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Anticommunism in 20th-Century Chile: From the “Social Question” to the Military Dictatorship

Summary and Keywords

Anticommunism was a central force in the history of the Chilean political conflict in the 20th century. Not only did several political actors define their identities and actions by their opposition to Marxist-inspired revolutionary projects, but also the state in different moments excluded and persecuted everything identified as “communist.” To a great extent, anticommunism relied on three main “frameworks”: Catholicism, nationalism, and liberalism, all of which were crucial elements in the construction of the Republic since the 19th century. Different combinations and interpretations within each framework resulted in different anticommunist expressions, from pro-fascist movements and nationalist groups to the conservative-liberal right wing, the Social Christian center and even moderate socialists. Many of them, especially in the second half of the 20th century, understood anticommunism as a defense of different variations of capitalism. Of course, anticommunism was not a uniquely Chilean phenomenon. It was, in fact, an ideological trend worldwide. This conditioned the reception in Chile of global events and ideas, while it enabled the construction of transnational networks among related actors. The enactment of the Law of Permanent Defense of Democracy in 1948, which outlawed the Communist Party, symbolized the alignment of Chilean politics to Cold War bipolarity. However, the Marxist left was able to recover during the “long Sixties,” in a political and cultural environment marked by the Cuban Revolution. The Popular Unity government was the materialization of all anticommunist fears. The counter-revolutionary bloc created then paved the way to the 1973 coup and the subsequent military dictatorship, which used anticommunism as state ideology. Human rights violations were legitimated by the dictatorship from that ideological framework. Anticommunism decayed by the late 1980s alongside socialist experiences around the world.

Keywords: anticommunism, Chile, Cold War, communism, political conflict, Law of Permanent Defense of Democracy

Definitions and Frameworks

Communism as ideology, political doctrine, and an alternative project of modernity was a phenomenon that deeply marked the history of Chile and the world in the 20th century. The 1917 Revolution and the foundation of the Soviet Union created the necessary reference for those who aspired to carry out an egalitarian, redistributive, and modernizing revolution.1 In Chile, the impact of socialist ideas translated as the politicizing of workers in the most modern areas of the economy, especially in the saltpeter mine fields, and in the organization of partisan organizations, such as the Partido Obrero Socialista (Socialist Workers Party, POS) in 1912; its successor, the Partido Comunista de Chile (Chilean Communist Party, PCCh) in 1922; and the Partido Socialista de Chile (Chilean Socialist Party, PSCh) in 1933, all of which were closely tied to the organized workers movement.2

At the same time that the Chilean Marxist left emerged, an opposition emerged from the state, the press, social organizations, and reformist and conservative political actors to those who defined themselves as socialists and, later, communists. Anticommunism, in this sense, can be first defined as a fundamental aversion to anything justly or unjustly associated with communist ideology and practice, insomuch as it is interpreted as antithetical to accepted practices, values, and social institutions. Thus, part of anticommunism implied the identification of certain fundamental tenets of society that must not be changed, and that rested on collections of shared ideas deeply ingrained in Chilean politics and culture. In this sense, and following Rodrigo Patto Sá Motta’s suggestions for the Brazilian case, anticommunism is spurred by three primary “frameworks”: Catholicism, nationalism, and liberalism.3

Similarly to other places in Latin America, Catholicism strongly impacted how politics operated in republican Chile. From the mid-19th century until well into the 20th, a series of papal documents such as Syllabus (1864), and the encyclicals Rerum Novarum (1898) and Divini Redemptoris (1937), among many others, warned in dramatic tones of the socialist and communist “danger.” In Chile, an important facet of the church hierarchy reproduced those admonitions exactly. Anticommunism, in this way, became one of the pillars of Chilean Catholic identity—above all when this was expressed in the political sphere. The Partido Conservador (Conservative Party) took on the public defense of the Church, emphasizing communism as anathema to the Church, at least until the reformist turn the Church took under the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), when it was replaced in this role by the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democrat Party, PDC). In this transition, progressivist ideas derived from the social doctrine of the Church displaced conservative notions of defending an immutable and hierarchical social order. Even after that, an important part of Catholic thought was related to the most efficient forms of avoiding a Marxist-inspired revolution.4

For its part, nationalism was a common element to a dissimilar group of political forces. Nevertheless, there was a nationalist stream that was historically opposed to everything related to communism, and that took on a natural expression in small groups and intellectual circles on the right end of the political spectrum. Its roots can be traced to the Ligas Patrióticas (Patriotic Leagues) in the north of Chile, which threatened both foreigners and socialists, as well as including organizations like the Milicia Republicana (Republican Militia) and the Movimiento Nacional Socialista (National Socialist Movement, MNS) of the 1930s, among many others. All these groups were not only composed by upper-class members fighting for their property and social privileges, but also by middle- and lower- class subjects, who interpreted communism as a foreign threat to fundamental social values. At the same time, despite their political marginality, nationalism developed a relatively sophisticated intellectual dimension mainly thanks to journals such as Estanquero in the 1940s and 1950s and Portada in the 1970s, among many others. With the understanding that communism as a foreign force would come to dissolve national unity by means of agitation through artificial social conflict and replace Chilean identity with an internationalism obeying Moscow, nationalist rhetoric was especially critical of the Marxist left. From that political tradition there emerged in the mid-1960s, alongside the remains of the conservative and liberal right, the Partido Nacional (National Party, PN), the opposition party most intransigent to Salvador Allende and the Unidad Popular (Popular Unity, UP). Many of the nationalist conceptual developments would serve as a basis for the political rhetoric of the military dictatorship.5

Liberalism was the ideological framework with which the Chilean republic was built in the 19th century, determining the discourse and political practices of a wide political spectrum ranging from traditionalist conservatives to radicalized versions of popular liberalism.6 In the 20th century, the forces that called themselves liberal defended both political and economic liberalism, which very often meant an explicit defense of capitalism. Communism, in this schema, was antithetical to liberalism, given that, on one hand, it would destroy the democratic system and republican institutions, concentrating power only in the party’s hierarchy and, on the other hand, it would stifle private activity by extending the reach of the state to all corners. Anticommunist liberalism, in this way, served to reaffirm its fundamental principles in the public sphere—such as private property or the limits of citizenship—particularly when they were in question and when state projects proposed large-scale reform, such as the Frente Popular (Popular Front) in the late 1930s and the UP in the early 1970s.

Anticommunism, as a result, was not only negation, but also affirmation of a flexible group of ideas and doctrines defined in opposition to the communist “threat.” In this relationship, mixed in were real aspects of distinct local and global socialist forces—such as its internationalism, anticapitalism, anticlericalism and, in many cases, contempt for liberal democratic forms—with stereotypical imagery used for its needs at any given moment. Thanks to this, anticommunism became a fundamental identifying aspect for many intellectuals, activists, and political movements. There were those who, like liberal Raúl Marín Balmaceda or conservative Sergio Fernández Larraín, dedicated their life to study, denounce, and fight against communism. In the same fashion, highly visible public organizations such as the Acción Chilena Anticomunista (Chilean Anti-Communist Action, AChA) in the late 1940s and publications in the 1960s such as P.E.C., by the ex-communist Marcos Chamudes, found their main identifying trait therein. Anticommunism was, from time to time, central to the configuration of political identities and, also, a source of conflict, as was the case with the difficult debates among Social Christians and conservatives between the late 1930s and the mid-1960s regarding strategies for fighting communism. In each case, anticommunism was defined in agreement with a determined intersection of some of its frameworks. Thus, there were those who united discourses and anticommunist practices that blended Catholic-conservative and nationalist-corporatist elements (such as Jaime Guzmán, the most important ideologue of Pinochet’s military dictatorship), while others appealed to reformist versions of Catholic thought alongside a defense of political liberalism (such as Eduardo Frei Montalva, leader of the PDC), among many other possible combinations.7

Of course, anticommunism was neither an exclusively Chilean phenomenon nor only a Latin American one. It was a central aspect of the ideological conflicts at a global scale that found its roots in the construction of socialist doctrines and organizations in 19th-century Europe and that would acquire a greater role with the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the creation of the Soviet Union. Later events such as the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) and the Cuban Revolution (1959) would shape Chilean anticommunist language.8 Anticommunism, in this sense, was a window into “global politics” and into a varied group of transnational networks among related local and global forces. Chile, perhaps to a greater extent than other Latin American countries, was particularly sensitive to the impact of these trends, given the formation in the 20th century of a system of parties analogous to that of Western politics, with a visible and socially rooted Marxist left, a secular and Catholic reformist center, and a liberal and conservative right.9 The adaptation and interpretation of “global politics” in the Chilean political conflict made anticommunism a structural factor of Chilean politics of the 20th century, that is, a decisive element of continuing and changing presence in the debates, and in the political actors involved in the struggle for political power.

This article will outline the primary trajectories of anticommunism in Chile, offering a chronological framework in five stages from its first expressions at the end of the 19th century to the raising of anticommunism to the status of state ideology during the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (1973–1990). Studying the course of Chilean anticommunism shines a new light on the nature of the political conflict, the power and adaptations of certain doctrines and idea systems, the practices (often violent) of exclusion on the part of the state, and the interrelation of Chilean politics with global political ideas, frameworks, and models.

The Emergence of Anticommunism in Chile and the “Social Question” (c. 1871–c. 1920)

In the mid-19th century, conservative publications such as the Revista Católica (Catholic Review) and the newspaper El Mercurio were already publishing admonitions against “socialism and communism, these two great heresies of modern times.”10 Events such as the 1871 Paris Commune revived these condemnations, now blended with an explicit concern regarding public sectors’ collective action against the established order.11 Said concerns were correlated to the situation within the country. By then, some popular sectors and urban areas were beginning a process of politicization and radicalization of liberal principles, first with the Partido Radical (Radical Party, PR) and later with a split from this, the Partido Democrático (Democratic Party, PD). These, in turn, created links with mutual aid worker organizations that, thanks to the slow diffusion of socialist literature, veered from a non-political and recreational disposition toward decidedly classist goals. At the turn of the century, anarchistic ideas helped to broaden the ideological repertoire of these sectors.12

The oligarchic state and conservative press, worried by popular politicization, responded with more warnings on the dangers of socialism. This reaction gave way to a certain oligarchic “way of being,” marked by the conviction that society was naturally unequal, as a result of the order of things determined by God.13 Therefore, anti-establishment political doctrines could not be allowed. In order to deal with the increasing social tensions, oligarchs had to find some simple explanations without resorting to a more sophisticated analysis that would put into question their dominant role. At the turn of the century, the image of the “agitator” was born, an element foreign to the social body that awakened the lowest passions of the popular sectors with purely destructive purposes.

The unequal impact of the process of economic and social modernization aggravated critics. By 1900, about 2,000 conventillos (narrow passages with small dwellings, generally unsanitary) coexisted with mansions in the French style owned by the oligarchy in Santiago. In the northern saltpeter mine region, miners were at the mercy of the owners of the oficinas, who also relied on the favor of local authorities to keep practices unchanged. The expression “social question” started to become common to refer to the increased visibility of urban and rural poverty and its sharp contrast with oligarchic opulence. From conservatives to socialists, intellectuals and activists offered different solutions: While some advocated for Christian charity and the resignation of the poor, others suggested the need for state intervention in the social sphere.14 There were even those who, like Luis Emilio Recabarren, proclaimed the need for a revolutionary restructuring of society in favor of the workers. Recabarren was at that time a young typographer and activist in the PD. In 1910, he participated in the diverse group of middle-class intellectuals critical of the excesses of liberalism in the context of the celebrations of the centenary of the Republic.15 Two years later, he would found, in the northern saltpeter mining region, the POS, which would become the favorite target of the conservative press in its attacks against socialist doctrines.16

Early antisocialism would not stay relegated to warnings. In the face of the most combative expressions by the emerging worker movement, the state did not hesitate to repress them directly. Also, by then the Chilean Army was imbued in a process of “Prussianization” of its structures and doctrines. As a part of that change, socialism and the worker movement became central aspects of its ideological foundation that were presented as threats to national unity and social stability.17 In 1907 there was an opportunity for this to be proven: A strike by saltpeter mine workers occupying a school at the port of Iquique ended with hundreds of workers bombarded with the army’s bullets. In later justifications by government and parliamentary authorities, antisocialist spirit and the defense of threatened “social harmony” took precedent.18

The Russian Revolution of 1917 changed the world of socialist and antisocialist references in Chile and elsewhere. The calls to a revolutionary change of society were no longer a promise or a threat, but were now incarnate in a powerful state of enormous territorial expanse. The conservative Chilean press announced in horror the Soviet government’s methods and its consequences, while socialist groups watched with admiration the achievements of what they understood was the “homeland of the workers.” Thus was created what Eugenia Fediakova has called an “explosion of the imaginary” elevating revolutionary Russia to the status of irresistible political symbol in the Chilean political conflict. The Soviet Union’s existence shaped Chilean political language, transforming fear and contempt for the world of the workers and the people into an ideological opposition regarding social models.19 This acquired more consistency in 1922 when Recabarren’s POS agreed to accept the conditions of the Third International, becoming the Chilean Communist Party.20

The economic crisis of 1915–1920 aggravated social tensions and changed the limits of political debate. While the price of saltpeter collapsed and unemployment rose, representative organizations of popular and middle-class sectors demanded changes in the oligarchic state. Arturo Alessandri, liberal leader from Tarapacá, was able to successfully engender that reformist spirit from the senate, disputing the socialists themselves on the sympathies of the saltpeter mine workers.21 With that accumulated prestige, he ran for president of the Republic in 1920. The presidential campaign was harsh and full of crossfire accusations. The conservative press, for example, accused Alessandri of being a revolutionary and “maximalist” and for seeking nothing less than the destruction of social order. The final result was narrow and was only resolved in an honor tribunal in the midst of a highly polarized climate.22 Alessandri’s victory marked the beginning of a new stage of the Chilean political conflict, one in which anticommunism gained more clout in the practices and language of a varied group of social and political actors.

The Modernization of Chilean Politics and Interwar Anticommunism (c. 1920–1938)

Alessandri did not bring communism to Chile as his detractors feared, nor did he manage to dismantle the oligarchic state as his followers had hoped. Parliamentary obstruction of the opposition and the generalized concern of those who hoped for concrete change provoked the public upset of young reformist military officers led by Carlos Ibáñez. After resigning and returning to his position, Alessandri did indeed achieve the proclamation of a new constitution in 1925, although he would later resign once more. Ibáñez became the strong man of the following governments, assuming the presidency in 1927. The military project begun then was as much anti-oligarchic as anticommunist, as proven by the diversity of political enemies that suffered persecution, repression, and exile under a regime that would quickly assume dictatorial and corporatist traits. The PCCh, for its part, would experience under Ibáñez its first period of clandestinity, while at the same time it would bleed out from in-fighting as a result of bolshevization ordered by the Third International and its South American Bureau in Buenos Aires, as well as because of the debates rooted in the conflict between Stalin and Trotsky.

Ibáñez’s initial success in attending to popular demands and coopting an important portion of the political class and worker unions23 was undone with the global economic crisis of 1929, which in Chile reached dramatic dimensions in 1931. Ibáñez was ousted by a cross-class social movement, opening a brief period of institutional instability where there was no lack of revolutionary proclamations and intentions. Part of the navy revolted in September 1931, an episode interpreted as a revolutionary movement by the political elite. Accusations against the PCCh of instigating the movement mixed with a global imaginary of the revolution, with the image of the Battleship Potemkin as icon.24 The following year, a group of radicalized military deposed the civil government of Juan Esteban Montero, replacing him with an ephemeral Socialist Republic (República Socialista) which included giving an opportunity to the PCCh to organize a small “soviet” (i.e., “council”) in the center of Santiago. The economic, social, and political crisis at that time was of such magnitude that the possibility of a socialist reorganization of the state and society was felt as more than possible by both those who longed for and those who feared that outcome.

Alessandri returned to power in 1932, this time under the presidential framework of the 1925 Constitution. In light of the previous years’ experience, the party system was restructured according to a left-right axis, concepts that started to be common at that time. On the left, the PSCh was founded in 1933, as a populist and unorthodox option as compared to the pro-Soviet PCCh. The PR began to gain followers among the urban middle classes, occupying the political center, while conservatives and liberals left their differences of doctrine aside to unite on the right. The political conflict in this scene was nourished by favorable and contrary references to social change and, therefore, to the hope of revolution. In this thread, in 1936, the Popular Front was born, an alliance among socialists, communists, and radicals, strongly influenced by the Spanish experience. In fact, the Spanish Civil War that was unleashed that same year strongly affected the local political language, polarizing positions among those who defended Franco’s nationalist counterrevolutionary uprising and those who identified with the ideals of the Republic. The election of 1938, in which the frentepopulista candidate Pedro Aguirre Cerda emerged victorious, developed in a particularly tense atmosphere because of the possibility of the Marxist left achieving power alongside the radicals. The right ramped up its anticommunist rhetoric, spreading apocalyptic images revolving around an eventual victory of the center-left and the eventual outbreak of popular violence against the Church and the upper classes just as they claimed the Spanish Popular Front did. The 1938 elections, in this sense, were first put forth as a confrontation between the right and the left, and in which anticommunism was used in a systematic way as a tool for the electoral battle.

Additionally, during the 1930s, some anticommunist political expressions managed to distinguish themselves and adopt their own characteristics. On one hand, a conservative anticommunism developed that surpassed the limits of the Conservative Party and included institutions such as the army and the church. In a countless number of institutional publications, pamphlets, and speeches, this variation of anticommunism was characterized by the defense of a hierarchical social order, property, religion, and Western “civilization,” using both Soviet Russia as well as Republican Spain as counter-examples.25 From this sector emerged the first polemicists specialized in anticommunism, as was the case of the writer and philosopher Valentín Brandau.26

On the other hand, some organizations defined themselves as anticommunist from nationalist and corporatist positions. There were the cases, although with differences among them, of the Republican Militia and the National Socialist Movement (MNS). While the former defined itself as a civil organization and armed defender of constitutional order against socialism and the participation of the military in politics, the latter employed a more confrontational nationalist rhetoric, identifying itself with European fascism. The MNS had a leading role in the most violent episodes in Chilean politics of the 1930s, thanks to its clashes with socialist and communist groups in the streets, until, after a failed attempt at a coup d’état in 1938, Alessandri would decide to unleash a bloody repression that ended the movement’s political influence.27

Lastly, in the 1930s there began to appear a social Christian variant of anticommunism, mostly rooted in the impact on the Catholic world of the Church’s early 20th-century Social Doctrine. Along these lines, some priests began to work with youth in organizations such as the Asociación Nacional de Estudiantes Católicos (National Association of Catholic Students, ANEC). Many of them would register with the Conservative Party as a united group, baptized as the Falange Nacional (National Falange). The differences between the conservative leadership and the Falangist youth came to a breaking point when the latter decided not to support the party’s presidential candidate in 1938. This political and generational conflict was also expressed in the approach to the communist “problem.” While the conservatives appealed to the repression of ideas and actions to safeguard civilization, the social Christians suggested that communism could be overcome by means of social reform and the constant improvement of the popular sectors’ conditions, without need for direct repression.28

Between the Popular Front and the Chilean Cold War (1938–1948)

The uniting factor of the Popular Front was anti-fascism, a political phenomenon as multifaceted and global as anticommunism.29 However, the “fascist threat” in Chile was rather minor. The MNS had a brief peak moment, and never managed to successfully compete for political space with the conservative and liberal right. During the years of World War II, small fascist-oriented groups proliferated, many of which stemmed as much from the MNS as from the Milicia Republicana.30 All these had as a central goal of their political practice the fight against communism, as was the case with the small Movimiento Nacionalista Anticomunista (Nationalist Anti-Communist Movement, MNA). In its newspaper, Antorcha (Torch), the MNA strongly rejected creole and international communism as well as liberal democracy for being inefficient against that threat. All of this was often peppered with anti-Semitic expressions, regarding the belief that it was the Jews who propagated the Marxist threat throughout the world.31

For its part, the political right had managed to maintain a strong presence in the Chilean Congress, which permitted it to contain the reformist impulse of the Popular Front, at the same time insistently spreading its aversion toward communism.32 In 1940, a group of conservative parliamentarians presented a plan for a law that would ban the PCCh—then part of the governmental coalition—which was approved by both houses. Only President Aguirre Cerda’s veto saved the situation.33 This attempt reflected for all a visible fact: Anticommunism had become the Chilean right’s raison d’être.

On the left, relationships were uneasy. The frentepopulista pact came apart due to conflicts between Socialists and Communists, as much for competition for electoral and labor union control, as well as due to the impact of international events such as the Molotov-Von Ribbentrop Pact. The PSCh approached the United States and its pan-American project of collaboration with the war effort, followed by the communists only when the Soviet Union entered the war. At the end of World War II, the arguments revived, coming to their pivotal point in the interim government of the radical Alfredo Duhalde, after the death of Juan Antonio Ríos. It came to the point of jailing communist leaders by order of socialist ministers, clashes in the streets, and state repression. Those conflicts had repercussions in the unions as well. The Confederación de Trabajadores de Chile (Workers’ Confederation of Chile, CTCh) was fractured, largely thanks to a turn by the socialist unionist leader Bernardo Ibáñez toward strongly anticommunist U.S. unionism.34

The end of the war brought other more long-lasting consequences. During those years in Latin American, a “democratic spring” occurred, with a rise in reformist political and social movements that broadened the meanings of citizenship and democracy. By 1947–1948, however, that moment began to weaken. In the presidential elections of 1946, the Radical party candidate, Gabriel González Videla, had won with Communist support, promising an ambitious program of reforms in favor of the workers. The international climate and the internal situation, however, created tension in the political sphere. The right demanded the government to expel the communists, while strikes were on the rise, especially in the vital coal areas of Lota and Coronel. The United States played an important role in pressing González Videla, since according to its view communism was the main continental threat. After the important electoral rise of the PCCh in 1947 local elections, and the honing of some worker strikes, González Videla broke with his old ally, calling for the unleashing of a “war against communism.” The coal region was occupied militarily and the leaders of the party were imprisoned and ostracized. Some of public fame, such as the poet and senator Pablo Neruda, would be forced to flee into exile.35

At this juncture there began to appear civil organizations explicitly oriented toward the fight against communism. The most important of these was Acción Chilena Anticomunista (Chilean Anti-communist Action, AChA), founded shortly after González Videla’s electoral victory and composed of a group of leaders from different political parties (Conservatives, Liberals, Radicals, and a good number of Socialists), ex-militaries, and intellectuals. The ideological foundation came from nationalist and Hispanist thinkers such as Jorge Prat Echaurren and his publication Estanquero, which promoted a spiritual regeneration of the nation outside the framework of liberalism. AChA, however, was not only relegated to discourse. It was organized as a paramilitary group, with arms inherited from the Milicia Republicana and units spread throughout various cities in Chile. The clashes with Communist party militants and coal miners occurred one after the other, even resulting in fatalities.36

González Videla would not resign himself to repressing communism. Along with some military ministers and conservative parliamentarians he drew up a plan for a law that would make the PCCh illegal and erase the electoral records of those identified as militants or sympathizers. The parliamentary discussion was extensive and, for many parties, the cause of harsh arguments. In the Conservative Party, for example, the social Christian sector led by Eduardo Cruz-Coke opposed the law, while the “traditionalist” majority supported it. Those differences opened a rift that would lead to a breakdown of conservatism a few years later. At the same time, the National Falange—also against the legislation—entered into a tough exchange of opinions with traditionalist conservatism, which also included representatives from the Catholic Church hierarchy. The divisions would also affect Radicals and Socialists. In sum, those who supported the legal initiative assumed that democracy should develop the mechanisms to defend itself against what they understood was a global threat to the foundations of society. As the Conservative representative Raúl Irarrázaval pointed out, what was at play was “the precious collection of institutions and rights that constitute the essence of our Western and Christian civilization. Only under its protection can the world continue thinking freely and living with dignity.”37 On the other hand, those who were opposed disputed the anti-democratic and anti-constitutional character of repressing ideas before they became action, as well as proposing alternative paths for overcoming the communist threat. Eduardo Frei, the Falangist leader, pointed out in the party review Política y Espíritu that his anticommunism “rejects police persecution” and the fraudulent justifications of those who only sought to maintain their own privilege.38

The Law of Permanent Defense of Democracy, or “Ley Maldita” (“Damned Law”) as the left-wing press called it, was approved in September 1948. Ramón Zañartu, the director of the Electoral Registry and a fervent anticommunist, began the work of eliminating from the electoral roll all those identified as communists. At the same time, the minister of the interior put at the disposal of administrators and government officials both the names of leaders and militants as well as the electoral performance of the PCCh in 1946, hoping that the percentage of those excluded from their electoral rights would approach the number of Communist votes. By the end of the period established by the law, more than 28,000 voter registrations were wiped from the books, while many of the most well-known Communists suffered punishments of detention and repression.39

Under the Rule of the “Ley Maldita” (1948–1958)

The problems in González Videla’s administration did not end with the enacting of the “Ley Maldita.” Strikes continued, including the participation of middle-class employees, one of the traditional bases of Radicalism. González Videla attempted to approach the right with an economic agenda of austerity, to later return to the center with a “social sensibility” cabinet, without improved results. The deterioration of Radicalism also swept through the rest of the party system, opening the door for the populist and anti-party candidacy of Carlos Ibáñez, who won easily in the 1952 presidential elections.

Ibáñez came to power at the head of heterogeneous political alliance that included the majority of the Socialists and a series of nationalist and corporatist groups within which the most important was the Partido Agrario Laborista (Agrarian Labor Party, PAL). Nationalism, marginal until then in the party system, now had an unprecedented opportunity to take on a greater role.40 However, problems would arise before the alliance achieved its expectations. The 1952 alliance would soon disintegrate. Ibáñez’s political and economic decisions were erratic, and social upheaval quickly reappeared. The year 1955 was a particularly hard year in this regard, mostly due to the fact that the government did not hesitate to use the Law of Permanent Defense of Democracy to put down strikes and protests. On April 2 and 3, 1957, social violence came to its highest point with long hours of protest, destruction, and repression in the heart of Santiago.41

The failure of Ibáñez’s populist project led to the recovery of the political parties. The right, for example, managed to recover its high percentage of votes of previous years. While some intellectuals on the right began to outline a liberal and modernizing economic plan, party leaders found in Cold War anticommunism a trademark for their identity. These perspectives were not contradictory. On the one hand, there were some conservative leaders such as Héctor Rodríguez de la Sotta who openly defended capitalism and the United States’ global leading role.42 On the other hand, there were right-wing politicians who specialized in transnational anticommunism, such as the conservative Sergio Fernández Larraín and the liberal Raúl Marín Balmaceda. For them, the world was divided into absolute evil based in Moscow and all those who opposed it, who by default were deemed “democratic.” The local political conflict was thus interpreted through these global categories. Fernández Larraín, for example, was inspired by the anticommunist persecution under Senator McCarthy in the United States, and he published extensive “reports” with lists of names and organizations of supposed communists.43 Thanks to the prestige he obtained from this work, Fernández Larraín was recognized as an authority in the continental anticommunist network surrounding the four Congresses Against Soviet Intervention in Latin America that took place between 1954 and 1958 in Mexico City, Río de Janeiro, Lima, and Antigua. In large part, those events were marked by the political struggle against Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala, and the celebration of his ousting at the hands of the anticommunist military with explicit support from the United States. Fernández Larraín was dedicated to identifying and denouncing communist infiltration throughout the continent, accusing with exacting rage the populist government of the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (Revolutionary Nationalist Movement, MNR) in Bolivia.44

For their part, the social Christian sectors obtained a more prominent role. The National Falange was determined to continue differentiating itself from conservativism, claiming their particular type of opposition to communism. Jaime Castillo, one of their main ideologues, published in 1955 El problema comunista (the communist problem), in which he criticized conservative anticommunism for being an excuse to defend the interests of the land-owning classes, without true concern for the democratic values that they claimed to defend.45 What is more, Castillo was one of the most active members of the Chilean chapter of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, a transnational organization funded by US intelligence to oppose pro-Soviet intellectual influence in Europe and that during those years expanded to Latin America with the goal of fighting communism through culture and intellectual debate.46 In 1957, the National Falange merged with other social Christian groups to create the Christian Democrat Party, with Eduardo Frei as their most prominent leader. From this moment, its influence and political weight would only grow. Frei’s achievement of third place in the 1958 presidential elections was evidence of this.

The left also underwent a process of reorganization. Communists and Socialists left their previous conflicts aside and allied themselves under the Frente de Acción Popular (Popular Action Front, FRAP). Alongside Christian Democrats, Radicals, and other groups, they formed the “Democratic Sanitation Bloc” near the end of Ibáñez’s government. The goal was twofold: first, to reform the electoral system and political legislation in order to strengthen democratic participation; and second, to obstruct the candidacy of the businessman Jorge Alessandri by means of suppressing bribery and other means by which the right had gained large numbers of votes. The Bloc achieved its mission with the support of Ibáñez with only months before the presidential election of 1958. The “Ley Maldita” was repealed, allowing the PCCh and its active members to be lawful again, and the system of “cédula única” (single ballot) was established for voting. Nevertheless, given the wide range of presidential candidates, Jorge Alessandri won by a narrow margin over Salvador Allende. After twenty years, the right returned to power.

Ghosts of Revolution and Counterrevolution in the “Long Sixties” (1959–1973)

The Cuban Revolution of 1959 began a new stage of political conflict in Latin America. What for many was a legitimate guerrilla movement against an illegitimate dictatorship quickly became the first properly socialist regime on the continent, causing panic among its detractors. The “red threat” no longer came from the far-off Soviet Union, but now had a firm Spanish-speaking ally which, additionally, would develop a strong calling for expanding the revolution throughout the continent. The Chilean anticommunist imaginary, from that moment, would acquire new elements. In 1963, for example, Isabel Letelier, an unknown conservative writer, would publish her novel Quintral, in which she imagined what a Marxist left government would be like in Chile. Supported with detailed illustrations, Letelier showed how the local barbudos (bearded ones) would take control of the goods, property, and women of the Chilean middle and upper classes, while scarcity and arbitrary violence would take over daily life.47 That type of dystopic imagery would be common in the “long Sixties.” Communism was now a present reality, with definite possibilities of coming to power and converting Chile into a “second Cuba.”

In this new setting, the political forces’ preparations for the 1964 elections would take on new tones. The right had been able to take over the executive branch in 1958, but shortly thereafter had to allow the Radicals into the coalition, given the meager economic results. All these would form the “Democratic Front,” united on the need to avoid the electoral victory of “communism.” The PDC, for its part, had managed to establish itself as a leading political actor. The Catholic Church now saw the PDC as its political expression, aiding it with resources and political legitimacy. The United States, similarly, saw in the PDC the best alternative to the left, decidedly collaborating with its expansion since the early 1960s.48 The political situation would be even more favorable for the PDC starting in March 1964. In a local election in the province of Curicó—which had plebiscite elements given the nearness of the presidential election in September of that year—the FRAP candidate, Óscar Naranjo, won. The result was surprising to everyone, considering that Curicó, a farming region, had been a stronghold of votes for the right. Facing what it considered to be a “communist advance,” the right went into a panic, renounced the Democratic Front and, leaving behind their bitter disputes of the past, gave its unconditional support to Frei and the PDC. Anticommunism, reformed with the impact of the Cuban reference, was vital in the movement of alliances leading up to an election understood as transcendental for the future development of the country and the continent.

Thanks to the strong connection between the continental setting of “inter-American Cold War” and the political conditions of 1964 Chile, the elections that year were a moment of great public projection of anticommunist arguments up to that point.49 The PDC, after Curicó, added to its reformist and regenerative discourse several insistent warnings on the “communist” danger that loomed over Chile. The right sought refuge in exactly those last arguments and pointed out that support for Frei was a sacrifice carried out for the continuity of the nation, family, and religion. At the same time, the CIA, alerted to the possibility of a Marxist victory, invested millions of dollars into financing propaganda and anticommunist groups to influence the election, relying on their experience of intervention in the 1948 Italian elections. From this combined effort among local and international actors, there emerged posters, radio announcements, books, newspaper inserts, and civil organizations, all aimed at presenting Allende and the FRAP as a vital threat to the nation, backlit by the Cuban example. On posters of organizations created at that time, such as the Foro por la Libertad del Trabajo (Freedom of Work Forum) or Acción Mujeres por Chile (Women’s Action for Chile), the left was represented as antithetical to family, children’s well-being, social peace, and harmony in the relationship between capital and labor. Thanks to the “Scare Campaign,” as the leftist press called it, the presidential campaign was experienced as a highly polarized political conflict, riddled with strong accusations among the contenders. In that environment, Frei won by absolute majority.50

The reformist impetus together with the PDC’s rejection of political alliances polarized the political system under Eduardo Frei’s government even more. While for the leftist opposition, implemented measures proved insufficient—although they supported the constitutional reform of 1967 that redefined the concept of property in order to allow the possibility of agrarian reform—for the rightist opposition, Social Christian reformism did nothing but open the gates for communism. Marcos Chamudes, an ex-Communist turned professional anticommunist, insisted on that theory in his journal P.E.C., which in turn received US support. At the same time, on the left and the right things were changing. Influenced by guevarismo, the PSCh shifted rhetorically toward ultra-left positions, especially after its 1967 Congress held in the city of Chillán. Additionally, that year, a new youthful group of radicalized students from Concepción took control of the small Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Left Movement, MIR) that openly praised armed conflict and revolutionary violence. On the other hand, conservatives and liberals—much diminished electorally, especially after the 1965 parliamentary elections—decided to dissolve themselves and merge with nationalist groups to create the National Party, with a much more confrontational appearance, that was less open to negotiation than the traditional right.51

The 1970 presidential campaign unfolded in a political climate deeply steeped in binary positions from the Cold War. Chile, in turn, began to be seen as a particularly conflictive area of global confrontation.52 Salvador Allende ran a fourth time for the presidency, now at the head of the Popular Unity, a leftist coalition based on the Communist and Socialist Parties, and that also included the majority of Radicals, among other minor parties. The PDC elected Radomiro Tomic, the leader of its internal leftist group, as their candidate, while the right appealed to Jorge Alessandri in an attempt to construct a “national” candidacy that was apolitical and moderate. Unlike in 1964, there was no possibility of an electoral pact for the center-right regarding their aversion to the left, in great part thanks to the accumulated bad feelings rooted in the application of the Agrarian Reform and radicalization toward the left of an important segment of the PDC. That allowed Salvador Allende to win by a narrow margin on September 4, 1970. Some ultra-right groups tried to avoid Allende’s confirmation by the National Congress, attempting to kidnap the commander in chief of the army, René Schneider, whom they assassinated. It was only a warning of the form the opposition would take toward the government, seen by an important part of the new government’s detractors as an incarnation of all the accumulated fears of the 20th century, projected with particular force into the public sphere during the 1960s.

The UP’s economic plan worked for the first year. Industry’s idle capacity was utilized at the same time that working capital expanded and salaries rose with redistributive effects in favor of the workers. The copper mines and the entire banking system were nationalized and agrarian reform began to deepen, urged in large part by the radicalized peasant base. All this was seen combined with political successes such as the almost 50 percent of votes for pro-government candidates in the municipal elections of April 1971. The problems began toward the end of that year. Inflation began to rise as well as the first signs of basic goods shortages.53 The right, politically cornered, started to gain ground in its denouncement of the intrinsic evil of “communism.” Stemming from Fidel Castro’s extensive visit to Chile, a group of conservative upper-class women managed to organize a mass march in the heart of the capital, called the “March of the Empty Pots,” seeking to put into question the plan to transition to socialism from the point of view of their situation as housewives, independent of social class. The clashes between leftist militants and members of the Patria y Libertad (Fatherland and Freedom)—a recently formed ultra-right violent group—highlighted even more the questioning of government competence. From that perspective, the cunning, trickster, and destructive nature of “communism,” now in the seat of power, was evidenced in practice.54

Conservative women were important actors in spreading anticommunist arguments in the public sphere in order to oppose and eventually topple he Marxist left from power. As right-wing men in the 1950s, conservative women also developed transnational networks with like-minded organization across the continent in the 1960s and early 1970s. Brazilian women who actively participated in the social mobilizations against Joao Goulart in 1964 (which ended in a military coup that inaugurated a long dictatorship) presented the main model to follow. Among other things, they organized the First South American Congress of Women in Defense of Democracy in Rio de Janeiro in April 1967, which sought to “teach” other Latin American women how to deal with atheist communism. Chilean Olga Irrarázaval, who had experience in organizing anticommunist campaigns through Women’s Action for Chile in 1964, attended the meeting. When Salvador Allende was elected in 1970, Chilean women had their Brazilian counterparts in mind. After the March of the Empty Pots, they organized “Poder Femenino” (Feminine Power, PF) which applied political strategies learned from the struggle against Goulart: social mobilization in name of apolitical, cross-class women who only wanted to defend their homes, their children, and the moral foundations of society. The success of PF in agglutinating thousands of upper-, middle-, and even lower-class women against Allende was largely due to the early transnational experience developed in the previous years.55

Anticommunist rationality was also amplified by right-wing newspapers and journals—such as Sepa, Tribuna, and the aforementioned P.E.C., in addition to the traditional El Mercurio, among many others—added to which were various radio stations and the Catholic University’s television channel. They were all particularly insistent on the broadcasting of the overly-simplistic anticommunist imaginary, which did not recognize the nuances regarding everything related to the government. Thus, the right-wing media—several of them financed by the United States—were vital in constructing an interpretive framework of reality based on the anticommunist tradition of previous years. From that perspective, the UP could only be arbitrary, violent, corrupt, totalitarian, and inefficient. Thanks to the fact that due to the government’s errors as well as the work of the opposition some elements of the anticommunist imaginary constructed and disseminated in the previous years were verified in practice—such as shortages, the “lines” to acquire basic products, and street violence—anticommunism itself grew more legitimate, broadening the social spectrum that could be mobilized for the political opposition.56

Social radicalization regarding the pairing revolution/counterrevolution and communism/anticommunism reached a new level due to the 1972 “October Strike.” Begun by the truckers’ union, it gained the support not only of the opposition political parties and businessmen, but also from the majority of middle-class social organizations, like professional associations, small merchants unions, small industry and small farm owners. The strikers took on the representation of the nation—they presented, in fact, a “Pliego de Chile,” i.e., a document with a set of demands allegedly signed by the entire nation—to oppose a government seen as unaware of the real interests of society. The government responded harshly, accusing the movement of a “political” and seditious nature, at the same time mobilizing its own social bases to reduce the effects of the strike.57 The very dynamic of political and social polarization made it so that on many occasions the social bases of both groups overtook their most recognized leaders. While the middle-class unions, women, and businessmen radicalized their oppositional political practices—accelerating in turn the PDC’s turn toward the right—the workers connected to the government hurried along the nationalization of businesses and the organization of “popular power” based on industrial “cordones” (groups of connected nationalized factories run by workers).58

From this moment on, the social conflict was head-on. The less-than-conclusive results of the parliamentary elections in March 1973 pushed the counterrevolutionary political and social bloc toward an all the more explicit insurrectionary strategy. The political rhetoric of the opposition was based on a radicalized anticommunism, turning the daily political conflict into a struggle for the nation’s survival. The state, too, was paralyzed, between the revolutionary executive branch and the legislative and judicial branches obstructing all initiatives in the name of democracy and the constitution. At the same time, the daily struggle was expressed in a constant effort to “win back the streets,” as much with massive organized acts as with constant clashes between armed brigades and sympathizers from both sides.59 The last months of the UP passed in that climate of bitter political struggle. The left, divided between those who called for preparation for armed conflict and those who sought to avoid that result, could do little in the face of the strengthening military conspiracy supported by the counterrevolutionary social bloc. On September 11, 1973, a violent coup d’état overthrew the constitutional government of Salvador Allende, calling for the defense of democracy and the global fight against communism.

State Anticommunism: The Military Dictatorship (1973–1990)

Gustavo Leigh, commander in chief of the air force and member of the military junta that took power on September 11, 1973, was explicit in his arguments on the reasons for the coup d’état. Facing the media, he pointed out that the military action was in reaction to the “Marxist cancer” that had brought to the country an “economic, moral, and social setback that could no longer be tolerated.” The solution was “to stamp it out completely” for which the new regime would have no reservations with the defeated.60 Six months later, the junta would share its “Declaration of Principles,” a document expressing the “re-foundational” spirit of the dictatorship, squashing any hope of a brief intervention. Therein it was established that “Chile is not neutral in the face of Marxism,” thus the regime “neither fears nor wavers in declaring itself as anti-Marxist.” The state, therefore, should watch out for the respect of property, free initiative, and individual freedoms, presented as contradictory with any state political project, of which Marxism was only the most recent iteration.61

The dictatorship went beyond rhetoric. At the same time that it proclaimed its anticommunism and anti-Marxism as primary ideological foundations of the regime, an enormous repressive system was deployed against left-wing organizations, the workers’ movement, and their social bases. In the first months after the coup, the military and police forces attacked everything related to the left, for which they created enormous detention, torture, and even extermination centers, such as the one run at the National Stadium. Soon after, Augusto Pinochet, commander in chief of the army and leader of the junta, created the Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (National Intelligence Directorate, DINA) with the goal of rationalizing repression and destroying the MIR, the PSCh, and the PCCh. Hundreds of thousands of Chilean citizens and foreigners suffered detention, torture, executions, disappearances, or exile, with the justification of fighting a war against the Marxist threat still looming over the nation.62 The DINA, in addition, reflected the junta’s conviction that it was a struggle against a global enemy, establishing ties with other Latin American dictatorships’ security organizations to exchange information and prisoners under the name “Operation Condor.”63

Furthermore, the dictatorship inherited the counterrevolutionary social group that had had a leading role in the destabilization of Allende’s government. This guaranteed it broad social acceptance in the first years. On the first three anniversaries of the coup, enormous mass actions in Santiago and provincial cities were organized, with the enthusiastic participation of middle-class, conservative women’s, and neighborhood organizations. The dictatorship, in fact, was receptive to the demands of many of these groups. Additionally, within the regime, groups from different ideological traditions coexisted, one of which was openly in favor of corporativism and that, consequently, sought the organization and integration of that social support base into the state.64 To a great extent, the acceptance of the dictatorship by an important segment of the population was due to the experience of radicalization toward the right under the UP and, furthermore, because of the government’s propaganda efforts to codify them as a fight for the nation against a vital threat. The most comprehensive attempt to depict reality on those terms was the so-called “Plan Z,” a made-up conspiracy according to which the UP would have planned to assassinate right-wing leaders in order to gain complete power only a few days before the coup. This synergy spurred the creation of what Steve Stern has called a “memory as salvation,” that is, a socially shared framework from which to remember and legitimate military authoritarianism.65

By 1975, the junta opted for neoliberal economic formulas from a group of economists educated at the University of Chicago. Neoliberalism, presented as an objective and authentic science, proposed to achieve development and prosperity through the market. With the liberalization of the economy and reduction of the state’s role, the criticism of “communism” became applicable to the political and economic system initiated with the Constitution of 1925.66 The results would only arrive by 1977–1978, after a profound economic crisis, thanks to the widespread growth of consumption, the boom of imports, and control of inflation. The legitimacy that had been gained in economic terms was further complemented by the institutionalization of the regime into the Constitution of 1980. Anticommunism, in spite of all this, had not been forgotten. It was not only a central part of the dictatorship’s everyday rhetoric, but also made up the institutional design of the times. Article 8 of the Constitution of 1980 declared Marxist parties to be illegal.

Despite the victorious atmosphere, the dictatorship also faced problems. International condemnation was nearly unanimous. The United Nations General Assembly approved one punishment after another on Pinochet’s regime, which could only respond with “consults” such as that of 1978 in which the citizenry was called to express its support for the regime in a highly irregular plebiscite. When the DINA threatened the opposition beyond Chile’s borders, the problems worsened. In 1976 a car bomb exploded in Washington, DC, killing Allende’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs Orlando Letelier, and his secretary and left-wing activist Ronni Moffitt. Pressure from the United States brought about the dissolution of the DINA and deeper international isolation. At the same time, within Chile, the marks of inhumane repression were beginning to multiply. With the efforts of institutions such as the Catholic Church’s Vicariate of Solidarity, discoveries added up, such as the cadavers of executed farmers in Lonquén, near the capital, in 1978. To the growing “moral opposition” sentiment was added the desperation of the “losers” of the neoliberal model, which reached from impoverished worker sectors to broad sectors of the middle classes previously protected by the state.67 All the opposition activity exploded in the wake of the economic crisis that occurred between 1982 and 1983. The Chilean economy’s high levels of debt created from a regional debt crisis a huge disaster that ended the modern dream of imports and consumer credit. In 1983, worker protests reached enormous proportions and later were coordinated by opposition political parties. The ghost of communism, in the eyes of the regime and its followers, was returning to Chile.

Starting at that moment, the political struggle would take on different terms. The opposition was organized into two poles: on the one hand, the Alianza Democrática (Democratic Alliance, AD), based on the alliance between the PDC and “renewed” socialist groups, and, on the other hand, the Movimiento Democrático Popular (Popular Democratic Movement, MDP), that united the MIR, the PCCh, and socialists who were not “renewed.” The PCCh, leaving behind a long political tradition of going unarmed, leaned toward a strategic line that would use “all forms of struggle,” as the secretary general, Luis Corvalán, said, including “acute violence” to overthrow the dictatorship.68 This would bring consequences. The AD tried to negotiate with the regime on the occasion of the 1983 protests, with little success. For its part, the Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez (Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front, FPMR), the armed branch of the PCCh, attempted in the “decisive year” of 1986 to admit arms into Chile and make an attempt on Pinochet’s life. Both initiatives failed. The moderate opposition ended up accepting the plan to transition to democracy appended to the 1980 Constitution that included a plebiscite under uncertain conditions in 1988. At the same time, the PDC blocked all initiatives by Socialists to approach the PCCh in order to unify the opposition. As they noted at the time, communism was incompatible with the AD’s goals of reestablishing democracy. Furthermore, the government made constant use of the fear of communism to discredit all types of opposition, which underscored the differences even more.69

Thanks to the work of the opposition and international pressure, the 1988 plebiscite was able to take place under the minimal necessary conditions. The option “No” against Pinochet won with 54 percent. During the campaign, the opposition mixed messages of condemnation regarding human rights violations with messages of hope and joy, while the regime’s propagandists took refuge in a televised repeat of the anticommunist “scare campaign” that did not achieve its mission. The context of an anti-dictatorial struggle and the celebration of liberal democracy on a global scale made the warnings launched by the regime about a “red threat” seem unconvincing.70

The end of Pinochet’s dictatorship coincided with the global crisis of socialist regimes. Communism as a historic force and model for society quickly fell into discredit in the 1990s. The crisis of the revolutionary idea brought with it also the crisis of the counterrevolutionary idea and, therein, of anticommunism as an ideological tool. Certainly, the post-authoritarian right continued to flaunt its opposition to Marxism, while the PCCh suffered a new period of electoral exclusion at the hands of the two-party system that did not allow it to enter Congress. Despite this, anticommunism ceased to be a leading force, and has only been invoked by representatives of the conservative sphere in moments of particular social tension or, in recent years, with the integration of the PCCh in governmental work.


As mentioned earlier, different versions of anticommunism were present in each of the stages of Chilean political conflict in the 20th century. From the first admonishments of the conservative press in the later decades of the 19th century to the recognition of anticommunism as state ideology in the military dictatorship, a wide range of political players acted and defined themselves in terms of their aversion to the model for social change based on Marxism and, especially, the communist reference of the Soviet Union. As was pointed out, Chilean politics were especially sensitive to the fluctuations of “world politics” to the point of organizing a party system in accordance with the most relevant ideological divisions at each moment. Because of this it is possible to say that anticommunism was a structural element of Chilean political history. On one hand, it served to define political identities, above all those situated in the sphere of conservative action, in their different iterations. In fact, of even more extreme counterrevolutionary stances, the greatest was the influence that anticommunism had on these actors. On the other hand, anticommunism legitimated political practices of violence and exclusion on the part of the state as well as nonstate actors. The periods of exclusion and/or persecution of the PCCh (and the left wing in general) are an indicator of that: They faced going underground under Ibáñez’s dictatorship. After that, they could only register legally as the Communist Party in 1947, only to be banned the following year. Between 1958 and 1973 they had a leading role in the party system, later being harshly persecuted and repressed under the military dictatorship. Although Article 8 of the 1980 Constitution, which banned Marxist parties, was repealed, the two-party system made the PCCh’s access to Congress impossible in the post-authoritarian democracy, a situation that was overcome with its incorporation into the center-left ruling party toward the end of the first decade of the 21st century.

That anticommunism has been a structural factor of Chilean political history for over a century does not mean that it should not be understood historically. It was not, in that sense, unambiguous or static. Its matters, practices, and limitations were due to the particularities of the political conflict at each moment. Thus, for example, the combination of anti-Semitism and anticommunism that was common in nationalist groups in the early 1940s was no longer acceptable—nor efficient—in the political struggle against the UP in the early 1970s. Those changes, at the same time, had much to do with the local reception of ideas, doctrines, contacts, and global resources. As mentioned, there were certain events with global effects—the Russian Revolution, the Spanish Civil War, the Cuban Revolution—that changed the Chilean anticommunist discourse. In the same fashion, anticommunism allowed many to come into contact with a series of foreign actors with whom they had common goals, something especially clear in the 1950s and 1960s, when US intelligence agencies intervened in Chilean domestic politics in accordance with their own understanding of Cold War bipolarity towards Latin America, while conservative women initiated contacts with like-minded groups across the continent. The study of anticommunism, therefore, enriches the analysis of Chilean and Latin American political history from the point of view of its entry into transnational networks, of super powers’ interventionism in countries of the developing world, and of the circulation of global political ideas.

Archivo fotográfico Fortín Mapocho. Fortín Mapocho photographic archive. Superb photographic archive of the social struggles against the military dictatorship during the 1980s.

Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional. National Congress Library. Digital access to parliamentary debates, political biographies, magazines, pamphlets, among other resources.

Catálogo de la Biblioteca Nacional. National Library Catalogue. Search engine to thousands of Chilean newspapers, magazines, books, pamphlets, etc., stored at the National Library in Santiago, Chile.

Centro de Documentación—Museo de la Memoria. Documentation Center—Museum of Memory. Digital access to an array of historical sources on the military dictatorship, especially those related to repression, violations of human rights, and political violence.

Centro de Investigación y Documentación—Universidad Finis Terrae. Research and Documentation Center—Finis Terrae University. See especially the collection of anticommunist propaganda during the 1964 presidential elections.

Centro Documental Blest. Blest Documentary Center. Online library and archive on recent Chilean history.

Memoria Chilena. See entries titled “El impacto de la Guerra Fría en Chile” and “La Ley de Defensa Permanente de la Democracia,” among many others.

Further Reading

Casals Araya, Marcelo. La creación de la amenaza roja. Del surgimiento del anticomunismo en Chile a la “campaña del terror” de 1964. Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2016.Find this resource:

    Correa, Sofía. Con las riendas del poder: la derecha chilena en el siglo XX. Santiago: Editorial Sudamericana, 2005.Find this resource:

      Cristi, Renato. El pensamiento político de Jaime Guzmán: una biografía intelectual. Santiago de Chile: LOM Ediciones, 2011.Find this resource:

        Deutsch, Sandra McGee. Las Derechas: The Extreme Right in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, 1890–1939. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999.Find this resource:

          Dinges, John. The Condor Years: How Pinochet And His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents. New York: The New Press, 2012.Find this resource:

            González Miranda, Sergio. El dios cautivo: las Ligas Patrióticas en la chilenización compulsiva de Tarapacá (1910–1922). Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2004.Find this resource:

              Grez Toso, Sergio. La “cuestión social” en Chile: ideas y debates precursores, 1804–1902. Santiago: Dirección de Bibliotecas, Archivo y Museos—Centro de Investigaciones Diego Barros Arana, 1995.Find this resource:

                Grez Toso, Sergio. Historia del comunismo en Chile: la era de Recabarren, 1912–1924. Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2011.Find this resource:

                  Harmer, Tanya. Allendes Chile and the Inter-American Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011.Find this resource:

                    Huneeus, Carlos. La guerra fría chilena: Gabriel González Videla y la Ley Maldita. Santiago: Random House Mondadori S.A., 2009.Find this resource:

                      Huneeus, Carlos. El régimen de Pinochet. Santiago: Penguin Random House, 2016.Find this resource:

                        Iber, Patrick. Neither Peace nor Freedom: The Cultural Cold War in Latin America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015.Find this resource:

                          Maldonado, Carlos. ACHA y la proscripción del Partido Comunista de Chile. Santiago: Documento de Trabajo No. 60—FLACSO, 1989.Find this resource:

                            Pavilack, Jody. Mining for the Nation: The Politics of Chiles Coal Communities from the Popular Front to the Cold War. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011.Find this resource:

                              Power, Margaret. Right-Wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle Against Allende, 1964–1973. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002.Find this resource:

                                Power, Margaret. “Who but a Woman? The Transnational Diffusion of Anti-Communism among Conservative Women in Brazil, Chile and the United States during the Cold War.” Journal of Latin American Studies; Cambridge 47, no. 1 (2015): 93–119.Find this resource:

                                  Sá Motta, Rodrigo Patto. Em guarda contra o perigo vermelho: o anticomunismo no Brasil, 1917–1964. São Paulo, SP, Brasil: Editora Perspectiva : FAPESP, 2002.Find this resource:

                                    Stern, Steve J. Battling for Hearts and Minds: Memory Struggles in Pinochets Chile, 1973–1988. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006.Find this resource:

                                      Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate, Verónica. La Milicia Republicana: los civiles en armas, 1932–1936. Santiago: DIBAM—Centro de Investigaciones Diego Barros Arana, 1992.Find this resource:

                                        Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate, Verónica. El nacionalismo chileno en los años del Frente Popular (1938–1952). Santiago: Univ. Católica Blas Cañas, 1995.Find this resource:

                                          Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate, Verónica. “Nacionalismo, ibañismo, fuerzas armadas: línea recta y el ocaso del populismo.” Contribuciones Científicas y Tecnológicas 25 no. 116 (1997): 1–41.Find this resource:

                                            Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate, Verónica. El golpe después del golpe: Leigh vs. Pinochet : Chile 1960–1980. Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2003.Find this resource:

                                              Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate, Verónica. Nacionales y gremialistas: el “parto” de la nueva derecha política chilena, 1964–1973. Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2008.Find this resource:


                                                (1.) On the importance of communism as an alternative project of modernization and as a key political force during the 20th century, see Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991 (London: Abacus, 2011); and Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

                                                (2.) For more, see, among many others, Sergio Grez Toso, Historia del comunismo en Chile: la era de Recabarren, 1912–1924 (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2011); Alan Angell, Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile (London; New York: Oxford University Press–Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1972); and Paul W. Drake, Socialism and Populism in Chile, 1932–52 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978).

                                                (4.) For more, see Brian H. Smith, The Church and Politics in Chile: Challenges to Modern Catholicism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982).

                                                (6.) Regarding liberalism and its impact on 19th-century Chilean political forces, see, among others, Iván Jaksic and Sol Serrano, “El gobierno y las libertades. La ruta del liberalismo chileno en el siglo XIX,” in Liberalismo y poder: Latinoamérica en el siglo XIX, ed. Ivan Jaksic and Eduardo Posada Carbó (Santiago, Chile: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2011); Juan Luis Ossa Santa Cruz, “No One’s Monopoly: Chilean Liberalism in the Post-Independent Period, 1823–1830,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 36, no. 3 (2017); and James A. Wood, The Society of Equality: Popular Republicanism and Democracy in Santiago de Chile, 1818–1851 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2011).

                                                (7.) Regarding Guzmán and Frei, see Renato Cristi, El pensamiento político de Jaime Guzmán: Una biografía intelectual (Santiago de Chile: LOM Ediciones, 2011); and Cristián Gazmuri, Eduardo Frei Montalva y su época, 2 vols. (Santiago: Aguilar, 2000).

                                                (8.) On the impact of the Spanish Civil War in the Chilean right wing, see Kirsten Weld, “The Spanish Civil War and the Construction of a Reactionary Historical Consciousness in Augusto Pinochet’s Chile,” Hispanic American Historical Review 98, no. 1 (February 1, 2018): 77–115.

                                                (9.) Several historians have noted this special receptivity of Chilean politics to the fluctuations of world politics, such as Olga Ulianova, “Algunas reflexiones sobre la Guerra Fría desde el fin del mundo,” in Ampliando miradas: Chile y su historia en un tiempo global, ed. Fernando Purcell Torretti and Alfredo Riquelme (RIL Editores–Instituto de Historia, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2012), 235–259; Joaquín Fermandois, Mundo y fin de mundo: Chile en la política mundial, 1900–2004 (Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile, 2005); and Alan Angell, “Algunos problemas en la interpretación de la historia chilena reciente,” Opciones 9 (1986).

                                                (10.) Cited in Simon Collier, Chile, la construcción de una república, 1830–1865: Política e ideas, trans. Fernando Purcell (Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile, 2005), 131–132.

                                                (11.) Luis Ortega, “Los fantasmas del comunismo y Marx en Chile en la década de 1870,” Revista de Historia Social y de las Mentalidades 2, no. 7 (2003).

                                                (12.) Regarding these topics, the work of Sergio Grez Toso is essential: Sergio Grez Toso, De la “regeneración del pueblo” a la huelga general: Génesis y evolución histórica del movimiento popular en Chile (1810-1890) (Santiago: Dirección de Bibliotecas, Archivos y Museos, 1997); Sergio Grez Toso, Los anarquistas y el movimiento obrero: la alborada de “la Idea” en Chile, 1893–1915 (Santiago, Chile: LOM Ediciones, 2007); Sergio Grez Toso, El Partido Democrático de Chile: auge y ocaso de una organización política popular (1887–1927) (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2016). See also Peter DeShazo, Urban Workers and Labor Unions in Chile, 1902–1927 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983).

                                                (13.) Luis Barros and Ximena Vergara, El modo de ser aristocrático: el caso de la oligarquía chilena hacia 1900 (Santiago: Ariadna Ediciones, 2007).

                                                (14.) Regarding the “social question,” see Sergio Grez Toso, La “cuestión social” en Chile: ideas y debates precursores, 1804–1902 (Santiago: Dirección de Bibliotecas, Archivo y Museos–Centro de Investigaciones Diego Barros Arana, 1995); and Juan Carlos Yáñez Andrade, Estado, consenso y crisis social: el espacio público en Chile, 1900–1920 (Santiago: DIBAM–Centro de Investigaciones Diego Barros Arana, 2003).

                                                (15.) Cristián Gazmuri, El Chile del centenario, los ensayistas de la crisis (Santiago: Instituto de Historia, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2001).

                                                (16.) Sobre Recabarren, Julio Pinto, Luis Emilio Recabarren: una biografía histórica (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2013).

                                                (17.) Genaro Arriagada Herrera, El pensamiento político de los militares (Santiago: Aconcagua, 1986).

                                                (18.) For more, see Julio Pinto Vallejos, Desgarros y utopías en la pampa salitrera. La consolidación de la identidad obrera en tiempos de la cuestión social, 1890–1923 (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2007); and Eduardo Devés Valdés, Los que van a morir te saludan. Historia de una masacre: Escuela Santa Maria, Iquique, 1907 (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 1997).

                                                (19.) Evguenia Fediakova, “Rusia soviética en el imaginario político chileno, 1917–1939,” in Por un rojo amanecer: Hacia una historia de los comunistas chilenos, ed. Manuel Loyola y Jorge Rojas Flores (Santiago: ICAL, 2000). See also Santiago Aránguiz, “Rusia Roja de los Soviets. Recepciones de la Revolución Rusa, del bolchevismo y de la cultura política soviética en el mundo obrero revolucionario chileno (1917–1927)” (PhD diss., Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2012).

                                                (20.) For more on that process, see the studies and documentary compilation in Olga Ulianova and Alfredo Riquelme Segovia, eds., Chile en los archivos soviéticos, 1922–1991, vol. 1. Komintern y Chile, 1922–1931 (Santiago: DIBAM–Centro de Investigaciones Diego Barros Arana, 2005).

                                                (21.) Julio Pinto Vallejos and Verónica Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate, ¿Revolución proletaria o querida chusma?: Socialismo y alessandrismo en la pugna por la politización pampina (1911–1932) (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2001).

                                                (22.) René Millar Carvacho, La elección presidencial de 1920. Tendencias y prácticas políticas en el Chile parlamentario (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1982).

                                                (23.) For more, see Jorge Rojas Flores, La dictadura de Ibáñez y los sindicatos: (1927–1931) (Santiago: Dirección de Bibliotecas Archivos y Museos, 1993).

                                                (24.) William F. Sater, “The Abortive Kronstadt: The Chilean Naval Mutiny of 1931,” The Hispanic American Historical Review 60, no. 2 (1980): 239–268. A few months later there was another episode of repression of people identified as “communists” in Copiapó and Vallenar, when a small revolutionary group (with some members of the PCCh among them) attempted to take over the local military regiment. The episode has been known since then as the “tragic Christmas” of 1931. Verónica Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate, Subversión, coerción y consenso: Creando el Chile del siglo XX (1918–1938) (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2017), chap. 4.

                                                (25.) Some of these publications were Alfredo Silva Santiago, Estudio sobre la manera práctica de combatir el comunismo en Chile (Santiago: Imprenta Chile, 1937); Indalecio Téllez, “Circular Cuartel General del Ejército: Sobre los errores del comunismo,” in Recuerdos Militares (Santiago: Centro de Estudios Bicentenario, 2005), 175–177; Edgardo Cavada, El Comunismo y su propaganda en Chile (Santiago: Imprenta El Imparcial, 1933); Mario Bravo Lavín, Chile frente al socialismo y al comunismo (Santiago: Biblioteca Ercilla, 1934); Ricardo Montaner, Asamblea Nacional de Acción Cívica: El comunismo en la teoría y en la práctica (Santiago: Imprenta El Esfuerzo, 1932); Hans Halm, La Rusia Soviética de Hoy (Santiago: Ediciones Luz, 1933); and Johann Phillipp, Así es Rusia. Lo que vio y experimentó un ingeniero alemán en la Unión Soviética (Santiago: Editorial Splendor, 1933).

                                                (26.) One representative example of Brandau’s works were compiled in Valentín Brandau, El fin del socialismo soviético (Santiago: Imprenta Universitaria, 1933).

                                                (27.) For more on these groups, see Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate, La Milicia Republicana; and Deutsch, Las Derechas.

                                                (28.) For more on the rupture of the Falange and the Partido Conservador, see George W. Grayson, El Partido Demócrata Cristiano chileno (Buenos Aires: Francisco de Aguirre, 1968).

                                                (29.) For more on the traits and development of anti-fascism in Western Europe, see the intriguing work of Michael Seidman, Transatlantic Antifascisms: From the Spanish Civil War to the End of World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

                                                (30.) Verónica Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate, “Las nuevas voces del nacionalismo chileno: 1938–1942,” Boletín de Historia y Geografía 10 (1993).

                                                (31.) “Estimularemos al máximo la Religión Católica,” Antorcha, no. 3, October 1941, 2.

                                                (32.) For more, see Sofía Correa, Con las riendas del poder: la derecha chilena en el siglo XX (Santiago: Editorial Sudamericana, 2005) capítulo 2; y Marcelo José Cavarozzi, Los sótanos de la democracia chilena, 1938–1964: las esferas de “protección” de los empresarios industriales: la CORFO, represión a los obreros y la inflación (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2017).

                                                (33.) Eladio Huentemilla, “Antecedentes de la Ley de Defensa Permanente de la Democracia” (Santiago, BA Thesis, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 1992).

                                                (34.) Andrew Barnard, “Chilean Communist, Radical Presidents and Chilean Relations with the United States,” Journal of Latin American Studies 13, no. 2 (1981).

                                                (35.) For more, see Jody Pavilack, Mining for the Nation: The Politics of Chile’s Coal Communities from the Popular Front to the Cold War (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011); and Carlos Huneeus, La Guerra Fría chilena: Gabriel González Videla y la Ley Maldita (Santiago, Chile: Random House Mondadori S.A., 2009).

                                                (37.) Raúl Irarrázaval, El comunismo en Chile (Santiago: Imprenta Chile, 1948).

                                                (38.) Cited in Cristián Gazmuri, Patricia Arancibia, and Álvaro Góngora, Eduardo Frei Montalva (1911-1982) (México, D.F: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1997), 166–167.

                                                (39.) Huneeus, La guerra fría chilena, 262.

                                                (40.) For more on the political groups that supported Ibáñez, see Joaquín Fernández Abara, El ibañismo (1937–1952): un caso de populismo en la política chilena (Santiago: Instituto de Historia, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2008).

                                                (41.) For more on this episode: Pedro Milos Hurtado, Historia y memoria: 2 de abril de 1957 (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2007).

                                                (42.) Rodríguez de la Sotta wrote a famous and polemic book on this issue: O Capitalismo o Comunismo. O vivir como en Estados Unidos o vivir como en Rusia (Santiago: Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 1952).

                                                (43.) Sergio Fernández Larraín, Informe sobre el comunismo rendido a la Convención General del Partido Conservador Unido el 12 de octubre de 1954 (Santiago: Talleres de la Empresa Editora Zig-Zag, 1954).

                                                (44.) Sergio Fernández Larraín, El marxismo en Bolivia. Informe de la mayoría de la comisión designada por el III Congreso de la Confederación Interamericana de Defensa del Continente, sobre la situación interna de Bolivia (Santiago: J. Cifuentes Impresor, 1957).

                                                (45.) Jaime Castillo Velasco, El problema comunista (Santiago: Editorial del Pacífico, 1955).

                                                (46.) For more on the Congreso por la Libertad de la Cultura en Chile y América Latina, see Karina Janello, “El Congreso por la Libertad de la Cultura: el caso chileno y la disputa por las ‘ideas fuerza’ de la Guerra Fría,” Izquierdas 14 (December 2012): 14–52; and Patrick Iber, Neither Peace nor Freedom: The Cultural Cold War in Latin America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015).

                                                (47.) Isabel Letelier, Quintral (Santiago: Ediciones Andes, 1963).

                                                (48.) Sofía Correa, “Iglesia y política. El colapso del Partido Conservador,” Mapocho 30 (1991).

                                                (51.) For more on the left and right wings in those years, see, among many others: Verónica Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate, Nacionales y gremialistas: el “parto” de la nueva derecha política chilena, 1964–1973 (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2008); Eugenia Palieraki, La revolución ya viene! el MIR chileno en los años sesenta (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2014); Marcelo Casals Araya, El alba de una revolución: la izquierda y el proceso de construcción estratégica de la “vía chilena al socialismo” 1956–1970 (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2010); and Tomás Moulian, La forja de ilusiones: el sistema de partidos, 1932–1973 (Santiago: Universidad ARCIS–FLACSO, 1993).

                                                (52.) Alfredo Riquelme, “La Guerra Fría en Chile: los intrincados nexos entre lo nacional y lo global,” in Chile y la Guerra Fría global, ed. Alfredo Riquelme and Tanya Harmer (Santiago: RIL Editores–Instituto de Historia, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2014), 11–43; and Ulianova, “Algunas reflexiones sobre la Guerra Fría desde el fin del mundo.”

                                                (53.) For more on the government’s economic plan and its expectations: Sergio Bitar, Transición, socialismo y democracia: la experiencia chilena (México: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1979).

                                                (56.) For more on the shortages and other problems for the UP that arose in 1972, see Pedro Milos, ed., Chile 1972. Desde “El Arrayán” hasta el “Paro de Octubre” (Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Alberto Hurtado, 2013).

                                                (57.) For two contrasting views of the era of the Paro de Octubre, see Claudio Orrego Vicuña, El paro nacional: vía chilena contra el totalitarismo (Santiago: Editorial del Pacífico, 1972); and Patricio García, Los gremios patronales (Santiago: Quimantú, 1973).

                                                (58.) For more on radicalization “from below” in the left-wing world, see Franck Gaudichaud, Chile 1970–1973. Mil días que estremecieron al mundo. Poder popular, cordones industriales y socialismo durante el gobierno de Salvador Allende (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2016); Peter Winn, Weavers of Revolution: The Yarur Workers and Chile’s Road to Socialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Peter Winn, La revolución chilena (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2013); and Florencia E. Mallon, Courage Tastes of Blood: The Mapuche Community of Nicolaś Ailío and the Chilean State, 1906–2001 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005).

                                                (59.) For more on the importance of the street during the UP, see Camilo D Trumper, Ephemeral Histories: Public Art, Politics, and the Struggle for the Streets in Chile (Oakland: University of California Press, 2017).

                                                (60.) Cited in Carlos Huneeus, El régimen de Pinochet (Santiago: Editorial Sudamericana, 2000), 122.

                                                (61.) “Declaración de Principios del Gobierno de Chile,” El Mercurio, March 13, 1974, 22.

                                                (62.) Verónica Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate, “¡Estamos en guerra señores!: El régimen militar de Pinochet y el ‘pueblo’, 1973–1980,” Historia 43, no. 1 (2010): 163–201.

                                                (63.) John Dinges, Operación Condor: una década de terrorismo internacional en el Cono Sur (Santiago de Chile: Ediciones B, 2004); and J. Patrice McSherry, Los estados depredadores. La Operación Cóndor y la guerra encubierta en América Latina (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2009).

                                                (66.) See Manuel Gárate, La revolución capitalista de Chile: 1973–2003 (Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Alberto Hurtado, 2012); and Juan Gabriel Valdés, Pinochet’s Economists: The Chicago School in Chile (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

                                                (67.) See Pamela Lowden, Moral Opposition to Authoritarian Rule in Chile, 1973–90 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996); and Peter Winn, ed., Victims of the Chilean Miracle: Workers and Neoliberalism in the Pinochet Era, 1973–2002 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004).

                                                (68.) On the strategic shift of the PC under the dictatorship, see Alfredo Riquelme, Rojo atardecer: El comunismo chileno entre dictadura y democracia (Santiago: DIBAM–Centro de Investigaciones Diego Barros Arana, 2009); and Rolando Álvarez, Desde las sombras: una historia de la clandestinidad comunista (1973–1980) (Santiago: LOM, 2003).

                                                (69.) For more on DC anticommunism under the dictatorship, see Augusto Varas, “Un desencuentro histórico,” in El Partido Comunista en Chile: una historia presente, ed. Augusto Varas, Alfredo Riquelme, and Marcelo Casals (Santiago: Catalonia, 2010).

                                                (70.) For more on the plebiscite campaign, see Joaquín Fermandois and Ángel Soto, “El plebiscito de 1988. Candidato único y competencia,” in Camino a La Moneda las elecciones presidenciales en la historia de Chile, 1920–2000, ed. Alejandro San Francisco and Angel Soto (Santiago: Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Instituto de Historia—Centro de Estudios Bicentenario, 2005); and Luis Thielemann, “Chile como campo en disputa. Discursos e imaginarios de nación en el debate electoral del plebiscito de 1988,” in Nacionalismos e identidad nacional en Chile. Siglo XX, ed. Gabriel Cid y Alejandro San Francisco (Santiago: Centro de Estudios Bicentenario, 2010).