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The Republic of Cyprus (or Cyprus) joined the European Union (EU) in May 2004 and adopted the single currency (the euro) in 2008. This article consists of three parts: it begins with a historical contextualization, explaining the reasons for Cyprus’ application for an Association Agreement with the (then) European Economic Community (EEC), and also examining the latter´s reaction and policy towards the 1974 Turkish invasion following a failed coup d´état against the Makarios Presidency that has led to a divided island since then (Part 1). In brief, what is known as the “Cyprus Problem.” This part also looks at the evolution of the Association Agreement during the period since 1975 which ended with the conclusion of a customs union Agreement between Cyprus and the European Community in 1987. The article next turns to an analysis of the Republic of Cyprus´ EU accession negotiations process (Part 2). It also covers the impact (or lack thereof) of various reunification plans, and most notably what is seen as the culmination of such efforts in the so-called 2002–2004 Annan Plans. The following section presents an assessment of how Cyprus has fared as a member state since it joined the EU (Part 3). It covers several key questions regarding the EU–Cyprus relationship. Whereas this article is not about the Cyprus problem itself, but as will be made clear throughout this study, it remains the dominant issue for the island. Others issues encompass EU relations with the Turkish-Cypriot community, the question of Turkey´s EU accession, the impact of the economic crisis of 2013, as well as energy security considerations following the discovery of gas in the region. The study concludes that being in the EU offers better perspectives for the Republic of Cyprus than if it had been kept outside it. If only because as the Accession Treaty makes it clear: it is the whole island that has joined the EU albeit the acquis communautaire cannot apply to the north, occupied, part of the Island following the invasion by Turkey. But all Cypriots are EU citizens. Yet, to a large extent, the experience of Cyprus prior to and after EU membership also reflects the kind of specific problems that a “small state” is facing in its international relations.

The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was a founder member of the European integration process, namely the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) created in 1952. However, the circumstances were very different from the 2010s. Germany was a divided and defeated state until 1990. Integration provided important political and economic support to West Germany. From the 1970s, it strengthened the FRG’s foreign policy reach, for the new state was constrained by Cold War politics as well as other legacies, notably the Holocaust. European integration provided a framework for building trust with western neighbors, particularly France. The collapse of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1989 and its absorption into the FRG through unification in 1990 brought about significant change to Germany’s relationship to European integration. The unified Germany became the largest member state. Initial concerns about German power in Europe were allayed by Chancellor Helmut Kohl pursuing deeper integration to bind the unified Germany further to integration: through creating the European Union (EU) itself and setting a course toward monetary union. Specific concerns about German power only really emerged in the 2010s, as the EU was bedeviled by several crises. In seeking to offer a comprehensive understanding of Germany’s relationship with the EU, coverage is organized around four broad themes: the historical dimension of the relationship; the substance of Germany’s European policy; the sources of Germany’s European policy; and Germany’s role and power in the EU. The historical dimension of Germany’s relationship with European integration is important as a first theme. It is no exaggeration to suggest that European integration helped emancipate the FRG from the historical legacy of turbulent relations with France, Nazi tyranny, and the opprobrium of the Holocaust. European integration afforded a complementary framework for Germany’s political and economic order. The importance of embedding German unification in a context of European integration should not be underestimated. Germany’s European policy has displayed considerable consistency up to the contemporary era. Support for further integration, for enlargement, the market order, and the development of an EU “civilian power” have been key components. These policies are important contributors to understanding Germany’s role in the EU: the second theme. The political and economic system of the FRG forms an important backdrop to understanding Germany’s policy and role in the EU: the third theme. From the 1960s until the 2010s, EU membership was subject to cross-party consensus and permissive public support. These circumstances allowed the federal government autonomy in pursuing its European policy. However, the political climate of European policy has become much more contested in the 2010s. Germany’s role was placed in the spotlight by the succession of crises that have emerged within the EU and in its neighborhood in the 2010s, particularly the eurozone and migration crises. The fourth theme explores how the question of German power re-emerged. These four themes are important to understanding Germany’s role in the EU, especially given Berlin’s centrality to its development.

Belgium is one of the six founding members of European integration, but it is often seen as a special one. In both policy and research, the country is widely known as the “heart of Europe.” It even sells itself to the outside world in this way. This metaphor has a double meaning, a literal and a figurative one. First, Belgium’s capital, Brussels, qualifies as the unofficial capital of the European Union. This meaning is strongly supported by facts, with the city hosting the most numerous and the most important institutions. The second meaning requires more detailed consideration. Indeed, and second, Belgium is perceived to be the most European of all European countries, even prepared to exchange sovereignty for supranationalism at any time and any price. A closer look at data, decisions, and developments shows, however, that while support for European integration is widespread, it is not omnipresent either in time or in place. Particularly in Flanders, the northern part of the country, support has been less obvious than elsewhere. Indeed, to understand Belgium and/in the European Union, one also has to understand the functioning of Belgium as a federal state composed of communities and regions, thus as a system of multilevel governance. While it is not the only federation among European Union member states, it uniquely combines a wide variety of federal characteristics. Most importantly here, the gradual process of federalization that Belgium has experienced has given the federated entities a strong voice in European Union decision-making. Member states still need to speak with one voice, however, resulting in a complex system of coordination and representation. The possibilities and realities of this system have attracted quite a lot of scholarly interest. The same goes for the rather fundamental question of whether the European Union and federated entities should be seen as unintended partners in the hollowing out of the federal state or whether the opposite holds true and the European Union is coming to Belgium’s rescue. The jury is still out on this, though the answer seems to be growing more and more complex as time passes.