A diplomatic row between Africa, specifically the African Union (AU), and the International Criminal Court (ICC), regarding accountability for mass atrocities exists. Critics accuse the ICC of bias on account of its African caseload, while the ICC counters that it has a mandate to afford justice to victims of heinous crimes—war crimes, crimes against humanity, war of aggression, and genocide—whenever domestic courts cannot do so. This article problematizes the relationship between the AU and the ICC, which was initially cordial until the indictment of former Sudanese autocrat, Omar Al-Bashir. The indictment of six Kenyan suspects, the “Ocampo Six,” among them, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, who subsequently ascended to power, worsened the Africa–ICC relationship. The article contends that, although flawed, the ICC is significant in addressing impunity. However, the ICC stands accused of favoritism, imperialism, erosion of the sovereignty of already weak African states, and escalation of conflicts. Historically, international criminal justice is steeped in controversy. Africa has suffered humiliation by the West, which evokes suspicion toward the ICC, perceived to be a stooge of Western powers. The ICC as a court of last resort, ought to afford justice to victims of mass atrocities whenever national judiciaries fail them. Crucially, however, domestic courts in Africa need capacity and political will to hold to account masterminds and perpetrators of mass atrocities. Thus, the choice between justice and peace or retributive and restorative justice preponderant among ICC critics in Africa is false. There cannot be peace and reconciliation in Africa without justice. Truth telling and retribution are complementary processes in combating impunity and realizing justice, stability, and prosperity.
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Westen K. Shilaho
Scarlett O'Phelan Godoy
In the majority of social movements in 18th-century Peru, the social composition was mixed—made up essentially of Indians and mestizos—the latter often playing a relevant part as leaders or part of the leadership of the uprisings. As it happens, Juan Santos Atahualpa and José Gabriel Túpac Amaru, who headed important insurrections during this period, were both mestizos ethnically and culturally. Although there was insurgency on the coast, it can be seen where social protests were concentrated and intensified was above all in the highlands, the Andes, and mostly in the area known as Lower and Upper Perú, that is, the southern Peruvian Andes and what became the republic of Bolivia. However, the uprising of Juan Santos put the Amazonian territory of colonial Peru on the map, which until then had had a marginal presence. It should be pointed out that not all 18th-century social movements were the same, nor did they have the same reach. Some were short-lived, attacked a specific authority, were easy to control, covered a limited space, and lacked defined leadership; in other words, they were social revolts. Rebellions were movements of greater magnitude, involving several towns or even provinces; mixed leadership, with political statements, placards, a duration of several days or weeks; and well-orchestrated repression. But if they had something in common, it was that neither the revolts nor the rebellions were “spontaneous.” In both cases, the rebels already had resentment against a specific authority or a certain abusive situation that led them to conduct themselves in a violent way in the context of social unrest. This was not about unexpected reactions but about predictable ones, on the part of the insurgents, as well as on the part of the colonial authorities. Opposing focal points had been created, which, eventually, could spread out. The Great Rebellion of Túpac Amaru II was an unprecedented mass movement that broke out in Cuzco in November 1780 and was preceded by a series of lesser revolts both immediate, that is, joint revolts, and those that arose previously over a longer period. This cumulative factor might explain the intensity and resonance that the insurrection achieved from 1780 to 1781. The “general uprising”—as it was called by colonial authorities—was, therefore, the culmination of a series of social movements of lesser reach that showed that the colonial populace was not passive when its interests and expectations were threatened. Quite the contrary; it was able to react, to respond. The Great Rebellion geographically encompassed two-thirds of the Viceroyalty of Peru, including Upper Peru, and lasted almost a year, preventing during that time the regular operation of the production centers of the Andean south and making revenue received by the Royal Treasury sporadic. Clearly, the criteria for a rebellion were emerging. However, it is interesting to note that the 18th-century uprisings, in the case of Peru, came together or coincided in three moments, three rebel conjunctures, where they formed nodes of social unrest. It can be noted that the first conjuncture was determined by the government of Viceroy Castelfuerte and the general visit that resulted. The second conjuncture is defined by the legalization of the forced distribution of goods by the corregidor—reparto or repartimiento—and the opposing relations that this measure provoked in the communities and other local authorities. The third conjuncture is forged in the context of the Bourbon fiscal reforms that brought Visitador Areche to Peru and unleashed social protests in different areas of the viceroyalty which culminated in the outbreak of the Great Rebellion.
Anthropological research in the Balkans has taken place under different labels—ethnography, ethnology, and folkloristics, to name a few. A throughline that connects the various scholarly histories in the region is the emergence of the discipline under the influence of German Romantic ideas about language and culture. Early anthropological research was entangled with the political goals of nation-building in the aftermath of projects of national liberation and oriented toward internal others, mainly peasants. After World War II, ideas from the Soviet practice of ethnography gained influence. Since the 1970s, national traditions of anthropological research have opened up to influences from the centers of anthropological knowledge production, primarily the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. From then on, a greater number of foreign anthropologists were coming to do fieldwork in the Balkans, more scholars from the Balkans began receiving their training outside the region, and those trained in their home countries started engaging in a more dynamic exchange with foreign anthropologists. This exchange resulted in a critical and reflexive examination of the definition and status of the Balkans as a concept. Anthropological research conducted in the aftermath of the fall of socialism, in the 1990s and later, has four overarching topics. First, many researchers focused on postsocialist transformations aiming to understand the various domains in which profound cultural changes were taking place. Second, the war in the former Yugoslavia and the rise of nationalism elsewhere saw a growing interest in the topic of ethnonationalism. Third, the continual flows of outmigration from the region, the process of European integration, and more attention to the enduring legacies of empires crystallized in the research on transnational flows. Fourth, analyses of gender and kinship across the previous three topics became important in their own right. Since the turn of the millennium, anthropologists have been more likely to take up topics that have global reverberations rather than those that are more limited to the Balkans. First, anthropologists have focused on novel political and economic subjectivities that have appeared in the region in response to overlapping crises. Second, the region has provided ample anthropological theorizations of the state against the backdrop of nostalgia for the lost socialist state and changing forms of action in the political domain. Finally, anthropologists have engaged with materiality more deeply by focusing on topics such as infrastructure, environment, and the body.
Tailan Chi and Yan Huang
The real option theory (ROT), a theory on investment decision making under uncertainty, has been applied to analyzing a broad range of questions in international business (IB). In the face of uncertainty, any discretion that the managers of a multinational enterprise (MNE) have over the timing, scale, speed, and sequence of investing or using the firm’s resources, in the forms of physical or intellectual capital or managerial time and effort, can be a real option. Such options confer upon the managers the right, but not the obligation, to exploit the upside potential while limiting the downside risk. Uncertainty, irreversibility, and absence of immediate and complete preemption are three necessary conditions for a real option to create value. Uncertainty offers opportunities to gather more information in the future, and such information can help managers make better decisions or alter prior decisions for improvement. Irreversibility is defined as the proportion of the investment committed to a project that cannot be recouped if the project is abandoned. Preemption refers to the revocation of the decision-making discretion that nullifies the option. It is possible to distinguish seven types of real options that have been examined in IB studies: (a) option to defer, (b) option to abandon/exit, (c) option to exchange, (d) option to grow/scale up, (e) option to contract/scale down, (f) option to switch, and (g) compound options. These types of options are found to influence a firm’s international market-entry strategies (e.g., location, timing, scale, speed, and mode) and the configuration and organization of the firm’s geographically dispersed production network. ROT has also been integrated with other economic theories, such as transaction cost economics and resource-based view, to better understand these decisions. Although ROT assumes a strong form of rationality on the part of the decision maker, it is also possible to incorporate cognitive or cultural biases into the theory and give the theory’s analysis greater realism. ROT represents a theoretical approach that can be integrated with various economic and noneconomic theories. More work in such theoretical integration can potentially help researchers gain deeper or more complete understandings of IB questions. Extant studies in IB typically analyze only a single type of option in isolation. But the global production network of a MNE typically has a portfolio of different types of options embedded, and the different types of options inevitably interact. The study of interactions among two or more types of options under different sources of uncertainty is likely to yield new insights on the strategy and organization of the MNE.
As part of a push to homogenize culture, the modern Argentine nation-state (1880–1930) did away with race as an explicit criterion of social classification, laying the foundations for the myth of White Argentina. Cultural productions and the mainstream media have fed that myth for a century. In recent decades (since the mid-1980s and the 1990s), however, community media outlets have drawn attention to racist practices against specific social groups, particularly Indigenous peoples, regional immigrants, and Black people. While working to forge ties with ancestors from the 19th century or even earlier, these alternative media outlets tend to overlook the 20th century entirely, as if to confirm how successfully Argentina rendered non-White people invisible during the nation’s modern history. Besides targeting minority groups, racism in modern Argentina was also directed at a large swath of the working class that embodies what shall be referred to here as negritud popular (low-class Blackness). What is the relationship between discrimination against specific groups, their responses to this discrimination, and a broader racism directed against working-class and popular sectors? Working through denial and drawing on appearance, Argentinian racism operates ambiguously and intersects with other forms of discrimination. By removing the racial dimension from racism, race could no longer be politicized, but “White” Argentines could still refuse to acknowledge others’ existence, shaping a racism through denial that is epitomized in the commonly heard “in Argentina there are no Blacks/Indians left.” Appearance proves key in this process: Although it alludes to the color of one’s skin and phenotype, it also encompasses a number of visible traits, such as clothing and accessories, gestures, and face and hair care, that, when taken together, convey a person’s social class and value. From this perspective, racism in Argentina targets two types of subjects (ethnic, national, and diasporic subjects, on the one hand, and negritud popular on the other), although certain individuals may fall into both categories. The spaces for racism in Argentina—and for combating racism—are difficult to locate with any precision.
Jose L. Bolívar Fresneda
Though World War II is part of the Caribbean’s popular imaginary and cultural production, World War II scholars have relegated the region to a footnote. It should not be so. From January 1942 to July 1943, 20 percent of all the allied shipping was sunk as a result of the one-sided naval battles that occurred there. German submarine warfare was sinking one oil tanker or merchant ship per day in Caribbean waters in the worst months of 1942. Nazi Germany’s aggressiveness in the Caribbean was strategic. In 1942 Aruba, Curaçao, and the Venezuelan oil fields and refineries provided roughly 95 percent of the oil required to sustain the East Coast of the United States—59 million gallons a day. The supply of bauxite from British Guiana and Surinam was crucial for the war effort. Moreover, control of the Caribbean meant control of the Panama Canal, which since 1914 had allowed the US Navy to control the eastern Pacific and the western Atlantic. The US Merchant Marine suffered heavy losses of ships and men, while the Allies struggled to contain the damage done to the supply of oil from Venezuela and airplane fuel from Curaçao to the United States. The United States invested billions in military installments on the British and American islands and transformed Puerto Rico into “the Gibraltar of the Caribbean.” Despite these investments Puerto Rico experienced food shortages because of German U-boat warfare in 1942, while Martinique suffered near famine in the aftermath of a British and American blockade induced by the Vichy government’s control of the Caribbean island.
Sadye L. M. Logan
Paul Chikahisa, MSW (1929–1996) was a pioneer in community advocacy and social service development for families and children. His life’s work also included social work education and practice as well as a commitment to the development of a prototype curriculum for social workers that reflected diversity, inclusion, and belonging.
Alexander B. Downes and Stephen Rangazas
Since the end of the Cold War, scholars have increasingly sought to explain the causes of civilian victimization—the intentional use of violence against noncombatants—during armed conflict. The question of the effects and effectiveness of violence against civilians, in contrast, has received less scholarly attention. One strand of research examines the impact of wartime civilian victimization on postconflict political behavior and outcomes. A second strand investigates the effectiveness of violence during the war itself. The principal question this literature asks is: Does civilian victimization “work”? Put more precisely, can intentionally targeting noncombatants help belligerents achieve their wartime objectives, whatever those might be? Civilian victimization takes different forms and serves different purposes in different kinds of conflicts; scholarship on its effectiveness is thus divided into work on irregular (predominantly intrastate) wars versus conventional (predominantly, but not exclusively, interstate) wars. No matter what its particular form or in which type of conflict it is used, however, civilian victimization tends to follow two broad logics: coercive and eliminationist. Most scholarship on irregular wars examines the effectiveness of coercive victimization, whereas studies of conventional war look at the efficacy of both. For example, a key debate in the literature on civilian victimization in irregular wars concerns whether selective or indiscriminate violence is more effective at deterring civilians from shifting their allegiances to the adversary. A broad consensus holds that violence is effective only when selective, but new studies have found that indiscriminate violence can also work under certain circumstances. Similarly, there is broad agreement (with some notable exceptions) in the literature on conventional war that coercive civilian victimization—which is almost by definition indiscriminate—is ineffective. In contrast, scholars have yet to assess systematically the effectiveness of eliminationist victimization in conventional war.
Anthony P. Morrison and Lisa J. Wood
Cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) is an evidence-based psychological therapy that has been shown to have small to medium effects in improving outcomes for people experiencing psychosis. CBT’s theoretical model, drawing together cognitive and behavioral theories, outlines that it is the appraisal and response to an event which maintains distress rather than the event itself. CBT for psychosis (CBTp) specifically aims to modify appraisals and responses to psychotic experiences in order to reduce distress. CBTp has a substantial evidence base and is the most frequently offered psychological treatment for psychosis. There have been significant advancements in the field, with process-oriented therapies and digital interventions showing promise; however, more large-scale trials are required. Moreover, service users report positive experiences with CBTp and value the normalizing therapeutic relationship, improved personal understanding, and acquisition of new coping strategies. Improving dissemination and adapting CBTp so that it is appropriate for all populations is an ongoing priority for future research. Moreover, the evidence base requires more user-centered research to ensure CBTp is meeting the needs of service users.
John P. Caughlin and Emily Gerlikovski
Conflict is a common experience in families. Although conflicts can be intense, most conflicts in families are about mundane issues such as housework, social life, schoolwork, or hygiene. Families’ negotiations over even such mundane topics, however, have important implications. Through conflicts with other family members, children typically first learn about managing difficulties with others, and the skills they learn in such conflicts are important to their social lives beyond their families. Yet poorly managed conflicts that become more intense or personal can undermine the well-being of families and family members. Family conflicts are extremely complex, and understanding them requires analysis at multiple levels, including examining the individual family members, dyads and larger groups within the family, and the sociocultural context in which families are embedded. At the individual level, family members’ conflict behaviors (e.g., exhibiting positive affect vs. negative affect), conflict skills (e.g., whether they are able to resolve problems), and cognitions (e.g., whether they make generous attributions about other family members' intent during disputes) all are important for understanding the impact of family conflicts. Examining conflict from the dyadic and polyadic levels recognizes that there are important features of conflict that are only apparent with a broader perspective. Dyadic and polyadic constructs include patterns of behavior, conflict outcomes that apply to all family members involved, and beliefs shared by family members. There are also particular types of relationships within families that have salient conflicts which have drawn considerable scholarly attention, such as parent–child or parent–adolescent conflicts, conflicts between siblings, marital conflicts, and conflicts between co-parents. In addition, families experience various transitions, and the life course of families influences conflict. Some key periods for conflict are the early years of marriage, the period of launching children and empty nest, and a family member navigating the end of life. Finally, family conflicts occur in a larger sociocultural context in which societal events and conditions affect family conflict. Such contextual factors include broad social structures (e.g., societal-level power dynamics between men and women), financial conditions, different co-cultural groups within a country, cross-cultural differences, and major events such as the COVID-19 pandemic that have direct effects on families and also elicit dramatic social responses that affect families. Despite the complexities, it is important to understand family conflict because of its implications for the health and well-being of families and family members.