It is impossible to divorce the criminalization of LGBTI conduct from the social, institutional, and extra-legal violence to which individuals within this community are subjected, as laws are a mirror of a society’s values. The foundation for laws that punish non-hetero-normative sexualities and gender expressions are societal constructions of hetero-normativity. Lawmakers codify their generalized views about what roles persons should fulfill or perform based on preconceptions regarding the attributes, behaviors, or characteristics of a person, class, or group. Non-hetero-normative sexual orientations and gender identities challenge traditional notions of sexuality and gender. Violence is used as a way to control the bodies of those who exhibit non-hetero-normative traits and values, as well as a form of social control to reinforce sexual and gender norms. The distinctions countries create in the targeted illegality of “male” and “female” homosexuality demonstrate the conflation of sex, gender identity, and sexual orientation. Laws that ban expressive conduct and effectively eliminate lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) persons from public discourse have historical roots in Christian and Muslim religious traditions. Whether codified or not, violence against LGBTI individuals is a consequence of deeply embedded gender inequality. Such inequality manifests in social and physical violence that ultimately punishes, controls, and erases LGBTI persons. Although international bodies have reacted against such violence by ratifying legal instruments to protect the LGBTI community, changing social conditions and preconceptions has proven to be the most effective route to protecting LGBTI persons’ human rights.
Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol
Russell H. Kaschula and Michael M. Kretzer
Language policies in sub-Saharan African nations emerge out of specific political, historical, socioeconomic, and linguistic conditions. Education plays a crucial role for all spheres of language policy. Policies either upgrade or downgrade indigenous languages through their application at various educational institutions. The most significant example is the selection of the language(s) used as languages of learning and teaching at higher-education institutions. The region’s colonial history also influences the language policies of the independent African states. Language policy in Senegal is an example of a francophone country focusing on a linguistic assimilation policy in which minor reforms in favor of indigenous languages have taken place. Rwanda’s language policy is unique as the former francophone nation now uses English as an exoglossic language in a type of hybrid language policy. Botswana is an example of an anglophone country that follows a language policy that is dominated by a very close connection to the notion of nation-building through its concentration on a single language, Setswana, alongside English. Tanzania is an anglophone African country whose policy focuses on Kiswahili, which is one of the very few indigenous and endoglossic languages. Kiswahili is broadly used in Tanzanian educational institutions until the tertiary level, but its use as medium of instruction focuses on the primary level. South Africa demonstrates the very close relationship between general political decisions and language policy and vice versa. Language policy decisions are never neutral and are influenced by the politics of a specific country. As a result, individual and societal language attitudes influence language policies. In addition to this, the overt and official language policy on a macro level may differ from the implementation of such policies on a micro level. At the micro level, practice can include covert language practices by various stakeholders.
The question of membership and belonging is widely recognized to have been at the root of many political crises in Africa since independence. The legal frameworks for citizenship were largely inherited from the colonial powers and still show strong affinities across colonial legal traditions. However, most African states have enacted significant amendments to citizenship laws since independence, as they have grappled with issues of membership, aiming to include or exclude certain groups. Substantive provisions have diverged significantly in several countries from the original template. African states have shared global trends toward gender equality and acceptance of dual citizenship. In relation to acquisition of citizenship based on birth in the territory (jus soli) or based on descent (jus sanguinis), there has been less convergence. In all countries, naturalization is inaccessible to all but a few. Manipulation of citizenship law for political purposes has been common, as political opponents have at times been accused of being non-citizens as a way of excluding them from office, or groups of people have been denied recognition of citizenship as a means of disenfranchisement. Moreover, even in states where a substantial proportion of residents lack identity documents, it seems that the rules on citizenship established by law have themselves had an impact on political developments. The citizenship status of many thousands of people living in different countries across Africa remains unclear, in a context where many citizens and non-citizens lack any identity documentation that records their citizenship. The content of the law is arguably therefore less influential than in some other regions. A rapid development in identification systems and the increasing requirement to show identity documents to access services, however, is likely to increase the importance of citizenship law. In response to these challenges, the African continental institutions have developed, through standard setting and in decisions on individual cases, a continental normative framework that both borrows from and leads international law in the same field.