Strategic Voting Versus Sincere Voting
Strategic Voting Versus Sincere Voting
- Damien BolDamien BolDepartment of Political Economy, King's College London
- and Tom VerthéTom VerthéDepartment of Political Science, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, and Center for Local Politics, Ghent University
Summary
People do not always vote for the party that they like the most. Sometimes, they choose to vote for another one because they want to maximize their influence on the outcome of the election. This behavior driven by strategic considerations is often labeled as “strategic voting.” It is opposed to “sincere voting,” which refers to the act of voting for one’s favorite party.
Strategic voting can take different forms. It can consist in deserting a small party for a bigger one that has more chances of forming the government, or to the contrary, deserting a big party for a smaller one in order to send a signal to the political class. More importantly the strategies employed by voters differ across electoral systems. The presence of frequent government coalitions in proportional representation systems gives different opportunities, or ways, for people to influence the electoral outcome with their vote. In total, the literature identifies four main forms of strategic voting. Some of them are specific to some electoral systems; others apply to all.
Keywords
Subjects
- Political Behavior
- Political Economy
- Political Institutions
- Political Psychology
- Quantitative Political Methodology