The Arctic has risen on the international agenda, both for the eight Arctic states and for other actors external to the region. Security and geopolitical dynamics have developed and changed in the north. Nevertheless, one-liner predictions of a resource race or an imminent conflict do not capture the nuances of Arctic politics. When it comes to territorial or border disputes, none remains in the Arctic. The last territorial dispute—over Hans Island—was settled in 2022. When it comes to maritime boundary disputes, only one remains—namely, between Canada and the United States. Along these parameters, the Arctic is in fact remarkably defined and stable, in contrast to other maritime domains surrounded by states. There are still disputes in which states disagree over the interpretation of international law or how to manage the change in resource activity brought forth by climate change. Looking at the international relations of the Arctic, it also makes sense to separate three sets of political dynamics: regional (intra-Arctic) relations, global relations with an Arctic impact or relevance or both, and subregional security relations. Examining security relations as a subset of Arctic International Relations makes it particularly apparent that these primarily revolve around the Barents Sea or North Atlantic maritime domain and the Bering Sea or North Pacific maritime domain, linking to, but not encompassing all of, the Arctic.
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Article
The Arctic in International Relations
Andreas Østhagen
Article
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Its Aftermath
Oscar Palma
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—FARC) was an insurgent group that emerged in the 1960s as a consequence of struggles between the Conservatives and the Liberals, as well as the consolidation of a Communist party that promoted an armed insurrection. A relative absence of state institutions in farther regions, the uneven distribution of land, and an impoverished peasant class were elements fueling rebellious movements. By the 1980s, however, FARC had become something more complex than an insurgent organization. After initially opposing the idea, the group accepted the generation of income through the taxation of activities in the cocaine-illicit economy. An unprecedented process of growth experienced by the insurgency, with this income, allowed a remarkable offensive against the security forces, in specific regions, by the end of the 1990s.
Since then, an explanation of the organization as a “pure” political insurgency would be inaccurate; the motivation and purpose of some fighters within the group was profit. Although an explanation radically separating political and criminal (economic) agendas may be flawed, at least a concept which portrays the organization as something more than just an insurgency seems helpful. The concept of hybrid group, in which armed, political, and criminal dimensions coexist, invites exploring different types of motivations, purposes, and tasks that fighters might have.
The observation of these dimensions also contributes to an understanding of the evolution of FARC after the Havana Agreement. A strong military offensive during the 2000s was one of the factors motivating the group to engage in peace negotiations with the Colombian government. With the Agreement, FARC as an armed insurgency ceased to exist, but the continuation of factors which motivated the existence of a hybrid group have triggered the emergence of a myriad of smaller groups, several of which claim to be the real successors of FARC, mixing in diverse ways the political and criminal agendas.
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