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date: 29 June 2022

The Indigenous Roots of the American Revolutionfree

The Indigenous Roots of the American Revolutionfree

  • Kristofer RayKristofer RayDepartment of History, University of Hull

Summary

Euro-Americans existed firmly on the periphery of an Indigenous North America in 1763, hubristic claims of continental sovereignty notwithstanding. Nowhere is this reality more clear than in the Ohio Valley and Illinois Country. Try as it might, the post-1763 British Empire could not assume jurisdictional control over this space. Even to begin to try was a task requiring significant investment—both in terms of more systematic Indigenous diplomacy and in terms of reforming colonial political structures unfit to accommodate imperial western policy. North American officials understood the problems quite well and were willing to spearhead reform. Between 1763 and 1775 they supported increased investment to defray North American expenses. They called for programs that would end colonial corruption, something they feared undermined Indigenous diplomacy and made a mockery of the rule of law. Ultimately, they concluded that centralizing Indian affairs offered the best means by which to stabilize North America. Colonials (generally) and speculators and their surveyor corps (specifically) powerfully disagreed, however, seeing Indian country as an untapped resource and imperial restraints as threats to local autonomy. They rejected the idea of centralizing power over Indigenous affairs and used the rhetoric of British constitutional liberty to reframe corrupt behavior into something it emphatically was not.

Subjects

  • Revolutionary History
  • Native American History
  • Western History

Indigenous North America after the Seven Years’ War

On August 26, 1764 British Lieutenant Thomas Morris embarked on a mission from Point aux Cedrés on Lake Erie. Its purpose was twofold: (1) to travel the Ohio River to proclaim British jurisdiction over the Pays des Illinois, as mandated by the 1763 Treaty of Paris; and (2) to appeal for peace with Indigenous polities then supporting attacks on (the newly acquired) Fort Detroit. Within days Morris became acutely aware that both missions would fail. Long before it could come close to the Ohio, unhappy Odawas and Twightwees (Miamis) diverted the expedition to towns along the Maumee River. Once there, Odawa sachem Pontiac proclaimed not only that “the English were liars” but that “his father (the french [sic] king) was not crushed (rubbing one hand over ye other) as they said.” He then presented Morris a letter “full of the most improbable falshoods [sic]” that the French Empire was encouraging westward Indigenous nations to block the extension of British jurisdiction in the Ohio Valley. A few days later, in a powerful display of performative symbolism, an unnamed sachem wearing a British military uniform informed Morris that Twightwees could not trust the English. Adding insult to injury was the fact that an unnamed Mohawk absconded with the expedition’s supplies, while Shawnees and Lenapes (Delawares) urged neutral Twightwee headmen to destroy the expedition before it could proceed further.1

All told Morris spent roughly three weeks in the upper Ohio Valley. When not fearing the imminence of his death he described an Indigenous world of remarkable pace and complexity. Kickapoos entered into and left the Miami towns in which he was detained, no doubt reporting their observations to their leadership upon their return to the Pays des Illinois. Odawas would have reinforced those observations in their travels between Lake Erie and Illinois. When Shawnees and Lenapes departed Miami country, some went to Ouiatanon on the Wabash River to encourage Wea Miamis to kill everyone on Morris’s expedition. Still others left to confer with St. Joseph’s River Potawatamis.2

Morris’s experience illuminates a world wherein Europeans existed firmly on the periphery, hubristic claims of continental sovereignty notwithstanding. In this world, the British Empire could not simply assume control. To do so would require significant investment, both diplomatically and through the reformation of colonial political structures incapable of supporting imperial western policies. North American officials like Commander in Chief Thomas Gage, Northern Indian Superintendent Sir William Johnson, Southern Indian Superintendent John Stuart, and their support networks understood the problems quite well and were willing to spearhead reform. Between 1763 and 1775 they supported increased investment to defray North American expenses. They called for policies that would end colonial corruption, something they feared undermined Indigenous diplomacy and made a mockery of the rule of law. Ultimately, they concluded that centralizing Indian affairs offered the best means by which to stabilize North America.

Many colonials disagreed strenuously. Land speculators (and their surveyors) particularly saw Indian country as an untapped resource, and as a result came to feel that imperial restraints threatened local autonomy. Rejecting the idea of centralizing power over Indigenous affairs they deployed rhetoric of constitutional liberty and reframed corrupt behavior as something it was not.

In short, to make sense of the American Revolution scholars must view European concerns through the lens of western, Indigenous realities. From Indian country, centralizing power, tax policy, and imperial reform take on an entirely different meaning.

Historiographical Moorings

Historians have come a long way since the days when Whig rhetoric provided blanket explanations for the causes of the Revolution. Few scholars, for example, accept that ideas or constitutionalism alone can explain the demise of the British North American Empire. Most concede the impact made by customs abuse and other forms of corruption upon the colonial/imperial rule of law. It is far more common for 21st-century historians than their 20th-century counterparts to address the contradiction between the rhetoric of liberty and the reality of slavery in North America. And such diligence has led several scholars to rethink the importance of trans-Appalachia to the revolutionary narrative. Historian Francois Furstenberg has gone so far as to suggest that the fate of the west represented “the great problem of North American, and perhaps even Atlantic, history from 1754 to 1815.”3 Along with work by historians such as Kathleen DuVal and Claudio Saunt, Furstenberg’s description of a trans-Appalachian war to control the continent represents a major leap forward in demythologizing the era.4

But if these sophisticated narratives remind audiences that affairs on the continent go well beyond the thirteen seaboard colonies, they nevertheless do not attempt systematically to explore the west as a cause of the Revolution. This “origins” story remains overwhelmingly focused upon the “east.” It is vital, then, for scholars to explore the Indigenous roots of the American Revolution.

The West and the Revolutionary Narrative

Fully understanding the impact of Indian Country on the rise and fall of British North America (rather than vice versa) requires scholars to begin in the 17th century. Spatial limitations make that impossible, so perhaps the best alternative is to accept Furstenberg’s starting point of the Seven Years’ War. That war concluded with the 1763 Treaty of Paris, wherein imperial France agreed to vacate most of their claims to North America. No one in trans-Appalachia immediately understood the decision, however, and the lack of clarity—combined with a French presence that would linger into the 19th century—reinforced autonomous decisions by Indigenous polities neither to accept or to encourage the permanence of British extension. In the upper Ohio Valley Wyandots, Shawnees, and Lenapes explicitly moved against the British army. Simultaneously the Anishnaabeg (Odawas, Ojibwes, and Potawatamis)—the “masters of empire” in the Great Lakes region—converged upon Detroit.5 At roughly the same moment a British expedition under Major Arthur Loftus left New Orleans to claim Illinois, only to give up before it reached Natchez due to Indigenous challenges in the lower Mississippi Valley. Thomas Morris’s expedition took place less than a year thereafter, and expeditions subsequent to Morris’s met with similar shock and disappointment.

The failure to extend meaningful jurisdiction, combined with the specter of continued western violence, produced two immediate results: (1) His Majesty’s government agreed to limit colonial westward movement in 1763 (more on that point to come); and (2) it convinced newly appointed Commander in Chief General Thomas Gage that the British Army remained on a war footing. That realization was an expensive one, requiring as it did the maintenance of fortifications, the presence of meaningful troop levels, and a high volume of trade goods for diplomacy. The difficulty of the situation became even greater in light of the fact that the post-1763 empire was drowning in debt and already looking to reform what it saw as corruption in North American finances. New tax regulations in 1765 and 1767, along with a greater willingness on the part of local populations to accommodate soldiers as they journeyed west, would alleviate some of the pressure.

Gage’s immediate thought, however, was that he would need to call on Indigenous support. Invoking the fiction of the Covenant Chain, he requested that the Six Nations subdue their western “props of the Longhouse” attacking Detroit.6 Shortly thereafter he invoked a thirty-plus-year-old Anglo-Cherokee Chain of Friendship by ordering Southern Indian Superintendent John Stuart to inquire whether “it may be possible to engage the Cherokees perhaps, to Seize the Persons & Goods of [French] Traders, as they go up the Ohio.”7 “Understanding that Nation extends [to the mouth of the Ohio],” he wrote to Stuart, and that they were “almost the only Indians who trade at Fort Massiac,” with the right gifts and diplomatic initiatives they could expedite British jurisdictional control.8

Insinuating the empire once again into inter-Indigenous geopolitics had disastrous consequences, not the least reason being that Gage unwittingly put the cash-strapped empire in the middle of palpable tensions between Cherokees, Chickasaws, and “westward” polities. When a 1765 expedition led by Alexander Fraser arrived in Illinois, for example, skeptical unnamed Indians stopped it and forced Fraser to explain that it represented “an English Chief come to acquaint their Nation that the Shawanese, Delaware, and all the Nations on the Ohio had made Peace.” Their response was telling: “They said it was very well, that they thought we had been Cherokees.”9 Fraser’s expedition was unsuccessful in securing British jurisdiction, but not long thereafter Deputy Northern Indian Superintendent George Croghan arrived from Fort Pitt. Kickapoos and Mascoutens explained to Croghan that the French “had warned them that the English were leagued with the Cherokees, bent on enslaving all Illinois people and on taking Indian land.” Indigenous fear was so strong that they mistook “Croghan’s Shawnee and Delaware escorts for invading Cherokees.”10 Later that year a French trader informed British Major Robert Farmar that Potowatamis had “killed 21 Charaqui” in Illinois and feared that open war could soon result. He suggested that he could “prevent this War & pacify them,” by appealing directly to the “five Chiefs from the Illinois of different Villages.” With the right inducements, he believed that they might “make peace with the English Nation.”11 Even so, there was a risk. Had another war broken out, the British would have lost jurisdictional control in Illinois for the foreseeable future.

Tensions between trans-Appalachian polities only increased over time. At the 1768 Congress at Hard Labour, South Carolina, in fact, Overhill Cherokee Headman Oconostota informed John Stuart that Westward Indians represented the major threat to Cherokee country. They had “shut their Ears to the Talks of their Father Sir William Johnson,” he explained, “and continue to strike us.” Of late, in fact, he had felt “much beaten by those Western Indians the Piankashaws, Youghtanous, Twightwees, Kickapous, Meamis, Otowawas and other western Nations.” An aggressive response would be forthcoming, and Stuart could do nothing to stop it.12 For his part, Stuart understood quite well that western polities “were in an Hostile State with us, as well as [Cherokees], [an opinion] Confirmed by Intelligence of their Behavior on the Ohio, and at the Illinois.”13(See Figures 1 and 2).

Figure 1. A British cartographer reveals the Indigenous complexity of the Ohio Valley. “A New Map of North America from the Latest Discoveries” (London, 1763). Credit: Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division.

Figure 2. French cartographer Jacques Bellin identifies the major Indigenous polities of the Ohio Valley and Pays des Illinois. Jacques Nicolas Bellin and Homann Erben, “Partie occidentale de la Nouvelle France ou du Canada” (Nuremberg, 1755). Credit: Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division.

Western Realities Meet Eastern Corruption

Inter-Indigenous tension—and the inability of the British Empire either to understand or to control it—directly shaped policy and events in post-1763 North America. It most notably manifested in a potentially explosive combination: the costs associated with improving western policy with the fact of unhappy colonists protesting laws such as the Quartering Act in New York or the Stamp Act more generally. That unhappiness meant that whatever fixes imperial officials attempted almost immediately came under challenge from local speculators and surveyors salivating to profit off of Indian Country.

It is fair to say that for most of the 18th century Indigenous western polities would not have identified colonial encroachment as their most pressing concern. It remained the case after 1763, although the situation was changing dramatically. Perhaps the most well-known issue stems from the boundary described by an October 1763 Royal Proclamation. Intended to stabilize imperial diplomatic footing, the Proclamation established a line loosely corresponding to the top of the Appalachian mountains, beyond which colonials could not cross until the “Royal Pleasure be known.” Colonial officials had to halt private land sales, cease issuing trans-Appalachian land grants, and ensure that Indians “not be molested or disturbed in the Possession of such Parts of our Dominions and Territories as, having been ceded or purchased by us, are reserved to them, or any of them, as their Hunting Grounds.”14 Although a temporary fix, the Proclamation clearly meant for the colonies to operate within imperial parameters. Subsequent expansion would have to follow protocols, the most important of which was that land could only transfer from Indigenous to European through formal congresses. It is a crucially important rhetorical point. According to the Oxford English Dictionary a congress is a “formal meeting or assembly of delegates or representatives for the discussion or settlement of some question; spec. (in politics) of envoys, deputies, or plenipotentiaries representing sovereign states, or of sovereigns themselves, for the settlement of international affairs.”15 By acknowledging the congressional nature of the encounter the British Empire conceded the fact of Indigenous sovereignty.

Colonial North American surveyors and speculators powerfully disliked these imperial restraints. Pinning their right to land in philosophers such as Emmer de Vattel, they dismissed the diplomatic complexities of Indigenous sovereignty and generally undermined the Ministry’s trans-Appalachian policies almost as soon as they became aware of them.16 In addition to the protocols established in the Proclamation, colonials cast aside obligations required by congresses at Augusta, Georgia (1764); Fort Stanwix, New York (1768); Hard Labor, South Carolina (1768); and Lochaber, South Carolina (1770), among others. The pattern of corruption was so predictable that Cherokee diplomats explicitly referred to it at Hard Labour. Exasperated by Euro-American indifference to negotiated boundaries, Oconostota declared that after new lines were perfected he would “dig a ditch” over which whites could not subsequently pass.17 Six Nations diplomats further hammered the point at a 1768 Iroquois-Cherokee conference at Fort Stanwix. Frustrated by colonial behavior, Haudenosaunee diplomats informed William Johnson that although he represented “a Government and Laws[,] you don’t prevent [land fraud].” They found it ironic: “you often tell us we don’t restrain our people, and that you do so with yours,” they observed, but “your Words differ more from your Actions than ours do.”18 If an empire built on written laws could not make its “People do what they are desired [and] prevent all this, and if they wont [sic] let us alone you should shake them by the head.”19

By 1774 eastern encroachment seemed to spiral out of control. Even as Parliament responded to the Boston “Tea Party” with the so-called Coercive Acts, Virginians attempted to assert control over undeniably Indigenous land at the confluence of the Great Kanawha and Ohio Rivers. General Gage believed the (predictable) subsequent conflict—known as “Dunmore’s War”—was nearly criminal. Mere months before Lexington and Concord he insisted to Shawnees and Lenapes that it “was Intirely [sic] a War with [Virginia, and] that none of the Kings [sic] troops had appeared against them.” He also proclaimed that “his Majesty was not pleased with the Virginians for what they had done.”20 Frustrations increased when word leaked that Virginian Richard Henderson’s Transylvania Company had “purchased” twenty-seven thousand square miles of the Southern Ohio Valley from Cherokees.21 Although no Indigenous polities lived there, the white settlement that eventually grew out of it devastated hunting reserves by allowing free-ranging livestock to reduce canebreaks and grasses used by game animals. A few years later Cherokee Headman “The Tassel” informed United States commissioners that Henderson was a “liar” who had forged Cherokee names on the deeds to the purchase.22 Although Virginia, North Carolina, and the British Empire rejected this “Transylvania Purchase,” the damage was done.

Indigenous Polities and the Debate over Centralized Power in British North America

Inter-Indigenous affairs in the west and encroachment from the east represented dire threats to British North America. Between 1763 and 1775 officials like Gage, Stuart, and Johnson believed the situation required immediate attention. Arguably most important was the need to centralize Indigenous affairs at the imperial level, a process that already was decades in the making. At least since the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War, North American observers expressed concern that thirteen different policies emanated from British North America to Native Country. In the face of pressure from New France and Louisiana such diplomatic cacophony seriously undermined continental stability. It so worried Benjamin Franklin that he even published that the colonies needed to “Join or Die” (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. This photograph reveals Benjamin Franklin’s fear that without stronger inter-colonial unity the French Empire and their Native allies could destroy British North America. Benjamin Franklin, “Join or Die” (United States, May 9, 1754). Credit: Library of Congress, Photos, Prints, and Drawings Collection.

In 1754 he offered a blueprint for rectifying the problem in his “Albany Plan of Union.” In effect, he elevated Indigenous affairs to the level of what John Locke called a federative power.23 He suggested that a North American “President General” should have power to “hold or direct all Indian treaties, in which the general interest of the Colonies may be concerned, and make peace or declare war with Indian nations.” Anticipating the powers asserted in the October 1763 Royal Proclamation, Franklin called for a Grand Council to “make all purchases from Indians, for the crown, of lands not now within the bounds of particular Colonies, or that shall not be within their bounds when some of them are reduced to more convenient dimensions.”24

Franklin’s proposal is striking for a number of reasons. It stripped control from the colonies by establishing an executive independent of local funding. It empowered a governing authority subject only to Crown oversight. And after its universal rejection, Franklin concluded that the colonies lacked the wherewithal to protect British interests. “So if ever there be an Union,” he declared, “it must be form’d at home by the Ministry and Parliament.”25 Only three years later John Campbell, 4th Earl of Loudoun—then commander in chief of military forces—agreed. In 1757 he asserted that “The King has seen that His Indian Interest has been lost in a great measure, by the management of the different Provinces.” As a result, George II had chosen to embark on a new policy: he “appointed two persons with large Sallarys [sic] for the Management of Indian affairs, one for the Northern Indians, and the other for the Southern, with Orders to the Commander in Chief to supply them with money, to Inspect into their Conduct and give Proper directions to them.”26 Power over Indigenous affairs, in other words, was centralizing.

Imperial negotiators encouraged further centralization just before the 1764 Augusta Congress between Southern Indians and the North and South Carolinas, Virginia, and Georgia. At that point several British officials wrote to the Earl of Egremont, secretary of state for the Southern Department, that the ministry had a golden opportunity “for … establishing the Commerce with Indians upon a general safe equitable footing.” The policy would have to come from above, however, because in their estimation it “will never be done by respective Provinces.”27 Pontiac’s “uprising,” Ohio Valley chaos, and abrogation of Indigenous treaty rights subsequently reinforced the point. Greater power thus was granted to Indian superintendents to regulate trade and migration. New boundaries were encouraged, but the ministry upbraided colonial leaders who did not do enough to stop fraudulent encroachments. A mid-1760s set of instructions from the King to North Carolina Governor William Tryon, for example, observed that “Indians … make great Complaints that Settlements have been made and Possession taken of Lands the Property of which they have by Treaties reserved to themselves.” Particularly galling to His Majesty’s government was that the “Chief Officers of Our said Colonies, regardless of the Duty they Owe to Us and of the Welfare and Security of Our Colonies, have Countenanced such unjust Claims and Pretensions by passing Grants of the Lands so pretended to have been purchased of the Indians.” Such blatant violations of the 1763 Proclamation would have “fatal Effects [and] would attend to a Discontent amongst the Indians in the present situation of Affairs,” Tryon was informed. The government seemed unequivocal on the matter: “upon all Occasions … support and protect the said Indians in their just Rights and Possessions, and keep Inviolable the Treaties and Compacts which have been Entered into with them.”28

Unfortunately, the metropole chose not to sustain the momentum. By 1768 London was frustrated by continually unsuccessful efforts to secure jurisdiction in the Ohio Valley, by inconsistent diplomatic practices, and by having to maintain expensive fortifications of limited value. It both initiated and exacerbated contentious arguments on the eastern seaboard regarding troop quartering, debt, constitutional liberty, and the centralization of power, so the ministry chose to retrench. Garrisons deemed unnecessary summarily closed. Those remaining open faced careful financial scrutiny, meanwhile, and limits were called for on diplomatic expenditures. Perhaps most ominously, the ministry scaled back superintendent support staffs and devolved significant authority over Indian affairs back to provincial authorities.

Retrenchment reimposed greater colonial control at a moment when imperial power should have been consolidating, argued men like Gage, Stuart, and Johnson. A frustrated General Gage exclaimed to Johnson that “Our concerns with Indians, are now greatly extended by our acquisitions in the late war & we seem to have occasion, for some settled, uniform system, for the management of Indian Affairs. The number of your Deputies, Interpreters &c should be increased, and the several nations with whom they are to deal, allotted to them.”29 Johnson’s son Guy believed that retrenchment was hopelessly naive. “I cannot help observing,” he remarked to Gage, “That the principle upon which [retrenchment] seems founded, That the Colonies will manage better and be more cautious in preventing frauds in Trade at this day than formerly, when under greater Apprehensions from the Indians, does not seem to promise all that their Lordships Expect from it.”30 Inevitably, the policy would lead to a more fraudulent, and thus far more precarious, relationship with the west.

Events on the ground bore out these fears, and to Indigenous diplomats British officials could do little more than register unhappiness with colonial behavior. To Parliament, however, they could press their conviction that centralized power could bring order to the North American Empire. By 1772 they were making headway. In addition to encroachments and violations of the rule of law by individuals, colonial authorities that year were refusing to establish more unified rules for Indian Trade. Johnson was exasperated and hoped that “The King [would take] Indian Affairs & their Expences [sic] upon himself.”31 The government agreed: in 1773 it announced that “The failure of the colonies to legislate for the Indian trade, the withdrawal of the interior garrisons, and the increased tensions with the tribes in the face of continuous encroachments” had forced it to re-centralize Indigenous policy.32

Centralization reached a climax in the form of the 1774 Quebec Act. Primarily a means by which to secure Catholic law and toleration in the old colony of New France, the Act also extended the boundaries of the Province of Quebec to the Ohio River. MP Alexander Wedderburn explained the implications to the House of Commons. The Act, he observed, was a permanent solution to the impermanence of the 1763 Proclamation. It gave Americans a boundary “beyond which, for the advantage of the whole empire, [they] shall not extend.”33 Individuals, in other words, could no longer subvert the interests of the whole. Undersecretary of State for the Colonies William Knox reinforced the point, noting that the new boundaries existed “for the avowed purpose of excluding all further settlement” in trans-Appalachia.34

Although the Act said nothing more about the Ohio Valley than Article I, Knox insisted that the Quebec legislature—not the thirteen colonies to its South—would implement Parliamentary intent. He saw it as quite positive: in addition to stopping encroachment, it would establish “uniform regulations for the Indian trade … competent to enforce such regulations, [as the] administration is pledged to recommend.” It would benefit all of British North America, in fact, although on one point Knox was unequivocal: limiting individual and colonial corruption in favor of the general imperial good was one of “the first objects upon which the legislative powers shall be exercised.” And should the Quebec legislature falter, “parliament will not fail to apply an adequate remedy.”35

Many London observers believed the North Americans would embrace this imperial alteration.36 They were wrong, of course. The Act was the victim of poor timing: its centralizing tendency ran exactly counter to the radical arguments gaining steam in the thirteen seaboard colonies. In light of the Coercive Acts—with which the Quebec Act was lumped—many North Americans adopted a defensive posture and embraced conspiracies of British tyranny. Rather than viewing it as a means by which to stabilize the west and address corruption colonial radicals reframed it as a loathsome example of legislative despotism. It extended toleration to Catholics and French law codes to the Canadians, it took power away from local legislatures, and perhaps most damning, it closed off valuable land from North Americans interested in speculation, sale, and migration. Out of this paranoia an empire of liberty began to develop, as historian Eric Hinderaker has noted, that cared little for Indian alliances or sovereignty.37 In such an environment the Quebec Act was a dead letter. As armed resistance gave way to rebellion on the eastern seaboard, British efforts to stabilize the west collapsed entirely.38

Devastating though it was, the War of American Independence did not break Indigenous agency, power, or sovereignty. The ultimate fate of the trans-Appalachian west, as Francois Furstenberg rightly notes, was far from settled (whether in 1776, 1783, or 1815). Regardless, it is crucial to understand how deeply the revolutionary moment was rooted in Indian Country. Any reasonable account must balance that reality with the over-heated narrative radiating outward from the eastern seaboard.

Discussion of Literature

The historiography comprising the traditional interpretation of the Revolution is vast and deeply learned—even if it collectively points toward an ahistorical insistence upon the inevitability of proto-independent America’s separation from the British Empire. A very brief sampling of important pre–World War II literature would include Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, which rejects the inevitability of Whig ideas in favor of the inevitability of economic determinism; Carl Becker, The Eve of the Revolution, which highlights both the struggle for self-government and the tyranny confronting the proto-American people; and Thomas Perkins Abernethy, From Frontier to Plantation in Frontier Tennessee: A Study in Frontier Democracy, which is hyper-critical of revolutionary land speculators but accepts the inevitability of white control over the continent.39

Cold War–era historiography became dominated by neo-Whig insistence that ideas matter most and pointed directly toward the inevitability of American independence. From this perspective three other points become clear: (1) in the world of ideas geo-political breakdown between east and west is irrelevant; (2) the Indigenous experience is irrelevant; and (3) a clear contrast existed between the British constitutional liberty invoked by North Americans and the rejection of said constitutional principles by a renegade Parliament. See for example Jack P. Greene, The Quest for Power: The Lower Houses of Assembly in the Southern Royal Colonies, 1689–1776; Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution; Edmund Morgan and Helen Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution; Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787; Pauline Meier, From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition, 1765–1776; Robert Middlekauf, The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763–1789; or Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution.40

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the literature has become incredibly complex and has turned the Revolution into an “Atlantic World” phenomenon. It generally maintains the same undercurrent of causation, however. See for example Jack P. Greene, Evaluating Empire and Confronting Colonialism in Eighteenth-Century Britain; Greene, Exclusionary Empire: English Liberty Overseas, 1600–1900; Craig Yirush, Settlers, Liberty, and Empire: The Roots of Early American Political Theory, 1675–1775; Peter Onuf and Elijah Gould, Empire and Nation: The American Revolution in the Atlantic World; or Michal Jan Rozbicki, Culture and Liberty in the Age of the American Revolution. For a rejection of revolutionary inevitability that nevertheless focuses almost exclusively on the eastern seaboard see Brendan McConville, The King’s Three Faces: The Rise and Fall of Royal America, 1688–1776.41

In the last forty years historians have transformed how scholars think about the problem of slavery in the revolutionary era. See for example Sylvia Frey, Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age; Edward Countryman, Enjoy the Same Liberty: Black Americans and the Revolutionary Era; Douglas Egerton, Death or Liberty: African Americans and Revolutionary America; Alan Taylor, The Internal Enemy: Slavery and War in Virginia, 1772–1832; George Van Cleve, A Slaveholders Union: Slavery Politics, and the Constitution in the Early American Republic; Eva Sheppard Wolf, Race and Liberty in the New Nation: Emancipation in Virginia from the Revolution to Nat Turner’s Rebellion; and Kristofer Ray (2016) “The Indians of every denomination were free, and independent of us”: Anglo-Virginian explorations of indigenous slavery, freedom, and society, 1772–1830. American Nineteenth Century History. 17 no (2), 139–159.”42

A lot of work remains in terms of understanding the west and its impact upon the Revolution. Foundational reading would include Francois Furstenberg, “The Significance of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier in Atlantic History”; Kathleen DuVal, The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent; and Eric Hinderaker, Elusive Empires: Construction Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1670–1800. See also Patrick Spero, Frontier Rebels: The Fight for Independence in the American West, 1765–1776; Kathleen DuVal, Independence Lost: Lives on the Edge of the American Revolution; Kristofer Ray, “Leadership, Loyalty, and Sovereignty in the Revolutionary American Southwest: The State of Franklin as Case Study”; Claudio Saunt, West of the Revolution: An Uncommon History of 1776; and Colin Calloway, The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America.43

Important scholarship on Indigenous trans-Appalachia includes Colin Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities; Gregory Evans Dowd, A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745–1815; Dowd, War under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations, and the British Empire; Michael McDonnell, Masters of Empire: Great Lakes Indians and the Making of America; Robert Morrissey, Empire by Collaboration: Indians, Colonists, and Governments in Colonial Illinois Country; Jacob Lee, Masters of the Middle Water: Indian Nations and Colonial Ambitions along the Mississippi; Kristofer Ray, “Cherokees and Franco-British Confrontation in the Tennessee Corridor, 1730–1760”; Ray, Before the Volunteer State: New Thoughts on Early Tennessee History; Robert Engelbert and Guillaume Teasdale, French and Indians in the Heart of North America, 1630–1815; and Gregory O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, 1750–1830.44 For more on the Haudenosaunee and their connection to the west in this period see Timothy Shannon, Indians and Colonists at the Crossroads of Empire: The Albany Congress of 1754; Shannon, Iroquois Diplomacy on the Early American Frontier; Daniel Richter and James Merrell, Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and Their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600–1800; and William Campbell, Speculators in Empire: Iroquoia and the 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix. For more on performative violence see Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America.45

Primary Sources

Those interested in researching the revolutionary west have a wealth of primary sources from which to choose. At the William Clements Library, University of Michigan see particularly the Thomas Gage Papers, William Henry Lyttelton Papers, Native American History Papers, Rogers-Roche Collection, Jeffery Amherst Papers, and George Clinton Papers. The Huntington Library in Los Angeles, California is the home for the extensive Loudoun Papers and Abercromby Papers. At the Newberry Library in Chicago, Illinois scholars should consult the Edward Ayer American Indian Studies Collection and the French in America Collection.

An incredible amount of material is available online or through database subscriptions. Merely a few examples would include the American Antiquarian Society (AAS) Historical Periodical Series; AAS Early American Imprints (Evans Series and Shaw-Shoemaker Series); Gale’s Sabin Americana, 1500–1926; or Readex’s America’s Historical Newspapers. See also Yale University’s Avalon Project; the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill’s Documenting the American South; Internet Archives; the American Library of Congress Digital Collections; or the British National Archives.

Perhaps the best material remains available in library stacks. Merely a few recommended sources include Patricia Kay Galloway, Dunbar Rowland, and Albert Godfrey Sanders, Mississippi Provincial Archives, vols. 1–5; William Jacobs, The Appalachian Indian Frontier: The Edmond Atkin Report and Plan of 1755; William McDowell, Colonial Records of South Carolina: Documents Related to Indian Affairs, vols. 1–2; Duane King, The Memoirs of Lt. Henry Timberlake: The Story of a Soldier, Adventurer, and Emissary to the Cherokees, 1756–1765; Theodore Pease, Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library French Series, vol. 2: Anglo-French Boundary Disputes in the West, 1749–1763; James Sullivan and colleagues, The Papers of Sir William Johnson, vols. 1–14; and William Abbott and colleagues, The Papers of George Washington (Colonial Series), vols. 1–10.46

Further Reading

  • Calloway, Colin. The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
  • Calloway, Colin. The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
  • Calloway, Colin. Pen and Ink Witchcraft: Treaties and Treaty Making in American Indian History. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
  • Calloway, Colin. The Indian World of George Washington: The First President, the First Americans, and the Birth of the Nation. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.
  • Dowd, Gregory Evans. A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745–1815. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992.
  • Dowd, Gregory Evans. War under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations, and the British Empire. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004.
  • DuVal, Kathleen. The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007.
  • DuVal, Kathleen. Independence Lost: Lives on the Edge of the American Revolution. New York: Random House, 2016.
  • Engelbert Robert, and Guillaume Teasdale, eds. French and Indians in the Heart of North America, 1630–1815. Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2013.
  • Furstenberg, Francois. “The Significance of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier in Atlantic History.” American Historical Review 113, no. 3 (June 2008): 647–677.
  • Hinderaker, Eric. Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1670–1800. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
  • McDonnell, Michael. Masters of Empire: Great Lakes Indians and the Making of America. New York: Hill & Wang, 2015.
  • Ray, Kristofer. Cherokees, Europeans, and Empire in the Trans-Appalachian West, 1670–1774. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, forthcoming 2021.
  • Ray, Kristofer. “‘Our Concerns with Indians Are Now Greatly Extended’: Cherokees, Westward Indians, and Interpreting the Quebec Act from the Ohio Valley, 1763–1774.” In The Quebec Act of 1774: Transnational Contexts, Meanings, and Legacies. Edited by François Furstenberg and Olivier Hubert. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, forthcoming 2020.
  • Sleeper-Smith, Susan. Indigenous Prosperity and American Conquest: Indian Women of the Ohio River Valley, 1690–1792. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2018.

Notes

  • 1. Thomas Morris, “Journal of Trip to the Wabash, August 26–September 17, 1764,” Thomas Gage Papers, vol. 138, William Clements Library, University of Michigan.

  • 2. This section—and several other small sections of the article—are paraphrased from Kristofer Ray, “‘Our Concerns with Indians are now greatly extended’ Cherokees, Westward Indians, and Interpreting the Quebec Act from the Ohio Valley, 1763–1774,” in The Quebec Act of 1774: Transnational Contexts, Meanings, and Legacies, eds. François Furstenberg and Olivier Hubert (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, forthcoming 2020).

  • 3. François Furstenberg, “The Significance of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier in Atlantic History,” American Historical Review 113, no. 3 (June 2008): 648.

  • 4. Kathleen DuVal, Independence Lost: Lives on the Edge of the American Revolution (New York: Random House, 2016); and Claudio Saunt, West of the Revolution: An Uncommon History of 1776 (New York: W. W. Norton, 2014).

  • 5. “Masters of Empire” is the label given by historian Michael McDonnell in Masters of Empire: Great Lakes Indians and the Making of America (New York: Hill & Wang, 2015).

  • 6. The Covenant Chain was the symbolic representation of the diplomatic relationship between the British Empire and the Haudenosaunee. From the British perspective the Chain placed the British above the Six Nations and the Six Nations above any Indigenous polity they had “conquered,” regardless of whether they had actually ever done so. For more on the concept see Daniel Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); Timothy Shannon, Indians and Colonists at the Crossroads of Empire: The Albany Congress of 1754 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); or David Preston, The Texture of Contact: European and Indian Settler Communities on the Frontiers of Iroquoia, 1667–1783 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009).

  • 7. Gage to Stuart, June 19, 1764, Thomas Gage Papers, vol. 20, William Clements Library, University of Michigan.

  • 8. Gage to Stuart, June 19, 1764.

  • 9. Fraser Report, Thomas Gage Papers, vol. 137, William Clements Library, University of Michigan, 7–8.

  • 10. Gregory Evans Dowd, A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745–1815 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 226.

  • 11. Lagautrais to Farmar, early 1765, from Illinois, enclosed in Farmar to Gage, April 13, 1765, Thomas Gage Papers, vol. 34, William Clements Library, University of Michigan.

  • 12. Speech of Oconostota, Journal of the Superintendent’s Proceedings of Congress held at Hard Labour, South Carolina, September 28–October 17, 1768, Thomas Gage Papers, vol. 137, William Clements Library, University of Michigan, 8.

  • 13. This particular statement, although about 1768, was part of a 1770 speech. Speech of John Stuart, Proceedings of a Congress of the Principal Chiefs and Warriors of the Cherokee Nation with John Stuart held at Congarees, South Carolina, April 3, 1770, Thomas Gage Papers, vol. 137, William Clements Library, University of Michigan, 3.

  • 14. The Proclamation further attempted to stabilize commerce, requiring that trade licenses would have to come from Royal governors. “The Royal Proclamation,” The Avalon Project, October 7, 1763.

  • 15. OED Online, s.v. “Congress, n,” accessed December 16, 2019. https://www.oed.com/public/freeoed/loginpage

  • 16. “The savages of North America had no right to appropriate all that vast continent to themselves,” Vattel wrote in the Law of Nations, “and since they were unable to inhabit the whole of those regions, other nations might without injustice settle in some parts of them, provided they left the natives a sufficiency of land.” Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, book 2, eds. Bela Kapossy and Richard Whatmore (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008), chap. 7, p. 310. See also John Winthrop, “Reasons to Be Considered for Justifying the Undertakers of the Intended Plantation in New England and for Encouraging Such Whose Hearts God Shall Move to Join Them in It (1629),” Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings 8 (1864–1865): 420–425; and John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960).

  • 17. Journal of the Superintendent’s Proceedings of Congress Held at Hard Labour, South Carolina, September 28–October 17, 1768, Thomas Gage Papers, vol. 137, William Clements Library, University of Michigan.

  • 18. Iroquois-Cherokee Congress, Thomas Gage Papers, vol. 75, William Clements Library, University of Michigan, 18.

  • 19. Or perhaps, suggested Six Nations delegates, the government had “no Mind to hinder them?” If so, they would do it on behalf of the British. After all, Haudenosaunee “Legs are long and our Sight is good, that we can see a great way thro the Woods; We can see the Blood you have spilled and the Fences you have made, and surely it is but right that we should punish those who have done us all this Mischief.” Iroquois-Cherokee Congress, 19.

  • 20. Gage to Johnson, February 5, 1775, Thomas Gage Papers, vol. 125, William Clements Library, University of Michigan.

  • 21. On Dunmore’s War, see Woody Holton, Forced Founders (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); and James Corbett David, Dunmore’s New World: The Extraordinary Life of a Royal Governor in Revolutionary America (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2015). For more on Henderson and the Transylvania Company, see Stephen Aron, How the West Was Lost: The Transformation of Kentucky from Daniel Boone to Henry Clay (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Marjoleine Kars, Breaking Loose Together: The Regulator Rebellion in Pre-Revolutionary North Carolina (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Kristofer Ray, Middle Tennessee, 1775–1825: Progress and Popular Democracy on the Southwestern Frontier (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2007); and Natalie Inman, “Military Families: Kinship in the American Revolution,” in Before the Volunteer State: New Thoughts on Early Tennessee History, ed. Kristofer Ray (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2015), 131–154.

  • 22. “Talk by Old Tassel,” in American State Papers, Class II, Indian Affairs, vol. 1, eds. Walter Lowrie and Arthur St. Clair (Washington, DC: Gales and Seaton, 1932), 42.

  • 23. Locke, Two Treatises.

  • 24. Albany Plan of Union 1754,” The Avalon Project, articles 10–12. For more on this point see Shannon, Indians and Colonists.

  • 25. Franklin to Collinson, December 29, 1754, in The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 5, ed. Leonard Labaree et al. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1959), 453–454.

  • 26. Earl of Loudoun to William Denny, May 5, 1757, Loudoun Papers, Box 77, no. 3562, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA.

  • 27. Wright, Dobbs, Fauquier, Boone, and Stuart to Egremont, November 10, 1763, in the Minutes of the Southern Congress at Augusta Georgia, October 1, 1763–November 21, 1763, Colonial Records of North Carolina, vol. 11, p. 205.

  • 28. “Copy Kings Instruction to the Govr No. 109 respecting Indian lands, ca. 1760–1775,” British Public Records, ca. 1600–1782 [manuscript], Southern Historical Collection, no. 517, Unit 2, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

  • 29. Gage to Johnson, October 14, 1768, Thomas Gage Papers, vol. 125, William Clements Library, University of Michigan.

  • 30. Guy Johnson to Thomas Gage, June 16, 1768, Thomas Gage Papers, vol. 78, William Clements Library, University of Michigan.

  • 31. Johnson to Gage, January 20, 1772, Thomas Gage Papers, vol. 109, William Clements Library, University of Michigan.

  • 32. Jack M. Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness: The Middle West in British Colonial Policy, 1760–1775 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), 238.

  • 33. Sosin, Whitehall, 245.

  • 34. William Knox, “The Justice and Policy of the Late Act of Parliament for Making More Effectual Provision for the Government of the Province of Quebec Asserted … ,” (London: J. Wilkie, 1774), 89; and Gale, Sabin Americana (Cengage Learning, 1774, 43).

  • 35. Knox, “The Justice and Policy,” 44–45, 47.

  • 36. William Johnson insisted, for example, that locals were no longer “very desirous of meddling” with Indian affairs and would welcome a reapplication of Crown control. Johnson to Gage, January 20, 1772, Thomas Gage Papers, vol. 109, William Clements Library, University of Michigan.

  • 37. Eric Hinderaker, Elusive Empires: Construction Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1670–1800 (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). See also Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America (New York: Norton, 2008).

  • 38. Patrick Griffin describes the west as nearly Hobbesian and suggests that a strong central power was necessary to stabilize it in the 1790s. See Patrick Griffin, American Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and Revolutionary Frontier (New York: Hill & Wang, 2007); and see also Ray, Middle Tennessee.

  • 39. Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (New York: MacMillan, 1913); Carl Becker, The Eve of the Revolution (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1918); and Thomas Perkins Abernethy, From Frontier to Plantation in Frontier Tennessee: A Study in Frontier Democracy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1932).

  • 40. Jack P. Greene, The Quest for Power: The Lower Houses of Assembly in the Southern Royal Colonies, 1689–1776 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963); Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967); Edmund Morgan and Helen Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965); Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969); Pauline Meier, From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition, 1765–1776 (New York: Norton, 1972); Robert Middlekauf, The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763–1789 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); and Gordon Wood , The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1991).

  • 41. Jack P. Greene, Evaluating Empire and Confronting Colonialism in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Jack P. Greene , ed., Exclusionary Empire: English Liberty Overseas, 1600–1900 (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Craig Yirush, Settlers, Liberty, and Empire: The Roots of Early American Political Theory, 1675–1775 (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Peter Onuf and Elijah Gould, eds., Empire and Nation: The American Revolution in the Atlantic World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005); Michal Jan Rozbicki, Culture and Liberty in the Age of the American Revolution (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2011); and Brendan McConville, The King’s Three Faces: The Rise and Fall of Royal America, 1688–1776 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).

  • 42. Sylvia Frey, Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991); Edward Countryman, Enjoy the Same Liberty: Black Americans and the Revolutionary Era (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011); Douglas Egerton, Death or Liberty: African Americans and Revolutionary America (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Alan Taylor, The Internal Enemy: Slavery and War in Virginia, 1772–1832 (New York: Norton, 2013); George Van Cleve, A Slaveholders Union: Slavery Politics, and the Constitution in the Early American Republic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010); Eva Sheppard Wolf, Race and Liberty in the New Nation: Emancipation in Virginia from the Revolution to Nat Turner’s Rebellion (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2009); and Kristofer Ray, “‘The Indians of every denomination were free, and independent of us’ (STET this title alteration): White Southern Explorations of Indigenous Slavery, Freedom, and Society, 1772–1830,” American Nineteenth Century History 17, no. 2 (2016): 139–159.

  • 43. Furstenberg, “The Significance”; Kathleen DuVal, The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007); Hinderaker, Elusive Empires; Patrick Spero, Frontier Rebels: The Fight for Independence in the American West, 1765–1776 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018); DuVal, Independence Lost; Kristofer Ray, “Leadership, Loyalty, and Sovereignty in the Revolutionary American Southwest: The State of Franklin as Case Study,” North Carolina Historical Review 92, no. 2 (April 2015): 123–144; Saunt, West of the Revolution; and Colin Calloway, The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

  • 44. Colin Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Dowd, A Spirited Resistance; Gregory Evans Dowd, War under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations, and the British Empire (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004); McDonnell, Masters of Empire; Robert Morrissey, Empire by Collaboration: Indians, Colonists, and Governments in Colonial Illinois Country (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015); Jacob Lee, Masters of the Middle Water: Indian Nations and Colonial Ambitions along the Mississippi (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018); Kristofer Ray, “Cherokees and Franco-British Confrontation in the Tennessee Corridor, 1730–1760,” Native South 7 (2014): 33–67; Kristofer Ray, ed., Before the Volunteer State: New Thoughts on Early Tennessee History (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2015); Robert Engelbert and Guillaume Teasdale, eds., French and Indians in the Heart of North America, 1630–1815 (Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2013); and Gregory O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, 1750–1830 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005).

  • 45. Shannon, Indians and Colonists; Timothy Shannon, Iroquois Diplomacy on the Early American Frontier (New York: Viking Press, 2008); Daniel Richter and James Merrell, eds., Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and Their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600–1800 (State College: Penn State University Press, 2003); William Campbell, Speculators in Empire: Iroquoia and the 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012); and Silver, Our Savage Neighbors.

  • 46. Patricia Kay Galloway, Dunbar Rowland, and Albert Godfrey Sanders, eds., Mississippi Provincial Archives, vols. 1–5 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1984); William Jacobs, ed., The Appalachian Indian Frontier: The Edmond Atkin Report and Plan of 1755 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1954.); William McDowell, ed., Colonial Records of South Carolina: Documents Related to Indian Affairs, vols. 1–2 (Columbia: South Carolina Archives Department, 1958); Duane King, ed., The Memoirs of Lt. Henry Timberlake: The Story of a Soldier, Adventurer, and Emissary to the Cherokees, 1756–1765 (Cherokee, NC: Museum of the Cherokee Indian, 2007); Theodore Pease, ed., Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library French Series, vol. 2: Anglo-French Boundary Disputes in the West, 1749–1763 (Springfield: Illinois State Historical Society, 1936); James Sullivan et al., eds., The Papers of Sir William Johnson, vols. 1–14 (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1921–1965); and William Abbott et al., eds., The Papers of George Washington (Colonial Series), vols. 1–10 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1983–1995).