1-20 of 31 Results

  • Keywords: debt x
Clear all

Article

Irene Sabaté Muriel

During the first two decades of the 21st century, a wide anthropological literature has tackled the social nature of debt and credit under contemporary capitalism, with its increasing centrality linked to financialization processes that involve the commodification of different kinds of debt. Indebtedness appears in different modalities and reaches different scales: that of individuals or households (consumption credit, mortgages), that of entrepreneurs and firms (microcredits, corporate debt), and that of national economies and public administrations (sovereign debt). In some cases, indebtedness evolves into overindebtedness as borrowers experience persistent difficulties in keeping up with loan repayments, due to a variety of factors, including poor financial decisions, lack of transparency or fraud on the creditors’ side, insufficient consumer protection, structural factors that incentivize recklessness on both the borrowers’ and the lenders’ part, and so on. For critical scholars, acts of borrowing should not be seen as the result of rational choice, but as a behavior naturalized by a neoliberal regime of accumulation where credit plays a central role, and where indebtedness is a precondition for social reproduction, especially among the poor. Although operational definitions of the notion of overindebtedness tend to focus on objective indicators and normative statements, a number of authors advocate for the exploration of its subjective dimension: when is debt experienced as a burden? Overindebtedness, on the one hand, has an impact on material living conditions, as it leads to economic precariousness, impoverishment, and dispossession. On the other hand, it also has political effects: if power relations between creditors and debtors are taken into account, it entails the disciplining and disempowerment of borrowers, who are forced to adopt a neoliberal ethos. In the face of excessive indebtedness, in cases where debts are unpayable and/or are perceived as illegitimate, debtors may react in a variety of ways, giving way to different forms of resistance, including the refusal to repay. The latter usually entails certain consequences, on moral terms—as defaulters are not fulfilling the obligation to repay—and/or in the form of debt enforcement. The politics of such resistances are to be understood as manifestations of opposition against a “debt economy” in which the most basic functions of household and national economies are only attainable through indebtedness. Occurrences of resistance to overindebtedness with explicitly political aims include debt audits, debt cancellation campaigns, different forms of collective disobedience, calls for changes in legislative frameworks, and experimentation with alternative credit-lending institutions. However, there are few cases where borrowers refuse to repay their debt for a conscious, politically motivated reason. In many other situations, their intentionality is not an emancipation from debt, but the attainment of more sustainable conditions for repayment, for instance, negotiating debt restructuration, prioritizing certain financial obligations over others, and so on. Apart from analyzing, comparing, and classifying existing resistances, both before and after the 2008 financial crisis as an important historical milestone, the scholarly literature on the topic also explores the possible conditions necessary for future resistances and a potential society free from financial speculation and exploitative debts.

Article

Giselle Datz

Sovereign borrowing and debt default have long been a part of a nation’s existence. Sovereign debt defaults (that is, the suspension of interest or principal payment on due debt) were common from the sixteenth century, when Edward III declared a default after military defeat in 1340, to the nineteenth century, when Latin American countries defaulted on some of their debts. Early loans were made in the form of repayable taxes until the system evolved to allow for sovereign loans, transparent enough that secondary markets for these debts were soon developed. A government may default on its debt due to unwillingness or inability to pay. In both cases, default is a difficult political decision whose real costs remain somewhat ambiguous from a theoretical standpoint. The costs of default are often contingent on the type of debt restructuring deal reached between the debtor and the creditor. The scholarly literature on sovereign debt crises is substantial, particularly with respect to the economic, legal, and political costs of default. More recent theoretical work has focused on the trend toward increased domestic debt, which is expected to help reduce the probability of a debt crisis. However, domestically issued sovereign debt can lead to other types of risk. While relying on domestic institutional investors in local economies can help smooth cycles of liquidity shortages, over-reliance on those investors (particularly pension funds) can undermine the solvency of domestic banks and social security arrangements.

Article

Vivian Zhanwei Yue and Bin Wei

This article reviews the literature on sovereign debt, that is, debt issued by a national government. The defining characteristic of sovereign debt is the limited mechanisms for enforcement. Because a sovereign government does not face legal consequences of default, the reasons why it makes repayment are to avoid default penalties related to reputation loss or economic cost. Theoretical and quantitative studies on sovereign debt have investigated the cause and impact of sovereign default and produced analysis of policy relevance. This article reviews the theories that quantitatively account for key empirical facts about sovereign debt. These studies enable researchers and policy makers to better understand sovereign debt crises.

Article

The United States is a nation built on credit, both public and private. This article focuses on private credit: that is, credit extended to businesses and consumers by private entities such as banks, other businesses, and retail stores. Business credit involves short-term lending for items such as inventories, payroll, and the like; and long-term lending for the building of factories, offices, and other physical plant. Trade credit, bank loans, bonds, and commercial paper are all forms of business credit. Consumer credit is extended to individuals or households to fund purchases ranging from basic necessities to homes. Informal store credits, installment sales, personal loans from banks and other institutions, credit cards, home mortgages, and student loans are forms of consumer credit. Until the 20th century, the federal government remained mostly uninvolved in the private credit markets. Then, after World War I and especially during the Great Depression, the government deliberately expanded the credit available for certain targeted groups, such as farmers and home buyers. After World War II the government helped to expand lending even further, this time to small businesses and students. Mostly the government accomplished its goal not through lending directly but by insuring the loans made by private entities, thereby encouraging them to make more loans. In the case of home mortgages and student loans, the government took the lead in creating a national market for securitized debt—debt that is turned into securities, such as bonds, and offered to investors—through the establishment of government-sponsored enterprises, nicknamed Fannie Mae (1938), Ginnie Mae (1968), Freddie Mac (1970), and Sallie Mae (1972). Innovations such as these by businesses and government made credit increasingly available to ordinary people, whose attitudes toward borrowing changed accordingly.

Article

Saskia Roselaar

The lex Poetelia Papiria was a law that abolished the contractual form of nexum (debt bondage). Livy 8.28 dates the law to 326bce, during the third consulship of Gaius Poetelius Libo Visolus and the first of L. Papirius Cursor, although Varro (Ling. 7.105) dates it to 313bce, during the dictatorship of Poetelius’s son. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (16.5) and Valerius Maximus (6.1.9) appear to favour a date after the Caudine Forks (321bce).Livy 8.28 says that the law was passed because of the cruelty and lust of a particular creditor. A young boy named Gaius Publilius was working as a labourer for Lucius Papirius (Valerius Maximus calls them T. Veturius and P. Plotius, respectively) to pay off his father’s debt. Papirius desired Publilius sexually because of his beauty and tried to seduce him. Publilius refused, and Papirius had him flogged. The wounded boy ran into the street, causing an outcry among the people. Eventually the Senate ordered the consuls to bring a measure before the people, and the lex Poetelia Papiria was passed.

Article

Alexes Harris and Frank Edwards

Despite the central role that fines and other fiscal penalties play in systems of criminal justice, they have received relatively little scholarly attention. Court systems impose fines and other monetary sanctions in response to minor administrative and traffic offenses as well as for more serious criminal offenses. Monetary sanctions are intended to provide a deterrent punishment to reduce lawbreaking, to provide opportunities for accountability through financial restitution, to restore harm caused to victims of crime, and to fund the operation and administration of courts and criminal justice systems. Fines, fees, and other monetary sanctions are the most common form of punishment imposed by criminal justice systems. Most criminal sentences in the United States include financial penalties, and monetary sanctions are routinely imposed for less serious, and far more common, infractions such as traffic or parking violations. For many, paying a monetary sanction for a low-level violation is an annoyance. However, for the poor and people of color who are disproportionately likely to be subject to criminal justice system involvement, monetary sanctions can become a vehicle for expanded social inequality and increasingly severe criminal justice contact. Failure to pay legal financial obligations often results in court summons or license suspensions that may have attendant additional costs and may trigger incarceration. In the United States, the criminal justice system is heavily and routinely involved in the lives of low-income people of color. These already-existing biases, coupled with the deep poverty that is common in many communities, join to widen the net of criminal justice involvement by escalating low-level infractions to far more serious offenses when people are unable to pay. Despite the routine justification of monetary sanctions as less-severe penalties, if imposed without restriction on the poor, they are likely to magnify the inequality producing effects of criminal justice system involvement.

Article

Kathleen C. Schwartzman

Neoliberalism swept over Mexico like a tsunami. It swept away the country’s edifice of economic nationalism and left in its place an economy based on principles of neoliberalism. These neoliberal practices go by the names of the structural adjustment programs (SAPs), or the Washington Consensus. In 1982, when Mexico declared its lack of adequate resources to meet external debt service payments, it (like other Latin American countries) entered into debt renegotiations. These renegotiations required Mexico to implement reforms such as the privatization of state-owned enterprises, currency devaluation, and state budget reductions. Later agreements expanded upon the neoliberal reforms (the 1986 adherence to GATT; the 1992 revision of Article 27 of the Constitution, the 1993 signing of NAFTA, and the 1994 peso devaluation). Multiple iterations of the Foreign Investment Laws opened up Mexico to foreign investors. The goal of the neoliberal adjustments was to stabilize the economy and make it attractive for foreign direct investment. FDI, as well as open trade, promised to bring economic well-being and political stability to Mexico. The evaluations of the post-1982 reforms are mixed, but by the 21st century, tend toward “disappointing.” Increasing globalization has further marginalized Mexico. Neoliberal globalization is essentially about Mexico’s integration into the current global economy and the interaction of the global and the local. Mexico has been integrated into the global economy since Cortez, but the tsunami of neoliberalism has left Mexico with fewer armaments for successful development.

Article

money  

Colin P. Elliott

Money is any object that is used as a medium of exchange, but moneys often also function as stores of value, accounting units, and means for making payments. Through the use of physical money—especially coinage stamped with symbols of society, state, and the divine—individuals were connected to a wider framework composed of strangers, governments, deities, and customs.1 In classical antiquity, money comprised a range of materials and goods, both physical and virtual, and these moneys performed a variety of economic, social, and cultural functions. Money was issued by different polities and powers, mostly by states but also by economic and religious elites and institutions.Aristotle insists that money use arose out of barter—certainly a possibility, although the archaeological record is ambiguous at best. The earliest known coin hoard, dated to the mid to late 7th centurybce and found in western Asia Minor, contains standardized globules of electrum which are both stamped (“coins”) and unstamped, giving credence to Aristotle’s claim that early coins “had a certain stamp, to save the trouble of weighing, and to express its value” (Arist.

Article

The global financial crisis of 2007–2009 helped usher in a stronger consensus about the central role that housing plays in shaping economic activity, particularly during large boom and bust episodes. The latest research regards the causes, consequences, and policy implications of housing crises with a broad focus that includes empirical and structural analysis, insights from the 2000s experience in the United States, and perspectives from around the globe. Even with the significant degree of heterogeneity in legal environments, institutions, and economic fundamentals over time and across countries, several common themes emerge. Research indicates that fundamentals such as productivity, income, and demographics play an important role in generating sustained movements in house prices. While these forces can also contribute to boom-bust episodes, periods of large house price swings often reflect an evolving housing premium caused by financial innovation and shifts in expectations, which are in turn amplified by changes to the liquidity of homes. Regarding credit, the latest evidence indicates that expansions in lending to marginal borrowers via the subprime market may not be entirely to blame for the run-up in mortgage debt and prices that preceded the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Instead, the expansion in credit manifested by lower mortgage rates was broad-based and caused borrowers across a wide range of incomes and credit scores to dramatically increase their mortgage debt. To whatever extent changing beliefs about future housing appreciation may have contributed to higher realized house price growth in the 2000s, it appears that neither borrowers nor lenders anticipated the subsequent collapse in house prices. However, expectations about future credit conditions—including the prospect of rising interest rates—may have contributed to the downturn. For macroeconomists and those otherwise interested in the broader economic implications of the housing market, a growing body of evidence combining micro data and structural modeling finds that large swings in house prices can produce large disruptions to consumption, the labor market, and output. Central to this transmission is the composition of household balance sheets—not just the amount of net worth, but also how that net worth is allocated between short term liquid assets, illiquid housing wealth, and long-term defaultable mortgage debt. By shaping the incentive to default, foreclosure laws have a profound ex-ante effect on the supply of credit as well as on the ex-post economic response to large shocks that affect households’ degree of financial distress. On the policy front, research finds mixed results for some of the crisis-related interventions implemented in the U.S. while providing guidance for future measures should another housing bust of similar or greater magnitude reoccur. Lessons are also provided for the development of macroprudential policy aimed at preventing such a future crisis without unduly constraining economic performance in good times.

Article

African financial history is often neglected in research on the history of global financial systems, and in its turn research on African financial systems in the past often fails to explore links with the rest of the world. However, African economies and financial systems have been linked to the rest of the world since ancient times. Sub-Saharan Africa was a key supplier of gold used to underpin the monetary systems of Europe and the North from the medieval period through the 19th century. It was West African gold rather than slaves that first brought Europeans to the Atlantic coast of Africa during the early modern period. Within sub-Saharan Africa, currency and credit systems reflected both internal economic and political structures as well as international links. Before the colonial period, indigenous currencies were often tied to particular trades or trade routes. These systems did not immediately cease to exist with the introduction of territorial currencies by colonial governments. Rather, both systems coexisted, often leading to shocks and localized crises during periods of global financial uncertainty. At independence, African governments had to contend with a legacy of financial underdevelopment left from the colonial period. Their efforts to address this have, however, been shaped by global economic trends. Despite recent expansion and innovation, limited financial development remains a hindrance to economic growth.

Article

Florian Exler and Michèle Tertilt

Consumer debt is an important means for consumption smoothing. In the United States, 70% of households own a credit card, and 40% borrow on it. When borrowers cannot (or do not want to) repay their debts, they can declare bankruptcy, which provides additional insurance in tough times. Since the 2000s, up to 1.5% of households declared bankruptcy per year. Clearly, the option to default affects borrowing interest rates in equilibrium. Consequently, when assessing (welfare) consequences of different bankruptcy regimes or providing policy recommendations, structural models with equilibrium default and endogenous interest rates are needed. At the same time, many questions are quantitative in nature: the benefits of a certain bankruptcy regime critically depend on the nature and amount of risk that households bear. Hence, models for normative or positive analysis should quantitatively match some important data moments. Four important empirical patterns are identified: First, since 1950, consumer debt has risen constantly, and it amounted to 25% of disposable income by 2016. Defaults have risen since the 1980s. Interestingly, interest rates remained roughly constant over the same time period. Second, borrowing and default clearly depend on age: both measures exhibit a distinct hump, peaking around 50 years of age. Third, ownership of credit cards and borrowing clearly depend on income: high-income households are more likely to own a credit card and to use it for borrowing. However, this pattern was stronger in the 1980s than in the 2010s. Finally, interest rates became more dispersed over time: the number of observed interest rates more than quadrupled between 1983 and 2016. These data have clear implications for theory: First, considering the importance of age, life cycle models seem most appropriate when modeling consumer debt and default. Second, bankruptcy must be costly to support any debt in equilibrium. While many types of costs are theoretically possible, only partial repayment requirements are able to quantitatively match the data on filings, debt levels, and interest rates simultaneously. Third, to account for the long-run trends in debts, defaults, and interest rates, several quantitative theory models identify a credit expansion along the intensive and extensive margin as the most likely source. This expansion is a consequence of technological advancements. Many of the quantitative macroeconomic models in this literature assess welfare effects of proposed reforms or of granting bankruptcy at all. These welfare consequences critically hinge on the types of risk that households face—because households incur unforeseen expenditures, not-too-stringent bankruptcy laws are typically found to be welfare superior to banning bankruptcy (or making it extremely costly) but also to extremely lax bankruptcy rules. There are very promising opportunities for future research related to consumer debt and default. Newly available data in the United States and internationally, more powerful computational resources allowing for more complex modeling of household balance sheets, and new loan products are just some of many promising avenues.

Article

Margaret Sherrard Sherraden

Financial capability combines the ability to act with the opportunity to act in ways that contribute to financial functioning. As large numbers of people struggle to manage their household finances, financial capability has become increasingly important. Improving financial capability requires financial education and guidance as well as improved access across the life span to appropriate and beneficial financial products and services. Examples of policies that promote financial capability across the life span include Children’s Development Accounts and myRAs, long-term investment vehicles that build financial capability. Social work can play a key role in building financial capability through interventions in households, communities, and policies. However, these contributions require practice and research to develop and test interventions. They also require financial education for social workers.

Article

The Mexican economy consisted of activities at the international, national, and local levels, including the export of minerals and agricultural commodities, manufactures and agriculture for domestic markets, and production of goods for everyday consumption, respectively. The impact of a decade of civil wars between 1910 and 1920, which comprised the Mexican Revolution, on the economy varied according to which level, the time period, and the geographical region. The crucial aspects of the economy consisted of transportation and communications, banking, mining, export agriculture, and government policies and actions. The important factors were the intensity of the violence, inflation, and the availability of capital. Chronologically, there were several stages to the economic history of the Revolution. The first consisted of the years of the Madero rebellion and presidency, 1910–1913, when there was little damage done and growth continued. The second and worst period was during 1914, 1915, and 1916, when the counterrevolutionary Huerta regime battled the rebel Constitutionalists and after the latter’s victory the ensuing civil war between the divided winners. The third stage occurred with the defeat of the radical factions of the Revolution led by Zapata and Villa and the restoration of a semblance of order in 1917. The fourth included the establishment of the Sonoran dynasty of de la Huerta, Obregón, and Calles and the slow reconstruction of the economy.

Article

The 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and subsequent European Debt Crisis had wide-sweeping consequences for global economic and political stability. Yet while these twin crises have prompted soul searching within the economics profession, international political economy (IPE) has been relatively ineffective in accounting for variation in crisis exposure across the developed world. The GFC and European Debt Crisis present the opportunity to link IPE and comparative political economy (CPE) together in the study of international economic and financial turmoil. While the GFC was prompted by the inter-connectedness of global financial markets, its instigators were largely domestic in nature and were reflective of negative externalities that stemmed from unsustainable national policies, especially those related to financial regulation and household debt accumulation. Many in IPE take an “outward looking in” approach to the examination of international economic developments and domestic politics; analysis rests on how the former impacts the latter. The GFC and European Debt Crisis, however, demonstrate the importance of a (CPE-based) “inward looking out” approach, analyzing how unique policy and political features (and failures) of individual nation states can unleash economic and financial instability at the global level amidst deepened economic and financial integration. IPE not only needs to grant greater attention to variation in domestic politics and policies in a time of closely integrated financial markets, but also should acknowledge the impact of a wider array of actors beyond banks and financial institutions (specifically more domestically rooted actors like households) on cross-national variation in the consumption of foreign credit.

Article

Mark Hallerberg

The topic of fiscal politics includes taxation and spending, budget balances and debt levels, and crises and the politics of austerity. The discussion often focuses on how some variable—such as the international environment, or political institutions—constrains “politics” in this realm. Almost omnipresent concerns about endogeneity run through this research. While this is a “big” policy area that deserves study, tracing causation is difficult.

Article

Keir James Cecil Martin

Corporations are among the most important of the institutions that shape lives across the globe. They often have a “taken for granted” character, both in everyday discourse and in economic or management theory, where they are often described as an inevitable outcome of the natural working of markets. Anthropological analysis suggests that neither the markets that are seen as their foundation nor corporations as social entities can be understood in this manner. Instead, their existence has to be seen as contingent on particular social relations and as being the outcome of long processes of historic conflict. The extent to which, at the start of the 21st century, corporations satisfactorily fulfill their supposed purpose of managing debt obligations in order to stimulate economic growth is particularly open to question. This was traditionally the justification for the establishment of corporations as separate legal actors in economic markets. Some 150 years on, other sociocultural relations and perspectives shape their boundaries and activities in a manner that means that their purpose and character can no longer be assumed on the basis of such axiomatic premises. Instead, their actions can be explained only on the basis of historic and ethnographic analysis of the contests over the limits of relational obligation that shape their boundaries.

Article

China’s economic impact on Africa in the 21st century has been enormous. China became Africa’s largest trading partner in 2009 and has subsequently widened the gap with Africa’s second largest trading partner. China is Africa’s largest bilateral source of loans and an important provider of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)-equivalent aid, although well behind the European Union and the United States. Annual foreign direct investment flows by Chinese companies are growing and are now in the same league as companies from other major investing nations. Increasingly, African leaders are focusing their economic relationships on China and, because of China’s economic success, some of them are also looking to China as an economic and political model. The future in Africa of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the use of the renminbi (RMB) as an international currency are less clear. China’s influence on African economies comes with challenges. China has developed a significant trade surplus with Africa. Although resource-rich African countries have sizable trade surpluses with China, most African countries, especially the resource-poor ones, have trade deficits, some of which are huge. The influx of inexpensive Chinese products is also stifling Africa’s ability to produce similar goods. African governments welcome Chinese loans, which are usually used for infrastructure projects, but there are signs these loans are contributing to a debt problem in an increasing number of countries. Most Chinese aid to Africa consists of the concessionary component of these loans. Small Chinese traders have flocked to Africa, competing head-to-head with African counterparts. This has led to growing antagonism with African market traders, although African consumers welcome the competition. While Western countries collectively are much more important to African economies than is China, Beijing has become the single most important bilateral economic partner in a number of countries and is challenging the United States and Europe for economic leadership across the continent. China’s most significant competition in the coming years may be less from the United States and other Western and Western-affiliated countries such as Japan and more from developing countries such as India, Brazil, the Gulf States, Turkey, and Indonesia.

Article

Unlike the Atlantic, slavery and slave trade in the Indian Ocean persisted over centuries, from antiquity to the present: slavery involved many actors, not necessarily attributed to tensions between the “West and the rest.” Multiple forms of bondage, debt dependence, and slavery persisted and coexisted over centuries, since ancient times, then with the expansion of Islam in the 8th century, and reached a peak with the intrusion of European powers between the 16th and the 19th centuries. However, even after the official abolition of slavery in the western colonies, forms of bondage and illegal slavery have persisted and were openly practiced in the Gulf region through much of the 20th century.

Article

Murray Z. Frank, Vidhan Goyal, and Tao Shen

The pecking order theory of corporate capital structure developed by states that issuing securities is subject to an adverse selection problem. Managers endowed with private information have incentives to issue overpriced risky securities. But they also understand that issuing such securities will result in a negative price reaction because rational investors, who are at an information disadvantage, will discount the prices of any risky securities the firm issues. Consequently, firms follow a pecking order: use internal resources when possible; if internal funds are inadequate, obtain external debt; external equity is the last resort. Large firms rely significantly on internal finance to meet their needs. External net debt issues finance the minor deficits that remain. Equity is not a significant source of financing for large firms. By contrast, small firms lack sufficient internal resources and obtain external finance. Although much of it is equity, there are substantial issues of debt by small firms. Firms are sorted into three portfolios based on whether they have a surplus or a deficit. About 15% of firm-year observations are in the surplus group. Firms primarily use surpluses to pay down debt. About 56% of firm-year observations are in the balance group. These firms generate internal cash flows that are just about enough to meet their investment and dividend needs. They issue debt, which is just enough to meet their debt repayments. They are relatively inactive in equity markets. About 29% of firm-year observations are in the deficit group. Deficits arise because of a combination of negative profitability and significant investments in both real and financial assets. Some financing patterns in the data are consistent with a pecking order: firms with moderate deficits favor debt issues; firms with very high deficits rely much more on equity than debt. Others are not: many equity-issuing firms do not seem to have entirely used up the debt capacity; some with a surplus issue equity. The theory suggests a sharp discontinuity in financing methods between surplus firms and deficit firms, and another at debt capacity. The literature provides little support for the predicted threshold effects. The theoretical work has shown that adverse selection does not necessarily lead to pecking order behavior. The pecking order is obtained only under special conditions. With both risky debt and equity being issued, there is often scope for many equilibria, and there is no clear basis for selecting among them. A pecking order may or may not emerge from the theory. Several articles show that the adverse selection problem can be solved by certain financing strategies or properly designed managerial contracts and can even disappear in dynamic models. Although adverse selection can generate a pecking order, it can also be caused by agency considerations, transaction costs, tax consideration, or behavioral decision-making considerations. Under standard tests in the literature, these alternative underlying motivations are commonly observationally equivalent.

Article

Hadrien Saiag

The global crisis that erupted in 2007–2008 clearly exposed that debt with financial institutions has become a key element of household social reproduction in most parts of the world. One way to analyze how this situation impacts on people’s lives is to investigate the very nature of debt (its “essence”), which is often conceived as intrinsically violent. However, most anthropologists consider how people manage their debt and take a situated approach to debt in context. Their focus on people’s financial practices takes a broad view of consumer credit as any number of monetary debts that households incur to make ends meet. Their examination of how debt is managed within the household points up that consumer credit is often used to sustain meaningful social relations, although this can trigger a debt spiral. This spotlight on how people’s financial practices relate to broader historical and social contexts shows that the rise of consumer credit is instrumental in reshaping class, racial, and gender relations in their material and moral dimensions, and that people can be found to resist debt in many ways. Although these trends in the anthropological literature make for a rich understanding of debt relations, much could still be done to understand why people in most settings complain about their debts, but do not openly rebel against them.