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The real option theory (ROT), a theory on investment decision making under uncertainty, has been applied to analyzing a broad range of questions in international business (IB). In the face of uncertainty, any discretion that the managers of a multinational enterprise (MNE) have over the timing, scale, speed, and sequence of investing or using the firm’s resources, in the forms of physical or intellectual capital or managerial time and effort, can be a real option. Such options confer upon the managers the right, but not the obligation, to exploit the upside potential while limiting the downside risk. Uncertainty, irreversibility, and absence of immediate and complete preemption are three necessary conditions for a real option to create value. Uncertainty offers opportunities to gather more information in the future, and such information can help managers make better decisions or alter prior decisions for improvement. Irreversibility is defined as the proportion of the investment committed to a project that cannot be recouped if the project is abandoned. Preemption refers to the revocation of the decision-making discretion that nullifies the option. It is possible to distinguish seven types of real options that have been examined in IB studies: (a) option to defer, (b) option to abandon/exit, (c) option to exchange, (d) option to grow/scale up, (e) option to contract/scale down, (f) option to switch, and (g) compound options. These types of options are found to influence a firm’s international market-entry strategies (e.g., location, timing, scale, speed, and mode) and the configuration and organization of the firm’s geographically dispersed production network. ROT has also been integrated with other economic theories, such as transaction cost economics and resource-based view, to better understand these decisions. Although ROT assumes a strong form of rationality on the part of the decision maker, it is also possible to incorporate cognitive or cultural biases into the theory and give the theory’s analysis greater realism. ROT represents a theoretical approach that can be integrated with various economic and noneconomic theories. More work in such theoretical integration can potentially help researchers gain deeper or more complete understandings of IB questions. Extant studies in IB typically analyze only a single type of option in isolation. But the global production network of a MNE typically has a portfolio of different types of options embedded, and the different types of options inevitably interact. The study of interactions among two or more types of options under different sources of uncertainty is likely to yield new insights on the strategy and organization of the MNE.

Since the early 1980s in the United States and the early 1990s in Europe and Asia, there has been a notable surge in the volume and frequency of share repurchases by companies. There are many different types of repurchases such as open-market repurchases, repurchase tender offers, privately negotiated repurchases, and accelerated share repurchases. Prior Research on share repurchases has identified many different motivations identified in prior literature, such as undervaluation, tax advantages, flexibility, takeover defense, and optimal capital structure. In addition, prior research has identified a number of organizational characteristics that can cause a firm to repurchase their shares such as the compensation structure of the executives, managerial characteristics, and managerial entrenchment. A large number of empirical studies have investigated the factors that motivate repurchases and implications of repurchases for stockholders, creditors, executives, and the economy in general. The results of these studies suggest that any generalizations about the benefits of repurchases may be inappropriate and that both the positive and negative effects may be context specific. Stock buybacks are becoming common in countries other than the United States. Empirical research on repurchases in different countries suggests that the motivations, incentives, and effects of repurchases may vary based on not only firm-specific factors but also country-level institutional conditions. We identify several avenues for future research such as the potential for principal–principal conflicts, the implications of governance characteristics for repurchase decisions, different executions strategies, and application of new methodological tools.