues, lessons learned, and future directions in the post-Yolanda super typhoon aftermath. International Journal of Public Administration, 38(10), 743–756.Find this resource:

Britton, N. (2007). National planning and response: National systems. In H. Rodriguez, E. Quarantelli, & R. Dynes (Eds.), Handbook of disaster research (pp. 347–367). New York, NY: Springer.Find this resource:

Commission on Audit. (2014). Disaster management practices in the Philippines: An assessment. Quezon City, The Philippines: COA.Find this resource:

Congress of the Philippines. (1991). RA 7160: An act providing for a local government code of 1991. Quezon City, The Philippines.Find this resource:

Congress of the Philippines (1994). RA 7924: An act creating the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, defining its powers and function, providing funds therefor and other purposes. Quezon City, The Philippines.Find this resource:

De La Poterie, A. T., & Baudoin, M. (2015). From Yokohama to Sendai: Approaches to participation in international disaster risk reduction frameworks. International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, 6(2), 128–139.Find this resource:

Domingo, S. N., & Olaguera, M. D. (2017). Have we institutionalized DRRM in the Philippines? (PN 2017-12). Quezon, The Philippines: Philippine Institute for Development Studies.Find this resource:

International Research Institute of Disaster Science. (2016). Typhoon Haiyan: Report on the ongoing process of building back better. Sendai, Japan: Tohoku University.Find this resource:

Iuchi, K., & Esnard, A. (2008). Earthquake impact mitigation in poor urban areas. Disaster Prevention and Management, 17(4), 454.Find this resource:

JICA. (2005). Earthquake impact reduction study for Metropolitan Manila. Tokyo, Japan: JICA.Find this resource:

National Economic and Development Authority. (2013). Reconstruction assistance on Yolanda: Build back better. Manila, The Philippines: National Economic and Development Authority.Find this resource:

Office of Civil Defense, the Philippines. (2011). National disaster risk reduction and management plan (NDRRMP) 2011‐2028. Quezon, The Philippines: Office of Civil Defense.Find this resource:

OPARR. (2014). Yolanda comprehensive rehabilitation and recovery plan. Manila, The Philippines: OPARR.Find this resource:

President of the Philippines. (1941). Executive Order 355: The civilian emergency administration and its service to the people. Manila, The Philippines.Find this resource:

President of the Philippines. (1968). Administrative order no. 151: Creating a national committee on disaster operations. Manila, The Philippines.Find this resource:

President of the Philippines. (1972). Letter of implementation no. 19, series of 1972, s.13. Manila, The Philippines.Find this resource:

President of the Philippines. (1974). Presidential Decree 477: To be known as the decree on local fiscal administration. Manila, The Philippines.Find this resource:

President of the Philippines. (1977). Presidential Decree 1096: Adopting a national building code of the Philippines (NBCP) thereby revising republic act numbered sixty-five hundred forty-one. Manila, The Philippines.Find this resource:

President of the Philippines. (1978). Presidential Decree 1566: Strengthening the Philippine disaster control, capability and establishing the national program on community disaster preparedness. Manila, The Philippines.Find this resource:

President of the Philippines. (2010). Republic Act 10121: An act strengthening the Philippine disaster risk reduction and management system, providing for the national disaster risk reduction and management framework and institutionalizing the national disaster risk reduction and management plan, appropriating funds therefor and for other purposes. Manila, The Philippines.Find this resource:

President of the Philippines. (2013). Providing for the functions of the presidential assistant for rehabilitation and recovery. Manila, The Philippines.Find this resource:

President of the Philippines. (2015). Memorandum order 79: Providing for the institutional mechanism for the monitoring of rehabilitation and recovery projects, and activities for Yolanda-affected areas. Manila, The Philippines.Find this resource:

President of the Philippines. (2017). Administrative order no. 5: Creation of an inter-agency task force for the unified implementation and monitor of rehabilitation and recovery projects and programs in the Yolanda-affected areas. Manila, The Philippines.Find this resource:

Santos, C., Toda, L., Orduna, J., Santos, F., & Ferrao, J. (2016). The impacts of typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines: Implications to land use planning. Climate, Disaster and Development Journal, 1(1), 57–66.Find this resource:

Villacin, D. T. (2017). A review of Philippine government disaster financing for recovery and reconstruction. PIDS Discussion Paper Series, No. 2017-21. Quezon City, The Philippines: Philippine Institute for Development Studies.Find this resource:

Wahlstrom, M. (2015). New Sendai framework strengthens focus on reducing disaster risk. International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, 6(2), 200–201.Find this resource:

Warren, J. F. (2013). A tale of two decades: Typhoons and floods, Manila and the provinces, and the Marcos years. The Asia Pacific Journal, 11(43), 1–21.Find this resource:

References

Agsaoay-Sano, E. (2010). Advocacy and support work for the disaster risk reduction and management (DRRM) law in the Philippines. In P. Cruz, E. M. Ferrer, & M. C. Pagaduan (Eds.), Building disaster resilient communities: Stories and lessons from the Philippines (pp. 129–143). Quezon City, The Philippines: UP.Find this resource:

Asian Disaster Preparedness Center. (2001). The Philippine disaster management story: Issues and challenges. Pathumthani, Thailand: ADPC.Find this resource:

Aurelio, M. A. (2004). Engineering geological and geohazard assessment (EGGA) system for sustainable infrastructure development: The Philippine experience. Engineering Geology for Sustainable Development in Mountainous Areas. Geological Society of Hong Kong. Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China.Find this resource:

Bankoff, G., & Hilhorst, D. (2009). The politics of risk in the Philippines: Comparing state and NGO perceptions of disaster management. Disasters, 33(4), 686–704.Find this resource:

Blanco, D. V. (2015). Disaster governance in the Philippines: Issues, lessons learned, and future directions in the post-Yolanda super typhoon aftermath. International Journal of Public Administration, 38(10), 743–756.Find this resource:

Blanco, H., Alberti, M., Olshansky, R. B., Chang, S., Wheeler, S. M., Randolph, J., . . . Watson, V. (2009). Shaken, shrinking, hot, impoverished and informal: Emerging research agendas in planning. Progress in Planning, 72(4), 195–250.Find this resource:

Briceno, S. (2015). Looking back and beyond Sendai: 25 years of international policy experience on disaster risk reduction. International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, 6(1), 1–7.Find this resource:

Britton, N. (2007). National planning and response: National systems. In H. Rodriguez, E. Quarantelli, & R. Dynes (Eds.), Handbook of disaster research (pp. 347–367). New York, NY: Springer.Find this resource:

Commission on Audit. (2014). Disaster management practices in the Philippines: An assessment. Quezon City, The Philippines: COA.Find this resource:

Congress of the Philippines. (1991). RA 7160: An act providing for a local government code of 1991. Quezon City, The Philippines.Find this resource:

Congress of the Philippines. (2009). RA 9729: An act mainstreaming climate change into government policy formulations, establishing the framework strategy and program on climate change, creating for this purpose the climate change commission, and for other purposes. Quezon City, The Philippines.Find this resource:

Congress of the Philippines. (2012). RA 10174: An act establishing the people’s survival fund to provide long-term finance streams to enable the government to effectively address the problem of climate change, amending for the purpose Republic Act no. 9729, otherwise known as the ‘Climate Change Act of 2009,’ and for other purposes. Quezon City, The Philippines.Find this resource:

De La Poterie, A. T., & Baudoin, M. (2015). From Yokohama to Sendai: Approaches to participation in international disaster risk reduction frameworks. International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, 6(2), 128–139.Find this resource:

Domingo, S. N., & Olaguera, M. D. (2017). Have we institutionalized DRRM in the Philippines? (PN 2017-12). Quezon: Philippine Institute for Development Studies.Find this resource:

Ejercito, J. (2017). SB 1553: An act creating the department of disaster and emergency management, defining its powers and functions, appropriating funds therefore, and for other purposes. Pasay City, The Philippines.Find this resource:

Forino, G., Meding, J. V., & Brewer, G. J. (2015). A conceptual governance framework for climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction integration. International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, 6(4), 372–384.Find this resource:

Gordon, A. (1973). The great Philippine floods of 1972. Weather, 28(10), 404–415.Find this resource:

Haas, E. (1978). The Philippine earthquake and tsunami disaster: A reexamination of behavioral propositions. Disasters, 2(1), 3–11.Find this resource:

Heijmans, A., & Victoria, L. (2001). Experiences and practices in disaster management of the citizen’s disaster response network in the Philippines. (No. CBDO-DR). Quezon City, The Philippines: Center for Disaster Preparedness.Find this resource:

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. (2004). The Philippines: Typhoons revised appeal no. 26/200. Geneva, Switzerland: IFRC.

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. (2017). Emergency appeal final report Philippines: Typhoon Haiyan. Geneva, Switzerland: IFRC.

International Research Institute of Disaster Science. (2015). IRIDeS fact-finding missions to Philippines. Sendai, Japan: Tohoku University.Find this resource:

International Research Institute of Disaster Science. (2016). Typhoon Haiyan: Report on the ongoing process of building back better. Sendai, Japan: Tohoku University.Find this resource:

Iuchi, K., & Esnard, A. (2008). Earthquake impact mitigation in poor urban areas. Disaster Prevention and Management, 17(4), 454.Find this resource:

JICA. (2005). Earthquake impact reduction study for Metropolitan Manila. Tokyo, Japan: JICA.Find this resource:

JICA. (2017). Data collection survey for strategy development of disaster risk reduction and management sector in the republic of the Philippines. Final Report. Tokyo, Japan: JICA.Find this resource:

Kelman, I. (2015). Climate change and the Sendai framework for disaster risk reduction. International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, 6(2), 117–127.Find this resource:

Lorna, V. (2003). Community-based disaster management in the Philippines: Making a difference in people’s lives. Philippine Sociological Review, 51, 65–80.Find this resource:

Luna, E. M. (2001). Disaster mitigation and preparedness: The case of NGOs in the Philippines. Disasters, 25(3), 216–226.Find this resource:

Mendoza, M. J. (2014). The policies, practices and politics of dealing with disasters (master’s thesis). Erasmus University.Find this resource:

Nakamura, R., Takahiro, O., Shibayama, T., Miguel, E., & Takagi, H. (2015). Evaluation of storm surge caused by typhoon Yolanda (2013) and using weather—storm surge—wave—tide model.

National Economic and Development Authority. (2013). Reconstruction assistance on Yolanda: Build back better. Manila, The Philippines: National Economic and Development Authority.Find this resource:

NDCC. (1999). Memorandum Order No. 2 s. 1999, re: Policies, Guidelines, and Procedures on Calamity Fund Management. Quezon, The Philippines: NDRRMC.Find this resource:

NDRRMC. (2011). National disaster risk reduction and management framework (NDRRMF). Quezon City, The Philippines: NDRRMC.Find this resource:

NDRRMC. (2013). Final reports regarding effects of typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan) 06–09 November 2013. Quezon City, The Philippines: NDRRMC.Find this resource:

NEDA. (2004). Medium-term Philippine development plan 2004–2010. Quezon City, The Philippines: NEDA.Find this resource:

NEDA. (2011). Philippine development plan 2011–2016. Quezon City, The Philippines: NEDA.Find this resource:

NEDA. (2017). Philippine development plan 2017–2022. Quezon City, The Philippines: NEDA.Find this resource:

NEDA, UNDP, & ECHA. (2008). Mainstreaming disaster risk reduction in subnational development and land Use/Physical planning in the Philippines. Manila, The Philippines: NEDA.Find this resource:

NOAH. (2018). Nation wide operational assessment of hazards. Quezon City, The Philippines: University of the Philippines.

Office of Civil Defense, the Philippines. (2011). National disaster risk reduction and management plan (NDRRMP) 2011–2028. Quezon City, The Philippines: Office of Civil Defense.Find this resource:

Office of the President, the Philippines. (1999). Memorandum order no. 02, s-1999: Policies, guidelines, and procedures on calamity fund management. Manila, The Philippines.Find this resource:

OPARR. (2014). Yolanda comprehensive rehabilitation and recovery plan. Manila, The Philippines: OPARR.Find this resource:

Philippines Statistic Authority. (2016a). Highlights of the Philippine population 2015 census of population. Quezon City, The Philippines.

Philippines Statistic Authority. (2016b). Population of the national capital region (based on the 2015 census of population). Quezon City, The Philippines.

Philstar. (2017, July 25). Full text of Duterte’s state of the nation address 2017. PhilstarFind this resource:

PHIVOLCS. (2018). Casiguran earthquake—02 August 1968. Quezon City, The Philippines: PHIVOLCS.

Presidential Assistance for Rehabilitation and Recovery. (2014). Yolanda rehabilitation and recovery efforts. Manila, The Philippines: PARR.Find this resource:

President of the Philippines. (1941). Executive Order 355: The civilian emergency administration and its service to the people. Manila, The Philippines.Find this resource:

President of the Philippines. (1968). Administrative order no. 151: Creating a national committee on disaster operations. Manila, The Philippines.Find this resource:

President of the Philippines. (1972). Letter of implementation no. 19, series of 1972, s.13. Manila, The Philippines.Find this resource:

President of the Philippines. (1974). Presidential Decree 477: To be known as the decree on local fiscal administration. Manila, The Philippines.Find this resource:

President of the Philippines. (1977). Presidential Decree 1096: Adopting a national building code of the Philippines (NBCP) thereby revising republic act numbered sixty-five hundred forty-one. Manila, The Philippines.Find this resource:

President of the Philippines. (1978). Presidential Decree 1566: Strengthening the Philippine disaster control, capability and establishing the national program on community disaster preparedness. Manila, The Philippines.Find this resource:

President of the Philippines. (1982). Executive Order 784: Reorganizing the national science development board and its agencies into a national science and technology authority and for related purposes. Manila, The Philippines.Find this resource:

President of the Philippines. (2010). Republic Act 10121: An act strengthening the Philippine disaster risk reduction and management system, providing for the national disaster risk reduction and management framework and institutionalizing the national disaster risk reduction and management plan, appropriating funds therefore and for other purposes. Manila, The Philippines.Find this resource:

President of the Philippines. (2013). Providing for the functions of the presidential assistant for rehabilitation and recovery. Manila, The Philippines.Find this resource:

President of the Philippines. (2015). Memorandum order 79: Providing for the institutional mechanism for the monitoring of rehabilitation and recovery projects, and activities for Yolanda-affected areas. Manila, The Philippines.Find this resource:

President of the Philippines. (2017). Administrative order no. 5: Creation of an inter-agency task force for the unified implementation and monitor of rehabilitation and recovery projects and programs in the Yolanda-affected areas. Manila, The Philippines.Find this resource:

Republic of the Philippines. (2018). About people’s survival fund. Manila, The Philippines: Climate Change Commission.Find this resource:

Salceda, J. (2017). HB 6076: An act creating the department of disaster resiliency and defining its powers and functions, appropriating funds therefor and for other purposes. Quezon City, The Philippines.Find this resource:

Santos, C., Toda, L., Orduna, J., Santos, F., & Ferrao, J. (2016). The impacts of typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines: Implications to land use planning. Climate, Disaster and Development Journal, 1(1), 57–66.Find this resource:

Sato, T., & Nakasu, T. (2011). 2009 Typhoon Ondoy flood disasters in Metro Manila. Natural Disaster Research Report of the National Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster Prevention, 45, 63–74.Find this resource:

Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines. (1945). Republic act 1190: An act to provide for the civil defense in time of war or other national emergency, creating a national civil defense administration, and for other purposes. Quezon City, The Philippines.Find this resource:

Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines. (1996). Republic Act 8185: An Act amending Section 324 (d) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the local government code of 1991. Quezon City, The Philippines.Find this resource:

Senate Economic Planning Office. (2017). Examining the Philippines’ disaster risk reduction and management system. No. PB-17-01. Manila, The Philippines: Policy Brief.Find this resource:

Shaw, T. (2015). Earthquake risk management, local governance, and community participation in manila. In R. Shaw, H. Srinivas, & A. Sharma (Eds.), Urban risk reduction: An Asian perspective (pp. 119–149). Bingley: Emerald.Find this resource:

Stewart, G. S., & Cohn, S. N. (1979). The 1976 august 16, Mindanao, Philippine earthquake (Ms=7.8)—evidence for a subduction zone south of Mindanao. Geophysical Journal International, 56(1), 51–65.Find this resource:

SURGE. (2015). Towards the scaling up of resilience in governance: Collection of position papers for the sunset review of republic act no. 10121. SURGE.Find this resource:

UNISDR. (2015). Disaster risk reduction and resilience in the 2030 agenda for sustainable development. Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR.Find this resource:

UNISDR. (2018). UNISDR history. Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR.Find this resource:

United Nations. (1989). International decade for natural disaster reduction, A/RES/44/236. Geneva, Switzerland: UN.Find this resource:

United Nations. (1999). International decade for natural disaster reduction: Successor arrangements, A/RES/54/219. Geneva, Switzerland: UN.Find this resource:

United Nations. (2005). Report of the world conference on disaster reduction. 18–22 January 2005: A/CONF.206/6, Kobe, Japan: UN.Find this resource:

United Nations. (2015). Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, A/CONF.224/CRP.1. Sendai, Japan: UN.Find this resource:

UNU-EHS. (2016). World risk report 2016 (focus: Logistics and infrastructure). Bonn, Germany: Alliance Development & Work. UNU-EHS.Find this resource:

USGS. (2018). M 7.9—Mindanao, Philippines. Virginia, The US: USGS.Find this resource:

Villacin, D. T. (2017). A review of Philippine government disaster financing for recovery and reconstruction. PIDS Discussion Paper Series, No. 2017-21. Quezon City, The Philippines: Philippine Institute for Development Studies.Find this resource:

Wahlstrom, M. (2015). New Sendai framework strengthens focus on reducing disaster risk. International Journal of Disaster Risk Science, 6(2), 200–201.Find this resource:

Warren, J. F. (2013). A tale of two decades: Typhoons and floods, Manila and the provinces, and the Marcos years. The Asia Pacific Journal, 11(43), 1–21.Find this resource:

Appendix 1: List of Acronyms

AO

Administrative Order

BBB

Build Back Better

CEA

Civil Emergency Administration

COP 21

Conference of the Parties 21

CRRP

Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan

CSOs

Civil Society Organizations

DBM

Department of Budget and Management

DCCs

(local) Disaster Coordinating Councils

DENR

Department of Environmental and Natural Resources

DILG

Department of Interior and Local Government

DND

Department of National Defense

DOST

Department of Science and Technology

DRRM

Disaster Risk Reduction and Management

DSWD

Department of Social Welfare and Development

EGGA

Engineering Geological and Geohazard Assessment

EIA

Environmental Impact Assessment

eMPATHY

E-management Platform: Accountability and Transparency Hub for Yolanda

EO

Executive Order

HFA

Hyogo Framework for Action

HUDCC

Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council

IATF

Inter-Agency Task Force for the Unified Implementation and Monitor of Rehabilitation and Recovery Projects and Programs in the Yolanda-affected Areas

IDNDR

International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction

ISDR

International Strategy for Disaster Reduction

JICA

Japan International Cooperation Agency

LCCAP

Local Climate Change Action Plans

LDRRMF

Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund

LGUs

Local Government Units

MMDA

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority

MTPDP

Medium-Term Philippines Development Plan

NCDA

National Civil Defense Administration

NCDC

National Civil Defense Council

NCR

National Capital Region

NDCC

National Disaster Coordinating Council

NDRRM Fund

National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund

NDRRMC

National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council

NDRRMF

National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Framework

NDRRMP

National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan

NEC

National Emergency Commission

NEDA

National Economic Development Authority

NOAH

Nationwide Operational Assessment of Hazards

OCD

Office of Civil Defense

OPAV

Office of the Presidential Assistant for the Visayas

PAGASA

Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration

PARR

Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery

PD

Presidential Decree

PDRA

Pre-Disaster Risk Assessment

PHIVOLCS

Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology

PPAs

(recovery related responsibilities on) Programs, Projects, and Activities

QRF

Quick Response Fund

RA

Repubic Act

RAY

Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda

RDCC

Regional Disaster Coordinating Councils

REINA

Real, Infanta, and Nakar (region)

SDGs

Sustainable Development Goals

SOP

Standard Operating Procedure

SURGE

Strengthening Urban Resilience for Growth with Equity

Notes:

(1.) The Great Philippine Floods of 1972 also led to the creation of the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) through Presidential Decree no. 78 (PD78), by reorganizing the Weather Bureau under the Department of National Defense in the same year.

(2.) Metropolitan Manila, provincial, and municipal governments represent three types of local governments.

(3.) The conversion rate used in this article is 0.0198 (1 PhP to USD), which is the year average for 2017.

(4.) This initiative eventually led to implementation of the Metro Manila Earthquake Impact Reduction Study (MMEIRS), funded by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).

(5.) With EO 249 of 1987, provinces, cities, and municipalities in the Philippines were reclassified into six categories, in accordance with average annual income for taxation purposes. For provinces and cities (excepting Manila and Quezon City), classes are categorized with the annual income of: 30 million pesos or more (first class); 20 to 30 million pesos (second class); 15 to 20 million pesos (third class); 10 to 15 million pesos (fourth class); 5 to 10 million pesos (fifth class); and less than 5 million pesos (sixth class). Municipalities are also classified into six categories, but the annual average income ceiling is smaller.