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date: 28 September 2023



  • Douglas Cairns


“Emotion” is a vernacular rather than a scientific concept. The experiences that are called emotions in English are a subset of a wider range of affective experiences. Categories of particular emotions similarly constitute families whose members are by no means homogeneous. As perceptions of the world and of ourselves, emotions are richly permeated by cognition. As syndromes of multiple factors, they have an event-like structure that lends itself to narrative explanation. Historical analysis of emotion(s) thus requires close attention to conceptual history and to contexts, both immediate and cultural/historical. Classicists can explore the historical contingency of “emotion” in Greek and Latin, both in the theories of the major philosophical schools and in a variety of literary texts. But emotion history now uses a much wider range of literary, documentary, visual, and material evidence. Understanding emotion is an essential aspect of many early 21st-century approaches to Classics, especially in ancient history, classical literature and rhetoric, and ancient philosophy, just as the visual and physical remains of the classical world are rich in emotional implications and deeply entwined with the representation, performance, and pragmatics of ancient emotion.


  • Greek Literature
  • Latin Literature
  • Philosophy

Updated in this version

Article rewritten to reflect current scholarship.

Doing Emotion History

As Sir Geoffrey Lloyd observes, “very considerable confusion still exists … on what emotion is and how it should be defined.”1 The modern English term “emotion” has its own particular history,2 and its international dominance, like that of English-language categories of particular emotions, is a regular source of complaint among those who study comparable phenomena in other cultures.3 English “emotion” is by no means co-extensive with its nearest equivalents in Greek or Latin. Pathos in Greek (from paschein, to undergo) has a wide range of senses in fields from logic to medicine.4 And although Greek writers from the 4th century bce onwards do refer regularly to the pathē of the soul (psychē), not even that category is co-extensive with English “emotion.” The Romans, for their part, deploy a range of different terms, such as animi motus, adfectiones/affectiones, adfectus/affectus, passiones, and perturbationes, for what the Greeks call the pathē of the soul.

The issue of definition is a live one in emotion research.5 For James A. Russell, “Emotion researchers face a scandal. We have no agreed upon definition of the term—emotion—that defines our field.”6 But Russell’s own work reveals that this is less of a scandal than it might seem. Though influential modern approaches have sought to pin down precisely which element in any scenario is “the emotion,”7 Russell is one of many to have demonstrated that such a project is misplaced. Emotions are fundamentally event-like in structure, a feature often described in terms of “scripts.”8 A script is a more or less prototypical scenario, not an essence:9 neither the category of emotion nor the categories of particular emotions (anger, fear, shame, etc.) are “classical” ones, in which membership depends on fulfilment of a limited set of necessary and sufficient conditions, but “fuzzy” ones that manifest indeterminate boundaries, overlap with other categories, display ambiguities regarding membership, and have an internal structure that encompasses peripheral as well as prototypical cases.10 The labels that are applied to these categories cover a range of cases with a variety of characteristics.

Though there may be a prototypical script or set of scripts for each emotion category, their elements are flexibly combinable, and no element is essential. Prototypical emotions involve appraisals of states of affairs, but there are less prototypical cases which do not—as when we are angry or afraid, but do not really know why. Emotion episodes regularly do include visible expressions and typical patterns of behaviour, but they need not. And even the feeling of arousal that we regard as characteristic of emotion is not absolutely necessary: fear of snakes can be dispositional as well as occurrent, so that we take care never to encounter one. And when we say things like, “I’m afraid you’re mistaken,” we are drawing on aspects of the category of fear without commenting on an occurrent experience.

Yet the occurrent emotional state, involving both valence (whether the stimulus is pleasant or unpleasant, good or bad, for the agent) and arousal (how calm or agitated the agent feels), is the prototypical case. Emotion research focuses overwhelmingly on episodes that involve some form of phenomenally salient affective state. Equally typically, states of that sort involve perceiving and appraising an object in certain terms. Emotions typically have both a markedly phenomenal aspect (what it feels like to experience one) and an intentional aspect (in the technical sense of being about something, having some object in mind). Thus emotions involve perceptions of ourselves as experiencers of the world as well as perceptions of the world. This combination of phenomenal salience with intentionality in the occurrent affective states that we, in English, prototypically regard as emotions is found also in the analogous Greek and Latin categories.11 Typical examples highlight forms of affective arousal that present themselves as things that happen to us rather than as things that we do. This is no doubt a prototype that classical concepts themselves have played a significant role in shaping. But though the combination of intentionality, phenomenality, and passivity may account for the “best examples” of the categories in question, it is not difficult, in English, Greek, or Latin, to find examples of emotion (pathos, adfectus, etc.) that do not exhibit all these features. Much modern research suggests that phenomenal passivity is a feature only of folk concepts of emotion.12 Old antitheses between reason and passion, cognition and affectivity, break down in contemporary views of affective experience as a continuum that underpins all conscious psychological processes,13 including those most associated with rational choice.14 The episodes that contemporary English describes as “emotions” are just the peaks and troughs of an affective continuum.15

The perception that emotions involve ways of perceiving the world and of perceiving ourselves as perceivers of the world is not a thin, passive experience, but a cognitively rich and conceptually permeated one, involving active, “top-down” aspects deriving from knowledge and experience as well as “bottom-up” sensory data.16 As Russell puts it,17

Perceiving oneself as having an emotion is no different in kind from other perceptions. Percepts are often compelling, but they are not simple. Nor are they infallible. Like other acts of perception, an emotional experience is not entirely “bottom-up,” not entirely data driven. A percept is the end product of a complex process involving raw data, concepts, learning, and context.

Thus emotions involve perceptions that depend on the concepts and categories of the cultures we grow up in. These are not entirely subsumed in language (they can be active in the non-verbal performance of emotion), but language is a central aspect of both the conceptualization and the experience of emotion.18 Attention to historical and cross-cultural variation in the sense and reference of emotion concepts is not about focusing on emotional discourse or “signs of emotion” rather than on “emotions themselves,”19 but a fundamental aspect of emotion research, an enterprise in which historical, linguistic, and literary disciplines such as Classics have much to contribute.

As events in themselves and as aspects of larger event-structures, emotions lend themselves to representation in narrative terms.20 Narratives furnish some of the best evidence for the study of emotion in any culture. Though there is a genuine sense in which the prototypical case of emotion is one that is being performed, by oneself or another, right here, right now, the fact that such cases are understood intersubjectively in terms of shared concepts, with their associated scripts and narratives, means that people can talk, in narrative terms, about the present and past emotions of themselves and others. Historical and literary sources are rich in such narratives.

Narrative entails contexts in which events proceed from cause to effect in ways that reflect the character and motivation of agents. When Thucydides (1.23.6) identifies the Spartans’ fear (phobos) of the Athenians’ growing power as the “truest cause” of the Peloponnesian War, it does not matter whether he thinks or means readers to think that any individual Spartan or group of Spartans experienced an occurrent episode of emotion on any particular occasion. The Spartans’ fear represents their attitude towards and behaviour in the light of developments as they construed them. That construal may have been one to which historical Spartans gave voice; but Thucydides’ identification of that emotion as a cause of war is adequately justified by his understanding of the policies and actions of the Spartan state. It is a regular feature of emotion scenarios that the behavioural and evaluative aspects of the script may be much more prominent than the affective, phenomenological elements.21 Emotions involve the outward as well as the inward aspects of the body, interaction between the individual and the physical and social environments, embodied practice in roles, relationships, and institutions, as well as the shared norms and concepts that give them their structure.22 The narratives that encompass such elements have their own cultural and historical contexts, and so the contextual factors one takes into account in assessing the presentation of emotion in a given narrative may need to encompass various aspects of genre and intertextuality.23 One cannot separate emotion as subjective experience from the contexts, expression, behaviour, norms, and discourse of emotion.

Thus Classicists are in a fortunate position. Many of the discipline’s skills—the understanding that translation is about ideas, not lexical tokens; the knowledge that ideas must be understood in contextually situated terms; the sense that terms and concepts change over time; the sensitivity to narrative cues about the motives of characters in the diegetic, mimetic, and mixed genres of ancient literature—turn out to be essential in using textual sources as material for the history of emotions. In so far as emotions are event-like in nature, readers have access to the emotions of individuals represented in any text that has even a minimal narrative form—from the epics of Homer to the sketches of the conditions, evaluations, and behaviour patterns associated with individual emotions in Aristotle’s Rhetoric.

Ancient Theories of Emotion

Ancient theories of emotion vary in their emphases, but generally agree with mainstream modern theories in seeing emotions as psychophysical events that feel a certain way, motivate action, and depend on appraisals of contexts and their significance for the agent.24 Ancient theorizing about emotion begins with Aristotle, but earlier thinkers had also shown an interest in relevant phenomena. Gorgias’s Encomium of Helen reflects a concern with the emotional effects of poetic speech that is rooted in the implicit aesthetics of earlier Greek (especially epic) poetry and anticipates later discussions in works such as Plato’s Ion and Aristotle’s Poetics.25 Plato never attempts to develop a systematic category of emotional pathē, but emotions in our sense do feature prominently in his work.26 A notable feature for Plato is their ambivalence: in the Philebus they are introduced as mixtures of pleasure and pain in the soul (Phlb. 47e–50e). In the Republic and the Phaedrus, emotions such as anger and shame are crucial to the account of the “middle” element of the tripartite soul, the thymoeides or “spirited part.” The potential of the thymoeides to support and to conflict with reason suggests a combination of cognition and affectivity in the emotions with which it is associated. This is a feature of thymos also in the Homeric poems, an important source of inspiration for Plato’s own conception,27 where it is associated with a wide range of cognitive, desiderative, and affective processes. Though the Republic does recognize educable, morally useful emotions, public emotional display, and in particular the effects that representations of emotion in epic and tragedy have on the emotional character of audiences, are also central to the dialogue’s case (in Book 10) against the performance of those genres. In later dialogues, such as Timaeus (69c–d) and Laws (644c–d), fear, anger, confidence, hope, and the like are typically represented as unreliable motives.

Aristotle discusses emotions especially in the Rhetoric and the De anima. In the former, he defines the pathē as the things that cause people to change and differ in respect of their judgements (2.1, 1378a19–22), specifying them as “anger, pity, fear, and all other things of that kind, as well as their opposites” (cf. Eth. Nic. 2.5, 1105b21–23; Eth. Eud. 2.2, 1220b12–14). In Rh. 2.2–2.17, he discusses twelve sets of emotion scripts, in terms of the dispositions of their patients, their targets, and the conditions and circumstances in which they are elicited, concluding with a series of character sketches outlining the differences in people’s emotional dispositions according to age and circumstance. As befits its focus on persuasion, the Rhetoric’s emphasis is on emotions as evaluative responses, especially on the part of audiences.28 This focus on audience emotion becomes a general orientation of ancient rhetorical theory (cf. e.g., Cic. De or. 2.185–216; Quint. 6.1–2). But the scenarios discussed also provide material for narratives of the emotional behaviour of others (e.g., one’s opponents), and the speaker’s representation of his own emotions is also important (e.g., 3.7, 1408a9–23). Throughout, the social aspect of emotion is to the fore: the scripts that Aristotle adumbrates reflect his chosen emotions’ role in social and political interaction and the dynamic interplay between emotion and social norms, especially in terms of the relation between emotion and social status.

But the Rhetoric also specifies that emotions are accompanied by pleasure and pain (2.1, 1378a20–21). The occasional addition of the term “disturbance” (tarachē) suggests that pleasure and pain here encompass not only what modern psychologists call “valence” (see section 1), but also the subjective phenomenology of physiological arousal. In the De anima discussion the physical aspect is much more prominent. In the opening chapter, Aristotle includes examples of what one might call emotions (anger, confidence, desire, 403a7; thymos, mildness, fear, pity, confidence again, joy, loving, hating, 403a17–18) alongside processes such as “perceiving in general” (403a7) in discussing whether all pathē of the psychē are shared by the body (403a16–b19). These pathē encompass all that the psychē undergoes in the most general sense. The emotions are chosen as prototypical examples mainly because they best illustrate the point that all or almost all pathē of the soul are “with body.” The De anima’s overall position is that soul and body may be distinct in definition, but are inextricable as aspects of the living organism (1.1, 403a10–16; 2.1, 412a1–413a10). The emotions and the other pathē of the soul reflect this conception in so far as they are “enmattered accounts” (logoi enyloi, 403a25).29 A dialectician and a natural scientist may offer different (formal versus material) definitions of (e.g.,) anger (as “desire to cause pain in retaliation” and as “boiling of the blood and hot stuff around the heart,” 403a30–b1), but neither is correct in itself. The true natural scientist’s definition of an “affection of the soul”—as “a certain movement of a body of a given kind or a part of it or a capacity of it produced by such and such and for the sake of such and such” (403a26–27)—requires both. Emotion is embodied not only in the sense that all experiences of embodied individuals are embodied, but also in that an emotion requires a specific physiological process (403a18–19, 403a31–403b1). Both conditions, formal and material, are necessary, but neither is sufficient: one can be faced with powerful reasons for anger or fear, but not feel the emotion because one is not in the requisite physical condition, but equally, if one is in that condition, the emotion may result even when the external circumstances do not warrant the appraisal that normally elicits it (403a19–24; cf. Rh. 2.2, 1379a10–22). This means not that physical conditions can determine the occurrence of an emotion without any appraisal at all, but that an appraisal of external circumstances which would not otherwise elicit the emotion can result from the physical condition of the patient. This emphasis on the physiological aspects of emotion recurs in Aristotle’s other works.30

Emotions are prominent elsewhere in the Aristotelian corpus. In the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics, the proper development of emotional capacities forms the basis of the virtues, which involve feeling emotion as reason prescribes in a given situation (Eth. Nic. 2.6, 1106b18–23). Emotion is thus essential for the developed forms of disposition and judgement that enable one to practise the virtues and to live a good life. This is not a matter either of repressing emotion or of moderating it in all circumstances, but of the development of states of character that allow one to feel emotion whenever and however it is appropriate to do so. The utility of emotion and its alignment with moral judgement also emerge in the Poetics, where pity (eleos) and fear (phobos) are the means by which tragedy effects the famous yet enigmatic katharsis (purification) of such emotions (Poet. 6, 1449b27–28). In one kind of tragic plot (the best, one of the two best, or the second best, depending on one’s interpretation),31 Aristotle continues (Poet. 13, 1452b28–1453a12), pity and fear are elicited by the change of fortune (from good to bad) of a high-status individual who is neither outstandingly virtuous nor thoroughly wicked, but who fails because of some error (hamartia). Though a passage in the De anima (3.3, 427b17–24) suggests that people are unaffected when they contemplate emotion-eliciting scenarios in works of art,32 the position of the Poetics is much more in keeping with ancient aesthetic and rhetorical theory in emphasizing that audiences experience real emotion, as one would in comparable real-life situations, in response to representations in art, narrative, and drama.

The approach to emotion in the main Hellenistic philosophical schools bears comparison with Aristotle’s account to the extent that both Stoics and Epicureans would agree on the indivisible unity of emotions as cognitive and physiological experiences: for both, all mental events are at once experiences of the body, including its no less material psychē. Mind and body affect each other mutually, and both judgements and physiological changes are necessary for emotion.33 But whereas for Aristotle everyday emotions can be integrated into a life that fulfils human potential for virtue and flourishing, for the Stoics and Epicureans, though the virtuous life is by no means affect-free, common or garden emotions are by and large regarded as material for therapy.34 This can be oversimplified as a distinction between the allegedly Aristotelian pursuit of moderation in emotion (metriopatheia) and a Hellenistic therapeutic approach that takes emotion, at least as commonly understood, to be a bad thing (e.g., Cic. Tusc. 4.38–57; Sen. De ira 1.6–21).

Of the two schools, the Epicureans make more concessions to everyday experience, but their approach can also involve a critical attitude towards many ordinary emotions, as obstacles to the goal of psychological stability (ataraxia). Substantial reflections of Epicurean approaches to emotion survive in the fragments of Philodemus’s De ira and Lucretius’s influential De rerum natura, 3.258–322.35 From Philodemus, it appears that Epicureans classified emotions, like desires, as natural and necessary; natural but not necessary; or neither (“empty”).36 The tendency to anger is natural (De ira, columns XXXVII.16–XLIV.35 Indelli), but not necessary (fragments 10.14–15, 12 Indelli). It is found even in the wise (XXXVI.17–20, XLVI.40–XLVII.18, XLVII.41–L.8), who may experience its pain when friends are wronged or when a friend does wrong (XLI.17–25); but such anger will be brief and mild (XXXIV.16–XXXV.5, XLII.4–14, 21–40, XLIV.26–8, XLVII.29–41), stopping far short of anything that could be described as “rage” or “fury” (thymos, XLIII.41–XLVI.14). The error of treating anger as necessary, by contrast, and taking pleasure in revenge or punishment (XLII.21–34, XLIV.28–35), makes it “empty” (XXXVIII.1–6, XXXIX.7–8). For Lucretius, anger is a matter of an individual’s physical constitution: the degree to which one is disposed to it will depend on the element of heat in the soul (3.288–306). Reason cannot completely remodel such dispositions—there will be residual traces (3.310–22); but it would in any case not be right to eradicate anger, as it is sometimes appropriate (3.312–13).

The Stoics go further in arguing that all pathē involve mistaken judgements and so have no place in the virtuous life. For them, pathē involve an impression (phantasia) that leads to arousal, but also an assessment that a stimulus of a certain type is present, an assent to that assessment, and a judgement that it is appropriate to be moved on that basis.37 They are thus functionally rational but normatively irrational:38 though they depend on rational assent, they are irrational in being mistaken about the good, the product of defective psychological states, and (after assent) difficult to control.

The Stoics distinguish four general categories of pathē: two that focus on the present (pleasure and pain) and two on the future (desire and fear).39 But Stoic definitions also make summary reference to physical changes (e.g., “contraction” in the case of pain and “elation” in that of pleasure).40 Emotions are not only judgements but also alterations in the pneuma (a mixture of fire and air) that is concentrated in the control centre or hēgemonikon in the heart (Chrysippus in Galen, PHP 3.7.2–4).41 But pneuma also suffuses the entire body, and the Stoics are attentive to a wide variety of physical symptoms beyond the changes that occur in the hēgemonikon. Soul and body affect each other mutually (by sympatheia). All these processes entail physical changes of an ensouled body.42 Thus, though the Stoics are famous for their claim that emotions are judgements, these are judgements of a particular sort: both the judgement (with its own physiological underpinnings) and the accompanying feelings and symptoms are necessary for an experience to count as an emotion.

Since emotions are not simply “cool” judgements, and since, once the subject has given assent, they are difficult to control,43 motivational conflict is possible in Stoic theory.44 This, however, is a matter not of the conflict of rational versus irrational desires, but of temporal vacillation between successive judgements of value.45 The fact that emotions involve assent makes one responsible for them.46

The Stoic ideal is the eradication of such pathē; but this is not a demand that human beings should be immune to all forms of affective experience. Seneca (De ira 2.2.5) writes of “preliminary beginnings of emotion” (principia proludentia adfectibus), and earlier Stoics had a category of “pre-emotions” (propatheiai).47 These are described in terms (such as “bites” or “pangs”) very like those used of the pathē in ordinary language. Even the Stoic sage will experience pre-emotions (e.g., Sen. De ira 2.2.2), though she will not assent to them.48 The sage will also experience “good emotions” (eupatheiai) informed by virtue.49 To the four categories of pathē there correspond three of eupatheiai: joy (at being virtuous), wish (to be virtuous), and caution (regarding anything that detracts from virtue). There is no virtuous analogue to pain (lypē), because nothing bad is present to the sage.50

Ancient philosophical and psychological theories of emotion thus have a history, one that is bound up with the norms and values of specific societies and the psychological and ethical theories of the major thinkers and schools. There is a strong family resemblance between ancient and modern categories and theories, especially with regard to emotions as irruptive, phenomenologically passive states.51 Though the rationality of pathē (their role in a virtuous life) is a recurrent issue and forms of reason versus passion dualism are found, there are no hard and fast antitheses between mind and body, cognition and affectivity.

Approaches to Emotion in Classics

A strong stimulus to contemporary research on ancient emotion was William Fortenbaugh’s 1975 book on Aristotle, which is fully informed by the cognitive-evaluative approach to emotion prominent in the 1950s and 1960s.52 That approach is central also to the spate of monographs and edited collections on emotion that have appeared since the 1990s.53 These have been joined by a large number of studies on particular emotions—anger,54 disgust,55 envy and jealousy,56 fear,57 forgiveness,58 grief,59 hope,60 joy,61 love,62 pity,63 remorse,64 shame,65 and wonder.66 The central strength of these works has been their focus on the ancient emotional lexicon and the construction, conceptualization, and valorization of emotion.

Douglas Cairns’s study of the Greek concept of aidōs (shame, respect, embarrassment, modesty, sense of honour) focused especially on strong evidence for internalization of and commitment to values of the honourable and the shameful that refute easy antitheses between shame and guilt. In a landmark study of Roman emotion, Robert Kaster concentrated on the social emotions verecundia, pudor, paenitentia, invidia, and fastidium as families of scripts for performance and self-presentation that involve delicate forms of balance between self-assessment, attention to others’ assessments, other-regarding behaviour, and the observance of social norms. David Konstan’s extensive body of work on emotions spans both Greek and Roman cultures and has contributed in particular to our understanding of ancient theories of emotion (particularly those of Aristotle and the Stoics, which offer fruitful opportunities for dialogue with modern cognitive-evaluative approaches),67 to the semantics and history of ancient emotional concepts,68 and to the sharpening of our appreciation of salient differences between ancient emotional lexica and our own.

One of the central emphases of this work has been the interaction between emotion and moral and social norms. This needs to be seen in terms not only of the embeddedness of ancient emotions, emotion concepts, and theories of emotion in social interaction and cultural normativity, but also of the fundamentally affective character of ancient moral, social, and legal values.69 These features also constitute major topics in other disciplines.70

Another important element of this current of research concerns the ways in which the conceptualization, labelling, and valorization of emotions shifts over time and varies from culture to culture. The fact that aidōs focuses on the honour of both self and others is a significant indication of the inclusive character of Greek notions of honour. This in turn provides a template for comparative analysis of analogous concepts in Latin.71 Though the Greek and Latin concepts map the emotional landscape in different ways, at a more general level both cultures illustrate the interplay of the esteem one seeks from others, one’s own image of oneself, and the respect for others’ claims to esteem that social interaction requires, prompting conclusions that undermine crude antitheses between competition and cooperation, heteronomy and autonomy. These conclusions reflect wider truths about the fundamental importance of mutual recognition in social interaction, in ethics and politics, and in the constitution of identity.72 In historical terms, a significant development may be observed in the way that both aidōs and its near-synonym, aischynē, begin (c. 430 bce) to focus not only on the future, on things one is ashamed to do, but also on the past, on things one is ashamed to have done (Eur. Heracl. 813–816; Hipp. 244).

Shifts can be observed in the usage of other emotion terms: in Homer, nemesis refers to righteous indignation at breaches of social norms, but it comes to be associated with grudging responses to others’ good fortune, a function exercised in the classical period by phthonos, normally malicious envy or jealousy, but sometimes also a morally responsive form of indignation.73 Emotion terms also come into existence: the late 5th-century interest in the retrospective, guilty conscience is reflected in the coinage of the term syneidēsis (calqued in Latin as conscientia), which facilitates new ways of talking about what English-speakers call “guilt.”74 In the 4th century bce, Greeks begin to use the term zēlotypia for forms of jealousy that might hitherto have been spoken of in other terms.75

Literature has been central to these studies, because literary sources provide rich evidence for the complex dynamics of emotional episodes in multifaceted depictions of more or less realistic forms of social interaction. Genres such as epic and drama provide manifold perspectives on characters’ motivation and substantial information on the eliciting conditions of their emotions. A wide range of other genres, from elegiac poetry and historiography to forensic oratory and biography, rely similarly on narrative constructions of characteristic affective scenarios as contexts for their representations of emotion. Representations of the dynamics of emotional agency in mimetic, diegetic, or mixed literary genres provide some of the best evidence of affectivity in action in ancient cultures.76 Genres can also be characterized by the thematic salience of particular emotions: the first word of the Iliad highlights the fact that (as Martin Mueller has put it) “Anger is to heroic what sex is to Victorian morality.”77 But the dominant note as the poem ends is the pity (eleos) that Achilles presents as a fundamental response to the vulnerability to vicissitude that all human beings share.78 As Virgil’s Aeneas says, weeping as he contemplates Trojan sufferings visually depicted at Carthage, sunt lacrimae rerum et mentem mortalia tangent (Aen. 1.462); yet, where the Iliad ends with pity, the Aeneid ends with a resurgence of anger. The mutability of fortune that makes all human beings vulnerable is both part of the script for pity in Aristotle’s Rhetoric and a recurrent feature of both literature and literary theory in antiquity, from Gorgias of Leontini onwards.79 If one is to believe Socrates in Plato’s Philebus, however, it is pleasure in others’ misfortune that defines comedy (Phlb. 48a–50d). Forms of anger and indignation, meanwhile, can be seen as characteristic of Juvenal’s persona as satirist,80 while Latin love elegy, to take another example, abounds in scenarios of erotic jealousy.81

Historiography, for its part, reflects not only the history of emotion concepts and the power of narrative to represent and to elicit emotion, but also the role that emotions play as historical causes. Western historiography begins with Herodotus’s narrative of offence and retaliation between Greeks and non-Greeks and the motif of reciprocity and retaliation structures the work on several levels.82 For Thucydides, as noted above, the “truest cause” of the Peloponnesian War is Sparta’s fear (phobos) of Athenian expansion (1.23.6). Herodotus’s interest in what one might call the “emotional regimes” of the peoples whose customs he reports is evident throughout;83 but differences in affective style between Athenians and Spartans are just as important in Thucydides.84 The ethnography of emotion is a recurrent feature of ancient historiography,85 often in conjunction with various forms of environmental determinism.86

Emotions also drive historical narrative: Tacitus claims to write sine ira et studio, but few believe him. Herodotus is explicit that wonder (thōma, i.e., thauma), both on his own part and as expected in his readers, is a major criterion behind the selection and presentation of his material. His own emotional attitudes to the events he narrates, for example pride at Greek resistance to Persian aggression or censure when that resistance is undermined, are not difficult to discern, with inevitable implications for audience emotion. When Thucydides writes that Nicias, of all his contemporaries, least deserved his fate (7.86.5), he not only pays tribute to his virtue (aretē), but also classes him as worthy of pity. In invoking that script, Thucydides is also addressing his readers’ emotions. Direct authorial intervention is just one of the ways in which historical texts do this. Historiography is thoroughly influenced by the emotion-eliciting practices of other literary genres (especially epic and tragedy) and by the theorization of those practices, especially in rhetoric. Though there could be controversy over how a historian might seek to move his audiences, as in Polybius’s criticism of Phylarchus for using sensationalist and dishonest methods to elicit sympathy for people who allegedly did not deserve it (2.56–63),87 Polybius is fully in step with his fellow historians in regarding readers’ emotions (specifically pity and anger, 2.56.13) as essential elements in their understanding of historical processes. In a case such as Tacitus’s account of the death of Vitellius (Histories Book 3), a complex set of emotional responses is steered by the portrayal of Vitellius’s own actions and feelings, the deployment of typically emotion-inducing scenarios (such as the dramatic reversal in Vitellius’s fortunes, 3.68.1), authorial spin, and the reactions of internal audiences.88 As a victim of the mutability of fortune, Vitellius is a potential candidate for sympathy (misericordia), until the abject terror in which he attempts to escape his fate and the unseemliness of his end make him “a disgusting spectacle,” object of the mob’s abuse rather than their tears (3.84).

Such passages highlight the techniques of literary narrative, elements of theatricality, and the vividness (enargeia) so prized by literary and rhetorical theory.89 The primary aim of literary and rhetorical enargeia is audience emotion ([Longinus] Subl. 15; Quint. 6.2.29–32); and large among the emotions thus elicited looms pity.90 The mutability of fortune is as typical a scenario for pity in ancient historiography and biography as it is in poetic and dramatic sources.91 Polybius (1.1.2) regards the use of others’ reversals to instruct people how to bear their own misfortunes as fundamental to the historian’s craft.92 The presentation of exemplary figures as worthy of emulation (Sall. Iug. 4.5) is as central to historiography as it is to biography.93

Early 21st-century approaches to the history of ancient emotions, fostered especially by a series of volumes edited by Angelos Chaniotis,94 widen the field, its focus, and its source base, with greater attention to sources for the expression, performance, and context of emotion in non-literary texts and in material culture. This represents a move away from elite and culturally authoritative texts to other forms of textual evidence—for example letters, wills, and petitions;95 inscriptions set up by private individuals;96 and inscriptions, religious and secular, commissioned by communities of various kinds.97 But the broadening of the source base also encompasses a shift of focus to the non-textual evidence of visual and material culture. Visual culture is an area in which great opportunities exist, but also considerable obstacles. In principle, sources such as vase-painting and sculpture might be thought to afford direct access to the physical expression of emotion in gesture and body language.98 But scholars have no unmediated access to the non-verbal expression of ancient emotions: to link the depiction of non-verbal behaviour in ancient art to ancient concepts of emotion one typically requires warrant from linguistic and especially narrative sources, along with as much contextual information as can reasonably be obtained, as well as a thorough understanding of the iconography of the wider corpus to which the depiction belongs.99 Recent work is now meeting these challenges.100

Chaniotis’s study of the multiple ways in which the dedication of a statue provides evidence for aspects of ancient affectivity indicates another fruitful approach in this connection, one that considers the products of the visual arts not just in their own right, as evidence for the depiction of emotion, but in their wider context, as functional objects in specific physical and cultural settings: statues not only represent emotional experience, but also express emotional commitment and elicit emotional responses.101 This complements earlier work on the emotional dimensions of sanctuaries and other locations for ritual performance.102 Epigraphic texts, dedications, religious architecture, and the configuration of the site more generally all contribute to the creation of a shared space for emotional experience and emotional performance, a locus for the enactment of the emotions—awe, fear, wonder, respect, hope, gratitude, and the rest—on which religious experience depends.103

Consideration of the embodied and embedded aspects of ancient emotion need not restrict itself to material evidence. Literary texts are also informative about the physicality of ancient emotions as aspects of the ways in which embodied human beings interact with the world. Most obviously, they are rich in representations of the objects, artefacts, spaces, symptoms, movements, postures, and gestures through which emotions can be expressed, symbolized, constructed, and elicited.104 But they are also rich in metonymies and metaphors drawn from the embodied experience of emotion itself, from other aspects of embodied experience, and from interaction with the physical and social environments more generally. Not only do these play a fundamental role in the formation and extension of emotion concepts, but they also afford at least a degree of access to a linguistic community’s shared representations of the phenomenology of emotion.105 To say “I shudder” rather than “I am afraid” is to give a more vivid and immediate sense of the emotion as a holistic, embodied experience; to present the onset of grief as the feeling of being suddenly enveloped in a cloud or a garment presents an individual’s emotion in terms of a shared cultural model of what that emotion is supposed to feel like and links it to its visible expression in body language and dress.106 Similarities, where they exist, between these schemas and those found in other societies will at least partly reflect the constraints that actual physiology, symptomatology, and other features of human embodiment place on metaphors and metonymies that depend on embodiment and embodied interaction with the physical and social environments.


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  • Cairns, Douglas. Aidōs: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature. Oxford: University Press, University Press, 1993.
  • Cairns, Douglas. “Look Both Ways: Studying Emotion in Ancient Greek.” Critical Quarterly 50.4 (2008): 43–62.
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  • Cairns, Douglas, Martin Hinterberger, Aglae Pizzone, and Matteo Zaccarini, eds. Emotions through Time: From Antiquity to Byzantium. Tübingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck, 2022.
  • Cairns, Douglas, and Damien P. Nelis, eds. Emotions in the Classical World: Methods, Approaches, and Directions. Stuttgart: Steiner, 2017.
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  • Chaniotis, Angelos, ed. Unveiling Emotions III: Arousal, Display, and Performance of Emotions in the Greek World. Stuttgart: Steiner, 2021.
  • Chaniotis, Angelos, and Pierre Ducrey, eds. Unveiling Emotions II: Emotions in Greece and Rome: Texts, Images, Material Culture. Stuttgart: Steiner, 2013.
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  • Rapp, Christof. “Aristoteles: Bausteine für eine Theorie der Emotionen.” In Handbuch Klassische Emotionstheorien: von Platon bis Wittgenstein, edited by H. Landweer and U. Renz, 47–68. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2008.
  • Renaut, Olivier. La Rhétorique des passions. Aristote, Rhétorique II.1–11. Paris, Classiques Garnier, 2022.
  • Sihvola, Juha, and Troels Engberg-Pedersen, eds. The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer,1998


  • 1. Geoffrey E. R. Lloyd, Cognitive Variations: Reflections on the Unity and Diversity of the Human Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 58. For a more detailed account of the issues presented in this section, see Douglas Cairns, “Introduction A: Emotions through Time?,” in Emotions through Time: From Antiquity to Byzantium, ed. D. Cairns, M. Hinterberger, A. Pizzone, and M. Zaccarini (Tübingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck, 2022), 3–33.

  • 2. Thomas Dixon, From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 2.

  • 3. See e.g., Anna Wierzbicka, Emotions across Languages and Cultures: Diversity and Universals (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

  • 4. See Christof Rapp, Aristoteles, Rhetorik, 2 vols (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2002), 2:543–545.

  • 5. Discussed in a special section of Emotion Review 4 (2012): 337–393.

  • 6. “Introduction to Special Section: On Defining Emotion,” Emotion Review 4 (2012): 337.

  • 7. See esp. William James, “What Is an Emotion?,” Mind 9 (1884): 188–205 at 189–190: “My thesis … is that the bodily changes follow directly the PERCEPTION of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion” (original capitalization and italics). More recently, see the neo-Jamesian formulations of Jesse Prinz, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), esp. 3, 244.

  • 8. See Beverley Fehr and James A. Russell, “Concept of Emotion Viewed from a Prototype Perspective,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 113.3 (1984): 464–486 at 482; Philip Shaver, Judith Schwartz, Donald Kirson, and Cary O’Connor, “Emotion Knowledge: Further Exploration of a Prototype Approach,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 52.6 (1987): 1061–1086; Agneta H. Fischer, Emotion Scripts: A Study of the Social and Cognitive Facets of Emotion (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1991); James A. Russell, “Culture and the Categorization of Emotions,” Psychological Bulletin 110 (1991): 426–450 at 442–444; “In Defense of a Prototype Approach to Emotion Concepts,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 60 (1991): 37–47 at 39; “Core Affect and the Psychological Construction of Emotion,” Psychological Review 110 (2003): 145–172 at 150–152, 160–166; in Classics, see Robert A. Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), esp. 63; cf. Douglas Cairns, “Look Both Ways: Studying Emotion in Ancient Greek,” Critical Quarterly 50.4 (2008): 43–62; and Ed Sanders, Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens: A Socio-Psychological Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

  • 9. “A script is to an event what a prototype is to an object”: Russell, “Culture,” 443 = “In Defence,” 39.

  • 10. For prototype theory, see Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen/Philosophical Investigations, 4th ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009), §§66–67; Eleanor Rosch, “Principles of Categorization,” in Cognition and Categorization, ed. E. Rosch and B. B. Lloyd (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1978), 27–48; and George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987).

  • 11. According to Wierzbicka, Emotions across Languages and Cultures, 275–307, all languages possess a category of this general type.

  • 12. See Lisa Feldman Barrett, How Emotions Are Made: The Secret Life of the Brain (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017).

  • 13. See James A. Russell and Lisa Feldman Barrett, “Core Affect, Prototypical Emotional Episodes, and Other Things Called Emotion: Dissecting the Elephant,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 76 (1999): 805–819 at 806; Kristen A. Lindquist and Lisa Feldman Barrett, “Constructing Emotion: The Experience of Fear as a Conceptual Act,” Psychological Science 19 (2008): 898–903 at 902; and James A. Russell, “Emotion, Core Affect, and Psychological Construction,” Cognition and Emotion 23.7 (2009): 1259–1283 at 1265. The point can be paralleled in ancient thought ([Longinus], Subl. 22.1) and in the psychology of William James: see The Principles of Psychology (New York: Henry Holt, 1980), 2:454, 485

  • 14. The notion that affectivity is essential to motivation is at least as old as David Hume, but in modern affect theory is especially associated with (in the first wave) Silvan Tomkins (e.g., “Affect Theory,” in Approaches to Emotion, ed. Klaus R. Scherer and Paul Ekman (Hillsdale NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1984), 163–195 and (more recently) Antonio Damasio (e.g., Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Putnam, 1994)). See also Barrett, How Emotions Are Made, 80–82. The enactivist approach of Giovanna Colombetti, The Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind (Boston: MIT, 2014), offers powerful support for the intrinsically affective nature of cognition more generally.

  • 15. Cf. Lisa Feldman Barrett, “Solving the Emotion Paradox: Categorization and the Experience of Emotion,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 10 (2006): 20–46 at 36: “the experience of an emotion will pop out as a separate event from the ebb and flow in ongoing core affect.”

  • 16. Top-down/bottom-up: see Barrett “Solving the Emotion Paradox,” 35.

  • 17. Russell, “Emotion, Core Affect, and Psychological Construction,” 1270.

  • 18. See Barrett, How Emotions Are Made, 84–111 and passim. For the same point from the perspective of emotion history, see William Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

  • 19. Pace Rüdiger Schnell, Haben Gefühle eine Geschichte? Aporien einer History of Emotions (Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2015).

  • 20. See Christiane Voss, Narrative Emotionen. Eine Untersuchung über Möglichkeiten und Grenzen philosophischer Emotionstheorien (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2004), 181–224; and Peter Goldie, The Mess Inside: Narrative, Emotion, and the Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), esp. 56–75.

  • 21. See Russell, “In Defense of a Prototype Approach,” 41–42.

  • 22. Contrast Schnell Haben Gefühle eine Geschichte? 761.

  • 23. See further below, “Approaches to emotion in Classics.”

  • 24. See Simo Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); and cf. Jacub Krajczynski and Christof Rapp, “Emotionen in der antiken Philosophie: Definitionen und Kataloge,” in Pathos, Affekt, Emotion, ed. Martin Harbsmeier and Sebastian Möckel (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2009), 47–78.

  • 25. See Dana L. Munteanu, Tragic Pathos: Pity and Fear in Greek Philosophy and Tragedy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

  • 26. See now Laura Candiotto and Olivier Renaut, eds., Emotions in Plato (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2020); and Francesco Benoni and Alessandro Stavru, eds., Platone e il governo delle passioni (Perugia, Italy: Aguaplano, 2021).

  • 27. See Douglas Cairns, “Anchoring the Tripartite Soul,” in Resisting and Justifying Changes: How to Make the New Acceptable in the Ancient, Medieval and Early Modern World, ed. E. Poddighe and T. Pontillo (Pisa, Italy: Pisa University Press, 2021), 181–209.

  • 28. See William Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion (London: Duckworth, 1975); John M. Cooper, “An Aristotelian Theory of the Emotions,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley, CA and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996), 238–257; Stephen R. Leighton, “Aristotle and the Emotions,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, ed. Rorty, 206–237; Christof Rapp, “Aristoteles: Bausteine für eine Theorie der Emotionen,” in Klassische Emotionstheorien: von Platon bis Wittgenstein, ed. Hilge Landweer and Ursula Renz (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2008), 45–68; Michael Krewet, Die Theorie der Gefühle bei Aristoteles (Heidelberg, Germany: Winter, 2011); and Olivier Renaut, La Rhétorique des passions: Aristote, Rhétorique II.1–11 (Paris: Garnier, 2022). See also Rapp, Aristoteles, Rhetorik. For an account of ancient Greek emotion based on the discussion in the Rhetoric, see David Konstan, The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2006).

  • 29. For what this means, see David Charles, The Undivided Self: Aristotle and the “Mind–Body Problem” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021).

  • 30. E.g., Part. an. 2.4, 650b33–651a17, 4.11, 692a22–25; Gen. an. 3.1, 749b33; Pol. 7.7, 1327b23–36; cf. the post-Aristotelian Probl. 2.26, 869a5–6; 8.20, 889a15–25; 10.60, 898a4–8; 15.16, 910a38–b8; 20.2, 923a9–12; 27.3, 947b23–948a12; 30.1, 954a31–4. See Rapp, Aristoteles, Rhetorik, 2:559–570; and Pierre-Marie Morel, “La physiologie des passions dans le De motu animalium d’Aristote,” in L’homme et ses passions, ed. I. Boehm, J.-L. Ferrary and S. Franchet d’Espèrey (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2016), 291–301.

  • 31. On the apparent inconsistencies between Poetics 13 and 14 on this point, see Malcolm Heath, “Aristotle on the Best Kind of Tragic Plot: Re-Reading Poetics 13–14,” in Reading Aristotle: Argument and Exposition, ed. Ron Polansky and William Wians (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2017), 334–351.

  • 32. Raising a central issue in contemporary debate: see Pia Campeggiani, “Nec cogitare sed facere: The Paradox of Fiction at the Tribunal of Ancient Poetics,” Theoria 86.6 (2020): 709–726.

  • 33. On the Stoics, see Margaret Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2007); see also Richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); and Michael Krewet, Die stoische Theorie der Gefühle: ihre Aporien, ihre Wirkmacht (Heidelberg, Germany: Winter, 2013). On the Epicureans, see Julia Annas, “Epicurean Emotions,” Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 30 (1989),): 145–164; Don P. Fowler, “Epicurean Anger,” in Susanna M. Braund and Christopher Gill (eds), The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature, ed. Susanna M. Braund and Christopher Gill (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 16–35; John F. Procopé, “Epicureans on Anger,” in Juha Sihvola and Troels Engberg-Pedersen (eds), The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Juha Sihvola and Troels Engberg-Pedersen (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer 1998), 171–196; and David Armstrong, “‘Be angry and sin not’: Philodemus versus the Stoics on Natural Bites and Natural Emotions,” in John T. Fitzgerald (ed.), Passions and Moral Progress in Graeco-Roman Thought, ed. John T. Fitzgerald (London: Routledge, 2008), 79–121. On emotion in Hellenistic ethics and psychology, see also Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (Berkeley, CA and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992); and Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); further essays in Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen, The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy; see also Christopher Gill, “Stoicism and Epicureanism,” in Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion, ed. Peter Goldie (Oxford:, Oxford University Press, 2010), 143–165. Cf. Fitzgerald, Passions and Moral Progress. Key texts in Anthony A. Long and David N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

  • 34. See Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire.

  • 35. For Philodemus see Giovanni Indelli, Filodemo, De ira (La Scuola di Epicuro 5; Naples, Italy: Bibliopolis, 1988); and David Armstrong and Michael McOsker, Philodemus, On Anger (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2020).

  • 36. See Epicurus Ep. 3.127; discussion in Annas, “Epicurean Emotions”; Fowler “Epicurean Anger”; Procopé, “Epicureans on Anger”; and Armstrong “‘Be angry and sin not’.”

  • 37. See e.g., Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers, §65 B (Andronicus); Cic. Tusc. 3.25, 61, etc.; Sen. De ira 2.4; and Graver, Stoicism, 44–45.

  • 38. See Christopher Gill, “Did Galen Understand Platonic and Stoic Thinking on Emotions?,” in Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen, The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy, 138–148; and Graver, Stoicism, 37–38.

  • 39. See Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers, §65 A 3–4 (Stobaeus), B (Andronicus), E (Stobaeus); Cic. Tusc. 4.11; and Graver, Stoicism, 53–59.

  • 40. Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers, §65 D (Galen); and Stobaeus 2.7.10b.

  • 41. = SVF 2.900.

  • 42. Graver, Stoicism, 33–34.

  • 43. See Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers, §65 A 1 (Stobaeus), J (Galen on Chrysippus); cf. Plut. Mor. 441C–D; Sen. De ira 1.7; and Graver, Stoicism, 61–62, 67–68.

  • 44. Graver, Stoicism, 69, 75–81; Gill, “Did Galen Understand,” “Stoicism and Epicureanism,” 152.

  • 45. See Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers, §65 G = Plut. Mor. 446F–447A; and Graver, Stoicism, 71.

  • 46. Graver, Stoicism, 64.

  • 47. Graver, Stoicism, 85–108. Graver argues (against Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind, 66–69 and passim) that this is original Stoic doctrine, and not something that derives solely from Seneca. For these “pre-emotions,” cf. David Konstan, “Reason vs. Emotion in Seneca,” in Emotions in the Classical World: Methods, Approaches, and Directions, ed. Douglas Cairns and Damien Nelis (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2017), 231–243.

  • 48. Gell. NA 19.1.17–18 = Epictetus fr. 9 = Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers, §65 Y; cf. Sen. De ira 2.2.2.

  • 49. See Long and Sedley, Hellenistic Philosophers, § 65 F, from Diogenes Laertius.

  • 50. Graver, Stoicism, 53–54. On whether non-virtuous people can (in effect) have eupatheiai, i.e., emotions that involve true beliefs about what is valuable (Cic. Tusc. 3.77–78), see Tad Brennan, “The Old Stoic Theory of Emotions,” in Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen, The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy, 51; and Graver, Stoicism, 6, 53 (on Sen. Ep. 23.4–6, the potential joy of the ordinary person), 59–60.

  • 51. Paul Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 242 defines “irruptive motivations” as “motivations not derived from general goals by means–end reasoning.”

  • 52. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion.

  • 53. On emotions in general, see Susanna M. Braund and Christopher Gill, eds., The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind; Margaret Graver, Cicero on the Emotions: Tusculan Disputations 3 and 4 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Robert A. Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Konstan, The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks; Graver, Stoicism; Fitzgerald, Passions and Moral Progress; Dana L. Munteanu, ed., Emotion, Genre, and Gender in Classical Antiquity (London: Bloomsbury, 2011); Angelos Chaniotis, Unveiling Emotions: Sources and Methods for the Study of Emotions in the Greek World (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2012); Angelos Chaniotis and Pieree Ducrey, eds., Unveiling Emotions II: Emotions in Greece and Rome: Texts, Images, Material Culture (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2013); Douglas Cairns and Laurel Fulkerson, eds., Emotions between Greece and Rome (London: Institute of Classical Studies, 2015); Ruth Caston and Robert A. Kaster, eds., Hope, Joy, and Affection in the Classical World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Isabelle Boehm, Jean-Louis Ferrary, and Sylvie Franchet d’Espèrey, eds., L’Homme et ses passions: Actes du XVII e Congrès international de l’Association Guillaume Budé organisé à Lyon du 26 au 29 août 2013 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2016); Ed Sanders and Matthew Johncock, eds., Emotion and Persuasion in Ancient Greece (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2016); Cairns and Nelis, Emotions in the Classical World; Margaret Alexiou and Douglas Cairns, eds., Greek Laughter and Tears: Antiquity and After (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017); Douglas Cairns and Damien Nelis, eds., Seneca’s Tragic Passions (= Maia 69.2, 2017); Douglas Cairns, ed., A Cultural History of the Emotions, Vol. 1, Antiquity (London: Bloomsbury, 2019); Dimos Spatharas, Emotions, Persuasion, and Public Discourse in Classical Athens (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019); Anja Bettenworth and Jürgen Hammerstaedt, eds., Writing Order and Emotion: Affect and the Structures of Power in Greek and Latin Authors (Hildesheim, Germany: Olms, 2020); Candiotto and Renaut, Emotions in Plato; Angelos Chaniotis, ed., Unveiling Emotions III: Arousal, Display, and Performance of Emotions in the Greek World (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2021); Douglas Cairns, Martin Hinterberger, Aglae Pizzone, and Matteo Zaccarini, eds., Emotions through Time: From Antiquity to Byzantium (Tübingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck, 2022); Viktoria Räuchle, Sven Page, and Vibeke Goldbeck, eds., Pathos and Polis: The Pragmatics of Emotion in Classical Greece (Tübingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck, 2022); and Nicole Diersen, Emotionen und Politik in der späten römischen Republik (Tübingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck, 2022).

  • 54. See Leonard Muellner, The Anger of Achilles: Menis in Greek Epic (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press): William V. Harris, Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Susanna Braund and Glenn W. Most, eds., Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 2003); Thomas R. Walsh, Fighting Words and Feuding Words: Anger and the Homeric Poems (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005); Kostas Kalimtzis, Taming Anger: The Hellenic Approach to the Limitations of Reason (London: Bloomsbury, 2012); Pia Campeggiani, Le ragioni dell’ira (Rome: Carocci, 2013); and Mattia Di Poli, ed., Il teatro delle emozioni: l’ira (Padua, Italy: Padua University Press, 2021).

  • 55. Donald Lateiner and Dimos Spatharas, eds., The Ancient Emotion of Disgust (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

  • 56. David Konstan and N. Keith Rutter, eds., Envy, Spite, and Jealousy: The Rivalrous Emotions in Ancient Greece (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003); Ed Sanders, Envy and Jealousy in Classical Athens: A Socio-Psychological Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Ruth Caston, The Elegiac Passion: Jealousy in Roman Love Elegy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Giulia Sissa, Jealousy: A Forbidden Passion (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2018); cf. Peter Walcot, Envy and the Greeks (Warminster, UK: Aris and Phillips. 1978).

  • 57. Robert Zaborowski, La Crainte et le courage dans l’Iliade et l’Odyssée: Contribution lexicographique à la psychologie homérique des sentiments (Warsaw, Poland: Stakroos, 2002); Mattia De Poli, ed., Il teatro delle emozioni: la paura (Padua, Italy: Padua University Press, 2018); and Dalida Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022); and Maria Patera, Stavros Perentidis, and Jenny Wallenstein, eds., La peur chez les Grecs: Usages et représentations de l’Antiquité à l’ère chrétienne (Rennes, France: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2023).

  • 58. David Konstan, Before Forgiveness: The Origins of a Moral Idea (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

  • 59. Gail Holst-Warhaft, Dangerous Voices: Women’s Laments and Greek Literature (London: Routledge, 1992); Katharine Derderian, Leaving Words to Remember: Greek Mourning and the Advent of Literacy (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2001); Margaret Alexiou, The Ritual Lament in Greek Tradition (2nd ed., Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002); Casey Dué, Homeric Variations on a Lament by Briseis (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002); Markus Schauer, Tragisches Klagen: Form und Funktion der Klagedarstellung bei Aischylus, Sophokles und Euripides (Tübingen, Germany: Narr, 2002); Casey Dué, The Captive Woman’s Lament in Greek Tragedy (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2006); Ann Suter, ed., Lament: Studies in the Ancient Mediterranean and Beyond (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Christos Tsagalis, Epic Grief: Personal Laments in Homer’s Iliad (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2008); and Emily P. Austin, Grief and the Hero: The Futility of Longing in the Iliad (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2021).

  • 60. George Kazantzidis and Dimos Spatharas, eds., Hope in Ancient Literature, History, and Art (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018).

  • 61. Mattia Di Poli, ed., Il teatro delle emozioni: la gioia (Padua, Italy: Padua University Press, 2019).

  • 62. David Konstan, Sexual Symmetry: Love in the Ancient Novel and Related Genres (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); Ed Sanders, Chiara Thumiger, Christopher Carey, and Nick Lowe, eds., Eros in Ancient Greece (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); David Konstan, In the Orbit of Love: Affection in Ancient Greece and Rome (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); and Dimitrios Kanellakis, ed., Pathologies of Love in Classical Literature (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021).

  • 63. David Konstan, Pity Transformed (London: Duckworth, 2001); Rachel Hall Sternberg, ed., Pity and Power in Ancient Athens (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005); and Rachel Hall Sternberg, Tragedy Offstage: Suffering and Sympathy in Ancient Athens (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2006); and Munteanu, Tragic Pathos.

  • 64. Laurel Fulkerson, No Regrets: Remorse in Classical Antiquity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

  • 65. Douglas L. Cairns, Aidōs: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley, CA and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993); and Marta Jimenez, Aristotle on Shame and Learning to be Good (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2021).

  • 66. Jessica Lightfoot, Wonder and the Marvellous from Homer to the Hellenistic World (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2021)

  • 67. On Aristotle, see Konstan, The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks; on Seneca, see Konstan, “Senecan Emotions,” in The Cambridge Companion to Seneca, ed. Shadi Bartsch (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 174–184, and “Reason vs. Emotion in Seneca.”

  • 68. See esp. Pity Transformed and Before Forgiveness.

  • 69. See e.g., Harris, Restraining Rage; and Sanders, Envy and Jealousy. On the affective character of ancient Greek moral, social, and legal norms see also Cairns, Aidōs; Cairns, “Ethics, Ethology, Terminology: Iliadic Anger and the Cross-Cultural Study of Emotion,” in Braund and Most, Ancient Anger, 11–49; Cairns, “The Politics of Envy: Envy and Equality in Ancient Greece,” in Konstan and Rutter, Envy, Spite, and Jealousy, 235–252; and Cairns, “Revenge, Punishment, and Justice in Athenian Homicide Law,” Journal of Value Enquiry 49 (2015): 645–665.

  • 70. On the intimate relationship between emotions and social norms, see esp. Jon Elster, Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999). On the emotional character of moral norms, see e.g., Jesse Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Ronald De Sousa. “Really, What Else Is There? Emotions, Value, and Morality,” Critical Quarterly 50.4 (2008): 12–23; and Carla Bagnoli, ed., Morality and the Emotions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). On emotions, values and legal norms, see John Deigh, Emotions, Values, and the Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) and the January 2016 issue of Emotion Review (vol. 8.1, pp. 3–61). The normative contexts of emotion also loom large in the sociology and history of emotions: see Arlie Russell Hochschild, “Emotion Work, Feeling Rules, and Social Structure,” American Journal of Sociology 85 (1979): 551–575; Hochschild, The Managed Heart: The Commercialization of Human Feeling (Berkeley, CA and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979); Peter N. and Caroline Z. Stearns, “Emotionology: Clarifying the History of Emotions and Emotional Standards,” American Historical Review 90 (1985): 813–836; Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling; Barbara Rosenwein, Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); and Monique Scheer, “Are Emotions a Kind of Practice (and Is That What Makes Them Have a History)? A Bourdieuian Approach to Understanding Emotion,” History and Theory 51.2 (2012): 193–220.

  • 71. See Cairns, Aidōs; Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community; and Cairns and Fulkerson, “Introduction,” in Cairns and Fulkerson, Emotions between Greece and Rome, 12–20.

  • 72. See Erving Goffman, Interaction Ritual: Essays in Face-to-Face Behaviour (New York: Anchor, 1967); Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1995), Honneth, The I in We: Studies in the Theory of Recognition (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2012); and cf. Douglas Cairns, “Honour and Shame: Modern Controversies and Ancient Values,” Critical Quarterly 53.1 (2011): 24–41.

  • 73. See David Konstan, “Nemesis and Phthonos,” in Gestures: Essays in Ancient History, Literature and Philosophy Presented to Alan J. Boegehold, ed. G. Bakewell and J. Sickinger (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 74–87.

  • 74. See Friedrich Zucker, Syneidesis–Conscientia: Ein Versuch zur Geschichte des sittlichen Bewusstseins im griechischen und im griechisch-römischen Altertum (Jena, Germany: Fischer, 1928).

  • 75. Konstan, The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks; and Sanders, Envy and Jealousy.

  • 76. See David Konstan, “Drama,” and Ruth Scodel and Ruth R. Caston, “Literature,” in Cairns, A Cultural History of the Emotions in Antiquity, 63–81, 109–124 (resp.).

  • 77. Martin Mueller, The Iliad (London: Methuen, 1984), 33.

  • 78. On the interplay of anger and pity in the Iliad, see Glenn W. Most, “Anger and Pity in Homer’s Iliad,” in Braund and Most, Ancient Anger, 50–75.

  • 79. See Munteanu, Tragic Pathos. For the mutability of fortune in historiography, see Lisa I. Hau, “The Changeability of Fortune in Greek Historiography: Moralizing Themes and Techniques from Herodotos to Diodoros of Sicily” (PhD diss., Royal Holloway University of London, 2007); cf. her Moral History from Herodotus to Diodorus Siculus (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016).

  • 80. See Catherine Keane, Juvenal and the Satiric Emotions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); earlier, e.g., William S. Anderson, Anger in Juvenal and Seneca (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1964).

  • 81. See Caston, The Elegiac Passion.

  • 82. See Jacqueline de Romilly, “La Vengeance comme explication historique dans l’œuvre d’Hérodote,” REG 84 (1971): 314–337; John Gould, Herodotus (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989), 63–64, 82–85; and Susanne Froehlich, Handlungsmotive bei Herodot (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2013), esp. 110–118, 139–142.

  • 83. For emotional regimes, see Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling.

  • 84. See Paul Cartledge and Paula Debnar, “Sparta and the Spartans in Thucydides,” in Brill’s Companion to Thucydides, ed. Antonis Tsakmakis and Antonios Rengakos (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2006), 559–587.

  • 85. See e.g., Harris, Restraining Rage, on anger in Herodotus; and Andrew Erskine, “Polybius and the Anger of the Romans,” in Cairns and Fulkerson, Emotions between Greece and Rome, 105–128 (on Greek perceptions of Roman anger in Polybius).

  • 86. See Randolph Ford, “Anger as an Ethnographic Trope: Changing Views from Aristotle to Seneca,” in Emotions across Cultures: China and Greece, ed. David Konstan (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2022), 143–168, on passages in Hdt., the Hippocratic Airs, Waters, Places, Arist. Pol., Polyb., Diod. Sic., Strabo, Caes., and Sen.

  • 87. See John Marincola, “Beyond Pity and Fear: The Emotions of History,” Anc. Soc. 33 (2003): 285–315, and “Polybius, Phylarchus, and ‘Tragic History”: A Reconsideration,” in Polybius and His World: Essays in Memory of F. W. Walbank, ed. Bruce Gibson and Thomas Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 73–90.

  • 88. See David Levene, “Pity, Fear, and the Historical Audience: Tacitus on the Fall of Vitellius,” in Braund and Gill, The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature, 128–149.

  • 89. Levene, “Pity, Fear, and the Historical Audience”; cf. Angelos Chaniotis, “Empathy, Emotional Display, Theatricality, and Illusion in Hellenistic Historiography,” in Chaniotis and Ducrey, Unveiling Emotions, 2:53–84; and Cynthia Damon, “Emotions as a Historiographical Dilemma,” in Cairns and Nelis, Emotions in the Classical World, 177–194.

  • 90. See Ruth Webb, “Imagination and the Arousal of the Emotions,” in Braund and Gill, The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature, 112–127.

  • 91. See Hau “The Changeability of Fortune”; and Douglas Cairns, “Exemplarity and Narrative in the Greek Tradition,” in Defining Greek Narrative, ed. Douglas Cairns and Ruth Scodel (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 103–136.

  • 92. Marincola, “Beyond Pity and Fear,” 303–306.

  • 93. See Matthew B. Roller, Models from the Past in Roman Culture: A World of Exempla (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2018); and Rebecca Langlands, Exemplary Ethics in Ancient Rome (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2018). On Plutarch’s Lives, cf. Aurelio Pérez Jiménez, “Exemplum: The Paradigmatic Education of the Ruler in the Lives of Plutarch,” in Sage and Emperor. Plutarch, Greek Intellectuals, and Roman Power in the Time of Trajan (98–117 AD), ed. Philip A. Stadter and Luc Van der Stockt (Leuven, Belgium: Leuven University Press, 2002), 105–114; and Frederick E. Brenk, “Setting a Good Exemplum: Case Studies in the Moralia, the Lives as Case Studies,” in The Unity of Plutarch’s Work: “Moralia” Themes in the “Lives”, Features of the “Lives” in the “Moralia”, ed. Anastasios G. Nikolaidis (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2008), 237–254.

  • 94. The core project publications are Chaniotis, Unveiling Emotions; Chaniotis and Ducrey, Unveiling Emotions II, and Chaniotis, Unveiling Emotions III.

  • 95. Chrysi Kotsifou, “Emotions and Papyri: Insights into the Theatre of Human Experience,” “A Glimpse into the World of Petitions: The Case of Aurelia Artemis and her Orphaned Children,” and “Being Unable to Come to You and Lament and Weep with You,” in Unveiling Emotions, 1:39–90, 1:317–327, 1:389–412, respectively.

  • 96. Chaniotis, “Constructing the Fear of the Gods: Epigraphic Evidence from Greece and Asia Minor,” in Unveiling Emotions, 1:205–234; and Irene Salvo, “Sweet Revenge: Emotional Factors in ‘Prayers for Justice’,” in Unveiling Emotions, 1:235–266.

  • 97. Chaniotis, “Constructing the Fear of the Gods” and “Moving Stones: The Study of Emotions in Greek Inscriptions,” in Unveiling Emotions, 1:91–130; Paraskevi Martzavou, “Dream, Narrative, and the Construction of Hope in the ‘Healing Miracles’ of Epidauros,” in Unveiling Emotions, 1:177–204; and “Isis Aretalogies, Initiations, and Emotions: The Isis Aretalogies as a Source for the Study of Emotions,” in Unveiling Emotions, 1:267–292; and Chaniotis, “Affective Diplomacy: Emotional Scripts between Greek Communities and Roman Authorities,” in Cairns and Fulkerson, Emotions between Greece and Rome, 87–103.

  • 98. See Viktoria Räuchle, “The Visual Arts,” in Cairns, A Cultural History of Emotions in Antiquity, 83–108.

  • 99. See Chaniotis, “Unveiling Emotions in the Greek World: Introduction,” in Unveiling Emotions, 1:18, 27; Jane Masséglia, “Emotions and Archaeological Sources: A Methodological Introduction,” in Unveiling Emotions, 1:137–139; “‘Reasons to be Cheerful’: Conflicting Emotions in the Drunken Old Women of Munich and Rome,” in Unveiling Emotions, 1:413–430; and Masséglia, Body Language in Hellenistic Art and Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

  • 100. See especially Masséglia, Body Language in Hellenistic Art and Society, improving substantially on Günther Neumann, Gesten und Gebärden in der griechischen Kunst (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1965). See also various works by Glenys Davies: “The Significance of the Handshake Motif in Classical Funerary Art,” AJA 89.4 (1985): 627–640; “The Language of Gesture in Greek Art: Gender and Status on Grave Stelai,” Apollo 140.389 (1994): 6–11; “Gender and Body Language in Roman Art,” in Gender and Ethnicity in Ancient Italy, ed. Timothy Cornell and Kathryn Lomas (London: Accordia, 1997), 97–107; “Clothes as Sign: The Case of the Large and Small Herculaneum Women,” in Women’s Dress in the Ancient Greek World, ed. Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones (London and Swansea: Duckworth/Classical Press of Wales, 2002), 227–242; “On Being Seated: Gender and Body Language in Hellenistic and Roman Art,” in Body Language in the Greek and Roman Worlds, ed. Douglas Cairns (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales), 215–238; “The Face of the Social Climber,” in, Free at Last! The Impact of Freed Slaves on the Roman Empire, ed. Sinclair Bell and Teresa Ramsby (London: Bristol Classical Press, 2012), 25–49; and “Touching Behaviour: Proxemics in Roman Art,” in Cairns and Nelis, Emotions in the Classical World, 159–176. Cf. Timothy McNiven, “Behaving Like an Other: Gender-specific Gestures in Athenian Vase Painting,” in Not the Classical Ideal: Athens and the Construction of the Other in Greek Art, ed. Beth Cohen (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2000), 71–97; “Fear and Gender in Greek Art,” in Reading the Body: Representations and Remains in the Archaeological Record, ed. Alison E. Rautman (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Museum, 2000), 124–131; Claudio Franzoni, Tirannia dello sguardo: corpo, gesto, espressione nell’arte greca (Turin, Italy: Enaudi, 2006); and Olympia Bobou, “Emotionality in Greek Art,” in Chaniotis and Ducrey, Unveiling Emotions, 2:273–311. Hedwig Kenner, Weinen und Lachen in der griechischen Kunst (Abhandlungen der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse 234.2; Vienna: Rohrer, 1960), discusses laughter and tears in Greek art. Mourning is an area in which the emotionality of ancient visual culture has been more systematically explored: see e.g., H. Alan Shapiro, “The Iconography of Mourning in Athenian Art,” AJA 95 (1991): 629–656; Ingeborg Huber, Die Ikonographie der Trauer in der griechischen Kunst (Mannheim, Germany: Bibliopolis, 2001); and John H. Oakley, Picturing Death in Classical Athens: The Evidence of the White Lekythoi (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

  • 101. See Chaniotis, “The Life of Statues: Emotion and Agency,” in Cairns and Nelis, Emotions in the Classical World, 143–158.

  • 102. See Chaniotis, “Emotional Community through Ritual: Initiates, Citizens, and Pilgrims as Emotional Communities in the Greek World,” in Ritual Dynamics in the Ancient Mediterranean: Agency, Emotion, Gender, Representation, ed. Angelos Chaniotis (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2011), 263–290, and “Constructing the Fear of the Gods.”

  • 103. Cf. e.g., Jane Masséglia, “Make or Break Decisions: The Archaeology of Allegiance in Ephesos,” in Unveiling Emotions, 1:329–355.

  • 104. On body language, see Carl Sittl, Die Gebärden der Griechen und Römer (Leipzig, Germany: Teubner, 1890); Jan Bremmer and Hermann Roodenburg, A Cultural History of Gesture: From Antiquity to the Present Day (London: Polity, 1991); Donald Lateiner, Sardonic Smile: Nonverbal Behavior in Homeric Epic (Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan University Press, 1995); Alan L. Boegehold, When a Gesture Was Expected (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); Thorsten Fögen, “Ancient Theorizing on Non-Verbal Communication,” in LACUS Forum 27 (2001): 203–216; Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones, Aphrodite’s Tortoise: The Veiled Woman of Ancient Greece (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2003); Cairns, Body Language; and Maria Luisa Catoni, La comunicazione non verbale nella Grecia antica: Gli schemata nella danza, nell’arte, nella vita (Turin, Italy: Bollati Boringhieri, 2008). Cf. n. 100 above. See also (on laughter) Stephen Halliwell, Greek Laughter: A Study of Cultural Psychology from Homer to Early Christianity (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008) and Mary Beard, Laughter in Ancient Rome: On Joking, Tickling, and Cracking Up (Berkeley, CA and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2014); (on tears) Thorsten Fögen, Tears in the Graeco-Roman World (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2009); (laughter and tears) Margaret Alexiou and Douglas Cairns, eds., Greek Laughter and Tears: Antiquity and After (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017).

  • 105. See Cairns, “A Short History of Shudders,” in Chaniotis and Ducrey, Unveiling Emotions, 2:85–107; “The Imagery of Erôs in Plato’s Phaedrus,” in Erôs in Ancient Greece, ed. Ed Sanders, Chiara Thumiger, Christopher Carey, and Nick Lowe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 233–250; “Psyche, Thymos, and Metaphor in Homer and Plato,” Ét. Plat. 11 (Etudes Platoniciennes); “Clothed in Shamelessness, Shrouded in Grief: The Role of ‘Garment’ Metaphors in Ancient Greek Concepts of Emotion,” in Spinning Fates and the Song of the Loom: The Use of Textiles, Clothing and Cloth Production as Metaphor, Symbol, and Narrative, ed. Giovanni Fanfani, Mary Harlow, and Marie-Louise Nosch (Oxford: Oxbow), 25–41; “Mind, Body, and Metaphor in Ancient Greek Concepts of Emotion,” L’Atelier du Centre de recherche historique 16; “Metaphors for Hope in Archaic and Classical Greek Poetry,” in Hope, Joy and Affection in the Classical World, ed. Ruth R. Caston and Robert A. Kaster (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 13–44; “Horror, Pity, and the Visual in Ancient Greek Aesthetics,” in Cairns and Nelis, Emotions in the Classical World, 53–77; and “Mind, Metaphor, and Emotion in Euripides (Hippolytus) and Seneca (Phaedra),” in Cairns and Nelis, Seneca’s Tragic Passions, 247–267. See also Cristóbal P. Cánovas, “The Genesis of the Arrows of Love: Diachronic Conceptual Integration in Greek Mythology,” AJP 132 (2011): 553–579; and Fabian Horn, “‘Bitter-sweet Love’: A Cognitive Linguistic View of Sappho’s ἔρος γλυκύπικρος‎ (Frg. 130 Voigt),” Poetica 48 (2016): 1–21. More broadly, see Horn, “‘Building in the Deep’: Notes on a Metaphor for Mental Activity and the Metaphorical Concept of Mind in Early Greek Epic,” G&R 63 (2016): 163–174, and “Dying Is Hard to Describe: Metonymies and Metaphors of Death in the Iliad,” CQ 68 (2018): 359–383; Andreas T. Zanker, Metaphor in Homer: Time, Speech, and Thought (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019). Latinists have focused less closely on emotion, but see Chiara Fedriani, Alessandro Buccheri, Irene De Felice, and William M. Short, “Semantic Analysis and Frequency Effects of Conceptual Metaphors of Emotions in Latin: From a Corpus-based Approach to a Dictionary of Latin Metaphors,” Journal of Latin Linguistics 20.2 (2021): 163–189; Chiara Fedriani, “Specialized Concepts and the Career of Metaphors: The Diachronic Development of anger is a hot fluid and love is a journey from Latin to Old Italian,” in Researching Metaphor: A Comprehensive Account, ed. Michele Prandi and Micaela Rossi (London: Routledge, forthcoming); and William M. Short, “Holism in Cognitive Approaches to the Ancient Emotions,” in Holism in Ancient Medicine and Its Reception, ed. Chiara Thumiger (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2021), 85–110; for the general approach, cf. William M. Short, “A Roman Folk Model of the Mind,” Arethusa 45 (2012): 109–147; “Getting to the Truth,” Arion 21 (2013): 140–168; “Metafora,” in Con i Romani: Un’ antropologia della cultura antica, ed. Maurizio Bettini and William M. Short (Bologna, Italy: Il Mulino: 2014), 329–352. The foundational studies are George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980), with Zoltan Kövecses, Metaphor and Emotion: Language, Culture, and Body in Human Feeling (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000) on emotion.

  • 106. See Cairns, “A Short History of Shudders” and “Horror, Pity, and the Visual” on shudders (phrikē) and “Clothed in Shamelessness, Shrouded in Grief” on clouds and garments.