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date: 23 November 2020

How to Make Individual Transferable Quotas Work Economically, Socially, and Environmentallylocked

  • Rashid SumailaRashid SumailaUniversity of British Columbia

Summary

The economic tool of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) gives their owners exclusive and transferable rights to catch a given portion of the total allowable catch (TAC) of a given fish stock. Authorities establish TACs and then divide them among individual fishers or firms in the form of individual catch quotas, usually a percentage of the TAC. ITQs are transferable through selling and buying in an open market. The main arguments by proponents of ITQs is that they eliminate the need to “race for the fish” and thus increase economic returns while eliminating overcapacity and overfishing. In general, fisheries’ management objectives consist of ecological (sustainable use of fish stocks), economic (no economic waste), and social (mainly the equitable distribution of fisheries benefits) issues. There is evidence to show that ITQs do indeed reduce economic waste and increase profits for those remaining in fisheries. However, they do not perform well in terms of sustainability or socially. A proposal that integrates ITQs in a comprehensive and effective ecosystem-based fisheries management system that is more likely to perform much better than ITQs with respect to ecological, economic, and social objectives is presented in this article.

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