Prior to World War I

Prior to World War I, U.S. military policy and law did not address homosexual behavior or identity. The Articles of War of 1916 were the first to directly address sodomy, which was treated as a crime only when combined with an intent to commit assault (Rostker et al., 1993). Prior to these changes, sodomy was not permitted in the armed forces but was punished through the civilian court system rather than within the military. Woodruff (1995a) has noted that this practice of allowing civilian courts to punish homosexual behavior was one that the United States inherited from English Common Law. Although sodomy was not a specific crime under military law before 1916, the army did court-martial soldiers who engaged in consensual sodomy for disrupting order and discipline (Borch, 2010). The military services were also empowered to administratively separate service members for homosexual behavior, without criminal court-martial proceedings.

Indeed, military policy toward homosexuality was generally vague in the pre-World War I period. Instead of specifically identifying homosexual conduct as prohibited or undesirable, the military interpreted policies requiring good character and proper conduct as grounds to exclude LGB service members. Perhaps for this reason, restrictions on LGB people serving in the armed forces were applied unevenly. Additionally, when restrictions were enforced, it was on the basis of behavior, not sexual orientation per se. Regulations excluding LGB people would not focus on the identity of the individual until World War II. One notable example of such uneven application of the rules is the case of Baron von Steuben, whom General George Washington brought to the United States in 1778 to assist with the professionalization of the U.S. Army. Von Steuben was gay and fleeing prosecution in Europe for his sexual behavior, but he developed a drill book for the Continental Army and was well received by both Washington and the soldiers he trained. However, shortly after Von Steuben began this work, the Continental Army forced Lieutenant Gotthold Frederick Enslin out of the service for having sex with another male soldier and perjuring himself when confronted with the sodomy charge. He was the first person forced out of the service for homosexual behavior (Shilts, 1993).

Interwar Years

In the interwar period, the military sharpened its policies to specify what it deemed desirable, and sodomy was established as an independent criminal offense with the 1920 update to the Articles of War. Borch (2010) noted that the army began treating homosexuality as an illness and LGB people were often separated from military service on medical grounds. Men who appeared too feminine or who engaged in homosexual sex and other forms of “sexual psychopathy” were identified as unfit for service (Army Regulation 40–105, 1921, cited in Rostker et al., 1993, p. 4). In addition to providing greater specificity about such undesirable characteristics, the army worked to achieve uniform implementation of such policies. Those known to have engaged in homosexual behavior were likely to be separated from military service, but the form of separation varied with the circumstances. Generally, consensual sodomy led to administrative discharges, while service members who committed sodomy in connection with assault or other criminal offenses were court-martialed (Rostker et al., 1993).

World War II and Postwar Period

A shift occurred during World War II, away from disqualifying service members based on their conduct toward disqualification based on their identity. The language in military policy documents shifted from “sodomist” (with its focus on what a person does) to “homosexual” (with its focus on one’s preferences or identity) (see Rostker et al., 1993, pp. 5–6; Bérubé, 1991, pp. 14–15). Identifying homosexuals as a group of people coincided with a development among psychiatrists to viewing homosexuals as a category of mentally ill persons (Marcosson, 1995, p. 63). This policy allowed the military to exclude recruits—or separate existing service members from military service—solely on the military’s judgment that the person was a homosexual. No evidence of prohibited conduct was required. This distinction between conduct and identity would re-emerge in the 1980s and 1990s as LGB service members challenged the legal rationale of the military’s exclusion policies.

Despite the clarification of military policy, enforcement during World War II was inconsistent (Rostker et al., 1993). Departmental policy gave commanders latitude in handling cases within their chain of command.² The options available to commanders ranged from medical treatment intended to “reclaim” a service member, to administrative discharge or court martial, depending on the circumstances (Woodruff, 1995, p. 129). War Department Circular No. 3 was issued in 1944 and codified the responsibility of commanders to either cure or remove homosexuals from the military. Similar guidance was published as Circular No. 85 in 1946 (Borch, 2010). These department-wide policies were complemented by service-level policies that generally followed a similar approach. Commanders had the latitude to identify which service members were useful in spite of their homosexuality (Evans, 2002). The overall approach was to treat homosexuality as a mental disorder that could be cured. Indeed, the decision to prevent LGB people from joining the military (and separate them from the military if they were already serving) was seen as a progressive alternative to criminal punishment for sodomy (Wicker et al., 1992).

The post–World War II period saw a number of changes to military policy that clarified and strengthened the exclusion of LGB people from military service. Although the army briefly changed its policy in 1946 to enable more homosexuals to receive honorable discharges, it reversed course in 1948, making it more likely that a homosexual separated from the army would be given a dishonorable discharge. Department-wide regulations issued in 1949 further sharpened the exclusion by eliminating the option of “reclaiming” homosexuals whom the chain of command viewed as useful to the military mission. This regulation replaced the policy of deferring to a commander’s discretion with a categorical policy that homosexuals should not be permitted to serve. For those who were already serving, it required “prompt separation” from military service (Rostker et al., 1993, p. 6). Similarly, Congress created the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) in 1950, which identified consensual sodomy as a criminal offense (Borch, 2010).³ The army revised its exclusion policy in 1950, creating three classes of homosexual offenses, all leading to separation. Depending on the level of offense, punishment ranged from administrative separation, to discharge, to court martial (Woodruff, 1995). Notably, the new army policy also created a duty for soldiers to report homosexual acts to their commanders (Borch, 2010).

In 1958, the army shifted its rationale for excluding LGB people. Whereas it had previously relied on the medical view that homosexuality was a psychiatric disorder, army officials now added that homosexuals would degrade morale and discipline if allowed to serve (Borch, 2010). The army had not yet given up the psychiatric argument, but the shift to including a nonmedical justification is important because it provides a preview of justifications the military would use for its exclusion policy once the medical community stopped treating homosexuality as a disorder. Focusing on the morale and discipline of military units also enabled commanders to speak with unique authority—unlike medical arguments about which the military relied on the views of outside experts. Similarly at the department-wide level, a 1959 DoD Instruction (DoDI 1332.14) cited “sexual perversion” as grounds for determining that a service member was unfit for duty and separating them from service (Rostker et al., 1993, pp. 6–7). This DoDI continues to govern administrative separation for enlisted personnel for a wide range of reasons, and it has been revised repeatedly to update the terms and conditions of separation for LGB service members.⁴ In most cases in which changes to administrative separation policy are discussed here, they were effected through revisions to DoDI 1332.14 and related documents.⁵

Military policy remained fairly constant until the 1970s, when the policy basis for exclusion began to shift. Although the military continued to exclude homosexuals from military service, the justification for that policy was coming under pressure. First, the medical community was reconsidering its stance on homosexuality and ultimately revised its guidance in 1973. The updated Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders II reflected the new expert view that homosexuality is not a mental disorder (Borch, 2010). Second, a series of legal challenges were working their way through the court system and threatened to erode the legal basis for excluding homosexuals from service. Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force (1978) and Ben-Shalom v. Marsh (1989) are two examples of high-profile cases that prompted the government to review its policy. Leonard Matlovich was serving in the Air Force when he revealed himself as a homosexual. He was discharged, challenged his separation, and the federal courts ordered the Air Force to reinstate him (Rimmerman, 2008). Similarly, Ben-Shalom was discharged after she admitted to being a homosexual, but the military offered no proof that she had engaged in homosexual acts. She challenged her discharge in court and won in 1980, but lost on appeal in 1989. As such cases threatened to undermine the military’s exclusion policy, Department of Defense (DoD) lawyers recommended changes that would strengthen the policy’s legal defensibility (Borch, 2010).

The army updated its regulations in 1970, at which point it eliminated the three tiers of homosexual offenses that it had established in 1950. Now, enlisted soldiers who engaged in homosexual acts or even had a “homosexual tendency” would be removed for “unfitness” or “unsuitability.” Homosexual officers would be removed for “professional dereliction” or for posing a risk to national security (Borch, 2010, p. 198). In 1975, DoD-wide policy rolled back these army regulations somewhat. The new DoD guidance explicitly identified homosexual acts as cause for separation from service, rather than identity per se. This change loosened the content of the restriction while putting the policy on stronger legal footing.

In addition to justifications based on unit morale and cohesion, LGB people were excluded from military service for other reasons. During the late 1940s and 1950s, the United States was engaged in an intensifying Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union, and some argued that LGB people would be susceptible to blackmail—and therefore be more likely to give away sensitive information (Moskos, 1994).⁶ McCarthyism affected LGB people during this period as well, with Senator McCarthy claiming that LGB people would undermine the moral welfare of the country (Rimmerman, 2008). Legal pressure continued to mount, however, as the courts increasingly took up constitutional and procedural challenges to military separation cases. This pressure led to the 1982 policy revision.

The 1982 Policy

Faced with a changed medical consensus and an eroding legal basis for excluding LGB people from military service, the Carter administration called for a review of DoD policy. The result was that the DoD issued yet another revision of DoDI 1332.14, again sharpening the language. For the first time, military policy articulated clearly that the department viewed homosexuality as “incompatible with military service” and it provided specific definitions of prohibited homosexual conduct. Notably, the policy cited both homosexual conduct and the “propensity” to engage in such conduct as threats to the military’s mission. Furthermore, the Department justified its policy on the grounds that it was necessary for “discipline, good order, and morale,” to ensure unit cohesion, and to enable the military to meet its deployment needs. The presence of homosexuals, it argued, “seriously impairs the accomplishment of the military mission” (Wicker et al., 1992, pp. 11–12).

The 1982 policy made the military an even more hostile environment for LGB people, who were to be separated in all but “extenuating circumstances.” However, two provisions provided additional rights to accused service members. First, service members gained the right to appeal a decision made to separate them from the military. This included the right to appeal within the military system, as well as the option to appeal to civilian courts following their separation. Second, they more often received honorable or general discharges because the policy established a new administrative category for separation solely on the basis of sexual orientation. Whereas service members were previously separated under categories of behavior related to misconduct or failure to perform their duties, the 1982 policy specified sexual orientation as a separate cause for separation. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted in a 1992 report that the department expelled approximately 1,500 homosexual personnel per year in the decade from 1980 to 1990 (Wicker et al., 1992).

RAND Report

RAND produced an exhaustive report in 1993 that evaluated the department’s historical approach to military service by LGB people, opinions within the military and the general public, and frequently raised concerns such as HIV transmission, violence, and an erosion of unit cohesion and effectiveness. In an attempt to find analogous situations from which the United States could learn, RAND researchers visited Canada, France, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom to assess how those countries had managed the presence of LGB people in their military forces. Notably, these countries’ policies ranged from a complete ban on LGB people in the military (in the United Kingdom) to an active antidiscrimination policy (the Netherlands). The differences in these approaches provided useful variation for the researchers as they estimated the effect that a change in U.S. policy would have. The RAND team also met with domestic police and fire departments that allow LGB people to serve openly in order to understand the impact on these organizations. They noted that the trust and cohesion required for success in the face of dangerous circumstances is similar, though not identical, in these civilian organizations. The experience of these organizations could provide lessons for the U.S. military that comes from a U.S. context. Finally, the researchers evaluated the experience of integrating racial minorities and women into the armed forces. Opponents of integrating racial minorities and women often made similar arguments about the threat to military effectiveness and unit cohesion, so the U.S. experience with these policy changes may be suggestive of the military’s ability to adapt to major personnel change.

The study’s authors concluded that the best approach, given the Clinton administration’s desire to remove barriers to LGB people serving in the military, was to adopt a policy that treated homosexuality as “not germane” to service. All other policies would remain in place and be applied even-handedly. Based on their study of foreign militaries and domestic organizations, the researchers found that most LGB people conceal their sexual orientation, tend to conform to prevailing customs, and face less hostility than would be expected based on surveys of opinion toward LGB people.⁸ The researchers also found that organizations that allowed LGB people to serve openly did not suffer problems with recruitment, retention, or effectiveness. Fears of HIV were common, however, and not easily dispelled. In response to the common argument that LGB people would impact unit cohesion, the authors predicted that the actual effects would be small. The history of integrating racial minorities into the U.S. military and the experience of allowing LGB people to serve in foreign militaries and domestic police and fire departments suggest that unit cohesion is largely unaffected by these personnel changes. In all cases, the RAND researchers stressed the importance of leadership in enabling a successful change in policy.

Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell

On July 19, 1993, the Clinton administration announced a new policy that might appear to fulfill Clinton’s campaign promise without provoking excessive opposition. This policy made a number of changes to DoD regulations on LGB service members. It refocused DoD policy on a service member’s conduct (rather than orientation or identity) when determining grounds for dismissal, it continued the prohibition on asking recruits about their sexual orientation, and it enabled openly gay service members to fight their separation from the military by convincing the military that, though homosexual, they would not engage in homosexual conduct. Lastly, the new policy required the equal application of the Uniform Code of Military Justice or UCMJ (Woodruff, 1995). This last provision was aimed at the practice of treating homosexual and heterosexual sodomy differently under military law. (The UCMJ definition of sodomy includes oral sex, but the prohibition on sodomy was being applied unevenly to homosexual and heterosexual service members.)

The July 19th policy also aimed to limit the circumstances under which a service member could be investigated for homosexuality. For example, it required more than a mere allegation of homosexuality to start investigative proceedings, and it prevented the use of investigations for the sole purpose of determining a service member’s sexual orientation. Importantly, the policy also shifted the express purpose of the DoD’s policy on homosexuality to include protection of homosexual service members. Sexual orientation was to be treated as a private issue and not a cause for dismissal or to refuse new recruits. However, the policy retained the prohibitions on homosexual sexual behavior, homosexual marriage, and public statements about one’s homosexuality (Woodruff, 1995). The policy was President Clinton’s attempt to create a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy. Although such a policy would not fulfill his campaign pledge to repeal the ban, it was designed to accommodate the competing demands of LGB advocates and those who opposed a broader repeal, including some within the executive branch. Indeed, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, was publicly opposed to lifting the ban (Wilcox & Wolpert, 1996). This created political pressure for President Clinton to find an option for a limited repeal of the exclusion policy.

President Clinton seems to have misestimated the political climate on Capitol Hill, where opposition to the policy was strong, even among Democrats. Indeed, Senator Sam Nunn (D-Georgia), who was the chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, led an effort to impose an alternative policy through legislation (Woodruff, 1995). The result was that the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 1994 included language that rolled back the protections sought in the DoD policy, asserting that no one has a constitutional right to serve in the armed forces. It echoed the concerns raised by exclusion advocates about “morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion,” and it concluded that allowing LGB people in the military would “create an unacceptable risk” (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, 1994, Sec. 571). The policy that Congress put forward in the NDAA called for separation from military service for homosexual acts unless the service member can show the act was an isolated incident and that his or her “continued presence in the armed forces is consistent with the interests of the armed forces” (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, 1994, Sec. 571). Additionally, service members who admit to being homosexual would be allowed to remain only if they demonstrate that they do not and will not engage in homosexual acts. Those who marry or attempt to marry someone of the same sex would be separated from service.

The move by Congress to undercut President Clinton’s proposed policy did three things. First, it set up President Clinton for additional criticism because he neither advocated strongly for the position he promised on the campaign trail nor achieved his proposed compromise position. Instead, he had a position forced on him by Congress. Second, it imposed a policy that was less favorable toward LGB people serving (or wishing to serve) in the military than even Clinton’s compromise position had proposed. Third, it gave this policy the power of law rather than that of a presidential or executive agency directive. Changes, therefore, would require an act of Congress or invalidation by a federal court.

Implementing DADT

In spite of this further restriction on LGB people serving in the military, the practical effect of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT) on the military’s approach has been disputed. Woodruff (1995a) has argued that the DoD appeared to be implementing its July 19th policy rather than DADT, which superseded it. Indeed, initial DoD implementation explicitly mentioned the July 19th DoD policy announcement (with its emphasis on sexuality as a private, personal issue) rather than the NDAA (which emphasized the incompatibility of homosexuality and military service). In this view, DoD’s actual implementation of DADT improved the situation for LGB people in the military, perhaps more than Congress intended. However, others have suggested that implementation was a worse outcome for LGB people, not only when compared with what was envisioned by the July 19th policy, but even when compared to the previous policy, established in 1981. Rimmerman (1996) argued that military commanders now felt empowered to actively seek out LGB people who were serving in the ranks, and Marcosson (1995, p. 60) noted that the enforcement of DADT “mirrors the prior regime in precisely those areas where reform was expected.” He has provided examples of intrusive questions about service members’ sexual lives and desires as well as efforts to use current or former service members to inform on other service members whom the military suspected of being homosexual (Marcosson, 1995). Such recognition that LGB people serving in the military continued to suffer many of the negative consequences that reform was supposed to address contributed to growing pressure for change to DADT.

Implementation of DADT was also expensive. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) studied implementation of DADT and found that more than 13,000 active military personnel were separated from service during the period from fiscal year 1994 to fiscal year 2009. Cost estimates for separating these personnel vary, but the GAO assessed the cost to DoD and the military services to be roughly $383 million (United States Government Accountability Office, 2005, 2011). (This includes two separate GAO estimates: approximately $190 million for 1994–2003 and another for $193 million for 2004–2009.) A University of California Blue Ribbon Commission re-estimated the costs for the first period evaluated by the GAO (1994–2003) and reached an estimate of $319.6 million, a difference of almost $130 million (University of California Blue Ribbon Commission, 2006). That commission did not estimate costs during the second period assessed by the GAO (2004–2009), but if one takes the University of California Blue Ribbon Commission estimate for the period from 1994 to 2003 and the GAO’s estimate for the period from 2004 to 2009, the total estimated cost reaches nearly $513 million. If one uses the GAO’s estimates for both periods, the cost would be closer to $383 million.

Public opinion shifted markedly while DADT was in effect. Brewer has written that the percentage of the public that strongly supported allowing LGB people to serve in the military rose 20 points from 1992 to 2000, while those strongly opposed dropped by 27 points (Brewer, 2003, pp. 1212–1213). This shift continued in the 2000s. Gallup, a polling firm, found that by 2005, 76% of the public believed that a homosexual should be allowed into the armed forces (Gallup, 2018). Despite debate over DADT’s implementation, its cost, and the shifts in public opinion, it remained in effect throughout the George W. Bush administration. LGBT advocates, however, continued to press for repeal. They saw an opening with the election of President Obama in 2008.

The Beginning of Open Service

Mindful of the Clinton administration’s political missteps, the Obama administration moved slowly on DADT and other gay rights concerns. Indeed, the administration was excoriated by gay supporters such as Andrew Sullivan (2009) for the “fierce urgency of whenever” on gay rights issues. However, the Obama administration began changing its approach to LGB service members in February, 2010. The Department of Defense announced that it would continue to comply with DADT, but it elevated the rank of a military officer whose authorization was required to investigate potential LGB people or discharge a homosexual service member. Only a brigadier general or rear admiral (lower half) would be able to take such steps. The military also began rejecting anonymous tips that someone was a homosexual, instead requiring statements under oath.

In 2010, Secretary Robert Gates directed an internal study to assess the likely impacts of repealing DADT (Borch, 2010). The DoD General Counsel at the time, Jeh Johnson, received responsibility for co-chairing this working group on the subject with Army General Carter Ham. Johnson described the experience as a conversation “with the entire U.S. military over a ten-month period” that resulted in the conclusion that repealing DADT would have only a small effect on military readiness, mostly from “limited and isolated disruption to unit cohesion and retention” (quoted in Johnson, 2012, pp. 411–412). However, the window of opportunity to loosen the exclusion policy was rapidly drawing to a close with the Republican takeover of the House of Representatives after the 2010 midterm elections. Democrats, with some Republican support, scrambled to pass a change in spite of intense opposition from Senator John McCain and others.

As the DoD was undertaking its review, the case Log Cabin Republicans v. United States was challenging the constitutionality of DADT in federal court. The lower courts differed on the issue, leading to conflicting court orders and an appeal by the plaintiffs to the United States Supreme Court. Johnson noted that the department wanted to avoid having a change forced on it by the courts. He and Ham submitted their report in November, 2010 and Secretary Gates urged Congress to repeal DADT. Senior military officers split on the question (Johnson, 2012, p. 420), but Congress passed a repeal on December 18, 2010. Four days later, President Obama signed it into law (Stolberg, 2010).

The effects of repealing DADT, though significant, were limited. LGB military members could serve openly but sodomy remained criminalized under the UCMJ. It was not until the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 that consensual sodomy was de-criminalized under military law (2014, Sec. 1707). Repeal also failed to make homosexual couples eligible for the spousal benefits enjoyed by their heterosexual counterparts in the military. This was because the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) prohibited the federal government from recognizing same-sex marriages, thereby making same-sex couples ineligible for spousal benefits. That ineligibility remained until the Supreme Court declared DOMA unconstitutional in United States v. Windsor (2013). With DOMA overturned, DoD began making spousal benefits available to same-sex couples (Huetteman, 2013). Furthermore, the repeal of DADT and the expansion of benefits for homosexual service members left intact the restrictions on transgender people serving in the military.

RAND Report

The RAND report estimated that between 2,150 and 10,790 transgender individuals were already serving in the military (in either the active or the selected reserve) and predicted that only a small fraction would likely access medical care related to transitioning genders. Using estimates from the private sector, the report’s authors estimated that healthcare costs associated with treating transgender service members would be between $2.4 million and $8.4 million per year. Further, they estimated that the number of service members likely to seek transition-related surgery would be very small (perhaps only 30 cases in the active component) and that the impact on readiness would be “negligible” (Schaefer et al., 2016, p. 70). The report also evaluated the experience of four foreign militaries that allowed open service for transgender individuals: Australia, Canada, Israel, and the United Kingdom. Policies varied somewhat among these countries, but the authors noted that flexibility in applying the rules and strong leadership were essential to success.

The report noted that the department would need to craft new policies in the following areas if it decided to lift the ban on transgender people serving in the military: accession, retention, and separation. Furthermore, some existing policies that governed housing assignments, restrooms, uniforms, and physical standards would require revision (Schaefer et al., 2016). In evaluating the experience of the four foreign militaries with regard to unit cohesion and readiness, the report found no evidence of reduced operational effectiveness. It did note that data on the subject are limited and nonrepresentative but suggested that, with a range of additional regulations, service by transgender people can be managed effectively (Schaefer et al., 2016).

Carter–Obama Policy

On June 30, 2016, Secretary Carter issued Directive Type Memorandum (DTM) 16-005, which changed the military’s approach to transgender people currently serving in the armed forces or wishing to join (Carter, 2016). This was followed by DoDI 1300.28, which provided additional guidance for how to manage gender transition for service members (Department of Defense, 2016). The new policy stated that gender identity could no longer be used as the sole criterion for separating a service member from military service or rejecting recruits. However, while it opened military service to some transgender people, it kept it closed to others. Specifically, a diagnosis of “gender dysphoria” in a transgender person could still be used to preclude them from service. Here, the terminology in DoD policy unfortunately confused the issue because it conflicted with common usage. Whereas DoDI 1300.28 refers to a transgender service member as one who has a medical diagnosis requiring gender transition, common usage of the term “transgender” refers to people who identify with a gender different from the gender assigned at their birth. These individuals may or may not experience the distress associated with gender dysphoria. It is this second category of people who generally require medical care.⁹ Subsequent policies sometimes used the more common definition.¹⁰

The new DoD policy also treated current service members and recruits somewhat differently. Transgender people who were currently serving would be permitted to continue their careers. They could be discharged for other reasons, but not solely because of their gender identity or a desire to transition genders. They would also have the opportunity to transition to their preferred gender while remaining in the military. Where their ability to serve was affected by their transition, the new policy required that they be subject to the same regulations covering service members who were unable to serve for other reasons. Accessions to the military were handled somewhat differently. Recruits with a history of gender dysphoria would need to demonstrate that they had been clinically stable for 18 months prior to entering service, and recruits in the process of gender transition were deemed ineligible to join the military during their transition. Members of this latter category of recruits were required to first complete their transition and remain stable in that gender (including 18 months of stability on any hormone therapy) before they would be eligible for military service. The same 18-month limitation was imposed on transgender individuals who transitioned genders with or without related genital surgeries. Both currently serving transgender service members and recruits were to be able to serve in their gender of choice, subject to the requirements imposed on people of that gender. The timing for the two groups, however, was somewhat different. Existing service members could serve openly immediately upon approval of DTM 16-005 on June 30, 2016 (Carter, 2016). The policies on recruits, however, would take effect after a year (on July 1, 2017) in order to give the department time to implement the change. Critically, that longer timeline extended past the end of the Obama administration and into the Trump administration.

Mattis–Trump Revision

The election of President Trump initiated a shift in how the military approaches transgender individuals, especially with regard to how it treats those currently serving. After taking office, the administration extended the timeline for compliance with the new accession policies from July 1, 2017 until January 1, 2018 to give the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security more time to study the issue (Trump, 2017, sec. 1).¹¹ On July 26, 2017, President Trump issued a series of controversial tweets stating (Phillip, Gibbons-Neff, & DeBonis, 2017):

After consultation with my Generals and military experts, please be advised that the United States Government will not accept or allow transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military … Our military must be focused on decisive and overwhelming victory and cannot be burdened with the tremendous medical costs and disruption that transgender in the military would entail.

On August 25, 2017, President Trump followed up with a memorandum to the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security raising concerns that the Obama-era policy failed to adequately consider its potential to “hinder military effectiveness and lethality, disrupt unit cohesion, or tax military resources” (Trump, 2017, Section 1[a]). President Trump instructed the departments to extend indefinitely the policy of blocking transgender accessions to the armed forces, halt sex reassignment surgeries for those currently serving (unless the service member could demonstrate a medical need to continue the surgery), and provide the president with a proposed alternative transgender policy. LGBT legal groups immediately challenged the policy change in court and won injunctions blocking the change in policy (Taylor et al., 2018).

In the face of strong legal opposition, the administration attempted to revise course with a more defensible approach. Secretary Mattis convened a panel of experts drawn from the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security to study the issue and concluded in a February 22, 2018 memo to the president that the Obama administration’s policy on transgender service members imposed “substantial risks” that “could undermine readiness, disrupt unit cohesion, and impose an unreasonable burden” that would negatively impact “military effectiveness and lethality.” It is striking that the DoD and RAND reviews reached opposing conclusions, and Secretary Mattis explained this by referencing data limitations in the RAND study, differences in the requirements facing U.S. and foreign militaries, and greater-than-anticipated complexity in implementing the Obama-era policy (Mattis, 2018, p. 2). The policy that Secretary Mattis proposed to President Trump thus broke with that of his predecessor, but maintained some commonality. For example, in place of the requirement that recruits be stable for 18 months before joining the military, Secretary Mattis suggested 36 months. Current service members with gender dysphoria would be allowed to continue serving, provided they were deployable, and those receiving treatment for gender dysphoria under the previous policy could continue to do so. The memo did make two major changes, however. The first is that it called for disqualifying transgender people who had made a gender transition (or required one) from joining the military. Second, it would allow transgender people without gender dysphoria to serve in accordance with the gender assigned at birth. This distinction was intended to clarify that people identifying with a gender different from the one assigned at birth would be eligible to serve in the military only if they do not have the “distress and impairment of functioning associated with” this identification (Mattis, 2018, pp. 2–3). President Trump responded to Secretary Mattis’ memorandum by empowering the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security to “implement any appropriate policies concerning military service by transgender individuals” (Trump, 2018, Sec. 2). However, the Trump administration’s shift on transgender people in the military was embroiled in a series of legal challenges that temporarily stalled implementation (Taylor et al., 2018). In January 2019, the Supreme Court lifted injunctions that blocked the Trump administration’s policy. While eliminating the injunctions allowed the policy to be implemented, legal cases challenging the ban on most transgender people in the military continue to proceed in the court system (Liptak, 2019). In addition, public opinion polling finds that the Trump administration’s approach is not fully supported by the American public. Taylor et al. (2018) find that while the public generally feels less warmly toward transgender people than gays and lesbians, they nonetheless support transgender people being protected from job discrimination and being allowed to serve in the military. However, the public tends to be less accepting of the use of public monies in support of transgender-related medical care.