Due to the similarities with the COVID–19 pandemic, there has been a renewed interest in the 1918–1919 influenza pandemic, which represents the most severe pandemic of the 20th century with an estimated total death toll ranging between 30 and 100 million. This rapidly growing literature in economics and economic history has devoted attention to contextual determinants of excess mortality in the pandemic; to the impact of the pandemic on economic growth, inequality, and a range of other outcomes; and to the impact of nonpharmaceutical interventions.
Estimating the effects of the pandemic, or the effects of countermeasures, is challenging. There may not be much exogenous variation to go by, and the historical data sets available are typically small and often of questionable quality. Yet the 1918–1919 pandemic offers a unique opportunity to learn how large pandemics play out in the long run.
The studies evaluating effects of the pandemic, or of policies enacted to combat it, typically rely on some version of difference-in-differences, or instrumental variables. The assumptions required for these designs to achieve identification of causal effects have rarely been systematically evaluated in this particular historical context. Using a purpose-built dataset covering the entire Swedish population, such an assessment is provided here. The empirical analysis indicates that the identifying assumptions used in previous work may indeed be satisfied. However, the results cast some doubt on the general external validity of previous findings as the analysis fails to replicate several results in the Swedish context. These disagreements highlight the need for additional studies in other populations and contexts which puts the spotlight on further digitization and linkage of historical datasets.
Article
The 1918–1919 Influenza Pandemic in Economic History
Martin Karlsson, Daniel Kühnle, and Nikolaos Prodromidis
Article
The Economic and Political Effects of Immigration: Evidence from the Age of Mass Migration
Marco Tabellini
Between 1850 and 1920, during the Age of Mass Migration, more than 30 million Europeans moved to the United States. European immigrants provided an ample supply of cheap labor as well as specific skills and know-how, contributing to American economic growth. These positive effects were not short-lived, but are still evident in the 21st century: areas of the United States that received more European immigrants during the Age of Mass Migration have higher income per capita, a more educated population, and lower poverty rates. Despite its economic benefits, immigration triggered hostile political reactions, which were driven by cultural differences between immigrants and natives, and culminated in the introduction of country-specific quotas. In contrast to the concerns prevailing at the time, European immigrants eventually assimilated. The process was facilitated by the inflow of 1.5 million African Americans who left the rural South to move to northern and western cities between 1915 and 1930. Black in-migration increased the salience of skin color, as opposed to that of religion and nativity, as a defining feature of in- and out-groups of the society. This reduced the perceived distance between native whites and European immigrants, thereby facilitating the integration of the latter. European immigrants also had long-lasting effects on American ideology. Parts of the country that hosted more immigrants during the Age of Mass Migration have a more liberal ideology and stronger preferences for redistribution well into the 21st century. This resulted from the transmission of political ideology from (more left-leaning) immigrants to natives.
Article
The Economic History of Denmark, 1784–2019
Niels Kærgård
A change of government in 1784 started a number of reforms that became the foundation of modern Denmark. Right up until the Second World War, agriculture was the predominant sector in the Danish economy, and changes in this sector therefore determined the development in the Danish economy. These changes include the transformation from common villages to privately owned farms, starting in the 1780s; the change from cereal to animal production in the 1880s; and the movement toward a growing number of small farms from 1919 until the trend was reversed after 1960. The economic importance of the agricultural sector has declined over time, currently contributing only 3% of the gross domestic product (GDP), as economic history since 1945 has been dominated by the creation of an urban welfare state with a big public sector. As a small open economy, Denmark’s international relations have hugely impacted the overall economic development.
Article
The Historical Evolution of Canadian Living Standards
Vincent Geloso
Canada is one of the richest countries in the world. It stands above most countries in the Americas. It is also noticeably poorer than its closest neighbor, the United States, despite considerable geographic similarity. These two facts have been true since as early as the 17th century. Why? An understanding of the historical path of Canada’s economic growth can be acquired by focusing on three important gaps in living standards within Canada: First Nations versus the rest of Canada, French Canadians versus English Canadians, and Atlantic Canada versus the rest of Canada. These three gaps allow an understanding of the crucial role of institutions in determining why Canada is rich on a global perspective and why it is poorer than the United States. However, explanations as to why Canada grew faster than Latin America are more speculative.
Article
The Italian Economy Before Unification, 1300–1861
Paolo Malanima
Italy played a central role in the Euro-Mediterranean economy during Antiquity, the late Middle Ages, and the Renaissance. Until the end of the 16th century, the Italian economy was relatively advanced compared with those of the Western European and Mediterranean countries. From the 17th century until the end of the 19th, GDP rose as the population increased. Yet per capita income slowly diminished together with real wages, urbanization, and living standards. Italy lost its central position in the Euro-Mediterranean world and, until the end of the 19th century, was a relatively backward area on the periphery of the most dynamic countries in the north and center of Europe. The Italian premodern economy represents a classic example of extensive growth or GDP growth without improvement in per capita income and living standards.
Article
The Ottoman Empire: Institutions and Economic Change, 1500–1914
Şevket Pamuk
The Ottoman Empire stood at the crossroads of intercontinental trade for six centuries until World War I. For most of its existence, the economic institutions and policies of this agrarian empire were shaped according to the distribution of political power, cooperation, conflicts, and struggles between the state elites and the various other elites, including those in the provinces. The central bureaucracy managed to contain the many challenges it faced with its pragmatism and habit of negotiation to co-opt and incorporate into the state the social groups that rebelled against it. As long as the activities of the economic elites, landowners, merchants, the leading artisans, and the moneylenders contributed to the perpetuation of this social order, the state encouraged and supported them but did not welcome their rapid enrichment. The influence of these elites over economic matters, and more generally over the policies of the central government, remained limited. Cooperation and coordination among the provincial elites was also made more difficult by the fact that the empire covered a large geographical area, and the different ethnic groups and their elites did not always act together.
Differences in government policies and the institutional environment between Western Europe and the Middle East remained limited until the early modern era. With the rise of the Atlantic trade, however, the merchants in northwestern European countries increased their economic and political power substantially. They were then able to induce their governments to defend and develop their commercial interests in the Middle East more forcefully. As they began to lag behind the European merchants even in their own region, it became even more difficult for the Ottoman merchants to provide input into their government’s trade policies or change the commercial or economic institutions in the direction they preferred.
Key economic institutions of the traditional Ottoman order, such as state ownership of land, urban guilds, and selective interventionism, remained mostly intact until 1820. In the early part of the 19th century, the center, supported by the new technologies, embarked on an ambitious reform program and was able to reassert its power over the provinces. Centralization and reforms were accompanied by the opening of the economy to international trade and investment. Economic policies and institutional changes in the Ottoman Empire began to reflect the growing power of European states and companies during the 19th century.
