High-Dimensional Dynamic Factor Models have their origin in macroeconomics, precisely in empirical research on Business Cycles. The central idea, going back to the work of Burns and Mitchell in the years 1940, is that the fluctuations of all the macro and sectoral variables in the economy are driven by a “reference cycle,” that is, a one-dimensional latent cause of variation. After a fairly long process of generalization and formalization, the literature settled at the beginning of the year 2000 on a model in which (1) both the number of variables in the dataset and , the number of observations for each variable, may be large, and (2) all the variables in the dataset depend dynamically on a fixed independent of , a number of “common factors,” plus variable-specific, usually called “idiosyncratic,” components. The structure of the model can be exemplified as follows:
where the observable variables are driven by the white noise , which is common to all the variables, the common factor, and by the idiosyncratic component . The common factor is orthogonal to the idiosyncratic components , the idiosyncratic components are mutually orthogonal (or weakly correlated). Lastly, the variations of the common factor affect the variable dynamically, that is through the lag polynomial . Asymptotic results for High-Dimensional Factor Models, particularly consistency of estimators of the common factors, are obtained for both and tending to infinity.
Model , generalized to allow for more than one common factor and a rich dynamic loading of the factors, has been studied in a fairly vast literature, with many applications based on macroeconomic datasets: (a) forecasting of inflation, industrial production, and unemployment; (b) structural macroeconomic analysis; and (c) construction of indicators of the Business Cycle. This literature can be broadly classified as belonging to the time- or the frequency-domain approach. The works based on the second are the subject of the present chapter.
We start with a brief description of early work on Dynamic Factor Models. Formal definitions and the main Representation Theorem follow. The latter determines the number of common factors in the model by means of the spectral density matrix of the vector . Dynamic principal components, based on the spectral density of the ’s, are then used to construct estimators of the common factors.
These results, obtained in early 2000, are compared to the literature based on the time-domain approach, in which the covariance matrix of the ’s and its (static) principal components are used instead of the spectral density and dynamic principal components. Dynamic principal components produce two-sided estimators, which are good within the sample but unfit for forecasting. The estimators based on the time-domain approach are simple and one-sided. However, they require the restriction of finite dimension for the space spanned by the factors.
Recent papers have constructed one-sided estimators based on the frequency-domain method for the unrestricted model. These results exploit results on stochastic processes of dimension that are driven by a -dimensional white noise, with , that is, singular vector stochastic processes. The main features of this literature are described with some detail.
Lastly, we report and comment the results of an empirical paper, the last in a long list, comparing predictions obtained with time- and frequency-domain methods. The paper uses a large monthly U.S. dataset including the Great Moderation and the Great Recession.
Jacob K. Goeree, Philippos Louis, and Jingjing Zhang
Majority voting is the predominant mechanism for collective decision making. It is used in a broad range of applications, spanning from national referenda to small group decision making. It is simple, transparent, and induces voters to vote sincerely. However, it is increasingly recognized that it has some weaknesses. First of all, majority voting may lead to inefficient outcomes. This happens because it does not allow voters to express the intensity of their preferences. As a result, an indifferent majority may win over an intense minority. In addition, majority voting suffers from the “tyranny of the majority,” i.e., the risk of repeatedly excluding minority groups from representation. A final drawback is the “winner-take-all” nature of majority voting, i.e., it offers no compensation for losing voters. Economists have recently proposed various alternative mechanisms that aim to produce more efficient and more equitable outcomes. These can be classified into three different approaches. With storable votes, voters allocate a budget of votes across several issues. Under vote trading, voters can exchange votes for money. Under linear voting or quadratic voting, voters can buy votes at a linear or quadratic cost respectively. The properties of different alternative mechanisms can be characterized using theoretical modeling and game theoretic analysis. Lab experiments are used to test theoretical predictions and evaluate their fitness for actual use in applications. Overall, these alternative mechanisms hold the promise to improve on majority voting but have their own shortcomings. Additional theoretical analysis and empirical testing is needed to produce a mechanism that robustly delivers efficient and equitable outcomes.
Economists have long regarded healthcare as a unique and challenging area of economic activity on account of the specialized knowledge of healthcare professionals (HCPs) and the relatively weak market mechanisms that operate. This places a consideration of how motivation and incentives might influence performance at the center of research. As in other domains economists have tended to focus on financial mechanisms and when considering HCPs have therefore examined how existing payment systems and potential alternatives might impact on behavior. There has long been a concern that simple arrangements such as fee-for-service, capitation, and salary payments might induce poor performance, and that has led to extensive investigation, both theoretical and empirical, on the linkage between payment and performance. An extensive and rapidly expanded field in economics, contract theory and mechanism design, had been applied to study these issues. The theory has highlighted both the potential benefits and the risks of incentive schemes to deal with the information asymmetries that abound in healthcare. There has been some expansion of such schemes in practice but these are often limited in application and the evidence for their effectiveness is mixed. Understanding why there is this relatively large gap between concept and application gives a guide to where future research can most productively be focused.
James Lake and Pravin Krishna
In recent decades, there has been a dramatic proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) between countries that, while legal, contradict the non-discrimination principle of the world trade system. This raises various issues, both theoretical and empirical, regarding the evolution of trade policy within the world trade system and the welfare implications for PTA members and non-members. The survey starts with the Kemp-Wan-Ohyama and Panagariya-Krishna analyses in the literature that theoretically show PTAs can always be constructed so that they (weakly) increase the welfare of members and non-members. Considerable attention is then devoted to recent developments on the interaction between PTAs and multilateral trade liberalization, focusing on two key incentives: an “exclusion incentive” of PTA members and a “free riding incentive” of PTA non-members. While the baseline presumption one should have in mind is that these incentives lead PTAs to inhibit the ultimate degree of global trade liberalization, this presumption can be overturned when dynamic considerations are taken into account or when countries can negotiate the degree of multilateral liberalization rather than facing a binary choice over global free trade. Promising areas for pushing this theoretical literature forward include the growing use of quantitative trade models, incorporating rules of origin and global value chains, modeling the issues surrounding “mega-regional” agreements, and modelling the possibility of exit from PTAs. Empirical evidence in the literature is mixed regarding whether PTAs lead to trade diversion or trade creation, whether PTAs have significant adverse effects on non-member terms-of-trade, whether PTAs lead members to lower external tariffs on non-members, and the role of PTAs in facilitating deep integration among members.