Contemporary authoritarian regimes use the law in order to stifle their rivals’ ability and willingness to challenge the state. Research has investigated the conditions that make legal repression more likely in electoral autocracies and advanced our understanding of the ways in which legislation may be used for repressive ends in these settings. To a lesser extent, studies have also explored the consequences of legal repression in nondemocracies, focusing on its impact on dissent, opposition leaders, protesters, and civil society.
This article discusses how, in Vladimir Putin’s Russia, the law has been used to exercise political power vis-à-vis the opposition. Since the early 2000s, the Russian authorities have used legislative channels to adopt and refine laws and regulations aimed at hindering protest and inhibiting the development of an independent civil society. The discussion of the Russian case contributes to comparative research on legal repression and authoritarian politics in various ways. First, it offers important insights into the direct and indirect consequences of legal repression on dissent, the development of civil society, and public opinion toward groups targeted by legal repression. Second, the study of Russia illustrates how institutional capture and power consolidation facilitate the adoption and implementation of repressive legislation. Finally, the Russian case advances our understanding of the dynamic nature of legal repression. Reforms to laws regulating protest and civil society in Russia showcase how domestic and external events may cause legal repression to escalate. The article concludes by identifying fruitful avenues for future research on legal repression.
