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date: 30 November 2022

law, Roman, institutional scheme offree

law, Roman, institutional scheme offree

  • Jakob Fortunat Stagl


The institutional scheme of Roman law was developed primarily by Gaius on the basis of a preceding tradition of law manuals. The scheme consists of dividing the law into a General Part, Family Law, Property Law, Law of Succession, Law of Obligations, and Civil Procedure. This scheme is apparent not only in Gaius’s Institutes but also in the whole of his didactic scheme, which can be discerned from descriptions of the curriculum in his time. Gaius’s larger didactic scheme is indebted to contemporary philosophical, rhetorical, and didactic currents, which made it possible for him to organise the law of Rome in such a solid and plausible way that the emperor Justinian adopted this scheme for his compilation, comprising the Institutes, the Digest, and the Codex.


  • Philosophy
  • Reception
  • Roman Law


Throughout the history of classical Roman law, that is, during the first three centuries ce, two different schemes competed subconsciously to provide the most apt comprehensive description of Roman law: the edictal scheme,1 which was based on the Praetor’s Edict and gained authority ratione imperii, and the scheme of various didactic manuals, of which Gaius’s (second half of the 2nd century ce) is by far the most important. Both schemes are connected to certain literary genres: the edictal scheme to the Commentarii ad edictum, and that of the didactic manuals to didactic expositions of the law, culminating in Gaius’s Institutiones. It is the main hypothesis of the present article that Gaius’s institutional scheme served as the model for Justinian’s compilation, the Corpus Iuris Civilis (a medieval title). Its influence on the Corpus Iuris made the institutional scheme of Gaius of utmost importance for all further developments in European law.2

Gaius’s Precursors: Mucius and Sabinus

The institutional scheme was not entirely Gaius’s invention, but rather the fulfillment of a preceding tradition. The first known precursor3 of Gaius was Quintus Mucius Scaevola, pontifex (c. 140–82 bce),4 who was the first to write about Roman civil law generatim, as Sextus Pomponius (second half of the 2nd century ce) called it (Pomp. D. 1. 2. 2. 41). Mucius was a Roman aristocrat and lawyer. We do not know his book directly, but only by means of the commentaries Ad Quintum Mucium5 written by Gaius and Pomponius.6 Lenel produced a cautious and for this reason fragmentary reconstruction of Mucius’ De Iure civili XVIII:7


Intestate succession

On servitudes?

Torts (De lege Aquilia)

De statuliberis (slaves manumitted by their masters under a condition)

Possession and Usucapion

Law of sales

Water rights?

Common ownership and society

Prisoners of war and law of captivity


In this scheme it seems that the author had grasped the idea of “law of successions,”7 the notion that the death of a person generates manifold legal problems and that the solutions to these problems are one field of legal knowledge. Mucius already made use of rather subtle distinctions: he knew, for example, five types of guardianship (Gai. 1, 188) and a variety of types of possession.8 As Guzmán Brito has pointed out, these distinctions go hand in hand with a tendency to a rather abstract style of legal reasoning, for example in D. 17. 2. 3: “Mucius … writes: It is impossible to constitute a society in which one of the partners carries all the losses whereas the other carries all the profits.”9 This tendency and Mucius’s interest in definitions10 have led Guzmán Brito to interpret the word generatim which characterizes Mucius’ method not as “according to classes” but rather as “generally.”11

The Mucian scheme is acknowledged as a precursor of Sabinus’s Tres libri iuris civilis12, a 1st-century ce treatise on civil law. Masurius Sabinus was a jurist of the ordo equester,13 head of the school of the Sabiniani, and the author of that treatise, which was famous throughout antiquity. No copy of it, however, was passed down; it is probable that even Justinian’s compilers did not possess one. Yet we can reconstruct the scheme and some of the contents of the book because Sabinus inspired a literary genre, the Libri ad Sabinum,14 which became one of the major sources of the Digesta, the most prominent part of the Corpus Iuris. The structure of the Libri ad Sabinum can be reconstructed as follows:


[Law of inheritance]




Intestate Succession




[Law of Persons]


On those who are not under someone else’s power and on those who are


De statu liberis (slaves manumitted by their masters under a condition)


Services to be rendered by freedmen


[Bonae fidei iudicia (« Equity »)]


Sales law and transfer of title


Common ownership and society


[Family Law]








Torts (De lege Aquilia)


Threats to one’s property




Unjustified enrichment


[Formal Obligations]


Contracts in writing


Verbal contracts


[Law of Property]


Actions for the recovery of property


Acquisition of property








Water rights




Law of Captivity

This scheme was certainly inspired by that of Mucius, especially insofar as it foregrounds the law of successions.15 The Edict may also have been important, though this is quite speculative. The Sabinian scheme reveals a division of civil law into the distinct elements of inheritance, persons, family law, obligations, delicts, and property law. The law of persons is conceived rather narrowly, lacking marriage and dowry.

Gaius: The Man and His Work

The perfecter of this didactic tradition is Gaius. Practically nothing is known of his personal life, and his peers cite him rarely if at all. These facts and the observation that he wrote a commentary on the edictum provinciale rather than the edictum urbanum induced Mommsen to propose that he was a “Provinzialjurist”16; this may be true, but there are many arguments against it, especially Gaius’s overriding sophistication as a teacher. The only thing that is sure about this “outsider” of Roman law is that he was something like a law professor.17

Though we do not know much about Gaius’s personal life, he is the only lawyer of the classical period of Roman law of whom we do possess a complete work: the Institutiones. (It is possible, though, that the so-called Ulpiani epitome/Tituli ex corpore Ulpiani are a complete work by Gnaeus Domitius Annius Ulpianus (c. 170–223 ce).18 When the Institutiones, hitherto known only in the revised version of Justinian’s Institutes (the first part of the Corpus Iuris), was discovered by Barthold Georg Niebuhr at the beginning of the 19th century, it triggered a revolution in the study of Roman law.19 Until then, classical jurisprudence was known only indirectly through Justinian’s compilation, and classical civil procedure was entirely unknown. All this changed with the discovery of Gaius’s book, and the subsequent importance of his Institutes for our knowledge of Roman law resulted in a perception that the Institutes are a comprehensive account of Roman private law. This perception obscures the fact that the Institutes are intended as a didactic work and were not written to inform posterity about Roman law.

Recent research has shown to what extent Gaius was embedded in the preceding tradition and surrounding cultural climate. Fuhrmann postulated that Gaius stands in the Hellenistic tradition of didactic literature.20 Nörr,21 Talamanca,22 and Wieacker23 have pointed out to what extent his institutional scheme was indebted to the diairetic method of divisio and partitio.24 Guzmán Brito has shown that the order of the three genera of law—persona, res, and actiones—which forms the basic structure of the Institutes, is probably derived from the Graeco-Roman rhetorical doctrine of circumstantiae: who, what, when, where, why, by what means, and by support of what.25 Most recently, Wibier has pointed out how much the Institutes are indebted to an oral didactic technique of question and answer.26

Gaius’s Didactic Scheme

The institutional scheme of Gaius27 in the classical sense of the tripartition28 personae,29 res,30 and actiones31 has attracted the attention of scholars ever since its modern discovery.32 It is the general opinion that Gaius did not invent the scheme but rather built upon the existing scheme of Mucius and Sabinus.33 Yet all these interpretations were based on the idea of reading the Institutes34 as a book that stands alone like a monad, which was famously described by Leibniz as “not having windows.” This view is, for example, responsible for the erroneous idea that family law does not have a place in the institutional scheme, whereas civil procedure, forming its third element, was supposed to be of overriding importance. Scholars of Roman law did not understand fully that the Institutes must be judged in their didactic context, and that the key to understanding the work consists accordingly in the reconstruction of his law school’s curriculum, thus embedding it in its didactic context. This view is proposed by Stagl,35 arguing that the Institutes are to be interpreted not as an isolated book but as part of a larger didactic scheme. Though the tripartition of persona, res, actiones is the basis of this scheme, it is modified by a didactic technique of Hellenistic origin.36 The various subjects are first discussed on a basic level (“Einführungsebene”) and then the specifics of each subject are discussed again in the same order on a second level (“Vertiefungsebene”).

Given the nature of our sources, it is clear that the main source of Gaius’s didactic scheme is Justinian’s compilation, especially his introductory constitutions. In order to understand Gaius thoroughly, the historian has to infer from Justinian on Gaius. This may be bewildering from a chronological standpoint, but it is perfectly reasonable from a historical standpoint, since Justinian was a classicist and had the greatest respect for “our” (noster) Gaius,37 as he calls him (Const. Imperatoriam § 3).

Justinian does not inform us precisely about the curriculum in Gaius’s day, but only about the curriculum “before” (antea) his own reform (Const. Omnem § 1: old curriculum, § 2: new curriculum). Yet there are good reasons to believe that not much had changed since Gaius.38 First, apart from vis inertiae, is the fact that the older curriculum was based on the by then obsolete classical law and, therefore, probably descended from classical times. With the help of the “old” curriculum and Justinian’s reforms, we are able to reconstruct Gaius’s curriculum as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Law School Curriculum in the Time of Gaius

First Year

Institutiones: Gaius’s Institutes

Libri singulares a) de illa vetere re uxoria, b) de tutelis, c) de testamentis, d) de legatis: Courses on dowry, guardianship, testaments and legacies

Second Year

Prima pars legum or πρωτα‎: A course on the basic principles, the philosophy and the history of law

Tituli (chapters) de iudiciis et tituli de rebus: The specifics of property law or obligations

Third Year

Tituli (chapters) de iudiciis et tituli de rebus: The specifics of property law or obligations (depending on what had been taught in the previous year)

8 libri responsorum Papiniani: The specifics of credit, defects liability, pawns, deeds and testimonies

Fourth Year

18 libri responsorum Pauli: The specifics of family and hereditary law

Fifth Year

Constitutiones: Collection of law cases and imperial legislation

The principal didactic idea of Gaius’s scheme is first to teach all subjects on a basic level, and then, in the same order, the specifics of each subject (a “concentric order”). The synopsis in Table 2 shows this scheme:

Table 2. Gaius’s Didactic Scheme

The basics: Institutiones.

The specifics: libri singulares and tituli

I. Personae: πρῶτα‎ (Inst. 1.1–8), persons (Inst. 1.9–141), guardianship (Inst. 142–200)

I. Libri singulares, a) de re uxoria, b) de tutelis, c) de testamentis, d) de legatis

Prima pars legum (= πρῶτα‎)

II. Res (Inst. 2.1–3.–225)

II. Tituli de rebus

III. Actiones (Inst. 4.1–187)

III. Tituli de iudiciis

The existence of such a didactic scheme is first of all proven by the fact that there is no chapter on dowry in the Institutes, which under no circumstances can be regarded as a contingency, since there is no chapter on dowry in Justinian’s Institutes either. This gap was filled, however, by the liber singularis on dowry, which the students were to read in the second year, on the specifics level.39 But there is further proof of such a didactic scheme in the text of the Institutes itself:


Gai. Inst. 1. 188: Gaius conveys to the readers (his pupils) that they should read the specifics of this matter in his books quos ex Quinto Mucio fecit. This is the only reference to this work, and nothing of it is cited in the Digest. Gaius was generally believed to be the author of such a work, based on lemmata from the book of Quintus Mucius, discussed in Gaius’s Precursors: Mucius and Sabinus.40 It is conceivable, indeed probable, that the explanation given in this reference was also integrated into Gaius’s Liber singularis de tutelis, and may even refer to that book.


Gai. Inst. 3. 33/a: In this instance Gaius refers his students to commentarii proprii for the reason that discussing the specifics of this matter would be disproportionate at this point (de quibus in his commentariis consulto non agimus, quia hoc ius totum propriis commentariis exsecuti sumus. Hoc solum admonuisse). These commentarii must have been some separate text,41 probably the Liber singularis de tutelis again.


Gai. Inst. 2.97: Gaius refers (alio loco referemus) here to a comprehensive tract on legacies, which is generally understood to be a reference to Gai. Inst. 2.191–28942 but could, of course, also be interpreted as a reference to the Liber singularis de legatis.

These references to literature outside of the Institutes would not make sense if it were not possible for the reader (a first-year student) to have access to the literature to which the author refers. This in turn presupposes a library. We know that there were many public libraries in Rome at that time,43 and we can infer from this that students at Gaius’s law school had access to a library specializing in law, probably within the school.44 This presumption is supported by Justinian’s account of the old curriculum, according to which the students “read aloud Paul’s ‘Legal Opinions’ amongst themselves” (Const. Omnem § 1 in fine). The Scholia Sinaitica also fit within this context. They were a transcription of a class on books 35 to 39 of Ulpian’s commentary on Sabinus, treating dowry and guardianship for students from the eastern empire.45 The text presupposes access to Ulpian’s work.46 The same is true for the Greek glossae on a Latin manuscript of Gaius’s Institutes in PSI 1182; they are probably to be linked to the law school of Alexandria and also presuppose access to a library containing major works of Paulus.

The sophisticated didactic technique of presenting a subject first on the basic level and then on a specific level would result in a sophisticated presentation that refers the reader to other literature. Thus, the basics and the specifics constitute a scheme in which all parts communicate among themselves—or, metaphorically, the Institutes have windows open to the broader didactic scheme.

Justinian does not explain what literature was used in teaching on the specific level before his time. Mommsen theorizes plausibly that the libri singulares were excerpts from Gaius’s Libri ad edictum provinciale.47 This is likely true for the tituli (another word for “chapter” or “monograph”). This conclusion is based on the technique of Justinian’s legislation, and on his own didactic concept of having law students first read his Institutes and then study the specifics of each subject with the help of the Digest, which is in turn largely an excerpt from the Libri ad edictum by Gaius, Paulus, and Ulpian.

One exception to this scheme of basics and specifics has already been hinted at: Gaius offers no chapter on dowry in his Institutes, but instead only addresses the specifics of it. The reason for this exception is that dowry had become a tool of Augustan population policy (favor dotis), which favoured marriage and tried to improve the birthrate among the empire’s Roman upper class. The political scope of the law explains why the jurists qualified these rules as a ius singulare, an irrational and political kind of law.48 It is obvious that from a didactic standpoint, such irregularities are not to be taught in the first year; only when the students have grasped the basic rules is it appropriate to talk about significant exceptions to them. This didactic technique, however, reveals that the Institutes and the rest of Gaius’s writings form a scheme in the proper sense. The elements of this scheme are as follows:


The πρῶτα‎ (Inst. 1.1–8) constitute a kind of general overview. They discuss the major divisions of law, parts of its history, the sources of law, and the constitution insofar as it is of interest for a practical lawyer.


Personae (Inst. 1.9–141) deals first with the different statuses of people, which were highly accentuated in Roman law. Two of these status-related topics deserve specific discussion: guardianship and dowry (Inst. 142–200 and libri singulares de re uxoria and de tutelis). In an aristocratic society like that of the Romans, wealth is not earned but preserved, and may be increased by advantageous marriage or by inheritance. The control of the family fortune is therefore of the utmost importance, which explains the great significance of guardianship and dowry. The law of betrothal and marriage forms part of the law of dowry. On the whole, personae is nothing else but “family law” in the modern sense.


The following part, res, has three important subdivisions. The first is “property law” (Inst. 2.1–96 and the tituli de iudiciis). We do not know exactly what the tituli de iudiciis were in Gaius’s time. In Justinian’s time, civil procedure, which might be intended by this term, was taught only in the basic course of the Institutes and not coherently at the level of specifics.


The second part of res is “law of succession” (Inst. 2.97–3.87 and the libri singulares de testamenti and de legatis).


The third part of res is obligations (Inst. 3.88–3.225 and tituli de rebus).49 The most important subdivision is that into obligationes ex contractu (Inst. 3.89–181) and ex delicto (Inst. 3.182–3.225).


Actiones would be Gaius’s last element (Inst. 4.1–187), which deals with pre-Augustan and classical civil procedure. The importance of this discipline had declined steadily as the cumbersome classical civil procedure with its formulae was replaced by the very informal imperial procedure (cognitio),50 a fact that was somewhat obscured by Gaius’s Institutes, which, like all didactic literature, have a conservative tendency.

In a more abstract fashion, this scheme looks very modern and familiar to the continental European lawyer:


General Part


Family Law


Property Law


Law of Succession


Law of Obligations


Civil Procedure

Nörr51 has written that the summa divisio of personae res actiones, which is the product of dividing the law into its genera, did not allow any further development, and that there is therefore no genetic connection to the so-called Pandectist scheme (General Part, Obligations, Things, Family, Succession) of later Continental jurisprudence. This may be true from a philosophical standpoint; from a historical standpoint, it becomes clear that Gaius did overcome the narrowness of the summa divisio thanks to didactic exigencies which he obeyed instinctively.

Gaius’s Dialectic Method and Its Relationship to the Didactic Structure of His Scheme

Whereas the didactic scheme provides the outer structure of Gaius’s oeuvre, the inner structure is dominated by the dialectic method (Gr. διαίρεσις‎ , diareísis, and μερισμός‎ , merismós, Lat. divisio and partitio), which was, together with the didactic disposition of the material, the likely reason for its popularity with later generations. Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 bce) gives a famous example of these two methods (Top. 4.28):

Definitions as well are either examples of “partition” or “division.” They belong to the category of partition when they dismember their object, as for example when someone says that civil law consists of laws, senatus consulta, jurisprudence, doctrine, the magistrates’ edict, customs and equity. To the category of division belong all those definitions which work in the following way: alienation of a res mancipi takes place either by delivering it in execution of an obligation or by a formal delivery between persons qualified for this by civil law.

Whereas the partitio dissects a genus into its different elements or species, divisio aims to look at a whole and to divide it into a certain number of genera, which are in turn subdivided into species. Divisio aims at an idea or concept, while partitio aims at adapting to reality by fragmenting it.52 The common element for both, logically very similar techniques, is the dissection of a given subject into different elements. The Romans did not invent this technique but rather took it from the Greeks, especially Aristotle and the Stoics.53 Cicero insists in various instances that an application of this method is necessary to make of any field of knowledge an ars, and he does so expressis verbis concerning jurisprudence (Cic. Brutus 41.152s; Orat. I.42.189s.).54 Gaius’s Institutes are cut from the same cloth, which is obvious in the way he begins his treatise on the law of persons (Gai. Inst. 1.8–9):

“All the law which we obey to belongs either to the law of persons, things or actions.55 The supreme divisio of the law of persons is surely that according to which all men are either free or slaves.”

To see how this technique worked in practice, observe how Gaius’s first step is to dissect ius by way of divisio into personae, res, and actiones, and the second is to dissect persona into two major genera: free men and slaves. He further dissects free men into the categories of ingenui and libertini, and the latter are further subdivided into cives Romani, Latini, and dediticii. In Inst. 1.48 he introduces a new division: “The law of persons is followed by another division: For some persons are independent, and others are under the power of other people (personae alieni iuris).” The personae alieni iuris are further subdivided into three main categories: in potestate, in manu, in mancipio. The category in potestate is further subdivided into servi and liberi (filii) and the latter into naturales and hi, qui adoptamus. As Guzmán Brito has pointed out,56 this is a case of hypodiaresis,57 another subdivision according to another criterion. The first subdivision of personae, liber, and servi is intended to show the legal consequences of having or not having Roman citizenship, while the second subdivision aims to show the legal consequences of being sui iuris and of being alieni iuris. These two subdivisions, which structure the whole treatise on persons, are anything but natural; they are a deliberate choice and as such artful. This illustrates Gaius’s technique and demonstrates how it is influenced by the technique of partitio and divisio.

Justinian, “Our Gaius,” and the Scheme of the Corpus Iuris Civilis

It has been said that Gaius was “the architect” of Justinian’s compilation.58 Nevertheless, some of the most important scholars of Roman law, such as Bluhme,59 and following him Krüger60 and Lenel61 (as well as Soubie62), held that the Digest was molded according to the Praetor’s Edict. This dominant opinion is based on an isolationist, monadic vision of the Institutes, some ambiguous remarks by Justinian about having used the Codex and the Edict as a model (Const. Deo auctore § 5),63 and the nature of the sources. We will see that the contrary is true: the whole of Justinian’s compilation was modelled on Gaius’s didactic scheme, and not on the Praetor’s Edict.

The Edict64 was a list of legal remedies like the rei vindicatio, an action for the recovery of property. Every praetor edited the edict as the basis of his annual tenure. Since he was the most important magistrate concerned with jurisdiction, the edict had enormous importance for Roman jurisprudence. It was never codified until Emperor Hadrian (76–103 ce), who commissioned Julian to edit the edictum perpetuum (the unchallenged reconstruction is by Lenel). Though it cannot be called a codification of Roman civil law, it inspired the literary genre of Libri ad edictum, which became the most exhaustive and comprehensive treatises on Roman civil law. We possess fragments of such works by Gaius,65 Paulus,66 and Ulpian,67 as well as the closely related Digesta68 by Julian. The edict developed for centuries as a result of the annually changing tenure of the praetors. The disposition of the material is, therefore, rather more historical than rational. The actio Publiciana, for example, which is modelled on the rei vindicatio, is listed before and not after the latter, which would have been the rational thing to do. The edict gained importance not for its rational properties but for the authority of the praetor’s office and through imperial sanction.

The genre of the Libri ad edictum, especially those of Paulus and Ulpian, became the backbone of the Digest. This fact and the assertion of Justinian that he had modelled the Digest according to the Edict69 are responsible for the erroneous opinion that this was actually the case. The contrary is true as the synopsis in Table 3 shows.

Table 3. Comparison of the Praetor’s Edict and Justinian’s Digest


Justinian´s Digest

First Section: “Introduction”

First Part: Πρωτα‎ (lib. 1–4)

Jurisdiction in the municipia (tit. 1)

Jurisdiction in general (tit. 2)

Edition of actions (tit. 3)

Pacta (tit. 4)

Summons (tit. 5)

Postulation (tit. 6)

Vadimonia (tit. 7)

Procuration in court (tit. 8)

Calumniator (tit. 9)

Restitutio in integrum (tit. 10)

De receptis (tit. 11)

Securities (tit. 12)

Legal force of verdicts (tit. 13)

Philosophy, history, method, sources of law, persons, objects, constitution (lib. 1)

Constitution of the courts, agreements and compromise settlements (lib. 2)

Procuration in court (lib. 3)

Ineffectiveness of legal acts, legal capacity, liability of boatmen etc. (lib. 4)

Second Section: “Ordinary legal remedies”

Second Part: De iudiciis (lib. 5–11)

Constitution of courts (tit. 14)

Legal remedies for the defence of property (tit. 15)

Corpses, burials (tit. 16)

Actiones certae creditae pecuniae (tit. 17

Management (tit. 18)

Bonae fidei iudicia (tit. 19)

Dowry (tit. 20)

Children (tit. 21)

Guardianship (tit. 22)

Theft (tit. 23)

Rights of the patronus (tit. 24)

Jurisdiction, claim to an inheritance (lib. 5)

Rei vindicatio, actio Publiciana (lib. 6)

Usufruct (lib. 7)

Servitudes (lib. 8)

Delicts (lib. 9)

Partition of border, inheritance or property, actio ad exhibendum (lib.10)

Testimonies, experts, burial plots, costs of burial (lib. 11)

Third Section: “Speedy legal remedies”

Third Part: De rebus (lib. 12–19)

Legal succession (tit. 25)

Testaments (tit. 26)

Legacies (tit. 27)

Legal procedure for freedom (tit. 31)

Iniuria (tit. 35)

Unjust enrichment, place of performance, promised performance, securities, loan (lib. 12–13)

Action against shipper, lex Rhodia, action against managers, action against the principal of a peculium, sc. Macedonianum (lib. 14)

Peculium (lib. 15)

Sc. Velleianum, set-off, custody (lib. 16)

Commission, company (lib. 17)

Sale, lease, tenancy, service (lib. 18–19)

Fourth Section: “Remedies against execution and claiming ineffectiveness”

Fourth Part: Umbilicus (lib. 20–27)

Personal execution (tit. 35–37)

Real execution (tit. 38–41)

Remedy claiming ineffectiveness (tit. 42)

Pignus (lib. 20)

Defects liability, guarantee for seizure (lib. 21)

Interest, credit, deeds, testimonies, evidence, presumptions (lib. 22)

Marriage and dowry (lib. 23–25)

Guardianship (lib. 26–27)


Fifth Part: De testamentis et legatis (lib. 28–36)



“Praetorian Stipulations”

“Edict of the Aediles”

Testaments (lib. 28–29)

Legacies and trusts (lib. 30–34)

Lex Falcidia (lib. 35)

Sc. Trebellianum (lib. 36)

Sixth Part (lib. 37–44)

Bonorum Possessio, legal succession (lib. 37–38)

Operis novi nuntiatio, damnum infectum, aqua pluvia arcenda, publicani, donations (lib. 39)

Liberalis causa, manumissiones (lib. 40)

Acquisition of possession and property (lib. 41)

Execution (lib. 42)

Interdicts (lib. 43)

Exceptions (lib. 44)

Seventh and Final Part (lib. 45–50)

Stipulations (lib. 45)

Guarantee, novation, solution, acceptilatio, praetorian stipulations. 46)

Libri terribiles: criminal law (lib. 47–48)

Appellation (lib. 49)

Urban administration, public works, pollicitatio, taxes, terminology, maxims of law (lib. 50)

As Kaser has pointed out, the scheme of the Edict is based on considerations of civil procedure, and hardly any systematic order of the substantive law can be recognized in it.70 The Digest, by contrast, has a systematic order, which corresponds to Gaius’s didactic scheme. Unsurprisingly, it is impossible to discern any parallelism between the two schemes if one looks at them soberly.

If this difference is so evident, why does Justinian bother to tell posterity that he modelled the Digest upon the Edict? In Justinian’s time there were two schemes of Roman law available: the didactic scheme of Gaius, based on principles of rationality, and the edictal scheme, based on the ancient authority of the Edict. This is underlined by the fact that there were two types of comprehensive statements of the law: the Libri ad Edictum and the Libri ad Sabinum—that is, a “commentary” on the Edict and a “commentary” on a didactic work. Moreover, these two types of literature form the backbone of the Digest. The great classical lawyers, especially those serving under the Severan dynasty, obviously considered the scheme of the Edict better suited for their purpose of an “encyclopedic” exposition of the law.71 It was therefore only natural that the classicist Justinian accepted their authority also under this aspect. Another reason may be the continuity of Roman jurisprudence between the end of the 3rd century ce and the 6th century, which is persuasively advocated by Mantovani,72 and evidence to be published in his project REDHIS. Anything else would have been revolutionary. Yet, underneath this surface, the didactic scheme of Gaius asserted itself (with the minimal modifications by Justinian), and the compilation was in fact modelled upon it, as the synopsis in Table 4 shows.

Table 4. Comparison of the Corpus Iuris Civilis and Justinian’s law curriculum

*Corpus Iuris Civilis

Justinian´s Law Curriculum

First Year

Institutiones Iustiniani

Institutiones Iustiniani

Πρωτα‎ (Dig. lib. 1–4)


Second Year

De iudiciis (Dig. lib. 5–11)

Vel de iudiciis libros septem vel de rebus octo

Libri singulares a) ex collectione quidam tripertiti voluminis, quod pro dotibus composuimus uno libro excerpto, b) ex duobus de tutelis et curationibus uno, c) ex gemine volumine de testamentis uno, d) ex septem libris de legatis et fideicommissi uno

Third Year

De rebus (Dig. lib. 12–19)

De rebus vel de iudiciis

Umbilicus (lib. 20–27)

D. lib. 20–22

Fourth Year

De testamentis et legatis (lib. 28–36)

D. lib. 24, 25, 29, 31–36

Fifth Year

Codex Iustinianus

Codex Iustinianus

Justinian’s compilation was modelled on Gaius’s curriculum and his own curriculum, with the understandable intention of synchronizing the two. In reality, Justinian’s compilation turned out to be not much more than a modernized version of Gaius’s didactic scheme, with updated Institutes and updated libri singulares and tituli.

As Table 5 shows, the Digesta—up to the thirty-sixth book—pursue the goal of delivering the material of the specifics, thus following Gaius’s scheme73.

Table 5. Comparison of Gaius’s didactic scheme and the scheme of the Digest

Didactic Scheme of Gaius

Scheme of the Digest

I. πρῶτα‎ (Gai. 1.1–8), personae (Gai. 1.9–141), tutela (Gai. 1.142–200)

I. Πρωτα‎, D. lib. 1–4

II. Res (Gai. 2.1–3. 225)

II. De iudiciis, D. lib. 5–11

III. Actiones (Gai. 4.1–187)

III. De rebus, D. lib. 12–19

IV. Libri singulares, a) de re uxoria, b) de tutelis, c) de testamentis, d) de legatis.

IV. Singularium, D. lib. 20–22 and Umbilicus, D. lib. 23–36

V. Specifics of I (prima pars legum), II. (tituli de rebus) and III. (tituli de iudiciis)

V. lib. 37–50 and Codex

It must be admitted, however, that De iudiciis in the Digest does not exactly correspond with actiones in Gaius’s Institutes. First, classical civil procedure had become obsolete in Justinian’s time, and second, Justinian simply does not treat civil procedure in books 5 to 11, but rather property and its protection. He seems to have split up the topic of civil procedure. Why he did so must remain unanswered here.

Further proof of the didactic nature of the Digest’s scheme is to be found in the composition of the three “Bluhmian masses.” As Bluhme noted, the compilers divided the writings of the classical lawyers available to them into the three masses: the Sabinian, the Edictal and the Papinian mass. These masses correspond in their composition strikingly with the curriculum before Justinian’s reform, as Bluhme has pointed out in detail.74

Gaius’s Method and the Inner Scheme of the Digest

It has been said that the use of the dialectical method of divisio and partitio is a characteristic trait of Gaius, perhaps only shared with Papinian (142–212 ce).75 Yet it is another question whether this method can be discerned in the Digest. To answer to this question it is necessary to look into the details:

D. 1.5.1 = Gai. Inst. 1.8 (Omne ius quo utimur vel ad personas pertinet vel ad res vel ad actiones) has already been cited. Gaius’s didactic scheme is nothing but a sophisticated execution of this maxim, and Justinian’s whole compilation as well as the Digest is not much more than an expansion of Gaius’s didactic scheme. Thus, the whole structure of Justinian’s compilation reflects this supreme division of personae, res, and actiones. But the Digest also reflects the Gaian structure in the structure of singular titles, as the synopsis in Table 6 illustrates.

Table 6. Comparison of the structure of Gaius’s Institutes and the Digest

Gaius, Institutes

Digest 1. 5–8

1.8: All the law which we obey to belongs either to the law of persons, things or actions. The supreme division of the law of persons is surely that according to which all men are either free or slaves.

1.5.1. (Gai. Inst. 1.8) All the law which we obey to belongs either to the law of persons, things or actions.

1.9: The supreme division of the law of persons is surely that according to which all men are either free or slaves.

1.5.2. (Gai. Inst. 1.9) The supreme division of the law of persons is surely that according to which all men are either free or slaves.

1.10: Among the free men, in turn, some are freeborn and others are freedmen.

Dig. Marcianus 1 Inst. (A text explaining how one becomes a slave.)

1.11: Freeborn are those who are born as free men;

freedmen are those who are freed from slavery in due course.

Dig. Marcianus 1 Inst. Freeborn are those who are born of a free mother … 6: Gai. Freedmen are those who are freed from slavery in due course.

Ingenui and libertini, the latter are subdivided into cives Romani, Latini and dediticii.

Citizenship, 1.5.17 e.g.

1.48. Law of persons is followed by another division: For some persons are independent, and others are under the power of other people (personae alieni iuris). Law of persons is followed by another divisions: For some persons are independent, and others are under the power of other people (personae alieni iuris).

1.97: According to what we have said not only natural children are under our power but those as well which we have adopted. 1.124: Let us now have a look on how those who are under somebody else’s power are freed from this legal burden.

D. 1.7: On adoptions and other ways of freeing someone from another’s power.

2.2: The supreme division, therefore, of things is into two categories: some belong to divine law, some to human law.

D. 1.8: The division of things and quality.

Only Gaius’s tract on guardianship (Inst. 1.142–200) does not fit into this scheme. The Digest, however, devotes two whole books (26 and 27) to this matter. Given the fact that some titles are obviously modelled on Gaius, and that their internal order is logical and not historical (as Bluhme would have it76), it is evident that the whole structure of the Digest was modelled on Gaius for a didactic purpose—a conclusion that is anything but surprising if one considers the didactic purpose of the Digest on the whole.77


Gaius’s institutional scheme can be characterized as essentially philosophical and rhetorical. The method of divisio and partitio, which permits the establishment of different fields of law and the development of a logically consistent scheme, stems from Greek philosophy. The rhetorical doctrine of circumstantiae influenced the arrangement of the different fields of law: personae, res, and actiones exemplify the questions who, what, and by what means.

The didactic division of the Gaian scheme into a level of basics and a level of specifics, drawn from the Hellenistic didactic tradition, was in turn quintessential in adapting this abstract scheme to the needs of students. It also paved the way for its success, culminating in Justinian legislation’s being modelled upon it. As a semiconscious byproduct, it allowed the creation of “family law” (guardianship, adoption, marriage and dowry) as a new and distinct field of jurisprudence. In contrast to modern opinion, the scheme of Justinian’s legislation is quintessentially “classical”: it belongs to antiquity.

Not only the outer structure of the Corpus iuris is indebted to Gaius’s scheme, but also the inner structure of some titles, especially at the beginning. It may be that Justinian’s commission would have modelled the Digest even more on Gaius if it had been given more time.


  • Fuhrmann, Manfred. Das systematische Lehrbuch: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Wissenschaften in der Antike. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1961.
  • Gioffredi, Carlo. “Aspetti della sistematica Gaiana.” In Nuovi Studi di Diritto greco e romano. Edited by Carlo Gioffredi, 241–279. Rome: Pontificia Universitas Lateranensis, 1980).
  • Guzmán Brito, Alejandro. “El carácter dialectico del sistema de las “Institutiones” de Gayo.” In Estudios de derecho romano en homenaje al prof. Dr. D. Francisco Samper. Edited by Patricio Carvajal, 427–457. Santiago, Spain: Librotecnia, 2007.
  • Kaser, Max. “Divisio obligationum.” In Studies in Justinian’s Institutes in Memory of J. A. C. Thomas. Edited by P. G. Stein and A. D. E. Lewis, 73–86. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1983.
  • Kreller, Hans. “Res als Zentralbegriff des Institutionensystem.” in ZSS 66 (1948): 579–599.
  • Lenel, Otto. Das Sabinussystem. Straßburg: Trübner, 1892.
  • Liebs, Detlef. “Juristenausbildung in der Spätantike.” In Juristenausbildung in Europa zwischen Tradition und Reform. Edited by Thomas Finkenauer et al. Tübingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck, 2008.
  • Nörr, Dieter. Divisio und Partitio: Bemerkungen zur römischen Rechtsquellenlehre und zur antiken Wissenschaftstheorie. Berlin: Schweitzer, 1971.
  • Quadrato, Renato. Le Istituzioni nell’insegnamento di Gaio. Naples: Jovene, 1979.
  • Scheltema, H. J. L’enseignement de droit des antécesseurs. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1970.
  • Scherillo, G. “Gaio e il sistema civilistico.” In Gaio nel suo tempo. Edited by Antonio Guarino and Lucio Bove, Naples: Jovene, 1966.
  • Schwarz, Andreas B. “Die Entstehung des modernen Pandektensystem.” Zeitschrift für Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung 42 (1921): 578–610.
  • Stagl, Jakob Fortunat. “Das didaktische System des Gaius.” Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte-Romanistische Abteilung 131 (2014): 313–348.
  • Stein, Peter. “The Development of the Institutional Scheme.” In Studies in Justinian’s Institutes in Memory of J. A. C. Thomas. Edited by P. G. Stein and A. D. E. Lewis, 151–175. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1983.
  • Talamanca, Mario. “Lo schema ‘genus-species’ nelle sistematiche dei giuristi romani.” In Colloquio Italo-Francese “La filosofia greca e il diritto romano” II. Rome: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1977.
  • Thomas, Yan. “Res, chose et patrimoine.” Archives de Philosophie du Droit 25 (1980): 413–426.


  • 1. The scheme of the Twelve Tables. On this see Dieter Flach, Das Zwölftafelgesetz: Leges XII tabularum (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2004); and Rudolf Düll, Das Zwölftafelgesetz: Texte, Übersetzungen und Erläuterungen (Munich: Heimeran, 1944), vol. 7 (Zürich: Artemis & Winkler, 1995) will be left aside here because we have only slight knowledge of it; Max Kaser, Das Römische Privatrecht (2d ed., Munich: Beck, 1971), vol. 1, 187; and Otto Lenel, Das Sabinussystem (Strassburg: Trübner, 1892), 4–7.

  • 2. Andreas B. Schwarz, Die Entstehung des modernen Pandektensystem, Zeitschrift für Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung 42 (1921): 578.

  • 3. On the following see Alejandro Guzmán Brito, “El carácter dialectico del sistema de las ‘Institutiones’ de Gayo,” in Estudios de derecho romano en homenaje al Prof. Dr. D. Francisco Samper, ed. Patricio Carvajal (Santiago, Spain: Librotecnia, 2007), 427–434; and Lenel, Sabinussystem, 10. See also Alejandro Guzmán Brito, Dialéctica, casuística y sistemática en la jurisprudencia romana, in Revista de Estudios Historico-Juristicos 5 (1980): 17 ff.

  • 4. Tomasz Giaro, Der Neue Pauly, vol. 8 (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2000), s.v. “Mucius,” no. 9. Also Franz Wieacker, “Über das Verhältnis der römischen Fachjurisprudenz zur griechisch-hellenistischen Theorie,” IVRA: Rivista internazionale di diritto romano e antico 20 (1962); Franz Wieacker, Griechische Wurzeln des Institutionensystem, Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung 70 (1953): 93 ff.; Okko Behrends, “Die Wissenschaftslehre im Zivilrecht des Q. Mucius Scaevola pontifex,” in Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen I, Philologisch-historische Klasse 7 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1976).

  • 5. Gaius, Ex Quinto Mucio (Pal. nr. 481 s., vol. I, col. 251); Pomponius, Ad Quintum Mucium Libri XXXIX (Pal. Nr. 219–325, vol. II, coll. 59–79)

  • 6. On the value of Pomponius’s treatise for the reconstruction, see Lenel, Sabinussystem, 11 f.

  • 7. Lenel, Sabinussystem, 14 f., comes to a similar conclusion.

  • 8. Cf. D. 41, 2, 3, 23 and D. 46.3.80.

  • 9. Guzmán Brito, “El carácter dialectico,” 428, with further references.

  • 10. Mucius was author of ὀροι‎, or simply Liber singularis (of definitions); Lenel, Palingenesia, 1.762–763, nr. 45–50.

  • 11. Guzmán Brito, “El carácter dialectico,” 431.

  • 12. On the following see Lenel, Sabinussystem; and Fritz Schulz, Geschichte der römischen Rechtswissenschaft (Weimar: Böhlau, 1961), 156–158.

  • 13. Wolfgang Kunkel, Die römischen Juristen (2d ed., Cologne-Weimar-Vienna: 1967), 119 f.

  • 14. For Paulus, Lenel, Palingenesia. I, col. 1251, Nr. 1598–col. 1293, Nr. 1893; for Pomponius, Lenel, Palingenesia juris civilis, II (Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1898), col. 86, Nr. 378–col. 148, Nr. 803; for Ulpian, Lenel, Palingenesia, II, col. 1019, Nr. 2421–col. 1198, Nr. 2992. On the problems of this method, Lenel, Sabinussystem, 16 f.

  • 15. Lenel, Sabinussystem, 4.

  • 16. Theodor Mommsen, “Gaius ein Provinzialjurist,” in his Gesammelte Schriften: Juristische Schriften, vol. 2 (Berlin: Weidmann, 1905), 26.

  • 17. Max Kaser, “La classicità di Gaio,” in Gaio nel suo tempo, ed. A. Guarino and L. Bove (Naples: Jovene, 1966), 43; and Max Kaser, “Gaius und die Klassiker,” Zeitschrift Savigny-Stiftung 70 (1953): 127 ff. See also Matthijs Wibier, Between Orality and Literacy: Communication and Adaptation in Antiquity, ed. Ruth Scodel (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2014), 356–374.

  • 18. Ulpian’s authorship is debated. See Felice Mercogliano, Tituli ex corpore Ulpiani: Storia di un testo (Naples: Jovene, 1997), 101 ff.; and Hein L. W. Nelson, Überlieferung, Aufbau und Stil von Gai Institutiones (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1981), 82, n. 4. On the one hand, Detlef Liebs, “Ulpiani Regulae: Zwei Pseudepigrafa,” in Romanitas–Christianitas: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte und Literatur der römischen Kaiserzeit. Johannes Straub zum 70. Geburtstag am 18. Oktober 1982 gewidmet (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1982), 282–292; Tony Honoré, Ulpian: Pioneer of Human Rights (2d ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002),207 ff; and Schulz, Geschichte der römischen Rechtswissenschaft, 222, n. 29. On the other hand, Martin Avenarius, “Comprehensive Literature on the Question,” in his Der pseudo-ulpianische liber singularis regularum (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2005), 36–60.

  • 19. Cristina Vano, Il nostro autentico Gaio: Strategie della scuola storica alle origini della romanistica modernadi (Naples: Editoriale Scientifica, 2000).

  • 20. Manfred Fuhrmann, Das systematische Lehrbuch: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Wissenschaften in der Antike (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1961).

  • 21. Dieter Nörr, Divisio und Partitio: Bemerkungen zur römischen Rechtsquellenlehre und zur antiken Wissenschaftstheorie (Berlin: Schweitzer, 1971), 20 ff.

  • 22. Mario Talamanca, “Lo schema “genus-species” nelle sistematiche dei giuristi romani,” in Colloquio Italo-Francese “La filosofia greca e il diritto romano” II (Rome: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1977).

  • 23. Mario Lauria, Ius Romanum I (Naples: Arte Tipografica, 1963); Wieacker, “Griechische Wurzeln des Institutionensystem,”, 93 ff., ders. IVRA 16 (1965): 269 ff.; and Johannes Stroux, “Griechische Einflüsse auf die Entwicklung der römischen Rechtswissenschaft gegen Ende der republikanischen Zeit,” in Atti del congresso internazionale di diritto romano, Bologna e Roma XVII–XXVII aprile MCMXXXIII; Roma, 1 (Pavia: 1934), 111–132.

  • 24. Franz Wieacker, Römische Rechtsgeschichte II (Munich: Beck, 1988), 113 f.

  • 25. Guzmán Brito, “El carácter dialectico,” 441 ff.

  • 26. Matthijs Wibier, “Transmitting Legal Knowledge: From Question-and-Answer Format to Handbook in Gaius’ Institutes,” in Between Orality and Literacy: Communication and Adaptation in Antiquity, ed. Ruth Scodel (Leiden, The Netherlands, and Boston: Brill, 2014), 356–374.

  • 27. On Gaius in general, see Tony Honoré, Gaius (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962); Kaser, “La classicità di Gaio,” 43; and Mommsen, “Gaius ein Provinzialjurist,” 26.

  • 28. The origin of the tripartition is disputed. See Wieacker, Römische Rechtsgeschichte II, 114: “Inspiration durch Schlüsselbegriffe.”

  • 29. Jakob Fortunat Stagl, “Da ‘qualcosa’ a ‘qualcuno,’ da ‘qualcuno’ a ‘qualcosa’: Percorsi esatti ed errati del concetto di persona,” Fontes Iuris: Atti del VI Jahrestreffen Junger Romanistinnen und Romanisten (Lecce, 30–31 marzo 2012), ed. Pierangelo Buongiorno and Sebastian Lohsse (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2013), 87–122.

  • 30. Hans Kreller, “Res als Zentralbegriff des Institutionensystem,” Zeitschrift Savigny-Stiftung 66 (1948): 579; and Yan Thomas, “Res, chose et patrimoine, Archives de Philosophie du Droit 25 (1980): 413–426.

  • 31. Giuseppe Falcone, Appunti sul IV commentario delle Istituzione di Gaio (Turin: G. Giappichelli, 2003), 169 f.; and Luigi Pellecchi, La praescriptio: Processo, diritto sostanziale, modelli espositivi (Padua: CEDAM, 2003).

  • 32. Peter Stein, “The Development of the Institutional Scheme,” in Studies in Justinian’s Institutes in Memory of J. A. C. Thomas, ed. P. G. Stein and A. D. E. Lewis (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1983), 151 et seq.; Max Kaser, “Divisio obligationum,” in Studies in Justinian’s Institutes in Memory of J. A. C. Thomas, ed. P. G. Stein and A. D. E. Lewis (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1983), 73 et seq.; G. Scherillo, “Gaio e il sistema civilistico,” in Gaio nel suo tempo, ed. A. Guarino and L. Bove (Naples: Jovene, 1966); Carlo Gioffredi, “Aspetti della sistematica Gaiana,” in his Nuovi Studi di Diritto greco e romano (Rome: Pontificia Universitas Lateranensis, 1980), 241.

  • 33. Otto Lenel, “Das Sabinussystem,” in Gesammelte Schriften, ed. O. Behrends and F. D’Ippolito, vol. 2 (Naples: Jovene, 1990), 19 ff., 63 ff.; and Riccardo Astolfi, I libri tres iuris civilis di Sabino (2d ed., Milan: CEDAM, 2001).

  • 34. Hein L. W. Nelson, Überlieferung, Aufbau und Stil von Gai Institutiones (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1981).

  • 35. Jakob Fortunat Stagl, “Das didaktische System des Gaius,” Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung 131 (2014): 313–348. See also Renato Quadrato, Le Istituzioni nell’insegnamento di Gaio (Naples: Jovene, 1979); H. J. Scheltema, L’enseignement de droit des antécesseurs (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1970); and Detlef Liebs, “Juristenausbildung in der Spätantike,” in Juristenausbildung in Europa zwischen Tradition und Reform, ed. Thomas Finkenauer et al. (Tübingen, Germany: Narr, 2008).

  • 36. Fuhrmann, Das systematische Lehrbuch; and Manfred Fuhrmann, “Die zivilrechtlichen Beispiele in Ciceros Topik,” in Topik und Rhetorik, edited by Thomas Schirren and Gert Ueding (Tübingen, Germany: Narr, 2000), 51 ff.

  • 37. Karl-Heinz Schindler, Justinians Haltung zur Klassik: Versuch einer Darstellung an Hand seiner Kontroversen entscheidenden Konstitutionen (Vienna: Böhlau, 1966).

  • 38. Stagl, Das didaktische System des Gaius, 332 f.

  • 39. Stagl, Das didaktische System des Gaius, 315 f.

  • 40. Lenel, Palingenesia, Gaius, n. 481; and Schulz, Geschichte der römischen Rechtswissenschaft, 253.

  • 41. Hein L. W. Nelson and Ulrich Manthe, Gai Institutiones III (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1992), p. 81.

  • 42. Gaius and Ph. Eduard Huschke, ed., Gai Institutionum commentarii quattuor: separatim ex iurisprudentiae anteiustinianae reliquiis a Ph. Eduardo Huschke compositis 6. Edited by Emil Seckel and Bernhard Kübler (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903), ad huius legis.

  • 43. Konrad Vössing, in Neue Pauly s.v. “Bibliothek/Bibliothekswesen,” 643 f.; cf. Liebs, Rechtsschulen, 237 f., notes.

  • 44. Stagl, Das didaktische System des Gaius, 335.

  • 45. Leopold Wenger, Die Quellen des römischen Rechts (Vienna: Holzhausen, 1953), 550 f.

  • 46. Schol. Sin. 14, 36.

  • 47. Mommsen, “Gaius ein Provinzialjurist,” 26, 36, and n. 25.

  • 48. Jakob Fortunat Stagl, Favor dotis: Die Privilegierung der Mitgift im System des römischen Rechts (Vienna: Böhlau, 2009), 317–336.

  • 49. If it is correct to infer from the Digest, de rebus is basically obligations and delicts.

  • 50. Max Kaser, “Gli inizî della cognitio extra ordinem,” in Antologia Giuridica Romanistica ed Antiquaria (Milan: Giuffrè, 1968), 169–197.

  • 51. Nörr, Divisio und Partitio, 57 f.

  • 52. Nörr, Divisio und Partitio, 25, 33.

  • 53. Nörr, Divisio und Partitio, 20 ff.

  • 54. On this see Guzmán Brito, “El carácter dialectico,” 439 f.

  • 55. On this see Nelson, Überlieferung, Aufbau und Stil von Gai Institutiones, 242 ff.

  • 56. Guzmán Brito, “El carácter dialectico,” 453.

  • 57. Diog. Laert. VII, 61–62 (= Von Armin, SVF. III, Diog. Nº 25). See Talamanca, “Lo schema ‘genus-species’ nelle sistematiche dei giuristi romani,” 57–63.

  • 58. Honoré, Gaius, xii.

  • 59. Friedrich Bluhme, “Die Ordnung der Fragmente in den Pandectentiteln: Ein Beitrag zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Pandecten,” Zeitschrift für geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft 4 (1820): 257, 263 f., 358 f.

  • 60. Paul Krüger, Geschichte der Quellen und Litteratur des römischen Rechts (2d ed., Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1912), 377; there follows Vincenzo Arangio-Ruiz, “Precedenti scolastici del Digesto,” in Conferenze per il XIV centenario delle Pandette (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1931) = Scritti di diritto Romano (Naples: Jovene, 1974), 2, 315, 321; P. Jörs, Paulys Realencyclopädie, s.v. “Digesta,” (Stuttgart, 1905), Sp. 49; and Wenger, Die Quellen des römischen Rechts, 582.

  • 61. Otto Lenel, Das Edictum perpetuum (3d ed., Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1927), 7.

  • 62. André Soubie, Recherches sur les origines rubriques du Digeste (Tarbes: Imprimerie Sainte-Joseph, 1960), 33 ff.

  • 63. See also Const. Tanta/Dedoken § 14.

  • 64. On the relationship of edictum praetoris and provinciale, see Lenel, Das Edictum perpetuum, 1–6.

  • 65. Ad edictum provinciale Nr. 53–388, coll. 189–237.

  • 66. Ad edictum Libri LXXX Nr. 83–849, coll. 966–1098.

  • 67. Ad edictum libri LXXXIII II Nr. 170–1797, coll. 421–898.

  • 68. Digestorum libri XC Pal. I Nr. 4–843, coll. 318–484.

  • 69. Const. Omnem § 4; and Const. Tanta/Dedooken § 5.

  • 70. Kaser, Das Römische Privatrecht, 188.

  • 71. On this see in general Jason König and Tim Whitmarsh, “Ordering Knowledge,” in Ordering Knowledge in the Roman Empire, ed. Jason König and Tim Whitmarsh (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 1–56; and with special regard to the law and the Digest, Jill Harries, “Encyclopaedias and autocracy: Justinian’s Enclopaedia of Roman law,” in Encyclopaedism from Antiquity to the Renaissance, ed. Jason König and Greg Woolf (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 178–196.

  • 72. Dario Mantovani, “Costantinopoli non è Bologna: La nascita del Digesto fra storiografia e storia,” in Interpretare il Digesto: Storia e metodi, ed. Dario Mantovani and Antonio Padoa Schioppa (Pavia: IUSS Press, 2014), 105–134.

  • 73. Only insofar as Gaius’s excerpts of his Libri ad edictum for teaching the specifics were substituted by the writings of other famous jurists—and above all the Libri ad edictum of Paulus and Ulpian—it is true to say that that the compilation and especially the Digest were modelled upon the Edict.

  • 74. Bluhme, Die Ordnung der Fragmente in den Pandectentiteln, 267 f.

  • 75. Guzmán Brito, “El carácter dialectico,” 434; and Nörr, Divisio und Partitio, 54 f. argues in the direction of a more general dissemination of divisio and partito.

  • 76. Bluhme, Die Ordnung der Fragmente in den Pandectentiteln, 361.

  • 77. Bluhme, Die Ordnung der Fragmente in den Pandectentiteln, 360.