Introduction

How things change. It was only in the mid-2000s that the study of the international relations of space seemed to many a rather exotic topic and an idiosyncratic choice, although some important works dealing with key aspects of space politics and space security from an international relations (IR) theory perspective had already made their appearance around that time, paving the way for a new generation of research on space.¹ As of the 2020s, of course, issues related to space have generated much attention and hardly a day passes without headlines about space exploration missions, the use of space for military purposes and the return of great power competition, the investment of billionaires in private space activities, and the urgent challenge of tackling space debris. These are just some of the key issues that attest to the ever-increasing importance of space at a time when more countries than ever before have become dependent on the use of various space applications for socioeconomic development. Consequently, there has been a renewed scholarly interest in examining the international politics of space, drawing on IR theory.

The aim of this study is to provide an overview of this literature, highlighting how contemporary IR theory has been applied to specific cases concerning space. Despite the fact that the study of the international politics of space still tends to be descriptive and undertheorized, there is already a growing literature that deals with key aspects of space activities from an IR theory perspective as a result of the broader surge of interest in the civilian, military, and commercial uses of space. This article provides the first comprehensive overview of this burgeoning and vibrant multidisciplinary subfield of IR. As such, it covers a substantial body of research on the politics of space that draws on realism, liberalism, constructivism, Marxism, critical theory, poststructuralism, feminism and gender studies, postcolonialism, and eclecticism. It also considers a distinctive approach that concentrates on the process of space policy decision-making at different levels of analysis, what can be called “Space Policy Analysis.” The discussion concludes with an outline of possible avenues for future research.

Before proceeding, a few caveats and clarifications are in order. First, the study of space is a multidisciplinary endeavor, and many insightful works have been done intersecting international and space technology within other relevant disciplines and subfields, including strategic studies, history, sociology, space law, geography, philosophy and ethics, science and technology studies, political economy, anthropology, and so on. Pulling all this together would be a formidable task worth taking elsewhere. But in order to make this study manageable, the focus is largely on IR approaches, although when it is necessary, some important works outside the discipline are discussed. For the same reasons, this study does not explore powerful composite visions that push for the expansion of humanity in space and their normative implications—a significant topic that has been the subject of Deudney’s (2020) impressive book Dark Skies. Second, this article is organized along IR theories with the aim of highlighting how each theoretical approach helps to capture something important of what is a complex totality of space relations, structures, and processes. Each of the theoretical approaches discussed offers a competing account of what aspects of the international politics of space matter the most and what should be the focus of study. However, by juxtaposing as wide a range of theoretical approaches to the study of the international politics of space as possible, the purpose is to convey the current diversity and plurality in the discipline by inviting the reader to decide which theoretical approach is more helpful in addressing different issues and problems related to space activities.

Realism

Realism is arguably one of the most influential theoretical approaches to the study of international relations. Given its dominance within the field, it is not surprising that realism is not a single coherent theory, but rather a cluster of theories and propositions concerning the factors that shape the international realm. This means that realists can reach different conclusions about state behavior and the international politics of space, so it is necessary to acknowledge the important differences within the realist school of thought. More specifically, with the risk of simplification, classical realists of the likes of Hans Morgenthau accept the effects of the anarchic international system and highlight the struggle for power and interstate competition within a balance-of-power system as the principal features of world politics rooted in human nature, but they also draw attention to the role of prudent statecraft, moderation, and morality.²

Unlike classical realists who assume that the causes of competition and conflict are ingrained in human nature, structural realists or neorealists believe that it is the anarchic structure of the international system that compels states as rational unitary actors to pursue self-help strategies to survive under anarchy. However, there are also some important variations within structural realism. On the one hand, defensive realists contend that states are interested in maximizing their security, as maximizing their power can be counterproductive by intensifying the insecurity of other states leading to counterbalancing coalitions. Therefore, states tend to opt for nonaggressive strategies and maintaining the status quo.³ On the other hand, offensive realists hold that states are seeking to maximize their relative power position in the international system. This means that states are always preoccupied with accumulating more power than their competitors, which locks great powers into perpetual competition (Mearsheimer, 2001). It is also useful to briefly mention here that neoclassical realism has gained much traction in recent years as a new synthesis, which upholds the importance of the structure of the international system, but also incorporates intervening variables at the domestic and individual levels (Lobell et al., 2009; Rose, 1998).

Despite these variations, with its focus on power politics and competition among states, realism offers a wide range of sophisticated analytical tools that help to capture certain aspects of the international politics of space. The most obvious manifestation of the sort of great power dynamics described by realists was the antagonistic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union in space during the Cold War, exemplified by the notion of a space race. From a realist point of view, the space relations between the superpowers can be seen as testimony to the struggle for power and prestige. But it is also apparent that military and national security considerations were a key driver behind the development of space capabilities since the beginning of the Space Age. Even though as part of the space race both superpowers stressed their civilian activities, such as human spaceflight and space exploration missions, at the same time this was an arms race derived from the desire to acquire highly accurate intercontinental ballistic missiles (Sheehan, 2007, pp. 7–11). Such dynamics were susceptible to what realists call the “security dilemma”. This refers to a situation in which a state’s effort to enhance its own security through military means has the effect of decreasing the perceived security of its competitor, setting in motion a sequence of action–reaction (Herz, 1950; Sheehan, 2007, p. 8; Townsend, 2021). Crucially, complicating the security dilemma is the inherent dual-use nature of space technology (Johnson-Freese, 2007).

Be that as it may, national security considerations were also the driving force for the development of space satellites used for supporting key military operations, such as surveillance, reconnaissance, early warning, and targeting that played a big part in the U.S. and Soviet deterrence policies amid the Cold War. Other countries soon followed suit with the deployment of their military space-based assets. Tellingly enough, the United States and the Soviet Union also detonated nuclear weapons in high altitudes, and there were many convinced that space would inevitably be the next war fighting domain. Furthermore, since the end of the Cold War, there has been a shift from space utilization in support of deterrence to the growing use of space assets as a military force multiplier that renders more effective the operation of combat forces on the ground through the provision of real time data.⁴

Significantly, while the militarization of space has been a principal feature since the advent of the Space Age, one of the thorniest issues in the early 21st century has been the weaponization of space. Even though defining what counts as a space weapon remains debatable and intrinsically political as a result of different, and often, opposing national interests, a space weapon usually refers to “any specialized destructive device built to operate or take effect” from Earth-to-space, space-to-space, and space-to-Earth (Bulkeley & Spinardi, 1986, pp. 3–4). Definitional issues aside, evidence of the growing use of space for military purposes by all the major space powers abounds in accordance with some key tenets of realist thinking.

In light of this, there is a substantial literature that has examined the politics of space security and assessed the national space policies of major space powers and their strategic interaction from a realist perspective. Not surprisingly, perhaps, U.S.–China space relations have attracted much attention. For example, Tellis (2007) offers an offensive realist analysis of China’s anti-satellite (ASAT) test of January 2007 when the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) successfully used a direct ascent kinetic kill vehicle to destroy a defunct FengYun-1C (FY-1C) Chinese weather satellite. Carrying out the test made China the third country (after the United States and the Soviet Union) to demonstrate such a capability. But the considerable amount of space debris that was produced gathered international condemnation; this, together with the fact that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs seemed to be unaware of its conduct, generated a great deal of debate about the motivations for the test. For Tellis, however, the test was suggestive of China’s broader strategy of counterbalancing U.S. military space superiority by exploiting asymmetric means—such as counterspace capabilities—because of strategic necessity, especially with regard to the possibility of a conflict with the United States over Taiwan. Tellis concludes by arguing that if the Chinese threat to U.S. space assets persists, then Washington should embark upon an offence–defense arms race with Beijing and be the winner.

Crucially, however, reflecting the important differences within the realist tradition, analysts have reached different conclusions about what strategy best serves the interests of space powers, and there has been a good deal of debate about the strategic utility of offensive counterspace programs and their limitations. Offering an analysis of U.S.–China space relations that is in line with defensive realism, Zhang (2011) argues that the security dilemma is a key factor in shaping the U.S. and Chinese military space programs. The author maintains that China’s interest in possessing military space capabilities has been largely prompted by U.S. plans for maintaining dominance in space and the development of the ballistic missile defense program, which can potentially negate China’s nuclear deterrent. Even so, in an optimistic reading of U.S.–China space relations, Zhang suggests that the security dilemma can be mitigated as a consequence of improving relations and strategic adjustments. This, in turn, can open the way for arms control in space.

In a somewhat similar fashion, in his Security and Stability in the New Space Age, Townsend (2021) uses a defensive realist framework for making sense of great power competition in space and the orbital security dilemma. One of the key findings is that cooperation can be the best U.S. strategy for avoiding the security dilemma in the domain of space, rested on commercializing parts of its space-related assets as a way of signaling intent. Rather than taking the path toward weaponization with possible short-term gains, Townsend asserts that opting for cooperation allows the United States to preserve its strategic advantage and long-term stability in space.

Other cases have also been subject to realist analyses. For instance, some observers have explored the importance of the space security dilemma between China and India (Lele, 2019) and the space security trilemma in South Asia between India–China, India–Pakistan, and China–Pakistan (Khan & Khan, 2019). Others have considered China’s initial participation in the E.U.’s Galileo navigation satellite system as an indication of a balancing attempt against the United States (Bolton, 2009) and the wider Sino–European space partnership as “a geotechnical balancer” (Johnson-Freese & Erickson, 2006). Equally, Japan’s space program also constitutes another case that illuminates the relevance of realist insights. More specifically, Kallender and Hughes (2019) argue that the militarization of Japan’s space program under Japanese Prime Minister Abe has signified a shift from the Yoshida doctrine, which refers to Japan’s postwar strategic outlook characterized, inter alia, by a focus on constraining military capabilities, to a new realism. This change in Japanese space policy is a key component of a broader security policy based on internal and external balancing through the acquisition of dual-use assets that partly aims to address China’s rise. Similarly, Pekkanen (2021a) offers a neoclassical realist analysis of Japanese space policy that takes into consideration both domestic and external elements of Japan’s balancing behavior, encompassing counterpace technologies, changes in policy-making structures, and space diplomacy.

Before moving on to discuss other theoretical approaches, it would be remiss not to acknowledge that much important work has been done regarding space power, geopolitics, and strategy that shares some assumptions with realist thinking.⁵ Suffice it to mention here two works for different reasons. The first is Dolman’s (2002) Astropolitik, one of the most influential and innovative works, especially in military circles. Applying classical geopolitics to outer space, Dolman identifies certain locations in space of strategic significance—chokepoints and pathways that are potentially vital in the context of international competition among states in space. He puts forward what he calls the “neoclassical astropolitical dictum”: “Who controls low-Earth orbit controls near-Earth space. Who controls near-Earth space dominates Terra. Who dominates Terra determines the destiny of humankind.” (pp. 6–7). On this basis, Dolman argues —among other things—that the United States should seek to establish a benign hegemony in space acting as a sort of custodian for the space activities of all states through the promotion of liberal democracy and capitalism. Yet, the point to emphasize is that, although there is a tendency to treat Dolman’s book as part of the realist tradition, the key propositions put forward are imbued with a sense of American exceptionalism as well as liberal overtones, which means that this book sits rather uneasily within the purview of realist IR theory. The second important work is Bowen’s (2020) War in Space, which offers a much needed informative and insightful study of space power mainly from a Clausewitzian perspective. By combining strategic studies and IR theory, War in Space bridges a gap in the literature and opens up avenues for further research.

Liberalism

Liberalism is one of the leading schools in IR which, in contrast to realism, takes a more optimistic view of the prospects for cooperation, peace, and security in the international system. This is because adherents of liberalism believe that the international sphere can be improved through the use of reason and under conditions of interdependence. It is important to recognize that liberalism is not a uniform theory, as it encompasses various versions. But is it possible to say that, as an influential approach, it brings to the fore the idea that progress, cooperation, and transnationalism are desirable and attainable through the promotion of liberal principles and values, such as democracy, the rule of law, and free trade, which have a pacifying effect on the conduct of international politics. More pertinently for the purposes of this discussion, another principal liberal idea, associated with “liberal internationalism,” is that international organizations strengthen cooperation and constrain competition and war.⁶

Liberals, therefore, pay deeper attention to international cooperation in space. Although they point out that cooperation is not easy, they stress that cooperative activities are the chief pattern of interaction in the practice of international space relations. In fact, that was the case even during the Cold War. One might intuitively expect that cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union would be foreclosed as a result of the divisions of the Cold War and the very notion of a space race. And yet, as Von Bencke (1997) shows in his insightful study of the politics of U.S.–Soviet space relations, cooperation always coexisted with competition between the two superpowers for much of the history of the Space Age. It is worth recalling, after all, that the launch of Sputnik occurred within the 1957–1958 International Geophysical Year (IGY), a major global scientific event that was partly spurred by the ideals of scientific internationalism and scientific cosmopolitanism (Stroikos, 2018).⁷ What is more, arms control agreements with significant implications for space security were achieved between the superpowers during the Cold War.

To be sure, the degree of space cooperation between the superpowers varied over time as a consequence of changing balances of domestic interests and external factors. The most apparent and dramatic illustration of this possibility was the Apollo–Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) in July 1975 and the iconic “handshake” in space between the Soviet and U.S. commanders that epitomized the remarkable improvement of bilateral relations between the superpowers since the early 1970s, known as the policy of détente (Ross-Nazzal, 2010; Sheehan, 2007, p. 65). In addition to bilateral space cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union, this period also saw the growing use of space technology by the superpowers as an instrument to achieve broader foreign policy aims. Regarding the United States, Krige et al. (2013) offer a detailed study of the role of NASA as an international actor tasked with the promotion of cooperation that was not confined to U.S.–Soviet relations, but also involved collaborative projects with Western Europe, Japan, and India. This focus on space cooperation also gradually led to the creation of the International Space Station. It should also be noted however that, since the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union had embarked on an effort to utilize the development of space stations in low-Earth orbit as a propaganda and foreign policy tool. This was evident in the Intercosmos program that allowed astronauts outside the Soviet Union to participate in the Soyuz/Salyut missions (Sheehan, 2007, pp. 58–62).

Liberalism also helps to take into consideration the development of multilateral cooperation. There have been an increasing number of formal and informal avenues for multilateral cooperation pertaining to space activities.⁸ To begin with, the United Nations system has been central to this, exemplified by the adoption of key resolutions by the General Assembly, and the formation of the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) in 1958 based in Vienna. The subsequent establishment of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in 1959 played a crucial role in the evolution of the legal framework governing space activities, consisting of five international treaties and a set of declarations and principles.⁹ The five international treaties are: the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, known as the “Outer Space Treaty” (OST); the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the “Rescue Agreement”); the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (the “Liability Convention”); the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the “Registration Convention”); and the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the “Moon Agreement”).¹⁰ Of the five treaties, the Outer Space Treaty is the most important, not least because it introduces a series of principles and concepts that have since been considered as the basic framework of international space law, including the concept that space should be reserved for “the benefit and in the interests of all mankind” and for “peaceful purposes” and that it is “nonappropriable” (Tannenwald, 2004, pp. 370–371). As Stuart (2009, p. 16) suggests , the Outer State Treaty, therefore, marks a shift toward cosmopolitan sovereignty.

Besides COPUOS, the U.N. Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva has been the venue for attempts to negotiate space arms control under the agenda item “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS),” while the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is tasked with the management of the radio frequency spectrum and the allocation of slots available in geostationary orbit. What should be added is that there are numerous formal and informal organizations for cooperation and global governance that cut across a wide range of space activities, including the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), the Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS), the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites (CEOS), and the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (ITSO).¹¹

The point to make here is that the end of the Cold War in tandem with the process of globalization acted as a catalyst for further space cooperation that is conductive to liberal analysis. Indeed, there is no dearth of cooperative policies, diplomatic initiatives, and multilateral international projects concerning space. Regionalism has also been an important part of accelerating cooperation, manifested in the promotion of space for European integration through the European Space Agency (ESA) and the European Union (E.U.) (Sheehan, 2007, pp. 72–90). Apart from Europe, other regional venues for space cooperation include the Arab Satellite Communications Organization (Arabsat), the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), and the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF).¹² Moreover, in 2018 the African Union (A.U.) adopted the Statute of the African Space Agency, while Latin American countries have announced plans for the creation of the Latin American and Caribbean Space Agency.¹³

These developments are indicative of a broader transformation in the nature of the international politics of space that is not any longer defined by a handful of states as was the case in the early phases of the Space Age. Instead, we are witnessing what Baiocchi and Welser (2015) call the “democratization of space,” characterized by the growing participation of new actors from developing countries to private entities, such as SpaceX and Blue Origin. Concomitant with this has been the shift from state to private authority in the global governance of space activities together with an increase in transnational Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs). This has the effect of blurring the distinction between the private and public realms as well as between military and civilian uses, raising accountability issues (Newlove-Eriksson & Eriksson, 2013).

These concerns notwithstanding, the liberal approach is especially appropriate in examining the impact of globalization, commercialization, and privatization on space activities. One of the most recent scholarly works to provide a liberal analysis of the international politics of space is Whitman Cobb’s (2021) Privatizing Peace that puts forward the commercial space peace thesis. According to the author, the growing role of private actors along with the growing dependence of the global economy on space-based assets help create powerful economic disincentives for conflict in space. Consequently, the further privatization of space activities should be encouraged.

It should also be emphasized that useful analyses have been carried out of the ever-complex regime for space activities employing regime theory. It is important to note that regime theory is usually associated with neoliberalism, also known as liberal institutionalism (Keohane, 1984). However, the distinction between neorealism and neoliberalism when it comes to regime theory is murkier than is often acknowledged.¹⁴ Be that as it may, for the purposes of this discussion, examples include analyses of the regime pertaining to communication satellites (Krasner, 1991; Martinez, 1985), the military space regime (Kuskuvelis, 1988), and the regime for the International Space Station (Stuart, 2009). Likewise, utilizing regime theory, Aliberti and Krasner (2016) examine the durability of the space regime by focusing on the cases of the allocation of radio spectrum, the use of the Geostationary Orbit, navigation satellites, remote sensing, and orbital congestion. Also relevant to this discussion is the application of Elinor Ostrom’s model for governing sustainable common-pool resources to Near-Earth Orbit by Johnson-Freese and Weeden (2012).

Constructivism

Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, social constructivism has gained a prominent position as an influential approach to the study of global politics. To be sure, as several scholars have pointed out, constructivism is not a theory of international relations per se. Rather, it should be seen as an approach with different variants underpinned by a shared commitment to highlighting the social dimensions of global politics and the sources of change through interaction, the role of ideas and identity in shaping national interests, and how norms constrain power.¹⁵ As such, it is not surprising that constructivism lends itself to the analysis of the social aspects of the international politics of space.

In this way, space security has been central to many constructivist approaches. Offering a critique of those views that see the weaponization of space as inevitable, Mueller (2003) suggests that there is nothing preordained about the use of space weapons, as the shift from space militarization to weaponization is essentially a political process. According to the author, it is worth remembering that both the United States and the Soviet Union had tested nuclear weapons in space, but eventually their placement in orbit was banned. In the context of discussing whether the space weaponization threshold has been crossed, which is usually understood to involve the actual deployment of weapons in space, Mueller argues that this has not been the case yet, not least because the large majority does not believe so. In other words, beliefs and perceptions do matter as space weaponization is “socially constructed.”

Echoing similar themes, in her analysis of the importance of rules for space security, Gallagher (2005) goes beyond power politics considerations and formal laws to take into consideration how norms, principles, informal rules, and shared practices structure international interaction among actors in space without a world government. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the ways in which the United States and the Soviet Union gradually recognized the benefits from the logic of reciprocal restraint that defined their space behavior from the mid-1950s through the mid-1970s. In so doing, Gallagher tacitly acknowledges the social and thus dynamic nature of the domain of space that is shaped by informal norms, shared understandings, and intersubjective meanings, in line with a constructivist approach.

Building on Gallagher’s work and constructivist insights, Moltz’s (2008) the Politics of Space Security, Moltz goes one step further to argue that the emergence of strategic restraint that shaped U.S.–Soviet space relations for much of the Cold War was the result of a process of steady learning by the superpowers regarding the qualities of space as an environment. As Moltz shows , it was through social interaction that the United States and the Soviet Union realized that space as an environment was not conducive to the detonation of nuclear weapons and ASATs due to risks emanating from electromagnetic pulse (ELP) radiation and orbital debris—what he calls “environmental learning.” Therefore, in this reading of space security, not only was there nothing predetermined about the consolidation of the logic of strategic restraint between the two superpowers, but the lessons learned by policymakers during that period can also be unlearned in the future, with implications for space security in the early 21st century.

What merits emphasis is that this way of thinking about space security has also been reflected in the promotion of the concept of a code of conduct or “rules of the road” aimed at defining responsible behavior in space through norms setting. The most unequivocal supporter of this idea has been Michael Krepon, the founder of the U.S. based nongovernmental organization the Henry L. Stimson Center (see Krepon, 2012; Krepon & Clary, 2003). Crucially, however, this thinking has also formed the basis for policy initiatives, such as the E.U.’s Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (Council of the European Union, 2008) and the U.K. resolution on “Reducing Space Threats through Norms, Rules, and Principles of Responsible Behaviors”, which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in December 2020 (United Nations General Assembly, 2020).

Beyond space security, constructivist analyses of other aspects of the international politics of space have also been provided. In one of the most important scholarly works on the regime for space activities, International Regimes for the Final Frontier, Peterson (2005) shows how reasoning by analogy, which was mainly inspired from the combination of the high seas and Antarctica analogies, was central to the process of outer space negotiations about regulating outer space activities. This serves to highlight the significance of social structures and interaction that shape actors’ beliefs and preferences by taking into consideration the influence of shared situation definitions as “social facts.” Reasoning by analogy was significant because those involved in these negotiations were dealing with a new physical realm of human activity that required locational classification, hence the need for drawing analogies from other domains of activities, such as air, Antarctica, and high seas.

The contemporary narrative of a looming arms race in space, typified by the notion of the emergence of a new space race, has also been subject to fruitful constructivist analysis. Cross (2019) argues that this dominant political narrative of a new space race accompanying the creation of the U.S. Space Force is misleading, as it downplays the fact that space is predominantly characterized by international cooperation and peace. According to the author, a similar tale can be told about the Cold War when a powerful political narrative facilitated the notion of a space race with the Soviet Union that remains influential. However, not only is this at odds with the origins of space as a realm of cooperation, but also understates the impetus for space cooperation throughout the Cold War. Still, given that perceptions do matter, the social construction of the new space race premised on the assumption that war in space is inevitable risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, even though it does not conform to reality. Thus, reverberating themes identified by the constructivist works discussed above, Cross suggests that we should not accept such deterministic views at a time when the imperatives of cooperation and peaceful uses of space are compelling.

Some research has also been done regarding the role of identity and space policy. Adapting a constructivist framework, Cunningham (2009) argues that China’s great power identity is the key driver behind its human spaceflight program as an important source of status marker. Focusing on another major space power, Eriksson and Privalov (2021) seek to explain elements of continuity and change undergirding Russia’s space policy by emphasizing the significance of ideational factors and identity through a constructivist prism. Likewise, Venet (2013) explores the links between the E.U.’s identity as an international actor and European space policy as part of a contribution to a collective volume that examines “European identity through space.” Similarly, dealing with a range of national space programs, in The Power of the Space Club Paikowsky (2017) argues that a key rationale behind the pursuit of space capabilities is the quest to join the space club as a source of great power status and national esteem.

Apart from constructivism, limited work has also been done from the perspective of the so-called English School of International Relations, a societal approach that shares some affinities with constructivism mainly concerned with the analytical idea of international society (Bull, 2002; Navari & Green, 2014). For example, exploring the history and origins of space exploration with a specific focus on the spaceflight movement of the 1920s and 1930s and the 1957–1958 International Geophysical Year (IGY), Stroikos (2018) considers the role of scientists and engineers as agents of international society in the context of the interplay between international society and world society. In doing so, the author highlights the significance of scientists and scientific internationalism in propelling the advent of the Space Age. But although scientific internationalism can be seen as a reflection of a world society, as the author points out, scientists are also agents of the international society of states in the sense that they act on behalf of the state. This process was consolidated during the Cold War when the state appropriated scientific internationalism, and remains relevant more than sixty years after the first tentative steps were taken toward the expansion of international society in outer space.

Marxism, Critical Theory, and Poststructuralism

Although some work has been done from the perspective of critical IR theory, studies on space have only recently concentrated directly on the themes advanced by Marxist ideas largely as a result of the growing commercialization and globalization of the space sector. Most of the existing works have been done by scholars working outside the discipline of IR. In this regard, a good starting point is the remarkable sociological study by Dickens and Ormrod (2007), Cosmic Society, which considers the politics of what they term “cosmic imperialism” that builds on Marxist themes, including the “outer spatial fix” based on David Harvey’s work. The authors conclude by calling for “a relationship with the universe that does not further empower the already powerful” (p. 190).¹⁶ This notable book notwithstanding, it should be noted that the explanatory value of “uneven and combined development,” which has gained traction within the discipline of IR , including studies of technology and IR, is yet to be employed by space analysts.

Having said that, as far as neo-Gramscian analyses are concerned, in her book Outer Space Development, which merits more attention from those interested in the study of the politics of space, Weeks (2012) uses a Gramscian lens to highlight how outer space development has been increasingly shaped by the hegemonic ideology of free-market that has already facilitated the privatization and commercialization of space exploration and space travel, leading to the promotion of social and economic equality. In doing so, the author calls for the need to pay more attention to the issues of equality and diversity embedded in the ways in which outer space is currently developing through education. Equally, Oikonomou (2016) examines the pro-industrial stance of the European Metalworkers’ Federation (EMF) toward E.U. space and defense policies. According to the author, this support can be understood as resulting from the function of the production of hegemonic ideology and discourse that has the effect of legitimizing the interests of the E.U. military-industrial complex, as the ruling social force. From the standpoint of the Frankfurt School strand of critical theory, Peoples (2009) builds particularly on critical theorists Herbert Marcuse and Theodor Adorno in his study of U.S. space policy and the militarization of space, underscoring the intrinsic relationship between technological rationality and domination that still “haunts modernity.”

Concomitant with critical theory is a burgeoning literature that considers key aspects of the politics of space through the lenses of critical geopolitics and critical geography. A number of works have initially sought to provide a critique particularly of the U.S. plans for the weaponization of space under the Bush administration, but they were also a response to the influential book Astropolitik by Dolman discussed earlier in the section on “Realism.” A few notable earliest works in this vein were MacDonald (2007), Grondin (2009), and Havercroft and Duvall (2009). Since then, such approaches have embraced a wide range of topics, occupying an important position in relation to the study of geography, geopolitics, culture, politics, and outer space.¹⁷

Moreover, with their focus on the critique of modernity and an interest in “deconstructing the processes by which certain ways of thinking about space emerged and became seen as valid, while others did not,” poststructuralists have a great deal to say about the international relations of space (Sheehan, 2007, p. 17). As an illustration, interrogating the connections between technology, spatiality, and outer space based largely on the work of Paul Virilio, Bormann (2009) offers a poststructuralist critique of the ways in which U.S. policies regarding the weaponization of space constitute outer space as a battlefield embodying certain qualities, while precluding alternative meanings and peaceful possibilities. As well, closely linked to poststructuralism is securitization theory and some interesting work has been done to apply such an approach to cases pertaining to space.¹⁸ Finally, although Susan Strange’s work defies categorization, mention should be made here that Lieberman (2017) has applied Strange’s concept of structural power to space.

Feminism, Gender Studies, and Postcolonialism

Feminism and gender studies can provide valuable insights into current debates about space policy. Indeed, from the place and role of women in the space sector to dominant discourses concerning space colonization and exploitation to the masculine bias that pervades prevailing meanings attached to space as a site of power relations, it is not an overstatement to argue that almost every facet of the international politics of space is gendered. It is surprising, therefore, that, although IR feminists have enriched the study of global politics, less attention has been paid to the politics of space activities. Of course, this is not to suggest that significant work has not been done from a feminist perspective—it has been done, but this has been carried out largely outside the discipline.¹⁹

More specifically, Casper and Moore (1995) offer a sociological study of the practices and discourses surrounding NASA’s human space program by highlighting the social construction of female bodies as inherently opposite to “a male norm” that has the effect of rendering gender and sexuality problematic for spaceflight within the hegemonic heterosexual paradigm. Similarly, focusing on the U.S. space program and the gendered politics of sending men into orbit, historian Weitekamp (2004) tells the fascinating but rather unknown story of thirteen U.S. women who were recruited by the Woman in Space program in the early 1960s. Crucially, although they had met the same criteria as the Mercury male astronauts, they were intentionally denied the chance to participate in the U.S. space program because of their gender identity. In other words, these aspiring female astronauts had “the right stuff,” but “the wrong sex.”

As far as space applications are concerned, Liftin (1997) provides a powerful critique of the discourse surrounding the universal benefits deriving from the use of Earth Observation satellites by revealing the ways in which the purported “global gaze” of remote sensing reproduces a specific understanding of science and rationality suffused with gender bias and unequal power relations. The key question then is whether and how a “feminist rehabilitation” of Earth Observation satellites is possible.

However, it should be noted that much of this research has focused on the experience of the U.S. space program, and it has been less concerned with the gendering of the international politics of space. One exception is the work by Griffin (2009), who argues that the U.S. space discourse concerning the justification for the commercial and military exploitation of space rests on a set of gendered assumptions that reinforce the prevalence of heterosexual masculinity(ies) as normal. One of the key consequences of this gendered process is the construction of a discursive hierarchy that represents the other states with space-faring capabilities as subordinate to the United States, enmeshed in the heterosexual binary of “masculine hegemony/feminine subordination” (Griffin, 2009, p. 68). Yet, the key point to make here is that there is clearly much scope for feminist contributions to the study of the international politics of space that can draw on feminist IR theory.

Postcolonialism is another approach from which the study of the international politics of space would gain an array of different perspectives on how a small group of Western actors exercise so much power over the non-Western world by focusing on the role of culture, race, and the enduring legacies of colonialism and empire.²⁰ From this perspective, the short history of the Space Age is replete with instances where developing countries have tried to address their concerns that space would be another domain of activities defined by the dominance of developed countries, further widening the economic and technological gap between the developed “North” and the developing “South.”

This is not surprising, considering the potential utility and major benefits that flow from the use of space technology and its applications for socioeconomic development in a wide range of areas, including telecommunications, meteorology, disaster monitoring, rescue support, tele-education, and agricultural production. Such criticisms became more acute as part of the Global South’s calls for a New World Information and Communication order in the 1970s that fed into “the first-come, first-served” policy of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), responsible for the allocation of GEO slots and the associated radio frequencies. For developing countries, the ITU’s policy had contributed to the establishment of a discriminatory regime in favor of those states with advanced space capabilities. The 1976 Bogota Declaration by seven equatorial states can also be seen as part of this North–South confrontation over the use of the geostationary orbit as a natural resource. Eventually, some of these concerns were accommodated when in 1982 the ITU reworded its Convention by considering “the special needs of the developing countries and the geographical situation of the developing countries” (cited in Sheehan, 2007, p. 135). Similarly, the 1982 U.N. Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE 82) recognized the need to enable the access of space technology in the developing world through cooperation.²¹

Concerns of justice and development have resurfaced in the first two decades of the 21st century. For instance, delving into the history and evolution of the idea of the global commons and its expression in key regimes, Sutch and Roberts (2019) remind us that the emergence of the outer space regime was from the outset informed by the normative underpinnings of global justice amid the process of decolonization and concerns that a new scramble for resources could unfold in space, perpetuating unequal power relations and inequalities between developed and developing states. Nowhere was this more evident than in the notion of the “common heritage of humankind” expressed in the provisions of the 1979 Moon Treaty that, among other things, espoused the idea of the equitable sharing of benefits accruing from the exploitation and use of lunar resources and envisioned the establishment of an international regime to regulate such activities when these become attainable. Regardless of the different and often competing legal interpretations of the “common heritage of humankind” framework that were provided with regard to the provisions of the Moon Treaty, the overwhelming majority of the developed countries were concerned that the novel stipulations of equitable sharing would have a detrimental impact on the future exploitation of lunar resources. Therefore, they opted to oppose the signing of the treaty that eventually rendered its status as a “failed” agreement. As a result, some analysts believe that the significance of the “common heritage of humankind” has been diminished. In contrast, Sutch and Roberts (2019) argue that the values of the global commons are more relevant than ever in space and should be defended in light of the challenge posed by contemporary U.S. policy discourse advocating space commercialization and militarization that runs the risk of reinforcing colonial legacies and unjust practices into space.

Whatever we may think about such claims, these instances serve to highlight the exercised agency by developing states in shaping the normative structure underpinning the global governance of space activities, which is usually neglected in standard accounts of the politics of space. From a postcolonial perspective, this also raises the issue of Eurocentrism in our understanding of space activities that still draws heavily from the experience of Western states with space capabilities, without acknowledging the global flows of space research and technology and how space technology has been developed and used through innovative ways in the developing world. This is also in line with calls for a global history of space exploration (Siddiqi, 2010a).

Be that as it may, it is plain that unequal power relations and hierarchies remain a key feature of the international politics of space, compounded by contemporary developments related to the commercialization, militarization, and colonization of space and their potential impact on impeding the developing world from the access to and use of space, as has been discussed. While postcolonial scholarship within the IR discipline has paid less attention to the dynamics of space technology, especially when compared to other areas of technology, in what follows is a brief discussion of some indicative works that deal with questions of race, empire, culture, and the influence of colonial history in the context of space.

To begin with, in contrast to standard accounts of the history of the nascent U.S. space program that is centered on the achievements of white male astronauts and engineers, Paul and Moss (2015) tell the story of ten African American space workers and how the space program contributed to the promotion of civil rights by situating this process in the wider context of fighting segregation and racism in the United States. Equally, building on postcolonial studies and science studies, Redfield (2002) investigates the connections between outer space and colonial history, exemplified in the employment of imperial tropes, such as frontier, colonization, and adventure, by illustrating the ways in which the locality and operation of the Guiana Space Center, the launching site in Kourou, French Guiana used by France and the European Space Agency (ESA) to launch satellites into space, remains wedded to its colonial past and the enduring influence of empire.

Two additional works should be mentioned here that, although they defy easy theoretical categorization, they deal with the themes of empire, colonialism, and outer space. The first is by Gorman (2005), who employs a cultural landscape approach to space exploration to shed light on the space activities of space powers that were sustained by their colonies during the Cold War. The second is by Duvall and Havercroft (2008), who argue that U.S. plans for the deployment of space-based military technology can have the constitutive effects of morphing into a new sort of sovereign empire in space, what they call “the empire of the future,” based on the simultaneous process of centralized but deterritorialized sovereignty.

Part of this research has also been a focus on the development of specific national space programs or projects in a postcolonial context. In this respect, leading space historian Siddiqi (2015) has situated India’s early space program within the wider process of the development of science and technology in postcolonial India promoted by a scientific elite committed to the pursuit of modernity by tracing the inherent tensions of such an endeavor.

In a more recent article, Bekus (2021) explores the links between postcolonial politics, identity, and outer space, considering the case of post-Soviet Kazakhstan. In a rather similar vein, building on sociological and historical studies of science and technology as well as the English School and borrowing from postcolonial studies, Stroikos (2020) suggests that technological advancement emerged as a “standard of civilization” that differentiated the “society of civilized states” from non-European societies, reproduced by a “techno-scientific orientalist” discourse. Focusing particularly on China and India, he moves on to consider how the construction of scientific and technological achievements as a civilizational standard continues to shape influential conceptions of highly visible technoscientific projects, such as nuclear and space programs, as indicators of power, status, and modernity in China and India.

Analytic Eclecticism and “Space Policy Analysis”

So far, the discussion has been confined to an overview of the main IR theories and approaches as distinctive and self-contained. Although it is on this basis that scholars usually choose to conduct their research on space, others build on more than one theoretical approach that is in accordance with Sil and Katzenstein’s (2010) call for “analytic eclecticism” in the study of international politics, which involves going beyond paradigms by combining different theories and approaches. In reality, as far as the study of the international politics of space is concerned, several works have employed such a pluralist framework for their subject under consideration, albeit implicitly. For example, in Meta-Geopolitics of Outer Space, Al-Rodhan (2012) draws on realism, liberalism, and critical geopolitics to develop an innovative metageopolitics framework that enables a multidimensional view of space power and space governance. Similarly, in Arms Control in Space, Mutschler (2013) employs neorealism, neoliberalism, and constructivism to make sense of the emergence of international regimes for arms control in space, investigating the merits and limitations of each theoretical approach in an eclectic fashion. Likewise, relying explicitly on analytic eclecticism, Byers (2019) considers the factors that shape Russian–Western cooperation in the Arctic and space.

Nevertheless, this discussion would be incomplete without briefly saying something about a distinctive body of research concerned with the study of the actors, agency, and organizational structures shaping the process of space policy decision-making that goes beyond state-centric analyses and transcending levels of analysis—what can be called “Space Policy Analysis (SPA).” Significantly, this literature shares many of the commitments of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), a subfield of IR preoccupied with the process of foreign policy formulation and foreign policy outcomes (Alden & Aran, 2017; Hudson & Day, 2020). Space constraints prevent an extended treatment of the synergy between SPA and FPA, but a number of cases can be briefly discussed here so that the interested reader can resort to the original works. In this regard, a good example is Spaceflight and the Myth of Presidential Leadership edited by Launius and McCurdy (1997), which contains accounts of the valuable contributions of U.S. presidents in the making of U.S. space policy by taking into consideration the importance of presidential power, domestic politics, and international politics. Likewise, leading historian Logsdon has offered detailed accounts of U.S. space policy under former U.S. Presidents Kennedy and Nixon (Logsdon, 2010, 2015). Various other useful studies have been made of specific factors, actors, and processes that influence U.S. space policy, including the role of NASA, presidential power, and Congress, as well as the impact of foreign policy goals, bureaucratic politics, political parties, advocacy coalitions, public opinion, and the space industry (Burbach, 2019; Handberg, 2003; Johnson-Freese, 2009; Kay, 2005; Krige, 2007; Krige et al., 2013; Krug, 1991; Launius, 2003; Mieczkowski, 2013; Sadeh, 2002; Steinberg, 2011).

Besides U.S. space policy, the cases of other space programs have also been examined. For instance, in a remarkable scholarly work, Siddiqi (2010b) tells the story of the origins of the Soviet space program by highlighting the impact of space enthusiasts in popularizing the idea of space travel as well as the personal initiatives of key designers and engineers that influenced the trajectory of Soviet space policy. Further, from an IR perspective, Moltz (2012) explores the multitude of drivers behind Asia’s key national space programs, with a particular focus on China, Japan, India, and South Korea, while Harding (2013) offers the first comprehensive account of the complex amalgam of factors that shape space policy in developing countries. Attention has also been paid to leading African and Latin American states (López, 2016; Oyewole, 2017). Equally, there is now a growing body of research that fits nicely with the orientation of SPA, surveying certain aspects of the space policies of major and emerging space players, such as China (Chen, 1991; Hanberg & Li, 2007; Johnson-Freese, 1998; Kulacki & Lewis, 2008; Li, 2013; Zheng, 2007), Europe (Hoerber & Sigalas, 2017; Hoerber & Stephenson, 2016; Suzuki, 2003), India (Aliberti, 2018; Gopalaswamy & Wang, 2010; Lele, 2021; Rajagopalan, 2011; Reddy, 2008), Japan (McCormick, 2021; Oros, 2007; Pekkanen & Kallernder-Umezu, 2010; Suzuki, 2007; Watanabe, 2011), Nigeria (Tella, 2018), and South Africa (Alden, 2007; Martinez, 2016).

Consequently, the general observation that flows from this discussion is that SPA offers a necessary antidote to state-centrism that permeates much of scholarly work that deals with the international politics of space from an IR theory perspective. Given the growing interest in space policy decision-making, SPA looks a quite promising approach.

Conclusions

The goal of this study has been to offer a comprehensive review of the literature that examines certain aspects of the international politics of space from an IR theory perspective. Given that there is already a remarkable body of research on space, substantial ground has been covered, but the intention was not to offer a comprehensive and definite account of the international politics of space. Rather, the modest aim has been to convey to the reader a sense of what insights IR theory brings to the study of the politics of space by discussing some key works and specific cases regarding this dynamic new subfield of international relations. With that in mind, this study has offered an overview of the application of contemporary IR approaches to space, considering realism, liberalism, constructivism, Marxism, critical theory, poststructuralism, feminism and gender studies, postcolonialism, and eclecticism. It has also identified a distinctive approach that places emphasis on the importance of the process of space policy decision-making, what is called Space Policy Analysis (SPA) , which has the merits of contributing to future research.

The key point that emerges from this discussion is that the study of the international politics of space has made significant progress, and it is clearly more diverse and vibrant than it was at the beginning of the 21st century, manifested in the different theoretical approaches already used and the burgeoning literature on actors, cases, and processes beyond the United States and Europe. To be sure, this reflects the broader transformation of the politics of space, as the gravity of space activities shifts to Asia and elsewhere. But it is also an indication that this emerging subfield is maturing. Yet, as we have seen, existing works still leave much to be done. While feminist and postcolonial approaches have made important contributions to the study of global politics, these approaches remain an underutilized research resource in the study of the international politics of space. Similarly, there is clearly the need for studies that focus on power and authority in the global governance of space activities, especially in light of emerging global space challenges, such as space debris. Equally, there is much scope for studies that deal with the role of non-state actors, emerging space powers, small states, normative theory, and the global space economy.

Nevertheless, in closing, the most general point to make is that there are grounds for thinking that the study of the international politics of space will gain more traction within the discipline at a time when new ideas and approaches are much needed in the face of the many challenges and issues pertaining to space security and space policy. The reader who is interested in embarking on the study of the international politics of space may feel disheartened to discover that much work has already been done, but at the same time may feel a sense of relief that many possible avenues for future research await, as outer space is not the final, but the new frontier for cutting-edge research within and outside the IR discipline.