Puzzles of Commitment, Compliance, and Defection in Water Resource Management
Puzzles of Commitment, Compliance, and Defection in Water Resource Management
- John WaterburyJohn WaterburyAmerican University of Beirut
Summary
Collective action problems (CAPs) are ubiquitous in human undertakings including in the development and management of shared water resources. Various rational-actor models have been applied to understand their dynamics. These analyses tend to come to pessimistic conclusions based on the assumption of “free-riding” whereby any participant in a collective action (CA) will be motivated to benefit from the action without contributing to its costs. If all participants follow this logic, there will be no CA and hence no net benefit to the participants.
This view assumes the logic of individual rationality. It does not adequately account for observed behavior, which may be driven by collective or group rationality. CA in water management and other domains has been initiated and sustained despite the temptation of free-riding. To understand why, it is necessary to analyze the dynamics of commitment, i.e., the initial collective undertaking; compliance, i.e., sustaining the initial commitment; and defection, when compliance breaks down. None of these variables is static. With respect to water, the technological means of its management constantly change so that the dynamics of compliance change as well. Technological change must be anticipated in the commitment phase. Just as important, cost/benefit analysis must encompass assessing payoffs in domains not related to water itself. These payoffs may not be part of the formal terms of commitment but must inform the compliance process. When the process unravels, “water wars” may result although that has been a rare outcome.
Keywords
Subjects
- Management and Planning
- Sustainability and Solutions