Introduction

Many researchers claim that party identification is the most important concept in modern electoral behavior research. Party identification is an early socialized, enduring, affective psychological identification with a specific political party. Some of the first empirical studies of voting behavior in the United States discovered the concept, and it is now incorporated in electoral studies in most democratic nations. Party identification warrants such importance because it structures a person’s view of the political world, provides cues for judging the political candidates and issues, shapes voting choice, influences participation in elections, and promotes stability in electoral systems.

This article discusses the evolution of party identification as a concept in electoral behavior research and provides evidence on the levels of partisanship across nations and across time. What has been learned from past research is described, along with the questions that still remain about the implications of party identification. Last, this evidence is linked to the implications for the working of the democratic process.

The Concept of Party Identification

Angus Campbell and his colleagues (1960) directed the first American national election surveys in the 1950s. As they examined how voters made their choices during an election, they noted that many people began the campaign with their decision already made. People often attributed their votes to long-established family traditions or positions they had held across many elections. Perhaps the most famous example is the saying that used to be applied to voters in the American South: they would vote for anyone, even a yellow dog, if it was a Democrat.

Such partisan loyalties exist as a central part of an individual’s belief system, acting as a political cue for other attitudes and behaviors. Campbell et al. (1960) described these partisan attachments as a sense of party identification: a long-term, affective psychological identification with one’s preferred political party. Social identity theory argues that these partisan ties are similar to identifications with a social class, religious denomination, or other social group. Party attachments are distinct from voting preferences, which explains why some Americans vote for the presidential candidate of one party while expressing loyalty to another party. Indeed, the conceptual independence of voting and party identification gives the latter its significance. Party identification has become a central element in our models of electoral behavior (Oscarsson & Holmberg, 2020).

Today, the election surveys in virtually every democratic nation contain some form of the party identification question. Its centrality to understanding political behavior generates continuing research on its causes and consequences. In addition, there is increasing evidence that these partisan ties are weakening in most contemporary democracies, which raises questions of what political life will be like if partisanship weakens.

Measuring Levels of Partisanship

One of the contentious issues involving partisanship is how to measure a long-term psychological attachment to a political party. To tap into these identities, Campbell and his colleagues (1960) developed what is now the standard question assessing party identification in the United States: “Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?”

If the respondents say they are a Republican or a Democrat, they are asked if they would call themselves a strong Republican or Democrat or a not very strong Republican or Democrat. If they say they are independent, they are asked if they think of themselves as closer to the Republican or to the Democratic Party. American researchers use this question to create a seven-point party identification scale that runs from being a strong Democrat at one end, an independent close to neither party in the middle, and a strong Republican at the other end.

Cross-national research found that this question was problematic in some party systems because specific elements of the American question did not capture partisanship in multiparty parliamentary systems (Budge et al., 1976). After much debate, researchers developed questions to tap party allegiances that reflect national traditions and party system conventions. The now standard question on partisanship in Germany illustrates one nation’s alternative¹: “Many people in the Federal Republic lean toward a particular party for a long time, although they may occasionally vote for a different party. How about you: Do you in general lean toward a particular party? Which one?” This question is a functional equivalent to the American question even though the wording is different to reflect conditions in Germany. Other nations adopted their own measure of partisanship. There are predictable variations in the strength of these identities across nations, especially as a function of the longevity and other characteristics of the party system. In most nations, however, many people approach a new election with a predisposition toward a favored party already in place.

Because of these variations in political context and the phrasing of the partisanship question, it is complicated to compare levels of partisanship across nations. The best evidence on the extent of partisanship in a nation comes from the respective national election studies that ask a question suited to national conditions. But this is little help in cross-national comparisons of partisanship if each nation uses a differently worded question. So instead, the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) asks another party attachment question: “Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular party? Which party do you feel closest to? Do you feel very close to this party, somewhat close, or not very close?” This question exchanges the idea of a long-term partisan identity for the idea of closeness to a party. Closeness should produce a “softer” measure of partisanship, which might change the likelihood of expressing a party attachment separate from immediate vote choice. This question also has been asked in recent U.S. surveys.

Figure 1 displays the percentage that indicated closeness to any party across several established and new democracies (also see Dalton & Weldon, 2007; Lupo, 2015a). There is considerable variation in the level of partisanship across nations, ranging from about two-thirds in Norway and New Zealand to about one-fifth in the nations at the bottom of the figure.² Some of this cross-national variation might come from the inevitable differences in how a standard question is translated into each language or the specific events occurring in the nation. Overall, multiple waves of the CSES have found patterns similar to the evidence presented here, although the results for a specific nation might vary across time as a function of the immediate election or political context.

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Figure 1. Close to a political party.

Sources: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Module 5 (2016–2021) with additional nations from Module 4 (2011–2016). Dark bars are established democracies; light bars are new third-wave democracies.

Partisanship in the United States ranks above the average. This is somewhat surprising given the past emphasis on the strong partisanship of Europeans, especially in proportional representation parliamentary systems. However, it may reflect the greater functional value of partisanship in the United States because of the long ballots and multiple choices that voters face. A Briton who casts five to six votes in a 5-year electoral cycle may feel less need (and less value) to psychologically identify with a party compared to an American who casts more than a hundred votes for local, state, and federal offices over this same period.

The other notable feature of the figure is the contrast between established democracies and the new democracies in the CSES. Four of the five nations with the lowest percentage feeling close to a particular party are from new democracies. Conversely, all five nations with the highest level of party closeness are from established democracies. Moreover, there is convincing evidence that levels of partisanship were even higher in established democracies in the recent past (see the discussion of “Dealignment”). There is also some evidence that the composition and the nature of the party system can affect levels of partisanship (Huber et al., 2005).

Thus, if partisanship is important for cues in guiding the opinions and behaviors of citizens, then the variations in the level of partisanship across nations should have important implications for how the electoral process works in these nations.

Developing Party Ties

Where do party ties come from? Campbell and his colleagues (1960) considered partisanship to be similar to other social identities; it primarily arises from early life learning and the social conditions of the individual. Studies of young children found that many developed partisan ties at a very early age, often during the primary school years (Kroh, 2020). Children learn party loyalties before they can understand what the party labels stand for—a process similar to the development of many other social identities such as religious denomination or class. By adolescence, party leanings—if not loyalties—are often common.

In established democracies, parents play a central role in the socializing of partisan identities. Research that compares the party identifications of parents and their children routinely finds high levels of agreement in stable party systems (Jennings et al., 1979). Parents successfully transmit their partisanship to their children because party loyalties reflect the values of the family unit and are formed when parents are the dominant influence in a child’s life. Children often receive a consistent string of partisan cues as their parents discuss the news of the day or the events in an election. Consequently, it does not take long for a child to figure out his or her parents’ partisan leanings and assume those as their own: This is what my family or “people like me” think about partisan politics. Such family traditions can date back several generations, such as a tradition of voting “Democrat,” “Labor,” or “Social Democratic.”

Similarly, the parents’ social situation provides useful cues on what party is supported by others in one’s church, social class, ethnicity, or region. Adolescents and young adults see which party their friends and coworkers support, which often reinforces their initial party ties. Thus, party identities become enmeshed in a web of other social identities that tend to persist through life. The early life socialization of partisanship is apparent in studies that track party attachments over time. For example, a longitudinal study that spanned one of the most turbulent times in modern American history found that 78% of adults held the same partisan ties in 1965 and 1973 (Jennings & Markus, 1984; also Jennings et al., 2009). Partisanship—like religious affiliation and other social identities—can change during one’s life, but changes are rare.

Indeed, the standard social learning model of partisanship argues that existing party ties tend to strengthen with age—or more precisely with continued experience in supporting one’s preferred party (Converse, 1969). As people routinely support “their” party in election after election, these ties grow stronger over time. For example, the 2020 American National Election Study reported that 61% of Americans under age 30 had a party identification, compared to 74% among those over age 65. The same age pattern appears in most established democracies.

The situation differs in new democracies where people are learning how to participate in elections. In nations such as the new democracies of central-eastern Europe, East Asia, and Africa, the democratic experience is new to both parents and their children. Indeed, parents might struggle to adapt to the new democratic system, especially when the previous system lacked any elections. Consequently, party ties are not based on the family and social traditions that reinforce these identities in established democracies. The political parties running in elections are also new, and changes in the partisan lineup across elections are likely. These factors make it difficult to identify with a party.

The social learning model of partisanship in new democracies thus suggests that party ties are initially weak and should slowly develop over subsequent elections if the party system stabilizes and families and social groups establish firm party loyalties (Converse, 1969; Dalton & Weldon, 2007). This model is consistent with the logic of party identification as a social identity and explains the lower level of partisanship among the new democracies in Figure 1. Furthermore, this implies that new democracies will require a generation or more to develop to levels of partisanship observed in established democracies.

The Effects of Partisanship

Research Controversies

Dealignment

Another current research controversy focuses on potential declines in the percentage of partisans. Because partisanship is so important to our understanding of electoral politics, the decline in the share of the public holding a party identification has generated substantial discussion and debate.

From the 1950s to the early 1960s, the percentage of party identifiers in the United States was a stable 70%–75% of the public, and less than a quarter of the public claimed to be “independents.” The percentage of partisans has generally decreased since the late 1960s (Figure 2). Where once only a quarter of Americans lacked a party identity, in 2016 roughly 40% were independents; this means nonpartisans are a plurality compared to either Republican or Democratic identifiers.

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Figure 2. Trends in party identifiers.

Sources: United States, 1952–2016, American National Election Studies; Great Britain, 1964–2017, British Election Studies; Germany, 1972–2016, Politibarometer Studies (Western Germany only 1990–2005); France, Eurobarometer Surveys (1975, 1978, 1981, 1986, 1988), European Election Studies (1994, 1999, 2004, 2009); French Election Studies 2012, 2017.

This trend was initially linked to the political struggles and institutional foibles of American politics. The initial decline in partisanship coincided with the conflicts over civil rights reform and the Vietnam War. Then the Watergate controversy and Richard Nixon’s resignation from the presidency started a long period of recurring political scandals. Other scholars pointed to the structure of American political institutions or the increasingly critical media as a source of weakening party attachments.

However, similar declines in partisanship have occurred in other established democracies in Europe, North America, and the Pacific Rim. For example, an almost identical pattern of declining party ties occurred in three European democracies (Figure 2).³ Because of the traditions of the British party system and the format of the British partisanship questionnaire, fewer Britons claim to be nonpartisans. In the 1964 British Election Study, 93% claimed a standing partisan preference; the share of partisans dropped to 78% in the 2010 election and 81% in 2017. The data for Germany and France show a parallel downward trend.

Long-term election studies for most affluent democracies generally show a shrinking number of partisans or a weakening of the strength of party identities over time (Clarke & Stewart, 1998; Dalton, 2012; Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000; Fiorina, 2002; Garzia et al., 2021; Klar & Krupnikov, 2016). There are parallel declines in the number of people who are members of a political party, and favorable opinions of political parties have broadly declined (Dalton & Weldon, 2005; Scarrow, 2017). These patterns provide evidence for what Dalton (2012) described as partisan dealignment—a persisting decline in the public’s level of partisanship.

Survey research has generally found that younger generations are less likely to inherit partisan identities from their parents. For example, the American National Election Studies found that nonpartisanship among Americans under age 30 is about 25% higher when compared to youth in the early 1960s. Other affluent democracies also are experiencing lower partisanship among the young. Researchers disagree on the reasons for and implications of these generational findings. However, if fewer young people inherit family partisanship, then the social learning model of party identification implies that they will not achieve the partisan levels of past generations and that dealignment will continue.

Much of the dealignment literature focuses on established democracies, attributing these trends to broad forces of social and political change—such as changing norms of citizenship, increased education, and a more assertive media. But similar forces are at work in many emerging democracies. There is some evidence that partisanship is not developing in many new democracies, as predicted in prior theorizing (Lupo, 2015b; Sheng, 2008). Instead, people are hesitant to develop party allegiances, and some elites react by stressing personality over party. While established democracies are undergoing dealignment, many new democracies are failing to develop party alignments in the first place, which has generated research on this irregular learning process and its consequences.

If partisanship structures the political behavior of the average citizen, as many experts argue, then the broad cross-national evidence of dealignment over the last several decades may be a cause for concern. Significantly fewer people now approach politics with a fixed party loyalty—although many people still have party allegiances. When a plurality of citizens lacks party identities, this has the potential to reshape electoral behavior and the nature of citizen politics in either a positive or negative direction.

Negative Partisanship

The increasing ideological polarization of many party systems has also led to renewed attention on the concept of negative partisanship (Bankert, 2020). While partisanship originally focused on positive feelings toward one’s preferred party, negative partisanship involves attitudes toward the opposition party or parties.

One conceptual question is the need for precision in defining these negative attitudes. Often it is simply measured by a question of like or dislike of the other parties. This research often finds that negative attitudes toward the parties different from a person’s preference have been increasing, presumably as a function of widening party polarization (Abramowitz & Webster, 2016). An alternative view looks for a more robust feeling than dislike of the other party. For instance, even if a voter does not identify with a party, are there parties for which they would never vote (Caruana et al., 2015). This seems closer to the nature of a party identity. And in developing party systems where positive party attachments are still developing, negative partisanship toward certain parties can be a stable influence on voter choice (Samuels & Zucco, 2018). This is sort of like enemies of my enemy are my friends.

The conceptualization, measurement, and consequences of negative partisanship is now a very active area of study. One question is whether negative partisanship has the same identity features as positive partisanship—that is, long-term psychological feelings toward the negative party. Panel surveys and longitudinal studies can address this topic. A second question is whether these sentiments are identities or simply an extension of ideological or policy disagreements. The former should be more enduring while the latter are more changeable. And finally, what are the behavioral consequences of negative partisanship for voting behavior and other aspects of political behavior?

A Dark Side of Partisanship?

Lavine et al. (2012) and other scholars have recently renewed questions about the value of party identification as a heuristic for making informed democratic choices. These authors argue that partisanship might act as blinders that shield partisans from discordant information that is necessary for making informed choices. Moreover, a sizable body of cognitive research suggests that when faced with the need to make a decision, many people selectively retrieve information to confirm their initial intuitive judgments or biases, rather than neutrally collecting and evaluating information. This is described as “motivated reasoning” (Haidt, 2012; Lodge & Taber, 2000). Campbell et al. (1960) described this as a perceptual screen built on party identities.

Since partisanship is the ultimate political heuristic, some partisans may unquestioningly agree with their party’s positions even when they should disagree in objective terms. For example, when an opinion survey asks a person to explain why they like a party or candidate, the individual may assemble a list of things that confirms their affective party preferences and ignore or discount factors that are inconsistent with their biases (Goren, 2012; Lodge & Taber, 2013). In other words, partisans may “think” backwards politically: if they affectively like a person or party, they then look for political explanations to justify this preference. This happens for both liberals and conservatives (Fischle, 2000). Motivated reasoning may thus lead many people to incorrect choices because the information behind their choice is biased.

This pattern is especially concerning as political polarization has increased in many nations, and “alternative facts” have become common among extremist parties and extremist candidates. The value of heuristics like partisanship depends on the accuracy and honesty of the cue-giver. Blind partisanship might make partisans susceptible to false statements by extremist politicians of their favored party. This is the vulnerability of using partisan heuristics as a basis for making electoral choices.

Thus, the lesson of this research is that the level of partisanship is only part of the explanation of how citizens manage the complexities of politics. Some voters can rely on partisanship as a surrogate, but heuristic voting has it limits. Similarly, some people can function as independents, but this requires the sophistication to make reasonable choices. Both partisanship and skills are factors that should be combined to understand contemporary electorates.

Conclusion

Research clearly suggests that if one wants to understand the general political behavior of individuals with a single question in a survey, then the party identification question would be the best one to ask. It provides a conceptual framework for many citizens, shaping their views of politics, influencing their political activity, and systemically affecting the overall party system. Thus, even if levels of partisanship are dropping as a result of dealignment, partisanship provides a touchstone for understanding political behavior.

However, lower levels of partisanship will change the nature of electoral politics. Electoral results will become more volatile, as has occurred in recent decades, because voter choices are becoming more fluid and based on the issues and candidates of the campaign. Fewer and fewer voters will begin each election with their choice already made. With weaker party ties, turnout in elections and participation in campaigns may continue to decline, which is not beneficial to democracy. The emergence of Green or New Left parties in Europe during the 1980s and extreme right parties in the early 21st century is likely linked to a larger number of unattached voters. Flash parties that rapidly emerge on the political stage may be a legitimate expression of public interests, but they can also arise from exploitative political elites or short-term reactions to a dramatic issue or event.

These challenges may be especially important for developing nations. Without the stabilizing presence of party identifiers, party systems may suffer from persisting instability. Moreover, a more fluid public, decoupled from habitual party cues, can also open the door to exploitation and demagoguery by political elites. A less educated public and a less robust civil society may be less resistant to such appeals. The invention of partisanship was a solution to the problem of limited voter sophistication when parties were reliable cue givers. When elites are less reliable cue givers, partisanship may create new challenges for responsible electoral democracy.

Whether these evolving patterns of partisanship and electoral behavior are a boon or a curse for electoral democracy depends on how citizens and political parties respond to these shifts. But contemporary patterns of partisanship are clearly changing from our classic models of the past.