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Corporate Lobbying in Foreign Policy  

Amy Skonieczny

More Americans than ever before believe that money in politics weakens our democracy. Public opinion polls show that the number of people who believe that the country is run by a few big interests looking after themselves rose to nearly 80% over the past 20 years. The belief that corporate interests drive public policy is not all that surprising when you consider the growth of lobbying in the United States. According to the Center for Responsive Government, from 1998 to 2016, the amount of money spent on lobbying the U.S. government grew from $1.45 billion to $3.12 billion with well over 10,000 lobbyists in Washington. With this all this money attempting to influence policy outcomes in Washington, it is no wonder that Americans are skeptical of the intentions of government officials. However, political scientists have found a more mixed result when it comes to the actual influence of money on politics. One study asked if the amount of money spent on any given issue really influences policy outcomes. Other studies have shown some benefit to the private parties that lobby. Thus despite significant research on the topic, there is little agreement among political scientists on just how lobbying influences political actors or if lobbying directly impacts policy results. When it comes to foreign policy, corporate lobbies are an ever-present influence in the crafting of government policies. Whether in the European Union or the United States or other countries around the world, corporate lobbies view representing their interests in a truly global fashion. While corporate interests are investing in shaping foreign policy in a variety of issues areas such as defense spending, arms sales, contractors on humanitarian missions, one area is particularly vulnerable to corporate influence—trade and finance. Research shows that U.S. trade politics is heavily influenced by the lobbying of business organizations and trade associations. In fact, the U.S. administration often relies on interested corporate parties to provide it with both the expertise that shapes the agreement itself and the political case for trade liberalization that shapes the public pro-trade campaign. In turn, corporate lobbying for trade agreements is a costly and involved process. For example, during the eight years of negotiations over the TransPacific Partnership Agreement, a regional trade agreement between the United States and 11 other Pacific Rim countries, corporations paid $2.6 billion dollars to lobbyists to influence the content of the agreement and to promote it to Congress and the American public. An overview of the literature on corporate lobbying and an examination of the case of U.S. trade shows a particular example of how corporate lobbying works to influence foreign policy.

Article

Interest Organizations and European Union Politics  

Justin Greenwood

Interest representation plays a systemic role in European Union (EU) policymaking and integration, recognized as such in the Treaty on European Union. Interest organizations supply technical and political information to the EU institutions, and EU institutions use interest organizations as agents of political communication. Interest organizations act as a proxy for an otherwise largely absent civil society, with a teeming population of groups advocating for every imaginable cause. Where groups are absent, so EU institutions have stimulated their formation. The result is a pluralist system of checks and balances, although the literature includes findings of “islands” resembling corporatist practice. EU institutions have designed a range of procedures in support of “an open and structured dialogue between the Commission and special interest groups,” now largely packaged as a “Better Regulation” program. Measures include funding for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), consultation procedures accompanied by impact assessments, a Transparency Register to provide lobbying transparency, and measures for access to documents that enable civil society organizations to keep EU institutions accountable. A multilevel governance system further strengthens pluralist design, making it impossible for any one type of interest to routinely capture the diversity of EU decision-making. A key controversy in the literature is how to assess influence and whether lobbying success varies across interest group type. EU public policymaking is regulatory, making for competitive interest group politics, often between different branches of business whose interests are affected differently by regulatory proposals. There are striking findings from the literature, including that NGOs are more successful than business organizations in getting what they want from EU public policymaking, particularly where issues reach the status of high salience where they attract the attention of the European Parliament. A key innovation of the Lisbon Treaty involves a European Citizens’ Initiative, which takes dialogue between civil society and EU institutions outside the ecosystem inhabited by civil society organizations and EU institutions known as the “Brussels bubble” and into the member states.