Regional Organizations and Geopolitics in the Indian Ocean
Regional Organizations and Geopolitics in the Indian Ocean
- Derek McDougallDerek McDougallThe University of Melbourne
Summary
Regional organizations in the Indian Ocean need to be understood in their geopolitical context. The sense of “regionness” in the Indian Ocean is weak. There is some focus on the oceanic region as a whole, but also on the various sectors of the ocean: northwest, northeast, southwest, and southeast. India, China, and the United States are the most important of the major powers involved, with their interests and engagement extending across the whole ocean. Other extraregional powers include Japan, Russia, and the European Union (EU). Among the middle powers, the most important are France (especially in the southwest sector), Australia (southeast), South Africa (southwest), and Indonesia (northeast), with the United Kingdom also playing a role. Some Middle Eastern states (especially Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates [UAE]) are involved in the Indian Ocean because the northwest sector has a strategic significance for issues in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. Then there is the “rest,” the range of Indian Ocean littoral and island states that are affected by developments in the Indian Ocean, especially in areas adjacent to their own territories.
There is only one comprehensive regional organization based on the whole Indian Ocean: the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). There is also a comprehensive regional organization for the southwest sector: the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC). Most of the other Indian Ocean organizations focus on different kinds of maritime activities. The more significant regional organizations affecting the Indian Ocean are those relating to the adjoining regions but with some Indian Ocean involvement. These are the organizations relating to southern and eastern Africa, the Persian/Arabian Gulf, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.
Subjects
- Diplomatic/International
- Indian Ocean Studies
- World/Global/Transnational
Geopolitics in the Indian Ocean
It is debatable as to whether the Indian Ocean should be considered as a “region” given the diversity of the countries adjacent to or entirely within the Indian Ocean. One approach is to see the ocean as consisting of sectors: northwest, northeast, southwest, and southeast. The northwest sector is adjacent to Arabia and the Persian/Arabian Gulf, east of the Horn of Africa, and west of the Indian subcontinent. The northeast sector centers on the Bay of Bengal, east of the Indian subcontinent, and adjacent to the Southeast Asian countries of Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. The southwest sector is next to southern and eastern Africa. The southeast sector borders on Western Australia, Australia’s immense western state. While there is a geopolitics extending across the whole Indian Ocean, the emphasis can vary in relation to the different sectors.
Keeping this situation in mind, geopolitics in the Indian Ocean can be reviewed in terms of the roles of the major powers, other powers, the middle powers, the Middle Eastern states, and the “rest” (the remaining Indian Ocean littoral and island states). Reviewing the geopolitics enables a better understanding of the role played by regional organizations.
Historically, this is a region where major regional powers such as the Mughal Empire (at its height in the 16th and 17th centuries) and the Ottoman Empire (14th century to 1922), as well as local states in areas such as the Indian subcontinent, eastern and southern Africa, and parts of Southeast Asia, were significant. In the modern era (from approximately the mid-19th century to the mid-20th century), the Indian Ocean became a “British lake” centered on India, but with the British Empire extending to territories in Africa, Southeast Asia, the Persian/Arabian Gulf and Arabia, and Australia (a self-governing British dominion from 1901) and among the Indian Ocean islands. Other colonial powers such as the Netherlands (Netherlands East Indies, modern Indonesia), France (Madagascar, Comoros, Réunion, Djibouti, Indochina, settlements in India), Portugal (Goa and some other enclaves in India, Mozambique), Germany (pre–World War I in German East Africa, now the major part of Tanzania), and Italy (Italian Somaliland, now the major part of Somalia, Eritrea, and the short-lived empire in Ethiopia [1936–1941]) also had a presence in this area.
The Major Powers
Historically, as indicated, the British Empire held sway in the Indian Ocean, but this situation changed with the independence of British India in 1947 (leading to India and Pakistan, with Bangladesh—former East Pakistan—separating from the latter in 1971), and concluded with British military withdrawal from “east of Suez” in 1971 (relating to the deployment of British forces in Malaysia-Singapore and the Persian/Arabian Gulf states). During the Cold War (the 1970s and 1980s in particular), the Indian Ocean was an area of contest between the Soviet Union and the United States, with nonaligned countries such as India preferring to see the ocean become a “zone of peace.” In the post–Cold War era, there has been a lot of focus on the competition between India and China in the Indian Ocean; however, the United States has continued to have a very significant role.
While independent India is the main heir to the British Raj, it is not as dominant in the Indian Ocean as was previously the case with the British Empire. Instead, India has aspired to play the leading role in the Indian Ocean, or at least one of the leading roles. In the early post-independence period, the focus was on the moral principles associated with nonalignment, with India eschewing alliance with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Increasingly, however, India became more “realist” in its international orientation. From the 1960s, India aligned with the Soviet Union on some issues, especially after the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1971. Post–Cold War India has pursued a policy of strategic autonomy and multialignment, working with various powers that assist India’s position but without having a long-term alignment or alliance with any one power. Among the other powers, India is closest to the United States, but without endorsing US policies generally. The alignment with the United States is more a form of soft balancing against China. India also cooperates with Japan and Australia (as well as the United States) in the “Quad” for the same purpose. In the southwest Indian Ocean, there is significant cooperation with France (centered on Réunion, a French overseas department) as a means of extending India’s influence in that part of the ocean. India also has significant defense cooperation with some of the Indian Ocean island states, especially Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles; in the case of Mauritius, its role as part of the Indian diaspora (two-thirds of the population are of Indian descent) enhances Indian influence.
In comparison with India, China’s role in the Indian Ocean is less prominent. It engaged more actively from about 2010, beginning with its contribution to antipiracy operations. China is involved in the ocean as a global power. Specific objectives include strengthening its position in the competition with India and making use of Africa-oriented island states such as Mauritius to develop its economic links with Africa. In the competition with India, strategic and economic links with countries such as Pakistan and Myanmar are helpful. Both the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor are prominent parts of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, aiming for improved access to the Indian Ocean for China. Economic links with island countries through trade, investment, and aid also serve a strategic purpose in reducing Indian influence; the Belt and Road Initiative is also prominent in this context. Low-level defense links can also be important in enhancing China’s influence.
The United States’ role in the Indian Ocean is also linked to its position as a global power. As with the Soviet-American rivalry previously, US engagement in the Indian Ocean is part of the competition with China. This is exemplified in US participation in the Quad and the development of an Indo-Pacific strategy (authorized by President Donald Trump in January 2018), linking East Asia and the Pacific to India (involving the Indian Ocean only in part, mainly in the northeast). Apart from the Indo-Pacific strategy, the US role in the ocean more broadly facilitates its engagement with India. It should be noted that while the United States is involved in all sectors of the ocean, it has a particular interest in the northwest sector relating to the politico-military involvement of the United States in neighboring countries. This includes the wars in Iraq (post-2003 but going back to the Gulf conflict of 1990–1991) and Afghanistan (post-2001), and US relations with key players in the region, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Turkey. Involvement, whether direct or indirect, in the Yemen war and the Syrian conflict is also relevant. In the Horn of Africa, the circumstances of Somalia are a particular concern; the United States has a base in Djibouti (as do China, France, Italy, and Japan). Depending on the situation, one manifestation of US involvement in the northwest sector of the ocean is the US base at Diego Garcia in the Chagos archipelago (British Indian Ocean Territory [BIOT], having been excised from the jurisdiction of Mauritius at the time of the latter’s independence in 1968).
Other Powers
While India, China, and the United States are the most significant powers in the Indian Ocean, there are several other powers that are active in this space. From outside the region, Japan, Russia, and the EU are powers that have their own regional focus, while also exerting influence on a range of global issues. Japan has a particular interest in protecting the sea lanes carrying oil from the Persian Gulf to Japan; most of Japan’s oil comes from this region, with Saudi Arabia as the leading supplier. Japan also engages in “soft balancing” against China through its leading role in the Quad and promotion of the Indo-Pacific strategy. The relationship with India is particularly important in this context, and a Japanese presence in the Indian Ocean can be helpful in strengthening Indo-Japanese relations. Japan has contributed to counterpiracy patrols in the Arabian Sea (northwest sector), as well as providing low-level naval support for some of the US operations in the area (such as Afghanistan after 2001).
Russia, as the main successor state to the Soviet Union, is less significant as an Indian Ocean power than was its Communist forebear. Nevertheless, Russia maintains some presence in the northern parts of the Indian Ocean, enhancing its strategic role in relation to the Indian subcontinent, the Horn of Africa, the Persian/Arabian Gulf, and the Middle East more broadly. The Russian relationship with India does not match the previous Soviet relationship with India but is still of some importance. From the Indian perspective, the Russian relationship can contribute to the strategy of multialignment; India participates in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, within which Russia and China are the leading members. Russia’s presence in the Indian Ocean has some bearing on the Russian relationship with Iran, helping the latter to counter US attempts at containment.
In the case of the EU, it has a number of members (particularly France, Germany, and Italy) with interests in the Indian Ocean. To these EU members, one can add the United Kingdom, a member of the EU from 1973 to 2020 (see section entitled “Middle Powers”). The EU sees its presence in the Indian Ocean as a manifestation of its common security and defense policy. The main manifestation of the EU role from this perspective has been in the participation of member countries in naval patrols in the Arabian Sea (northwest sector) to counter Somali pirates. The Indian Ocean also plays a role in the context of the EU’s relations with the developing countries, with agreements for economic cooperation; a good example is the agreement with the Southern African Development Community (SADC), concluded in 2016. Development assistance focuses on South Asia, southern and eastern Africa, and the Indian Ocean island states, including agreements with relevant regional organizations.
Middle Powers
Middle powers involved in the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean include France, Australia, South Africa, Indonesia, and the United Kingdom. While Australia, South Africa, and Indonesia adjoin the Indian Ocean, France and the United Kingdom are both territorial and extraterritorial in relation to the ocean. As a republic, France centers on its metropolitan territory and is a leading member of the EU, but there are also overseas departments, including both Réunion and Mayotte in the Indian Ocean. In addition, France has close links with the former colonial territories of Madagascar, Comoros (from which Mayotte separated), and Djibouti. The focus for France is the southwest sector where Réunion is located, functioning as an important military base. France has an important political influence not just with its former territories, but with the island countries of Mauritius and Seychelles (both French up to the time of the Napoleonic wars). Defense cooperation with India has emerged as an important theme in France’s involvement with the southwest sector. The involvement of French companies can be significant in some contexts; for example, the French company Total is involved in the exploitation of natural gas reserves off the coast of northern Mozambique.
With Australia, South Africa, and Indonesia, engagement in the Indian Ocean forms one aspect of their international role. Australia sees itself as an Asia-Pacific power but has reoriented itself towards an Indo-Pacific strategy. It is simultaneously focused on its security alliance with the United States and its trade relationship with China, the two aspects sometimes being in tension with each other (especially given increasing Sino-US competition). The Indo-Pacific strategy suggests a stronger focus on India, taking further the strategy of constraining China that is implicit in the Quad. While the political center of gravity in the Australian federation is in the eastern states, the increased emphasis on the Indian Ocean, particularly the southeast sector, receives strong support in Western Australia.
With South Africa, its primary focus is southern Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, more generally, as well as having a global role through such groupings as BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa). Its concerns in the Indian Ocean relate mainly to the southwest sector, seeing this sector as an extension of southern Africa. The relationship with France—mostly cooperative—is significant for South Africa’s role in the southwest Indian Ocean.
Indonesia likewise gives particular attention to Southeast Asia (especially through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN]), while also having a wider Islamic and global role (in the former case through the Organization of Islamic Cooperation). Links with India are part of Indonesia’s role in the Indian Ocean, both being engaged with the northeast sector.
In addition to France and the three powers adjoining the Indian Ocean, one might also add the United Kingdom as a “middle power” engaged in the Indian Ocean (it should also be noted that the United Kingdom was a member of the EU from 1973 to 2020). The United Kingdom is likely to develop further its involvement in the Indian Ocean post-Brexit, attempting to strengthen its links with leading Commonwealth countries such as India, and continuing its naval deployment in the ocean; a specific issue that remains unresolved is the future of the BIOT (the one remaining British territory in the Indian Ocean), leading to difficulties on the one hand with Mauritius and its supporters (including India), but also possibly causing tensions with the United States (given the US interest in maintaining Diego Garcia as a base).
Middle Eastern States
One aspect of the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean concerns the involvement of various Middle Eastern states, particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iran, and Turkey. The northwest sector is the main zone of engagement. Involvement in that sector has some bearing on the situation in neighboring parts of the Middle East, including such conflicts as the Yemen war, and the contest between Iran and Saudi Arabia; Afghanistan is also relevant in this context, although not part of the Middle East as usually defined. Israel and Turkey are part of the wider context, as are the situations in Iraq and Syria. It is relevant that the major powers and a range of other powers are engaged in the ocean and can have a direct or indirect influence on situations in the Middle East. Most important in this respect is the United States with its various deployments relating to the Middle East (and Southwest Asia) supported through the role it plays in the Indian Ocean.
In relation to the four states as listed, Saudi Arabia has drawn on its links with the United States to strengthen its position in the contest with Iran; the strength of this relationship can vary, being particularly strong during the Trump administration (2017–2021). The UAE is also close to the United States, as well as to Saudi Arabia. Iran draws on its links to Russia and China to help in its contest with Saudi Arabia and the United States. Turkey’s role in the Indian Ocean relates to its emergence as a more significant power not just in the Middle East but in areas beyond. All four states attempt to further their influence with Indian Ocean states, as well as with the various other powers active in the region.
The Rest
In addition to the powers that have previously been mentioned, there are other littoral states (Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Myanmar [Burma], Thailand) and Indian Ocean island countries (Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Maldives, Sri Lanka) that warrant mention in the context of geopolitics in the Indian Ocean. These states vary in size, but all have some influence in the geopolitics of the region. The other powers attempt to influence these states, but they all have some agency, influenced by factors such as the extent of their security and economic dependence, domestic politics (divided or not), and geographical location (strategically important or less so). Some of these states might bandwagon with other powers, but they can also try to maintain their independence in various ways.
With Kenya, Mozambique, and Tanzania, their engagement with Indian Ocean issues is not strong. Their main concerns relate to southern and/or eastern Africa. Comoros and Madagascar, along with Mauritius and Seychelles, are not just part of the African subregions but are also the island states of the southwest sector of the Indian Ocean. Mauritius is politically close to India, while also having economic ties to China. Seychelles, similarly, leans towards India but less so than with Mauritius.
The regional focus for Pakistan and Bangladesh is South Asia (Pakistan also being engaged in Southwest Asia); Maldives and Sri Lanka, while Indian Ocean island states, are also part of South Asia. India is the key to regional politics for all these states; the India-Pakistan conflict being part of this dynamic. With this latter aspect, Pakistan can seek relationships with other powers as a means of balancing India; China being most important in this respect.
With the two Southeast Asian states, Myanmar is also in some respects part of the South Asian context. The relationship with India is important, with China again having some role in balancing Indian influence. Thailand is more exclusively focused on Southeast Asia; however, the Indian Ocean dimension can play a role with some of Thailand’s key relationships, most importantly with the United States and China, but with India also providing opportunities if engagement with a range of powers is sought.
In summary, this overview of the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean suggests the complexity of the situation. It is not just a matter of how the major powers interact, but various other powers, both regional and extraregional, are involved. The type of interaction can vary depending on the sector of the ocean. Among the various powers, it is the major powers that are most likely to be engaged across the whole ocean. It is also the case that the issues arising in the different sectors are influenced by the situations in adjoining regions: namely southern and eastern Africa, the Middle East (extending to Southwest Asia), South Asia, and Southeast Asia.
When considering the role of regional organizations, the underlying dynamics across the ocean, in the different sectors, and in the adjoining regions provide the context. That context is crucial to understanding the role and dynamics of the different organizations.
Regional Organizations in the Indian Ocean
The fact that there are so few regional organizations covering all or part of the Indian Ocean indicates the weak sense of “regionness.” The Indian Ocean identity is of minor importance for most states. The regional organizations that are important are in the regions adjoining the Indian Ocean. These organizations focus on issues important to their own regions. Indian Ocean issues can play some role in this context but are not central.
The section “Organizations Covering All or Part of the Indian Ocean” indicates the role and significance of each organization in the Indian Ocean as well as those organizations in regions adjoining the Indian Ocean. The section “Organizations in Areas Adjacent to and Overlapping with the Indian Ocean” emphasizes the way in which the different organizations relate to Indian Ocean issues, even though such issues are not central.
Organizations Covering All or Part of the Indian Ocean
There are two regional organizations covering all or part of the Indian Ocean that are general in scope. The IORA covers the whole Indian Ocean but is not comprehensive in its membership. There is also an organization focused on the southwest sector of the ocean, the IOC. In addition to these general organizations, there are some bodies focused on maritime activities and other more specialized activities.
IORA began with an initiative of the Australian government in 1995. The organization started as the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation in 1997, changing its name to IORA in 2013. It initially comprised fourteen members, but by 2021 there were twenty-two, covering southern and eastern Africa (Comoros, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, Tanzania); the Middle East (Iran, Oman, UAE, Yemen); South Asia (Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Sri Lanka); Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand); and Australia. Notable omissions from membership are Saudi Arabia in the Middle East (where conflict with Iran would be a factor), Pakistan in South Asia (relating to the conflict with India), and Myanmar in Southeast Asia. There is a small secretariat based in Mauritius. IORA has ten dialogue partners, including China and the United States, as the externally based major powers in the Indian Ocean, and France (important in the southwest sector); the others are Egypt, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.
Organizationally IORA has annual ministerial meetings (Council of Foreign Ministers) and a twice-yearly meeting of senior officials; in March 2017, there was a Leaders’ Summit held in Jakarta. There is also a 1.5-track dialogue known as the Indian Ocean Dialogue (with representatives from both governments and civil society organizations), usually held on an annual basis. There is a range of noncontroversial cooperative activities, involving a number of specific projects. Since India’s period as chair in 2011–2013, these activities as claimed by IORA have included maritime safety and security, trade and investment facilitation, fisheries management, disaster risk management, tourism and cultural exchanges, academic cooperation, developing the blue economy, and women’s economic empowerment. However, in terms of the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean, the role of IORA is not important. It provides one possible framework for dialogue and consultation on major geopolitical issues but is little used in that respect.
More specific in focus is the IOC, in the southwest sector of the ocean. The IOC predates IORA, having been founded in 1982, with the Port Louis Declaration. Its original members were Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles; it expanded in 1986 to include Comoros and France. The formal arrangements for the IOC date from the conclusion of the General Cooperation Agreement (Victoria Agreement) in 1984. France’s membership was through its overseas department of Réunion. Interestingly, Mayotte—separated from the other three islands of Comoros at the time of independence from France in 1975 (and an overseas department since 2011)—is not formally part of the IOC. France’s membership of the IOC brings greater financial resources to the IOC and enhances its clout as an international organization. At the same time, this situation detracts from the potential role of the IOC as a voice for the independent island states of the southwest Indian Ocean. From the perspective of geopolitics, it is worth noting that the prominent French role in the IOC benefits India, given close Franco-Indian cooperation; however, India also has its own independent relations with the various island states. China and India are among the seven observers to the IOC; others include Japan, the EU, and the United Nations (UN).
The main focus for the IOC is on functional and economic cooperation, covering such areas as climate change, fisheries, maritime activities, trade cooperation, waste management, agricultural research, and capacity building (in relation to the IOC itself). The EU has links to the IOC as part of its involvement in development cooperation in this part of the Indian Ocean; the EU is the leading source of development funds for the IOC. The IOC has a small secretariat based in Mauritius.
In August 2019, the Moroni Declaration attempted to strengthen the political role of the IOC by allowing for more meetings involving heads of government; a revised Victoria Agreement enabled an institutional strengthening of the IOC. A summit at this level was held in Madagascar in June 2020.
The main bodies focused on maritime activities in the Indian Ocean are the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), and the Indian Ocean Memorandum of Understanding on State Port Control. For counterpiracy activities there is the Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS). An example of a more specialized organization is the Indian Ocean Tourism Organization.
The IOTC commenced in 1996, following an initiative of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization. The IOTC’s aim is to manage tuna fishing in the Indian Ocean; it is therefore open to states and regional organizations with an interest in such fishing. Most of the thirty-one members (2021) are Indian Ocean littoral or island states, but some (such as China, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the EU) are not. The IOTC’s secretariat is in Seychelles. Within the IOTC, there have been some tensions between Indian Ocean states and members representing countries alleged to be overfishing (the EU in the case of fishing fleets based in France and Spain).
The IONS is a forum that began in 2008 under the auspices of the Indian Navy. Meeting every two years, the IONS enables the navies and maritime forces of member states to exchange information and discuss issues relevant to the operation of navies in the Indian Ocean. The membership consists of twenty-four littoral and island states in the Indian Ocean, including France (through Réunion) and the United Kingdom (through the BIOT). There are eight observers, including Madagascar (an Indian Ocean island state); the other seven observers are external to the Indian Ocean but deploy naval forces in the Indian Ocean, although not necessarily on a continuing basis. These include China, Japan, Russia, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain (the latter four primarily through their contributions to the EU’s counterpiracy activities).
In the case of the Indian Ocean Memorandum of Understanding on State Port Control, this arrangement began in 1997 as a mechanism to ensure adherence to relevant international conventions on maritime safety (primarily the International Maritime Convention). It is linked to the International Maritime Organization, an agency of the UN. There are twenty member states from the Indian Ocean region (2021), including France (through Réunion) and Sudan (Red Sea coastline). There is a secretariat based in Goa, India.
The CGPCS is an international grouping initiated by the UN Security Council in 2009, to achieve better coordination of states and other actors involved in counterpiracy activities in the northwest sector of the Indian Ocean, adjacent to Somalia. There is not a formal membership. Some navies such as those of India, China, Russia, and Iran operate independently in counterpiracy activities. The main joint operation is the US-led Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), with a coalition of thirty-three contributing countries (2021); the CMF is also involved in Gulf security and general issues of maritime security, not just counterpiracy. Since 2008, EU members (and some others) have operated through the European Union Naval Force—Operation Atalanta, in conjunction with the CMF.
Outside the maritime domain, an example of a specialized regional organization in the Indian Ocean is the Indian Ocean Tourism Organization, established at a conference in Perth, Western Australia, in 1995, and active over about a decade. At an intergovernmental level, sustainable tourism features as an important focus for both IORA and the IOC. With a strong francophone emphasis, the “Vanilla Islands” project commenced in 2010 as a joint initiative by the tourist organizations in Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mayotte, Réunion, and Seychelles to promote these islands as tourist destinations.
Organizations in Areas Adjacent to and Overlapping with the Indian Ocean
Apart from the organizations focused specifically on the Indian Ocean, both general and more specific, there are other organizations that relate to areas adjacent to and overlapping with the Indian Ocean. Rather than consider these organizations in a comprehensive way, it is possible to assess their significance for the Indian Ocean by examining situations in which such organizations have had an impact on Indian Ocean issues. The latter term covers issues relating to Indian Ocean island states but also a range of littoral states in terms of their engagement with the ocean dimension. The focus initially is on relevant African organizations, followed by organizations covering the Persian/Arabian Gulf, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia and Southeast Asia combined. The emphasis is on geopolitical issues, but not exclusively so.
In relation to Africa, the main regional organization is the African Union (AU), formed in 2002 as the successor to the Organisation of African Unity (established in 1963). Since the AU includes all the African states, its scope extends well beyond Indian Ocean issues. Nevertheless, the AU has intervened in a number of conflicts in Indian Ocean coastal and island states. In 2007, the AU sent an intervention force to overcome a political impasse over elections in Comoros; this force was known as the Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros. In 2009, AU mediation helped to resolve a political crisis in Madagascar. The best-known AU intervention is the African Union Mission in Somalia, dating from 2007 and authorized by the UN Security Council. The AU has also endorsed Mauritius’s claim to the Chagos archipelago, adding to the widespread international support the island state enjoys on this issue.
In relation to the areas of Africa adjoining and extending into the Indian Ocean, the main organizations are the SADC (formed 1980), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA, formed 1994), and the East African Community (EAC, dating from 2000 in its present form). While these organizations might be viewed as primarily concerned with development and economic cooperation, they can also play a role in relation to geopolitical issues. SADC has sixteen members (2021), including four Indian Ocean island states (Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles) and three Indian Ocean coastal states (Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania). South Africa is the leading member, with SADC enhancing its role in the southwest sector of the Indian Ocean, cooperating with but also competing against France.
In the case of COMESA, again there are the four Indian Ocean island states (as with SADC), plus four coastal states (Kenya, Mozambique, Somalia, South Africa, but not Tanzania; Djibouti and Eritrea can be added if the Red Sea is included), out of a total membership of twenty-one states in 2021. The leading member is South Africa, followed by Kenya. With the EAC, Kenya and Tanzania are the only members (out of six in 2021) with Indian Ocean coastlines; Kenya is the most significant member of this group.
Moving east to the Arabian peninsula and the Persian Gulf (also referred to as the Arabian Gulf), the main regional organization is the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), consisting of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Formed in 1981, the official title is the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf. As the title indicates, the grouping centers on the Persian/Arabian Gulf, but Iran and Iraq are noticeably absent (the official title, emphasizing “Arab” states provides a rationale for Iran’s exclusion). Yemen’s absence might be explained by the focus on the Gulf. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are the two strongest states in the group, looking for support in the conflict with Iran. Oman and Qatar have been more open to some cooperation with Iran; tensions with Qatar resulted in Saudi-led attempts (supported by the UAE and Bahrain among GCC members) to isolate Qatar in the period 2017–2021. In the context of the Arab Spring in 2011, a Saudi-UAE force under the auspices of the GCC entered Bahrain to help end an uprising among the Shia majority there against the Sunni rulers. It is perhaps best to see these issues as Gulf-centered, but clearly the Persian/Arabian Gulf links directly to the northwest sector of the Indian Ocean.
In the case of the Indian subcontinent, the main regional organization is the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), founded in 1985. SAARC includes not just the countries of the subcontinent (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, plus Afghanistan), but also the nearby Indian Ocean island states of Maldives and Sri Lanka; the India-oriented island state of Mauritius in the southwest sector of the ocean is an observer. Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan are Indian Ocean littoral states, with India one of the major powers in the ocean. Because of Indo-Pakistani tensions, regional cooperation through SAARC is on a “lowest common denominator” basis, meaning a range of relatively low-level functional activities and some economic cooperation. SAARC lists its main areas of cooperation as follows: human resource development and tourism; agriculture and rural development; environment, natural disasters, and biotechnology; economic, trade, and financial cooperation; social affairs; information and poverty alleviation; energy, transport, science, and technology; education, security (terrorism, crime, drug trafficking, human trafficking); and culture. SAARC is not of great significance for the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean.
Compared with SAARC, ASEAN, the main regional organization in Southeast Asia, is more high profile. Of its ten members, only one (Myanmar) is solely an Indian Ocean coastal state. Indonesia and Thailand have significant Indian Ocean coastlines, and Malaysia and Singapore also have an Indian Ocean dimension. Nevertheless, the significance of ASEAN for Indian Ocean geopolitics is not great. ASEAN is generally reluctant to become involved in the “internal” affairs of member states; its capacity for concerted action is limited. That being said, issues with an Indian Ocean dimension arise for ASEAN from time to time. With the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004, the ASEAN countries of Indonesia, Thailand, and Myanmar were directly affected. However, it was a coalition focused on Australia, India, Japan, and the United States that was most active in the immediate response, with the UN later assuming the main coordinating role; ASEAN was not prominent. ASEAN has been relatively low-key in its engagement with Myanmar over issues of military rule and democracy (for example, the military coup in early 2021), as well as in relation to the treatment of the Rohingya in Rakhine state.
A regional grouping with members from both South Asia (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka) and Southeast Asia (Myanmar, Thailand) is the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation. Apart from the landlocked countries of Bhutan and Nepal, all these countries have Indian Ocean coastlines. Formed in 1997, it engages in relatively low-level functional and economic cooperation, similar to SAARC. It provides a Bay of Bengal identity, linking all the countries of South Asia (except Pakistan) to two Southeast Asian countries. Although it has some relevance for the northeast sector of the Indian Ocean, it does not have great significance for the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean. It could provide one means for India to engage with Myanmar, given the competition between India and China in relation to that country.
Discussion of the Literature
There is a limited literature on the regional organizations of the Indian Ocean; this is understandable given that there are so few organizations with a specifically Indian Ocean focus. There is more writing on the regional organizations that are in adjoining areas but have an Indian Ocean dimension (although that dimension does not necessarily receive much attention): specifically, the AU, the GCC, SAARC, and ASEAN. The literature on these regional organizations focuses on the dynamics of the organizations, their areas of involvement and significance. The geopolitical context receives attention in relation to the dynamics.
The literature on the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean is more extensive, often linked to a particular historical phase. During the imperial era, histories generally focused on a particular country, such as India, rather than discussing the Indian Ocean as a whole. A recent book by Andrew Phillips and Jason C. Sharman gives attention to the international interactions of the pre-imperial polities in the Indian Ocean and the nature of Western imperial expansion in that context.1 Phillip Darby shows how the end of the Indian Ocean as a “British lake” came in the late 1960s rather than with the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947.2
Apart from works focusing on geopolitics in historical context, there are historically oriented works relating to the Indian Ocean, such as books by Kavalam Madhava Panikkar;3 as well as “big histories” that might have an Indian Ocean focus (hence the approach known as “Indian Ocean world studies” that derives in turn from a “world history” framework).4
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Cold War contest between the United States and the Soviet Union was a central theme in literature relating to the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean, with strategic analysis the main genre.5 A subtheme is the Indian Ocean zone-of-peace proposal as initiated by Sri Lanka and adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1971.6
In the post–Cold War era, the United States has remained as one of the major powers in the Indian Ocean. However, increasing attention has been given to the roles of India and China, and particularly the competition between those two powers. Combining journalistic and academic perspectives, both Robert Kaplan and Bertil Lintner have written strategic overviews of the Indian Ocean in recent times.7 Other authors such as David Brewster have focused on India’s role, including the competition with China.8
There is some literature focused on the politics (including the geopolitics) of the southwest Indian Ocean. Apart from individual country studies, there are also examples of regional approaches.9
There is writing on specific issues affecting the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean, such as the controversy over Diego Garcia (the site of the US base in the BIOT), where Mauritius has the support of India and most developing countries to recover the Chagos archipelago from the United Kingdom to enable the return of the Chagossians to their island home.10
The key research questions relate to the goal of obtaining a better understanding of the changing geopolitics of the Indian Ocean, including the ocean as a whole and its various subsectors. One aspect of this is to determine the extent of “regionness.”11 In understanding the geopolitics and “regionness,” there is a need to examine the role of regional organizations. This includes both organizations specific to the Indian Ocean and one or more of its sectors, and also the role of organizations in adjoining areas that also relate to at least part of the Indian Ocean.
The major journal for Indian Ocean affairs is the Journal of the Indian Ocean Region.
Links to Digital Materials
The National Security College, part of the Crawford School of Public Policy at the Australian National University, has a project entitled “Made for Multipolarity: Operationalising an Indo-Pacific Strategy in the Indian Ocean,” supported by the Australian Department of Defence.
Further Reading
- Alpers, Edward A. The Indian Ocean in World History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Arasaratnam, Sinnappah. “Recent Trends in the Historiography of the Indian Ocean, 1500 to 1800.” Journal of World History 1, no. 2 (Fall 1990): 225–248.
- Basrur, Rajesh, Anit Mukherjee, and Thazha Varkey Paul, eds. India-China Maritime Competition: The Security Dilemma at Sea. Abingdon: Routledge, 2019.
- Brewster, David. India’s Ocean: The Story of India’s Bid for Regional Leadership. London and New York: Routledge, 2014.
- Brewster, David, ed. India and China at Sea: Competition for Naval Dominance in the Indian Ocean. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Darby, Phillip. British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947–1968. London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1973.
- Garofano, John, and Andrea J. Dew, eds. Deep Currents and Rising Tides: The Indian Ocean and International Security. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013.
- Kaplan, Robert D. Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power. New York: Random House, 2010.
- Lintner, Bertil. The Costliest Pearl: China’s Struggle for India’s Ocean. London: Hurst & Company, 2019.
- McDougall, Derek. “The Indian Ocean Commission: Regional Cooperation in the South-West Indian Ocean.” The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 83, no. 332 (1994): 455–467.
- Panikkar, Kavalam Madhava. Asia and Western Dominance: A Survey of the Vasco da Gama Epoch of Asian History, 1498–1945. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1953.
- Panikkar, Kavalam Madhava. India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Sea Power on Indian History. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1945.
- Pearson, Michael N. The Indian Ocean. New York: Routledge, 2003.
- Phillips, Andrew, and Jason C. Sharman. International Order in Diversity: War, Trade and Rule in the Indian Ocean. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Prange, Sebastian R. “Scholars and the Sea: A Historiography of the Indian Ocean.” History Compass 6, no. 5 (2008): 1382–1395.
- Raja Mohan, Chilamkuri. Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012.
- Sellström, Tor. Africa in the Indian Ocean: Islands in Ebb and Flow. Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 2015.
- Wagner, Christian. “The Indian Ocean Rim—Association for Regional Co-operation (IOR–ARC): The Futile Quest for Regionalism?” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region 9, no. 1 (2013): 6–16.
Notes
1. Andrew Phillips and Jason C. Sharman, International Order in Diversity: War, Trade and Rule in the Indian Ocean (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
2. Phillip Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947–1968 (London: Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1973).
3. Kavalam Madhava Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Sea Power on Indian History (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1945); and Kavalam Madhava Panikkar, Asia and Western Dominance: A Survey of the Vasco da Gama Epoch of Asian History, 1498–1945 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1953).
4. Examples are Edward A. Alpers, The Indian Ocean in World History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); and Michael N. Pearson, The Indian Ocean (New York: Routledge, 2003). Two good historiographical reviews are Sinnappah Arasaratnam, “Recent Trends in the Historiography of the Indian Ocean, 1500 to 1800,” Journal of World History 1, no. 2 (Fall 1990): 225–248; and Sebastian R. Prange, “Scholars and the Sea: A Historiography of the Indian Ocean,” History Compass 6, no. 5 (2008): 1382–1395. See also the books in the Palgrave Series in Indian Ocean World Studies. The work of Fernand Braudel, with its focus on the material environment, is an inspiration for this approach, even though Braudel focused mainly on the Mediterranean world.
5. See, for example, William L. Dowdy and Russell B. Trood, eds., The Indian Ocean: Perspectives on a Strategic Arena (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1985); Rasul B. Rais, The Indian Ocean and the Superpowers: Economic, Political and Strategic Perspectives (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986); and Kim C. Beazley and Ian Clark, The Politics of Intrusion: The Super Powers and the Indian Ocean (Sydney: Alternative Publishing Cooperative, 1979).
6. This theme features, for example, in George W. Shepherd Jr., The Trampled Grass: Tributary States and Self-Reliance in the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987).
7. Robert D. Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power (New York: Random House, 2010); and Bertil Lintner, The Costliest Pearl: China’s Struggle for India’s Ocean (London: Hurst & Company, 2019).
8. David Brewster, India’s Ocean: The Story of India’s Bid for Regional Leadership (London and New York: Routledge, 2014); David Brewster, ed., India and China at Sea: Competition for Naval Dominance in the Indian Ocean (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2018); and Rajesh Basrur, Anit Mukherjee, and Thazha Varkey Paul, eds., India-China Maritime Competition: The Security Dilemma at Sea (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019).
9. Phillip M. Allen, Security and Nationalism in the Indian Ocean: Lessons from the Latin Quarter Islands (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987); and Tor Sellström, Africa in the Indian Ocean: Islands in Ebb and Flow (Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 2015).
10. For example, see David Vine, Island of Shame: The Secret History of the U.S. Military Base on Diego Garcia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); Peter H. Sand, United States and Britain in Diego Garcia: The Future of a Controversial Base (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Thierry Ollivry, Diego Garcia: Enjeux stratégiques, diplomatiques et humanitaires (Paris: Harmattan, 2008); Stephen Allen, The Chagos Islanders and International Law (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2014); and Stephen Allen and Chris Monaghan, eds., Fifty Years of the British Indian Ocean Territory: Legal Perspectives (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2018).
11. An insightful assessment of “basin consciousness” in the Indian Ocean is Jeremy Prestholdt, “Locating the Indian Ocean: Notes on the Reconstitution of Space,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 9, no. 3 (2015): 440–467.