Why Children?

There has been no shortage of discussion as to why armed groups and terrorist organizations recruit children. Some scholars argue that terrorist organizations recruit women or children when they are at their weakest in an attempt to bolster their ranks (Bloom & Horgan, 2015). However, Pearson argues that recruitment may demonstrate a “show of strength” to enhance lethality despite intensified conscription, for example in Nigeria by Boko Haram (Pearson, 2014). Others have posited that because weapons have been streamlined and the size reduced, children can operate guns just as well as adults, lowering the barriers to membership (Bloom, 2019; Stohl, 2002). Children are malleable—their bodies and minds are always changing and growing, which often makes them easier to coerce than adults (Stohl, 2002, p. 4). Further, they are distinctively vulnerable to a variety of pressures, including economic, political, or community/family networks that feed into that acquiescence.

Using children can provide unique advantages. Terrorist groups raise funds by abducting children for ransom. Boko Haram reportedly received 3 million dollars in exchange for the release of a family of seven French nationals (BBC, 2013; Zenn, 2014). Similar allegations have been made that the group received millions in ransom from the Nigerian government for the release of the Dapchi and Chibok schoolgirls. However, the government vehemently denies these claims (Sahara Reporters, 2018). Likewise, at their peak, ISIS earned millions via kidnapping and extortion; though most victims were foreign nationals, some were Yazidi and Christian girls ransomed to their families. Nonetheless, both Boko Haram and ISIS (and others) routinely use the threat of kidnapping to extort money from parents.

Apart from serving as a source of financial reward, children can be trained to become capable and committed fighters, carrying out attacks while evading detection given their slight build. This is particularly true for young girls, who are regarded with less suspicion. In their research on Boko Haram suicide bombers, Warner and Matfess (2017) found that the group was “at the forefront of normalizing children” and deployed over 81 children to carry out suicide attacks between 2011 and 2017—accounting for almost 20% of the total suicide attacks. The three youngest bombers were seven years old, and girls (Warner & Matfess, 2017, p. 4). What is striking, however, is that those suicide attacks carried out by children and teenagers were comparatively deadlier than average—killing an additional 9.4 individuals per attack (p. 37).

Another reason for the mobilization of children is that it serves as a signaling technique, one that terrorizes a population by indicating the group’s willingness to push the boundaries of brutality. Victimizing children broadens “the acceptable limits of terrorism in order to maintain the overall climate of fear” (Horgan et al., 2016, p. 646). Tynes (2018) argues that children are used as a “tactical innovation” in that groups use a “morally bad tactic to determine how far they are willing to go for victory” (p. 8). Further, their inclusion goes against long-standing norms: when an armed group uses children, it rarely goes unnoticed by the press. International awareness of the group intensifies, often giving it a level of attention that groups seek. Additionally, using children signals a new degree of brutality by showing that even the most vulnerable are not safe—not just from the violence perpetrated against them, but from children carrying out the violence themselves.

ISIS capitalized on this and consistently used children in their posted propaganda images and videos—oftentimes in combat and as executioners. However, children were also used as a recruitment tool to “shame” older adults into participation. Children were fed a steady diet of propaganda in ISIS-controlled schools and in their communities. When the Syrian state descended into chaos in 2014, ISIS assumed de facto authority over schools in the areas under its control. As well as indoctrinating children, these schools provided ISIS recruiters with easy access to the children and an opportunity to scout for talent or select for specific traits. Children with an aptitude for communication were deployed as recruiters, adopting public-speaking roles to conscript others on the Dawa (the call) caravan.

Child recruiters not only goaded adults to participate but also persuaded children with promises of status, purpose, and admiration from adults and the public alike. Thus, children constituted a form of “deviant peer” whereby they recruited other children. Since not every child achieved cub status, the group was able to make participation in these units appear desirable and limited. However, ISIS is not alone in their use of children as recruiters, as many other terrorist organizations have engaged in similar tactics. In Somalia, al-Shabaab offered children money in exchange for recruiting other children (HRW, 2012). Women and young girls coerced other girls to join Boko Haram—often maintaining that their lives were much better with the group than without it (Nwaubani, 2017).

This is underscored by Pearson’s research, which details that women and girls have actively recruited other young women to carry out terrorist attacks. In 2014, the same year that multiple blasts were perpetrated by women and girls in Kano, the group established an all “female wing” of Boko Haram led by Hafsat Bako, the widow of a former Boko fighter. This wing was responsible for organizing female-led attacks but also for recruiting teenage girls and young women, especially the widows of fallen Boko Haram fighters. Like in ISIS, the widows were encouraged to remarry and become the wives of current fighters. In contrast to ISIS, women filled tactical positions, such as spies and bombers (Pearson, 2014).

The Pathways Into Terrorism: Coerced, Voluntary, and Conscripted Children

Like adults, children’s pathways during recruitment and mobilization vary from individual to individual. We argue that children take one of three pathways, but we recognize that the pathways may overlap: children can be coerced into joining, and these same children may eventually believe they had volunteered. Children can also have ideological preferences, grievances, or motivations that may push them to join the group. Finally, children can be forcibly conscripted. Armed groups abduct children after their parents have been killed (often at the hands of the fighters), but also seize children from school. The most infamous example is the April 2014 abduction of 276 girls from their school in Chibok, Kano State, by Boko Haram militants. Many of the girls were married off to fighters, and some became enforcers for the other women and a few were eventually suicide bombers.

Contemporary research delves into the role of the children’s social ecology, arguing that pressure to volunteer or self-mobilize is coercive and stems from a variety of sources: from family, teachers, the community, and the wider society. There has been a marked rise in terrorist groups procuring children from their parents, and often families hand over a child in exchange for protection, or out of ideological support for the group and its aims.

In some cases of children involved in militant movements, recruitment occurred via existing kinship and social networks, and notably through community-centered activities (Cantori & Harik, 1984). Children in conflict areas are routinely exposed to violence perpetrated by all sides from a very early age. Exposure to violence may alter the child’s perceptions of right and wrong and may impact the children’s willingness to participate in violent activities themselves. For example, early trauma and adversity places a child at risk for a variety of negative outcomes including greater likelihood of engaging in violence. The structural conditions that foster an environment conducive to violence can be the result of the shared experiences of a people inhabiting a conflict zone. Ethnic groups in conflict will cohere in unique ways and the experiences of the few will be felt by the many, especially with the global media.

There are severe psychological sequelae that result from living in conflict areas. In particular, in cases where a dominant group exercises population control tactics, checkpoints, patrols, searches, and seizures, people suffer humiliation. As Fierke (2012) argues, “when ongoing suffering or humiliation is the shared experience of the people, expressions of this pain may come to occupy a central place in the language, narrative, and practice of its culture” (Fierke, 2012, p. 92). Humiliation may be the impetus for resistance. In a situation marked by past humiliation, there is a further dynamic between emotional experiences and those expressions that are permitted. It is under these circumstances that a “culture of martyrdom” thrives and captures the imagination. These “cultures of martyrdom” are observable in areas where martyrs are memorialized and elevated to “cult-hero status” in some communities—as groups use their images for posters, murals, or stamps, to exalt the individual bomber who is spoken of with reverence. Bloom (2019) dedicates an entire chapter to this phenomenon in Small Arms, as she discusses the influence of this constructed “culture” on would-be child recruits across a variety of conflicts. The concept of martyrdom is not unique to jihadi groups and has been celebrated by other cultures and in other religions. In contexts where children are taught that their death can mean more than their life, one can understand why children might believe their vocation is to “join” a militant group (p. 118).

Moreover, children killed on purpose or by accident serve as powerful mobilization tools for adults in the community. The killing of innocent children can instantly rally people behind the cause. Likewise, images of children killed by an occupying force, for example the iconic images from the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, speak to a different audience and can incentivize a community to take action against a brutal state (Motro, 2000). The use of images of children to mobilize people to join terrorist movements is especially successful throughout the Middle East and North Africa. These children become martyrs in their community and are celebrated and admired far and wide. Interestingly, such images have cross-national appeal, and thus pictures of a slain Palestinian baby may have as much resonance in Algeria or Morocco as it does locally in the Occupied Territories.

Despite their young age, children can have preferences, grievances, and ideological beliefs. While beliefs can be manipulated, they can also serve as the underpinnings for self-mobilization. The literature on radicalization addresses these complex processes, and like adults children may mobilize not because of ideological sympathy or “radicalization,” but from a desire for personal gain (economic, social, etc.) or simply because they perceive no other options. Scholars have identified a variety of socioeconomic catalysts such as lack of economic opportunity, weak educational systems, and rampant corruption or inequality as hypothetical mobilizing factors. The so-called root causes (i.e., deprivation, frustration, greed, grievance, etc.) all demonstrate that there is no “one-size-fits-all” explanation for every situation.

In the case of Boko Haram, some child fighters recounted that they were lured to join the group with financial incentives (Mercy Corps, 2016). Others insisted they were promised some other subsidy—wives, weapons, and/or status—and many reported actually enjoying their time within the group as they gained a community and “respect” (HRW, 2019; Topol, 2017). Many young girls who were kidnapped and married to fighters returned to the group after being rescued, not only because they were shunned by their communities upon return, but because they had become sympathetic to the group during their captivity (Nwaubani, 2017, 2018). Other girls and women took a more active role in their mobilization and joined on their own volition because they wanted to (Matfess, 2017).

In sum, there are several reasons why terrorist organizations seek to integrate children to their ranks. Children provide a unique advantage both strategically and tactically. Like their adult counterparts, children join these groups in a variety of ways, and the pathways vary from person to person and from group to group. However, the role of coercion in these processes cannot be overstated: while many children seemingly want to join the group, their desire is theoretically manipulated, and adults facilitate the processes of involvement.

Children in al-Shabaab

In Small Arms, Bloom (2019) posits that “there are two processes that lead to children’s involvement in terrorist violence: (1) targeted recruitment initiated by adults, or (2) facilitated engagement, in which a child, responding to personal, social, and/or cultural factors, seeks out engagement with the group” (p. 75). Through an in-depth analysis of the literature as well as a survey of open sources, publicly accessible information, government and nongovernmental organization (NGO) reports, and newspaper articles, this appears to be accurate for the case of al-Shabaab in Somalia. Some children joined because they believed they wanted to, with beliefs rooted in ideological sympathy with the group, a quest for identity or belonging, or the promise of economic incentives.

However, others joined because they had few alternatives—they were coerced into joining, even under penalty of death. After 2016, al-Shabaab increased the number of abductions and took over schools throughout the country with the goal of training and psychologically conditioning youth. The group also demanded that community elders surrender children to the group; if they refused, the group resorted to coercive means such as kidnapping to secure young recruits. In 2016, the United Nations estimated that 6,163 children, some as young as nine, had been recruited by armed groups in Somalia since 2010, including by the Somali government and opposition clan militias. Al-Shabaab was by far the most egregious offender as they were responsible for 70%, and over half of their force was comprised of militants under the age of 18 (Al Jazeera, 2017). The group’s recruitment of children peaked in 2018 as nearly 2,230 children were recruited (Children and armed conflict Report of the Secretary-General, 2019). However, al-Shabaab is not the only faction guilty of exploiting children.

As Fritz’s (2012) research demonstrates, children were actively recruited into Somali piracy as the result of endemic poverty and the lack of economic opportunity. She recounts an example in which 61 pirates were captured, 25 of whom were under the age of 15 (Fritz, 2012). Similarly, the Somali National Army (SNA) recruited an estimated 920 children, and tribal militias may have recruited even more (Al Jazeera, 2017). One militia member, Abdul, a 14-year-old boy, told a reporter with the East African that he had fought with his clan’s militia since he was eight years old and hoped to join the SNA since the militias and army already worked together. By the age of nine, he killed his first al-Shabaab fighter after the group killed his father. He received no payment for his service but is occasionally gifted food or clothes by a grateful community (Barigaba, 2018).

According to the Ceeljaale elder and chief Yuusuf Osman Ali, their clan’s militia employs children, but only out of desperation—without them, their town would be taken over by al-Shabaab (Barigaba, 2018). In their 2011 report on children in Somalia, Amnesty International assessed that “boys over 15 years old are often considered adults and, in a situation of state collapse, breakdown of the rule of law and clan feuds, have been expected by some to defend their clan and family” (Amnesty International, 2011, p. 22).

There are many reasons why children joined al-Shabaab. Conventional wisdom assumes that recruitment for jihadi terrorism occurs primarily along religious lines. Somalia is predominantly comprised of Sunni Muslims, the majority of whom follow a “Sufi-type brand of Islam” (Amble & Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2014, p. 532). As Amble and Meleagrou-Hitchens argue, some regions in Africa have been more receptive to Salafi-jihadi ideology, such as Kenya, while Somaliland remained largely unaffected. They found that the jihadi narrative has greater impact on Kenyan Muslims as a result of their lower socioeconomic status. However, in Somaliland, because the Salafi-jihadi message challenges perceptions of effective governance and stability, they are less predisposed toward it (p. 538).

In the case of Somalia, Anderson and McKnight (2015) found that “cultural and religious factors may be less important in mobilization,” despite the widely held belief among radicalized believers that Islam in East Africa is “under attack by the west” (p. 10). While many Somalis are devout, the authors argue that they are “far from fundamentalist” as “pastoral life ensured pragmatism ruled over religious doctrine” (p. 7). Despite the fact that al-Shabaab is innately conservative and fundamentalist, it has proven malleable by evolving and being flexible in its religious fervor (p. 9).

Botha’s (2014) research, focused on Kenyan socialization of those who joined al-Shabaab, found that 87% of those interviewed cited religion as their reason for joining; 97% perceived that their religion was under attack; and 34% joined the group after being inspired to do so by a religious leader (Botha, 2014, p. 903). The ages of their respondents ranged from 10 to 40; however, five were between the ages of 10 and 14, with an additional 17 aged between 15 and 19; the remaining 78 were above the age of 20 (p. 909). Nonetheless, almost all the respondents had experienced high levels of frustration with their situations before they joined—with anger being the most common emotion (Botha, 2014, p. 912).

Kfir (2016) observes that al-Shabaab manipulated a “victim narrative” that Somali Muslims, and Muslims in general, were being oppressed by the West (p. 778). This allowed the organization to attract individuals to wage a defensive jihad to protect Islam from attack—an individual obligation that is a requirement for everyone to observe. In their research on the recruitment of Kenyans, two interviewees expressed ideological sympathy with the group as the foundation for their mobilization. The Kenyans had no ethnic ties to the group, but they felt drawn to the organization as they were waging jihad against those in the “war against Islam” (Amble & Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2014). However, three respondents alluded to economic incentives for their recruitment, as they were allegedly offered between 40,000 and 200,000 Kenyan schillings (395–1,983 USD) per month to join, underscoring the role of poverty and the promise of economic incentives (p. 525).

While some children joined seemingly of their own volition, it is important to highlight how “willing participation shades into coercion” as significant pressure can come from the family and one’s community (Bloom, 2011, p. 30). Children may be coerced through “outright force,” including the compulsion to “kill or be killed,” as well as through more explicit threats such as “kill or we kill someone you love” and other forms of “subtle trickery,” including peer/community pressure (Bloom, 2019, pp. 74–75). Amnesty International’s (2011) report found that many children were forced to join the group on the threat of death (Amnesty International, 2011). However, many more had been kidnapped. According to the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG), al-Shabaab’s abductions tripled in 2017, including over 364 children abducted in just the second quarter (United Nations Security Council, 2017, p. 153).

A detailed report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) shows how al-Shabaab began ramping up aggressive child recruitment in September 2017. However, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) reported that the rise in school attacks and attempted kidnapping began as early as 2013, when the group abducted over 100 religious teachers in Galgadud region after they rebuffed al-Shabaab’s pressure to furnish new recruits (Refworld, 2018). The group routinely threatens parents and teachers if they refuse to hand over children—including those as young as eight years old (HRW, 2018a). Onyulo (2018) reported that parents with even younger children have been solicited to compel their kids to join—if they refuse, the group kidnaps them regardless (Onyulo, 2018).

One teacher disclosed that militants stormed their school and demanded teachers deliver 25 children between the ages of eight and 15; when the teachers refused, they were beaten. In June 2017, the group abducted 45 elders in El Bur after they refused to hand over 150 children. They were released, but the group abducted 300 children and placed them in an al-Shabaab school that July (HRW, 2018a). While the SEMG found that child recruitment declined by two thirds in the first half of 2017, it spiked again in July, in preparation for anticipated military offensives (United Nations Security Council, 2017, p. 157). Al-Shabaab has resorted to kidnapping youth to bolster its battle capabilities as children have been trained to carry out a variety of roles.

However, unlike Boko Haram, who deploy children for suicide attacks, it is unclear to what extent al-Shabaab engages children on the front lines (Warner & Chapin, 2018; Warner & Matfess, 2017). As Warner and Chapin found, in al-Shabaab’s suicide bombing attacks the age of the attacker is often unclear. Nonetheless, they posit that al-Shabaab likely uses adults, because the media would mention underage bombers had children been involved (Warner & Chapin, 2018, p. 25). It is equally possible that al-Shabaab attackers could be teenagers given the group’s track record of recruiting youth. Based on the SEMG reporting that they have been training children for suicide missions, it is safe to assume there have been child suicide bombers among the attackers (United Nations Security Council, 2017). In interviews with Amnesty International, children have reported that their friends had bombs strapped to them and were told to detonate them (Amnesty International, 2011, p. 32). However, hard data and actual numbers are difficult to verify.

Boys were trained to assemble improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other explosives, and subsequently taught to detonate them. Boys also received extensive weapons training and were trained in both offensive and defensive tactics (United Nations Security Council, 2017, p. 154). According to the U.S. Department of Labor, “these children planted explosive devices, acted as human shields, conducted assassinations and suicide attacks, gathered intelligence, and provided domestic service; some girls were also forced into sexual servitude” (U.S. Department of Labor, 2018, p. 1). However, as Robert “Rowbow” Ochola, a Kenyan Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) activist, explained to Agullo and Lianes, the group is increasingly turning to young women to fill these roles as they garner less suspicion, and there has been an influx in young girls acting as spies and scouts (Agullo & Lianes, 2018).

Young girls are used to convey weapons due to their ability to pass through checkpoints largely undetected. Many others have become spies and scouts for potential targets and to gather intelligence. According to the SEMG report, however, young girls were not given weapons training. Whether or not this is true is difficult to verify, as women and girls have regularly reported being given access to guns during their time with the group. As with Boko Haram, women are recruited to become wives for the fighters. Young girls may be identified as potential brides while still in school (United Nations Security Council, 2017, p. 154). In The Daughters of al-Shabaab, Fatuma explains that after marrying a fighter and entering the group at age 17, she was quickly given a leadership role in which it appears she worked to manage the other women. She explained that when more women were brought in and were assigned husbands, those that refused to consummate the marriage were killed (Agullo & Lianes, 2018). In this instance, women and young girls are used comparably to the women in Boko Haram—to maintain camp order and increase cohesion (Oriola, 2017).

Multiple reports from both media and NGOs have described children spotted in battles, and, when captured, they provide insight into the ways in which al-Shabaab uses children. Children are recruited to plant explosives, and, according to one account, “one of their [leaders] used to give young people money, between 1 and 100 USD. The leaders [of the armed groups] do not bury mines in the street, they only give maps and instructions to the young people to do it” (Amnesty International, 2011, p. 32). The United Nations similarly reported evidence that children have received training on how to build and detonate these explosives as well.

In Somalia, children face insurmountable and overlapping crises: drought, famine, and inherent insecurity are rampant, and poverty is pervasive. Since poverty is a facilitating factor for recruitment, these structural conditions limit children’s options but also may explain why families choose to relinquish their children. Al-Shabaab’s kidnapping has resulted in thousands of children fleeing from communities—often unaccompanied. In many of these cases, children are recruited by al-Shabaab or become victims of human trafficking for either labor or sexual purposes (2017 Trafficking in Persons Report). Many of these children are actually trafficked by external actors after fleeing al-Shabaab.

Children fled from their homes unaccompanied or with their siblings. Some were able to connect with relatives; however, over half have settled in informal camps for internally displaced persons (HRW, 2018a). Life in these settlements is hard, and they often lack requisite resources to provide aid and security for children. In this way, displaced youth become even more susceptible to the violence of al-Shabaab, and their likelihood of being recruited or abducted increases. However, even children that escaped the group have reportedly returned just to have access to food and water (United Nations Security Council, 2017).

Children in the Islamic State

While the number of children involved in violent extremist groups has declined in the two decades following the publication of the United National 1996 Machel Report, groups that avoided using children on the front lines 20 years prior began to embrace the tactic in new and unprecedented ways (Machel, 1996). ISIS heralded its exploitation of children and featured children in most of the ISIS propaganda, including child martyrs in their “about to die” eulogies, and depicted executions carried out by boys as young as 10 (Bloom et al., 2016).

Concerns about this potential threat have led to an urgent call for increased efforts to prevent radicalization to violent extremism across the globe. However, there is a dearth of empirical evidence on the subject and little guidance for effective prevention. The various methods of indoctrination employed by armed groups often point toward the different roles children play in the broader context of the conflict. This is most evident in a group’s approach to education, particularly in the case of ISIS.

ISIS tried to engender a sense of pride, prestige, and competition among the “cubs of the caliphate” to achieve this special status. Students earned cub status in one of the dedicated training camps where they learned the skills needed to become a militant (Fox News, 2015). During its rise, ISIS used footage of child soldiers being trained as part of its propaganda. Between May and July 2015, the group released three videos featuring children aged between 10 and 15 years old. A video from February 2015 featured 80 children—some as young as five—wearing camouflage, standing in formation, and engaging in military exercises with guns. They were taught how to behead people and how to use AK-47s (Engel, 2015).

ISIS pioneered a unique form of individual resilience by combining intense physical and military training with sustained ideological and psychological indoctrination. The group designed a systematic process to generate competent militants who embraced every aspect of its teachings, not just mindless drones (Horgan et al., 2016).