1-12 of 12 Results

  • Keywords: financing x
Clear all

Article

Henrik Cronqvist and Désirée-Jessica Pély

Corporate finance is about understanding the determinants and consequences of the investment and financing policies of corporations. In a standard neoclassical profit maximization framework, rational agents, that is, managers, make corporate finance decisions on behalf of rational principals, that is, shareholders. Over the past two decades, there has been a rapidly growing interest in augmenting standard finance frameworks with novel insights from cognitive psychology, and more recently, social psychology and sociology. This emerging subfield in finance research has been dubbed behavioral corporate finance, which differentiates between rational and behavioral agents and principals. The presence of behavioral shareholders, that is, principals, may lead to market timing and catering behavior by rational managers. Such managers will opportunistically time the market and exploit mispricing by investing capital, issuing securities, or borrowing debt when costs of capital are low and shunning equity, divesting assets, repurchasing securities, and paying back debt when costs of capital are high. Rational managers will also incite mispricing, for example, cater to non-standard preferences of shareholders through earnings management or by transitioning their firms into an in-fashion category to boost the stock’s price. The interaction of behavioral managers, that is, agents, with rational shareholders can also lead to distortions in corporate decision making. For example, managers may perceive fundamental values differently and systematically diverge from optimal decisions. Several personal traits, for example, overconfidence or narcissism, and environmental factors, for example, fatal natural disasters, shape behavioral managers’ preferences and beliefs, short or long term. These factors may bias the value perception by managers and thus lead to inferior decision making. An extension of behavioral corporate finance is social corporate finance, where agents and principals do not make decisions in a vacuum but rather are embedded in a dynamic social environment. Since managers and shareholders take a social position within and across markets, social psychology and sociology can be useful to understand how social traits, states, and activities shape corporate decision making if an individual’s psychology is not directly observable.

Article

Marius Guenzel and Ulrike Malmendier

One of the fastest-growing areas of finance research is the study of managerial biases and their implications for firm outcomes. Since the mid-2000s, this strand of behavioral corporate finance has provided theoretical and empirical evidence on the influence of biases in the corporate realm, such as overconfidence, experience effects, and the sunk-cost fallacy. The field has been a leading force in dismantling the argument that traditional economic mechanisms—selection, learning, and market discipline—would suffice to uphold the rational-manager paradigm. Instead, the evidence reveals that behavioral forces exert a significant influence at every stage of a chief executive officer’s (CEO’s) career. First, at the appointment stage, selection does not impede the promotion of behavioral managers. Instead, competitive environments oftentimes promote their advancement, even under value-maximizing selection mechanisms. Second, while at the helm of the company, learning opportunities are limited, since many managerial decisions occur at low frequency, and their causal effects are clouded by self-attribution bias and difficult to disentangle from those of concurrent events. Third, at the dismissal stage, market discipline does not ensure the firing of biased decision-makers as board members themselves are subject to biases in their evaluation of CEOs. By documenting how biases affect even the most educated and influential decision-makers, such as CEOs, the field has generated important insights into the hard-wiring of biases. Biases do not simply stem from a lack of education, nor are they restricted to low-ability agents. Instead, biases are significant elements of human decision-making at the highest levels of organizations. An important question for future research is how to limit, in each CEO career phase, the adverse effects of managerial biases. Potential approaches include refining selection mechanisms, designing and implementing corporate repairs, and reshaping corporate governance to account not only for incentive misalignments, but also for biased decision-making.

Article

Bruce Chapman and Lorraine Dearden

The rapid worldwide growth in higher education undergraduate enrollments since around 1990 has meant that governments have had to rethink provision and funding arrangements to help ensure both cost-effective and equitable outcomes. It is important to understand in detail the fundamental financial conceptual building blocks that are necessary for an efficacious and socially just higher education financing system. In response to the critical question of who should pay for higher education and student income support, the case for the sharing of the costs between students, graduates, and taxpayers is overwhelming from the perspectives of both efficiency and equity. Further, there is a consensus that governments should intervene with respect to the underwriting of student loans, but there are very important and quite different implications for borrowers with respect to loan collection arrangements. The most equitable and effective higher education financing instrument involves loans that are repaid only when and if debtors can afford to do so, known as income-contingent loans. The less desirable form of student loans, defined by time-based collection, is internationally still the most common approach, but recent advances in economic theory and econometric methodology provide both conceptual bases and exciting and innovative ways for governments to understand why traditional student loan approaches are inferior to income-contingent collection. When the effects of student loans on access and welfare become more properly understood, the case for targeted assistance for all disadvantaged prospective students for reasons of social justice remains compelling. The importance of the attainment of the right financing system was highlighted by the economic trauma associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, an ordeal that caused many universities to experience an entirely unexpected financial crisis and led millions of students to struggle with unanticipated loan repayment difficulties.

Article

Sumit Agarwal, Jian Zhang, and Xin Zou

Households are one of the key participants in the economy. Households provide land, labor, and capital to the external economy, in exchange for incomes including rents, wages, interests, and profits; the incomes are then utilized to buy goods and services from the external economy again, rendering an income flow circular. This suggests that households make complicated decisions in almost all areas of economics and finance, which constitute the scope of household finance studies. Specifically, household finance encompasses the following three topics: (a) how households make financial decisions regarding saving, consumption, investment, housing, and borrowing; (b) how organizations provide goods and services to satisfy these financial functions; and (c) how external interventions (from firms, governments, or other parties) such as financial technology (FinTech) affect these financial activities. Despite the important stake in the financial system, it was not until recent decades that household finance became a prosperous research field. For many years, financial studies mostly focused on financial markets, nonfinancial corporations, and financial institutions and intermediaries, with households being delivered as a simplified representative agent. Classical economic models do consider households in the economic system, but mainly focus on their functions in the income flow circular (i.e., the saving or demand for products). Recently, the household finance field received more attention and has produced a large strand of theoretical and empirical studies due to the incremental participation of households in financial markets, the observed consequences of events such as financial crises, the availability of more detailed high-quality granular data, and the regulations and interventions induced by technology innovation.

Article

Charles Ka Yui Leung and Cho Yiu Joe Ng

This article summarizes research on the macroeconomic aspects of the housing market. In terms of the macroeconomic stylized facts, this article demonstrates that with respect to business cycle frequency, there was a general decrease in the association between macroeconomic variables (MV), such as the real GDP and inflation rate, and housing market variables (HMV), such as the housing price and the vacancy rate, following the global financial crisis (GFC). However, there are macro-finance variables, such as different interest rate spreads, that exhibited a strong association with the HMV following the GFC. For the medium-term business cycle frequency, some but not all patterns prevail. These “new stylized facts” suggest that a reconsideration and refinement of existing “macro-housing” theories would be appropriate. This article also provides a review of the corresponding academic literature, which may enhance our understanding of the evolving macro-housing–finance linkage.

Article

The Ottoman Empire stood at the crossroads of intercontinental trade for six centuries until World War I. For most of its existence, the economic institutions and policies of this agrarian empire were shaped according to the distribution of political power, cooperation, conflicts, and struggles between the state elites and the various other elites, including those in the provinces. The central bureaucracy managed to contain the many challenges it faced with its pragmatism and habit of negotiation to co-opt and incorporate into the state the social groups that rebelled against it. As long as the activities of the economic elites, landowners, merchants, the leading artisans, and the moneylenders contributed to the perpetuation of this social order, the state encouraged and supported them but did not welcome their rapid enrichment. The influence of these elites over economic matters, and more generally over the policies of the central government, remained limited. Cooperation and coordination among the provincial elites was also made more difficult by the fact that the empire covered a large geographical area, and the different ethnic groups and their elites did not always act together. Differences in government policies and the institutional environment between Western Europe and the Middle East remained limited until the early modern era. With the rise of the Atlantic trade, however, the merchants in northwestern European countries increased their economic and political power substantially. They were then able to induce their governments to defend and develop their commercial interests in the Middle East more forcefully. As they began to lag behind the European merchants even in their own region, it became even more difficult for the Ottoman merchants to provide input into their government’s trade policies or change the commercial or economic institutions in the direction they preferred. Key economic institutions of the traditional Ottoman order, such as state ownership of land, urban guilds, and selective interventionism, remained mostly intact until 1820. In the early part of the 19th century, the center, supported by the new technologies, embarked on an ambitious reform program and was able to reassert its power over the provinces. Centralization and reforms were accompanied by the opening of the economy to international trade and investment. Economic policies and institutional changes in the Ottoman Empire began to reflect the growing power of European states and companies during the 19th century.

Article

Murray Z. Frank, Vidhan Goyal, and Tao Shen

The pecking order theory of corporate capital structure developed by states that issuing securities is subject to an adverse selection problem. Managers endowed with private information have incentives to issue overpriced risky securities. But they also understand that issuing such securities will result in a negative price reaction because rational investors, who are at an information disadvantage, will discount the prices of any risky securities the firm issues. Consequently, firms follow a pecking order: use internal resources when possible; if internal funds are inadequate, obtain external debt; external equity is the last resort. Large firms rely significantly on internal finance to meet their needs. External net debt issues finance the minor deficits that remain. Equity is not a significant source of financing for large firms. By contrast, small firms lack sufficient internal resources and obtain external finance. Although much of it is equity, there are substantial issues of debt by small firms. Firms are sorted into three portfolios based on whether they have a surplus or a deficit. About 15% of firm-year observations are in the surplus group. Firms primarily use surpluses to pay down debt. About 56% of firm-year observations are in the balance group. These firms generate internal cash flows that are just about enough to meet their investment and dividend needs. They issue debt, which is just enough to meet their debt repayments. They are relatively inactive in equity markets. About 29% of firm-year observations are in the deficit group. Deficits arise because of a combination of negative profitability and significant investments in both real and financial assets. Some financing patterns in the data are consistent with a pecking order: firms with moderate deficits favor debt issues; firms with very high deficits rely much more on equity than debt. Others are not: many equity-issuing firms do not seem to have entirely used up the debt capacity; some with a surplus issue equity. The theory suggests a sharp discontinuity in financing methods between surplus firms and deficit firms, and another at debt capacity. The literature provides little support for the predicted threshold effects. The theoretical work has shown that adverse selection does not necessarily lead to pecking order behavior. The pecking order is obtained only under special conditions. With both risky debt and equity being issued, there is often scope for many equilibria, and there is no clear basis for selecting among them. A pecking order may or may not emerge from the theory. Several articles show that the adverse selection problem can be solved by certain financing strategies or properly designed managerial contracts and can even disappear in dynamic models. Although adverse selection can generate a pecking order, it can also be caused by agency considerations, transaction costs, tax consideration, or behavioral decision-making considerations. Under standard tests in the literature, these alternative underlying motivations are commonly observationally equivalent.

Article

The Hou–Xue–Zhang q-factor model says that the expected return of an asset in excess of the risk-free rate is described by its sensitivities to the market factor, a size factor, an investment factor, and a return on equity (ROE) factor. Empirically, the q-factor model shows strong explanatory power and largely summarizes the cross-section of average stock returns. Most important, it fully subsumes the Fama–French 6-factor model in head-to-head spanning tests. The q-factor model is an empirical implementation of the investment-based capital asset pricing model (the Investment CAPM). The basic philosophy is to price risky assets from the perspective of their suppliers (firms), as opposed to their buyers (investors). Mathematically, the investment CAPM is a restatement of the net present value (NPV) rule in corporate finance. Intuitively, high investment relative to low expected profitability must imply low costs of capital, and low investment relative to high expected profitability must imply high costs of capital. In a multiperiod framework, if investment is high next period, the present value of cash flows from next period onward must be high. Consisting mostly of this next period present value, the benefits to investment this period must also be high. As such, high investment next period relative to current investment (high expected investment growth) must imply high costs of capital (to keep current investment low). As a disruptive innovation, the investment CAPM has broad-ranging implications for academic finance and asset management practice. First, the consumption CAPM, of which the classic Sharpe–Lintner CAPM is a special case, is conceptually incomplete. The crux is that it blindly focuses on the demand of risky assets, while abstracting from the supply altogether. Alas, anomalies are primarily relations between firm characteristics and expected returns. By focusing on the supply, the investment CAPM is the missing piece of equilibrium asset pricing. Second, the investment CAPM retains efficient markets, with cross-sectionally varying expected returns, depending on firms’ investment, profitability, and expected growth. As such, capital markets follow standard economic principles, in sharp contrast to the teachings of behavioral finance. Finally, the investment CAPM validates Graham and Dodd’s security analysis on equilibrium grounds, within efficient markets.

Article

Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries have experienced a long-term process of improvement in populational health conditions, shifting their health priorities from child–mother care and transmissible diseases to non-communicable diseases (NCDs). However, persistent socioeconomic inequalities create barriers to achieve universal health coverage (UHC). Despite a high level of governmental commitment to UHC, and rising coverage, approximately 25% of the population does not have access to healthcare, particularly in rural and outlying areas. Health system quality issues have been largely ignored, and inefficiency, from health financing to health delivery, is not on the policy agenda. The use of incentives to improve performance are rare in LAC health systems and there are political barriers to introduce reforms in payment systems in the public sector, though the private sector has opportunity to adapt change. Fragmentation in the financing of healthcare is a common theme in the region. Most systems retain social health insurance (SHI) schemes, mostly for the formal sector, and in some cases have more than one; and parallel National Health System (NHS)-type arrangements for the poor and those in the informal labor market. The cost and inefficiency in delivery and financing is considerable. Regional health economics literature stresses inadequate funding—despite the fact that the region has the highest inequality in access and spends the most on healthcare across the regions—and analyzes multiple aspects of health equity. The agenda needs to move from these debates to designing and leveraging delivery and payment systems that target performance and efficiency. The absence of research on payment arrangements and performance is a symptom of a health management culture based on processes rather than results. Indeed, health services in the region remain rooted in a culture of fee-for-service and supply-driven models, where expenditures are independent of outcomes. Health policy reforms in LAC need to address efficiency rather than equity, integrate healthcare delivery, and tackle provider payment reforms. The integration of medical records, adherence to protocols and clinical pathways, establishment of health networks built around primary healthcare, along with harmonized incentives and payment systems, offer a direction for reforms that allow adapting to existing circumstances and institutions. This offers the best path for sustainable UHC in the region.

Article

Facundo Abraham, Juan J. Cortina, and Sergio L. Schmukler

There has been substantial debate about the expansion of global non-financial corporate debt after the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008–2009. But the main facts and policy challenges discussed in the literature are yet to be uncovered and summarized. Understanding the trends and issues can help readers gauge how large the growth of this type of financing has been, as well as the risks that more non-financial corporate debt might entail. Non-financial corporate debt steadily increased after the GFC, especially in emerging economies. Between 2008 and 2018, corporate debt rose from 56 to 96% of gross domestic product (GDP) in emerging economies whereas it grew at the same rate as GDP in developed economies. Non-financial corporate debt after the crisis was mainly issued through bond markets, and its growth can be largely attributed to accommodative monetary policies in developed economies. Although the growth in debt financing has some positive aspects for emerging market firms in terms of expanding financing and diversifying financing sources, it also amplified solvency risks and firms’ exposure to changes in market conditions. Slower global economic growth worldwide as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic could impose significant costs to emerging market firms that increased reliance on debt financing. Policy makers in emerging economies face challenges to mitigate overall risks and to contain corporate vulnerability in the non-financial sector. Because capital markets have an important role in the expansion of financial activity and are not as regulated as banks, policy makers have limited tools to alleviate the risks of growing non-financial corporate debt.

Article

International transactions are riskier than domestic transactions for several reasons, including, but not limited to, geographical distance, longer shipping times, greater informational frictions, contract enforcement, and dispute resolution problems. Such risks stem, fundamentally, from a timing mismatch between payment and delivery in business transactions. Trade finance plays a critical role in bridging the gap, thereby overcoming greater risks inherent in international trade. It is thus even described as the lifeline of international trade, because more than 90% of international transactions involve some form of credit, insurance, or guarantee. Despite its importance in international trade, however, it was not until the great trade collapse in 2008–2009 that trade finance came to the attention of academic researchers. An emerging literature on trade finance has contributed to providing answers to questions such as: Who is responsible for financing transactions, and, hence, who would need liquidity support most to sustain international trade? This is particularly relevant in developing countries, where the lack of trade finance is often identified as the main hindrance to trade, and in times of financial crisis, when the overall drying up of trade finance could lead to a global collapse in trade.

Article

Diane McIntyre, Amarech G. Obse, Edwine W. Barasa, and John E. Ataguba

Within the context of the Sustainable Development Goals, it is important to critically review research on healthcare financing in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) from the perspective of the universal health coverage (UHC) goals of financial protection and access to quality health services for all. There is a concerning reliance on direct out-of-pocket payments in many SSA countries, accounting for an average of 36% of current health expenditure compared to only 22% in the rest of the world. Contributions to health insurance schemes, whether voluntary or mandatory, contribute a small share of current health expenditure. While domestic mandatory prepayment mechanisms (tax and mandatory insurance) is the next largest category of healthcare financing in SSA (35%), a relatively large share of funding in SSA (14% compared to <1% in the rest of the world) is attributable to, sometimes unstable, external funding sources. There is a growing recognition of the need to reduce out-of-pocket payments and increase domestic mandatory prepayment financing to move towards UHC. Many SSA countries have declared a preference for achieving this through contributory health insurance schemes, particularly for formal sector workers, with service entitlements tied to contributions. Policy debates about whether a contributory approach is the most efficient, equitable and sustainable means of financing progress to UHC are emotive and infused with “conventional wisdom.” A range of research questions must be addressed to provide a more comprehensive empirical evidence base for these debates and to support progress to UHC.