Domestic Contexts and Opportunities for Diversionary Conflict

While the motives for diversionary conflict are rooted in domestic problems and challenges that leaders might face, there are also domestic contexts that create opportunities for diversionary tactics to be used and domestic factors that may constrain leaders from using such tactics. Thus, while many states may have domestic issues that might make the diversionary use of force appealing, the various domestic contexts of states also shape the likelihood of this option being chosen (see the article “Diversionary Theory of War in Foreign Policy Analysis”). Regime type and elections, regime change, domestic structures, economic and military capabilities, domestic ethnic cleavages, and even the individual psychology of leaders can impact the likelihood of diversionary conflict.

Significant research has been conducted on how regime type impacts the use of diversionary force. Some early works found that democracies were less likely to use diversionary force than authoritarian governments (Enterline, & Gleditsch 2000; Heldt, 1999; Miller, 1995, 1999). Other authors, such as Gelpi (1997) and Davies (2002), found democracies to be more likely to utilize diversionary conflict than authoritarian countries. According to Gelpi (1997), authoritarian countries have fewer constraints and, as such, can respond to domestic unrest through repression. However, democracies have political pressures and bids for reelection that prevent them from forcefully repressing opposition groups. Davies (2002) found that violent domestic strife increases the likelihood of diversionary conflict, while nonviolent domestic strife increases the likelihood of repression.

Related to democracies, the process of elections and domestic reselection has also been discussed as a potential domestic opportunity for the use of diversionary force (Leeds & Davis, 1997; Smith, 1996). Smith (1996) considered the reselection process in democratic states. He suggested not only that leaders, particularly in democracies that are coming up on reelection, may have incentives to utilize diversionary force in the face of domestic unrest, but also that potential targets of such behavior are aware of this issue and are likely to take actions to avoid being targeted. Leeds and Davis (1997) confirmed Smith’s argument. This argument hints at the importance of the potential targets of diversionary force but does not fully explore this idea. Similarly, Richards et al. (1993) focused on the importance of the domestic reselection processes, framing the discussion of diversionary uses of force as a principal–agent problem, where leaders are tempted to use aggressive foreign policy to improve the likelihood they can remain in office. Tarar (2006) combined a diversionary model in the wake of reselection with a bargaining model of war. His game theoretical model suggests that the benefits of holding office, compared to the costs of war, are important elements that leaders consider when contemplating diversionary tactics. Gent (2009) expanded on these strategic models by considering the two-level game aspect of diversionary theory. In particular, Gent argued that reselection processes may not lead to war in all cases and that the strategic interactions between countries are important. As such, Gent also brought more international considerations into the discussion of diversionary war, but this is limited to strategic interactions between the countries and not a wider variety of international and dyadic characteristics.

Looking at authoritarian states and the case of Argentina’s invasion of the Falkland Islands, Oakes (2006, 2012) considered a state’s extractive capacity as an important factor impacting the options that states have in responding to domestic problems. She argued that authoritarian states with low extractive capacity may not have the resources available to make reforms addressing domestic unrest but will also not have the capacity to repress this discontent, and thus, these states may choose diversionary tactics. In addition, Oakes argued that diversionary conflict is more likely when there is a symbolic target available for a state to initiate conflict with and the potential conflict is likely to have a low cost. Oakes’s focus on the importance of a symbolic target is key, and it is a significant attempt to bring in characteristics of the target state, and the international context, into the study of diversionary conflict. Similarly, Enterline and Gleditsch (2000) considered both domestic and international factors and how they might impact the use of diversionary tactics. Domestic constraints affect the options leaders have, while international environments are also important. The authors argued that diversionary tactics may be more likely in the presence of threatening international environments.

Some authors have considered regime type and diversionary force in more nuanced ways, suggesting that not all democratic or authoritarian countries have similar opportunities for diversionary force. Pickering and Kisangani (2005) found that only certain types of democracies and autocracies are likely to use diversionary tactics. Kisangani and Pickering (2007) distinguished between different types of diversion—benevolent and belligerent diversionary uses of force. The authors found that democracies and mixed regimes tend to use benevolent uses of force while autocracies do not use either type of diversionary force. In a follow-up study, Kisangani and Pickering (2011) found that more accountable democratic leaders, such as the leaders of majoritarian, weak party majority, and minority governments, were more likely to use diversionary force than those leaders with less accountability, and that democratic leaders are more likely to use benevolent military force than belligerent force for diversion. These findings suggest that domestic constraints, such as leader accountability, impacts the opportunity for diversionary conflict. Pickering and Kisangani (2010) found not only the best evidence for diversionary uses of force by single-party regimes (compared to personalist and military regimes), but also that personalist and military regimes use diversionary force overseas when faced with unrest.

Sobek (2007), focusing on Renaissance Italy, found that autocratic states, or oligarchies, are more likely to use diversion while republics were less prone to diversionary tactics. Furthermore, Sobek found that oligarchies are more likely to attack states that were experiencing turmoil. This is important as it indicates that not all targets are created equal. Mansfield and Snyder (2005) contended that regimes in transition from autocracy to democracy, particularly without certain types of domestic institutions, will be more bellicose in their foreign relations. Gent (2009) argued that leaders of mixed regimes (rather than democracies or autocracies) are the most likely to engage in diversionary actions. Similar to Sobek, Gent suggested that international factors, in particular strategic interactions between states, impact their propensity toward diversionary tactics. However, these studies are somewhat limited in their consideration of international factors.

Aside from regime type and regime changes, other scholars have focused on domestic resources, capacities, and capabilities when discussing diversionary tactics. Miller (1999) argued that domestic structures condition the relationship between domestic problems and diversionary uses of force. He focused on levels of policy resources, which are measured by the proportion of total central government revenue that is derived from direct taxes, and argued that governments with more available revenue are better able to recover from economic problems and, thus, have less incentive for diversionary tactics in the wake of economic crisis. Conversely, those leaders with fewer resources available to them will be more likely to pursue diversionary tactics.

Yeh and Wu (2020) argued that the process of diversionary behavior is different in weak states than strong ones. First, weak states are likely to be less prone to utilize diversionary force, as such states will potentially have harsher electoral consequences for using force. Second, the relationship between weak states and great powers is likely to impact the choice of diversionary tactics, as such tactics might not be supported by great powers that the weaker state relies on. Using the case of Taiwan, the authors found support for the idea that diversionary tactics are conditional. This piece is particularly interesting in that it combines domestic-level conditions (being a weak state) with international-level and dyadic-level factors—the relationship between the state and great powers. Similarly, Li et al. (2009) considered the use of diversionary tactics by Taiwan. They focused on actions that fall short of war, arguing that middle powers such as Taiwan, with strong connections to major powers like the United States, may be more reluctant to use diversionary tactics that would lead to war. Within this context, they found that the leaders in Taipei were more likely to use independence rhetoric as a diversionary tactic when faced with domestic problems.

A significant amount of research focusing on diversionary conflict focuses on the decision-making of United States leaders (e.g., see Blomdahl, 2017; Fordham, 1998a, 1998b; Foster & Keller, 2014; Foster & Palmer, 2006; Hess & Orphanides, 1995; Meernik, 1994, 2000; Meernik & Waterman, 1996; Ostrom & Job, 1986; see also the article “The ‘Rally-’Round-the-Flag’ Phenomenon and the Diversionary Use of Force”). The focus on the United States further suggests the importance of power, resources, and capabilities as domestic factors that might provide opportunities for diversionary conflict. Not all countries will have the domestic contexts and opportunities for such tactics, and the United States is unique in its capacity (Fordham, 2017).

In addition to regime type, institutions and state capabilities, a state’s societal characteristics, including ethnic composition, has also been theorized to impact the likelihood of diversionary tactics. Haynes (2016) found that ethnically fragmented states are more likely to initiate diversionary conflicts. Finally, psychological features of leaders also play a role in the choice of diversionary tactics. Foster and Keller (2014) argued that leaders with low conceptual complexity, especially if they are also hawkish in their foreign policy leanings, will be more likely to lean toward simplistic decision-making processes, which would include utilizing diversionary tactics. The authors tested their theory by looking at U.S. leaders and found support for their propositions. Foster and Keller (2020) considered the British case and found that prime ministers who are especially distrustful are more predisposed to use military force, will be more focused on the potential costs of domestic economic problems, and fear that others in their cabinet are interesting in overtaking their position. Such individuals will be more inclined to seek out diversionary conflicts rather than attempt to fix economic policy.

International and Dyadic Contexts and Opportunities for Diversionary Conflict

There is a significant number of studies focused on the various domestic contexts that impact the likelihood of diversionary tactics. Some of these studies also incorporate a small number of international or dyadic-level factors in their analyses (e.g., Enterline & Gleditsch, 2000; Gent, 2009; Oakes, 2006, 2012; Sobek, 2007; Yeh & Wu, 2020). Still, fewer studies have focused on the international factors and opportunities that influence diversionary uses of force than those that fully analyze domestic considerations. This is somewhat surprising since diversionary theory rests on the interplay between domestic and international factors. Furthermore, when making foreign policy decisions, actors are likely to consider the characteristics of the target state and their historical relationship with this state. Various causal processes and theories linking domestic problems within a country to the use of diversionary tactics also make underlying assumptions about the target of the diversionary action. For example, in-group and out-group mechanisms are built on the relationship and connection between the in-group (the state potentially utilizing diversionary tactics) and the out-group (the target state). It is significantly more likely that these dynamics would lead to a rallying effect in situations when the out-group is viewed as a potential threat to the in-group.

Similarly, scapegoating other countries and attempting to blame them for your own internal problems is likely to only work for certain external targets, such as those that have had negative relations with your country in the past and/or those that pose some real or perceived threat to the country. As Enterline and Gleditsch (2000) and Oakes (2006) argued, diversionary conflict may be more likely when the state has a symbolic target or there is an interstate threat. Even the diversionary casual processes that point to leaders’ attempts to set the agenda or demonstrate their competence in foreign policy are likely to be more effective against certain kinds of states. Overall, the characteristics of the state that is the target of diversionary behavior is quite important for understanding diversionary conflict, as the characteristics of the target likely have significant impacts on opportunity for diversionary conflict. In addition, these international and dyadic factors likely interact with domestic opportunities for diversionary conflict and, thus, need to be more fully researched.

Several key international contexts and dyadic relationships have been identified in the literature on diversionary conflict. Dyadic power considerations have been discussed as important international contexts affecting diversionary behavior, as have regime types and human rights records of target states. Situations where there are internationally contentious issues, such as rivalry or territorial disputes, and situations where there are cross-border ethnic considerations between countries are some of the areas that appear to provide important international opportunities for the diversionary use of force.

Jung (2014a) considered a wide range of dyadic factors that might affect the likelihood of diversionary conflict and argued that diversionary tactics are most likely to be used against certain types of external targets. In particular, the author argued that targets that are fear-producing, such as those that are rapidly rising in power or that have different identities, are more likely to stoke the domestic audience’s fear, and thus more likely to produce a rallying effect. The author found that the presence of a rising power, a territory target, or a hegemony target is associated with diversionary conflict. Importantly, Jung (2014a) that “when there is no attractive diversionary target, a state’s domestic unrest makes its political leaders less likely to initiate a dyadic conflict” (p. 573). This study clearly indicates the importance of characteristics of target states in potential cases of diversionary conflict. The author also argued that certain states are more likely to be the target of diversionary force. In particular, he found that states that have high levels of constraints, like democracies or states with high levels of trade openness, are more likely to be the target of diversionary conflicts, as they will be less likely to reciprocate harshly. Thus, not all targets are created equal. Tokdemir and Mark (2018) considered factors of the target state that may impact the United States’ use of diversionary conflict. They found that U.S. presidents are more likely to choose targets that violate human rights, as these states provide easy and convincing targets to both domestic and international audiences.

Another dyadic factor that has been theorized to impact the opportunity for diversionary tactics is international rivalry. International rivalry creates an historical context that shapes interactions between countries and the foreign policy decisions that leaders make. Rivals have a history of competitive and conflictual interactions that make them more likely to distrust one another and less likely to seek peaceful resolutions to disputes. Many studies have demonstrated the war prone-ness of rival states (Diehl & Goertz, 1992, 1993, 2000; Hensel, 1998, 1999; Senese & Vasquez, 2008, Thompson, 1995, 2001; Vasquez, 1996). International rivalry creates a situation where certain states might be perceived as particularly threatening and/or are symbolic targets that could produce in-group and out-group dynamics and lead to rallying effects.

Mitchell and Prins (2004) considered how international rivalry between states might make diversionary tactics more likely to be utilized by leaders. They argued that within the rivalry context, which is ripe with antagonism, mistrust, and animosity, leaders can more easily manipulate foreign policies to suit their own personal agendas. In addition, leaders in such rivalry situations can blame domestic problems, such as economic weakness, on these international rival states. These processes correspond with both the in-group/out-group and scapegoating explanations for the diversionary use of force. Rival states are easily turned into an out-group, helping to create a greater sense of in-group identity and potential rallying effects. Furthermore, rivals, because of their “enemy” status, are easy targets for scapegoating. Mitchell and Prins found that high levels of inflation (as a measure of domestic instability) increase the probability of militarized dispute initiation between rival states, while actually decreasing the likelihood of these types of disputes among non-rivals. However, they also found that the increased likelihood of diversionary conflict between rivals is largely limited to non-democracies, connecting back to the domestic opportunities for diversionary conflict. Thus, a rivalry relationship increases the likelihood that leaders (particularly authoritarian leaders) will use diversionary tactics when faced with domestic unrest. This study highlighted one of the key international, or dyadic-level, factors that provides an opportunity for diversionary uses of force while also connecting to domestic opportunities. In addition, it emphasized the importance of considering characteristics of the potential targets of diversionary acts.

Foster (2006) also considered a variety of international and dyadic-level factors, including rivalry, that impact diversionary uses of force. Like Mitchell and Prins (2004), he considered the interplay of international and dyadic and domestic and state-level factors. He analyzed how power status interacts with rivalry to impact diversionary behavior. He found that nonmajor powers generally appear to divert only against enduring rivals, while major powers are slightly less likely to use diversion against rivals than nonrivals. However, these findings seemed to be particularly driven by the case of the United States, where when faced with high levels of inflation, the United States is more likely to initiate conflict against nonrivals than against rivals, but that other major powers are more likely to initiate conflict against rivals than nonrivals. Carter (2020) also analyzed diversion by the United States, though she focused on “diversionary cheap talk” rather than diversionary force. She found that the United States is more likely to criticize foreign countries, and particularly historical rivals, when faced with domestic economic problems.

Another international and dyadic factor that has been connected to the diversionary use of force is territory—and territorial disputes specifically. A significant amount of research has shown that territorial disputes are one of the primary causes of war between states (e.g., see Hensel, 2000, 2001; Huth, 2000; Kocs, 1995; Vasquez, 1996). Authors have emphasized that territory is often viewed as a highly salient issue—either due to its strategic value or its affective value to population (Hensel, 2001; Hensel & Mitchell, 2005; Hensel et al., 2008; Huth & Allee, 2002; Toft, 2003). Furthermore, territorial disputes have also been linked to other international contexts, such as rivalry (Rasler & Thompson, 2006; Vasquez, 1996). Theories related to diversionary behavior would suggest when a country is involved in a territorial dispute, the other state in that dispute would make a salient target, similar to a rival state. This could be through portraying the other state as an “out-group” or by using scapegoating tactics to blame internal problems on that state. Furthermore, beginning a conflict as part of a territorial claim could potentially help demonstrate competence in foreign policy. Overall, territorial disputes provide an international or dyadic opportunity for the use of diversionary tactics.

Heldt (1999) briefly discussed the economic benefits of territorial conflict as a motive for diversionary conflict, but this is a small part of the overall argument and theory, and he is primarily concerned with how various domestic factors impact the likelihood of territorial disputes more generally. Tir (2010) argued that given the salience of territorial issues, diversionary tactics may be especially used to launch territorial conflicts. Tir (2010, p. 417) suggested that territorial diversions, versus other types of diversionary conflict, are better able to capture the public’s attention, can more easily tap into the public’s feelings regarding their identity, and can help the leader unify a fractured society. Tir found that government unpopularity is strongly associated with militarized territorial disputes, while economic growth has a weaker relationship with such disputes.

Expanding on the work of Mitchell and Prins (2004), Mitchell and Thyne (2010) consider the relationship between contentious issues (more broadly) and diversionary behavior. The authors found that when states are involved in a contentious issue claim (such as a territorial dispute) they are generally more likely to initiate a militarized dispute; however, this likelihood is especially high when accompanied by high levels of inflation (supporting a diversionary theory of conflict). Furthermore, the more salient the claim, the higher the likelihood of diversionary tactics. Mitchell and Thyne’s findings are consistent with those of Mitchell and Prins (2004) and Tir (2010), as well as support the idea promoted by Oakes (2006) concerning the importance of “symbolic” targets. Jung (2014a) found that challengers in a territorial claim are more likely to initiate a military conflict related to the contested claim when they suffer domestic problems, and this is particularly true when the target country is weaker than the challenger—thus posing a lower military risk. Similarly, Wiegand (2018) found that in states involved in territorial disputes and with political unrest, but not economic unrest, are more prone to diversionary uses of force—specifically the initiation of militarized interstate disputes. Taken together, these studies give strong support for the idea that diversionary tactics are more likely to be used in certain international and dyadic contexts, such as those associated with a rivalry and/or territorial dispute.

Similar to rivalry and territorial disputes, cross-border ethnic connections can create ripe situations for diversionary tactics. Several studies have demonstrated the potential foreign policy impact of cross-border ethnic connections (Carment, 1993; Carment & James, 1995; David & Moore, 1997; Davis et al., 1997; Heraclides, 1990, 1991; Mishali-Ram, 2006; Moore, 2002; Saideman, 1997, 2001; Trumbore, 2003; Woodwell, 2004). Ethnic connections can also overlap with territorial issues, adding salience to territory, particularly if this territory is seen as a “homeland” for a particular ethnic group or is in some other way highly connected to a particular population (Hensel, 2001; Hensel & Mitchell, 2005; Hensel et al., 2008; Toft, 2003). Cross-border ethnic connections can create pressures on leaders to take action against another state, particularly when ethnic kin are disadvantaged or discriminated against in the other state, or can provide exploitable opportunities for states due to the salience of ethnic identities. Given these opportunities, potential cross-border ethnic and religious ties can also be connected to potential diversionary tactics. Diversionary theories relying on in-group and out-group distinctions are especially well suited for a discussion of cross-border ethnic connections or differences—as ethnicity can easily be framed in in-group and out-group terms. Similarly, scapegoating theories fit well with potential cross-border ethnic connections.

Jung (2014a) found that identity targets, defined as situations where two states have different majority religious identities, were significantly associated with diversionary tactics, but only during the Cold War, and not in the post-Cold War period. This particular approach to identities is quite limiting as it combines major religions like Islam into a single category and thus does not account for interreligious differences (such as those between Shi‘a and Sunni) and does not consider the role of ethnic affinity between countries. Haynes (2016) considered diversionary opportunities presented when the initiating state (particularly an ethnically fragmented state) has an ethnic connection to the targeted state. Haynes argued that diversionary conflict will be most likely when the target state has an ethnic connection to an excluded minority in the initiative state. The idea is that the target state may be viewed particularly threatening because of its potential connection to the excluded group in the initiating state. The target state could be providing support for the initiating state’s exclude ethnic group, or at least can be accused of such action. As such, conflict with this target state is an exploitable conflict opportunity for the initiating state. The results support Haynes’s argument, and he utilized the case of the 1998 dispute between Turkey and Syria to illustrate these transnational ethnic dimensions.

While Haynes argued that initiating states with marginalized ethnic groups might use diversionary tactics against states with ethnic ties to these groups, arguments could also be made that diversionary tactics could be used by an initiating state to protect their ethnic kin that are marginalized in a neighboring state. In such a situation, it would be easy to present the target state as a threatening “out-group.” Although previous research has considered how such connections impact foreign policy, none have considered how diversionary uses of force might also relate to the idea of coming to the aid of one’s ethnic brethren. This is certainly an area for future research on opportunities and diversionary theories of conflict.